Carmont (near Stonehaven) derailment - 12 August 2020

[Rockhopperr]

It’s very much secondary because if the debris wasn’t there nor the train (or if the train was running at a reduced speed and able to stop in time), there wouldn’t be any crash at all or the consequences substantially reduced. Reading the full report it is clear the RAIB make this casual analysis first. The fact the train was an old HST is a consequence which had a factor in events. Prevention is better than cure.

I say again, these features are primary factors in the fatalities and injuries sustained. Not in the cause of the accident.
Taken as a whole, the events immediately after the collision with the land slip would’ve been different without these glaring HST weakpoints.

 

[Bletchleyite]

ASLEF demanding withdrawal of HST fleet by next year.

This is ludicrous. I agree they should be replaced (for lots of reasons, not just this one) but something more realistic such as "an order must be placed in the next 6 months for replacement stock, or an agreement for stock to be moved from another TOC must be concluded within that time" would be a better thing to push for.

 

[cf111]

Voyagers, Meridians would be the obvious answer. Twenty years ahead in safety design.

Sorry Yorkie, hadn't got to your post when l responded.

I'd have been delighted to have something from the 22x family when the HSTs were chosen. Availability and costings probably put paid to that.

I like the HSTs and I would not think twice about travelling on one as we have all done for decades, but they are old, only getting older, and their introduction into squadron service in Scotland had been something of a joke.

The accident itself was not caused by the type of train, but the RAIB report strongly makes the point that if it had been a 220, for arguments sake and using a unit which runs on that as stretch of line, then the consequences of that accident would very likely (we can of course never be certain, as the RAIB correctly point out) have been less severe.

Network Rail will have to address the recommendations put to them but it would be remiss to say "well this sort of thing will never happen again so why bother going doing anything more?". We have a very safe railway in the UK and part of keeping things that way is that we should keep facing up to problems rather than choosing to ignore them. People get very defensive over some trains, this is an enthusiasts' fourm and it isn't a criticism of anyone personally, but maybe it's time to let the HSTs retire.

 

[mike57]

Train encounters landslip, has to turn back. Obviously no one was aware of the first landslip, or the train would not have set off in the first place, therefore permitting the train to return at line speed is a somewhat strange one, the criteria for 'Are conditions bad enough to trigger landslip' has already been met. I know there are other factors as well but it does seem strange.

 

[BRX]

Looking at images of the aftermath of the recent german crashes, where modern DMUs have collided head on, doesn't really suggest to me that a newer train type and cab design would significantly change the risk to a driver in a high speed collision. Nor do they suggest to me that passengers in the leading carriage would be in any way safe, or safer than passengers in the trailer of an HST immediately behind the loco.

 

[Horizon22]

I say again, these features are primary factors in the fatalities and injuries sustained. Not in the cause of the accident.
Taken as a whole, the events immediately after the collision with the land slip would’ve been different without these glaring HST weakpoints.

Whilst the RAIB agree (paragraph 535) that it is “more likely than not” that different stock would have had s better outcome, it’s unknown to what level that might have been and may have had other unintended consequences. Some other aspects (the lifeguards) would have made no material impact on the incident. Striking a bridge parapet at speed is also a catastrophic incident, no matter what design you’ve got.

In root cause analysis you always look at what could have prevented the incident ever taking place. The two aspects I mentioned previously are those. Without removing those, and just different rolling stock, it is probable this was still a fatal incident for the driver and possibly guard and the other passenger. If this was normally loaded, then yes the casualties in comparison would probably have been lower but that’s a lot of “what ifs”.

 

[GB]

The accident itself was not caused by the type of train, but the RAIB report strongly maks the point that if it had been a 220, for arguments sake and using a unit which runs on that as stretch of line, then the consequences of that accident would very likely (we can of course never be certain, as the RAIB correctly point out) have been less severe.

That is not what paragraph 487 alludes to...

The cab was subjected to severe impact conditions. The speed of impact was significantly beyond the collision speeds for which even modern cabs are designed to provide protection for occupants. For example, the cab ends of more modern trains (since around 2000) were designed to absorb energy and protect the driver in collisions with an identical train at a closing speed of up to 60 km/h (37 mph).53 Later train designs (since around 2010) were designed for a closing speed of up to 36 km/h54 (22 mph), in line with European Technical Specifications for Interoperability. These design collision speeds are equivalent to a single train colliding with an immovable object (or plane of symmetry) at half the design speed. The estimated speed of impact between the power car and the ground at Carmont (paragraph 484) was over twice the higher of the equivalent design speeds into an immovable object. Given the severity of the collision conditions, significant damage to this or any other cab’s structure was inevitable.

We can't prove or disprove the actual outcome of different stock but the RAIB suggests there would have been significant damage regardless.

 

[Deltic1961]

From a safety advancement perspective, would anyone feel comfortable driving from Aberdeen to Glasgow nowadays in a Vauxhall Victor or flying to NY in a 727?

Of course there's the whole nostalgia thing with the HSTs but technology has come on leaps and bounds since the 70s on cars, aircraft and trains.

 

[BRX]

From a safety advancement perspective, would anyone feel comfortable driving from Aberdeen to Glasgow nowadays in a Vauxhall Victor or flying to NY in a 727?

Of course there's the whole nostalgia thing with the HSTs but technology has come on leaps and bounds since the 70s on cars, aircraft and trains.

The difference in crashworthiness safety of an older/newer car is much more significant than that of an older/newer train, for the simple reason that you are much, much more likely to be involved in a car crash than in a train crash.

 

[tomuk]

From a safety advancement perspective, would anyone feel comfortable driving from Aberdeen to Glasgow nowadays in a Vauxhall Victor or flying to NY in a 727?

Of course there's the whole nostalgia thing with the HSTs but technology has come on leaps and bounds since the 70s on cars, aircraft and trains.

Pre Covid you could travel transatlantic on a 737 which is the same fuselage as a 727 and the earlier 707 so in fact you are incorrect technology hasn't moved on since the 1950s in the case of Boeing.

 

[DanNCL]

Looking at images of the aftermath of the recent german crashes, where modern DMUs have collided head on, doesn't really suggest to me that a newer train type and cab design would significantly change the risk to a driver in a high speed collision. Nor do they suggest to me that passengers in the leading carriage would be in any way safe, or safer than passengers in the trailer of an HST immediately behind the loco.

Modern cabs all have a crumple zone designed to protect the driver. The cab structure itself is steel/aluminium, effectively built like a tank, and hidden from sight by fibreglass panelling. The fibreglass panelling (which is all you normally see from the outside of the cab) is intended to come out badly damaged in a crash.

For example on an 800 (you could probably also use this example on all 125mph UK trains newer than the HST, even the 91s and Mark 3/4 DVTs), the fibreglass nose provides a buffer zone between the location of first impact in a head on collision and the structure of the cab itself. The fibreglass will take a lot of the impact, protecting the cab structure itself to an extent.

Of course the prospects for the driver in any cab during a crash like that are incredibly bleak, but with a modern cab would they likely would ‘only’ be severely injured as happened at Grayrigg, as opposed to dead.

 

[Bletchleyite]

Pre Covid you could travel transatlantic on a 737 which is the same fuselage as a 727 and the earlier 707 so in fact you are incorrect technology hasn't moved on since the 1950s in the case of Boeing.

Planes are different from trains, in that all safety measures are predicated on them not hitting each other, because it's effectively impossible (due to weight constraints and high speeds) to build one to withstand being hit by another one.

With rail we both look at "avoiding collisions" and "making them survivable if they happen". With cars we mostly just look at the latter.

== Doublepost prevention - post automatically merged: 10 Mar 2022 ==

Looking at images of the aftermath of the recent german crashes, where modern DMUs have collided head on, doesn't really suggest to me that a newer train type and cab design would significantly change the risk to a driver in a high speed collision. Nor do they suggest to me that passengers in the leading carriage would be in any way safe, or safer than passengers in the trailer of an HST immediately behind the loco.

The thing to bear in mind about German stock, particularly low-floor and even more so double-deck, is that it has a much larger cross-section than UK stock. Experiment with a piece of paper - with all else equal, a smaller tube is stronger for end-loading than a larger one.

With regard to LHCS, Germany still has lots of Mk1-like underframed stock in service - they didn't have a "safety bonfire" of it like we did.

 

[gimmea50anyday]

Pre Covid you could travel transatlantic on a 737 which is the same fuselage as a 727 and the earlier 707 so in fact you are incorrect technology hasn't moved on since the 1950s in the case of Boeing.

The age of the design of the 737 was a contributory factor to the requirement to introduce the MCAS software that caused the crashes and the subsequent grounding of the 737 MAX. The CFM Leap engines size required them to be installed further forward and higher up in to the wing compared to the CFM56 used on previous models and their distinctive tlat bottomed nacelles, and this shifted the centre of gravity causing the plane to pitch up. Rather than redesign the fuselage which Boeing should have done they cheated and introduced the MCAS software which made adjustments to the rear spoilers to counter the planes tendency to pitch up and neglected to tell alirlines and their pilots about it.

 

[68000]

The age of the design of the 737 was a contributory factor to the requirement to introduce the MCAS software that caused the crashes and the subsequent grounding of the 737 MAX. The CFM Leap engines size required them to be installed further forward and higher up in to the wing compared to the CFM56 used on previous models and their distinctive tlat bottomed nacelles, and this shifted the centre of gravity causing the plane to pitch up. Rather than redesign the fuselage which Boeing should have done they cheated and introduced the MCAS software which made adjustments to the rear spoilers to counter the planes tendency to pitch up and neglected to tell alirlines and their pilots about it.

and MCAS took it's input from only one sensor!

 

[Bletchleyite]

The age of the design of the 737 was a contributory factor to the requirement to introduce the MCAS software that caused the crashes and the subsequent grounding of the 737 MAX. The CFM Leap engines size required them to be installed further forward and higher up in to the wing compared to the CFM56 used on previous models and their distinctive tlat bottomed nacelles, and this shifted the centre of gravity causing the plane to pitch up. Rather than redesign the fuselage which Boeing should have done they cheated and introduced the MCAS software which made adjustments to the rear spoilers to counter the planes tendency to pitch up and neglected to tell alirlines and their pilots about it.

and MCAS took it's input from only one sensor!

MCAS would have been fine if...

1. It took input from more than one sensor
2. They bothered telling anyone about it

But yes, the 737 Max is an utter bodge of an aircraft, and suffers in terms of safety as a result.

 

[O L Leigh]

Comparisons between rail vehicles and other modes of transport is very much like comparing chalk and cheese, as are the comparative risks of collision. This is a specific incident in which a real train had an actual accident.

I can't really see that the option of installing further safety measures across the HST would rate higher than replacement with modern rolling stock in an ALARP assessment. They should be replaced with modern rolling stock in as short a time as reasonably practicable.

I don’t disagree. My point is that the boat had already sailed long ago. Opportunities existed to address these issues but they were not taken.

 

[YorkshireBear]

I still think the focus should be on all the other things. HSTs days should be numbered anyway for various reasons so I see no reason to remove them from service based on this report. Or are we also saying that we should no longer run any railtours on the off chance they hit a landslip?


It is important it was investigated, I just don't believe it justifys an immediate removal, the other things should all be worked on. Whatever unit you put in that situation there would have been deaths, and therefore the other causes need to be looked at in real detail.

 

[tomuk]

I think overall we are concentrating too much on the the crashworthiness aspect as the report says

The speed of impact was significantly beyond the collision speeds for which even modern cabs are designed to provide protection for occupants.

The more important areas are the poor control of the civil engineering and the operational control by Network Rail. It is easier to concentrate on something we are all familiar with ie HST rather than the more esoteric details of Construction Design and Management and Emergency Management.

 

[XAM2175]

It was touched on a fair bit in the report that the RAIB were unsure about whether a modern cab would have fared significantly better - although it is unlikely to have detached in such a dramatic and violent way, once hitting the bridge parapet it was going to be particularly destructive sadly.

Sometimes the collision force and closing speed is just too great to handle. Whilst HSTs should be phased out due to age anyway this is very much a secondary factor beyond the disastrously managed drainage works and the fact the train was still running at full speed.

Yes, I think the report is clear enough that at that speed there was sadly little chance of a good outcome for the driver, even if they'd been driving a train built to current standards.

Nevertheless the extreme nature of the damage sustained by the cab at Carmont is chilling, and I can't fault drivers for feeling some concern for their protection in lower-energy impacts.

I'm curious to see the results of the investigation into a high-speed derailment and subsequent collision with a stand of trees that involved an HST-derived vehicle in Australia in February 2020. Both occupants of the leading cab - the driver and a safeworking pilot - were killed, and I suspect that inadequate protection will be identified as a factor there as well.

Investigation: RO-2020-002 - Derailment of XPT ST23, Wallan, Victoria, on 20 February 2020

Modern cabs all have a crumple zone designed to protect the driver. The cab structure itself is steel/aluminium, effectively built like a tank, and hidden from sight by fibreglass panelling. The fibreglass panelling (which is all you normally see from the outside of the cab) is intended to come out badly damaged in a crash.

You're correct, but it must be noted here (as identified in the report) that even the most-modern cabs in service today are not designed to survive a collision at so high a speed. Certainly though a modern cab will better protect a driver against lower-speed collisions, and over-run by other vehicles in the train, but none of those protections would have saved the driver at Carmont given that he died of secondary impact. A three-point seatbelt might have, but even then that can't be said for certain as both its mounts and its pretensioner are liable to fail above a certain kinetic energy loading.

Nobody seemed to be able to find the relevant documentation for sign off, when the works were checked it wasn’t the full amount (because there were no “as-built” drawings) and there were a few missed opportunities to get this right;

I am deeply disturbed that NR's entire asset management program appears to rely wholly on the contractor supplying the as-built drawings, which is to say that the contractor effectively has to remind NR of the fact that the new asset even exists.

I think overall we are concentrating too much on the the crashworthiness aspect ... The more important areas are the poor control of the civil engineering and the operational control by Network Rail. It is easier to concentrate on something we are all familiar with ie HST rather than the more esoteric details of Construction Design and Management and Emergency Management.

This is a very pertinent observation. The track became obstructed entirely independently of any rolling stock, and I think the report is sufficiently clear to allow it to be said that even with a much a newer train instead of an HST the occurrence of a derailment cannot be ruled out.

 

[YorkshireBear]

I think overall we are concentrating too much on the the crashworthiness aspect as the report says

The more important areas are the poor control of the civil engineering and the operational control by Network Rail. It is easier to concentrate on something we are all familiar with ie HST rather than the more esoteric details of Construction Design and Management and Emergency Management.

Indeed.

It is important but it shouldn't be the focus, although i suspect many in the rail civil engineering industry won't comment extensively on the main matters.

 

[Peter Mugridge]

I am deeply disturbed that NR's entire asset management program appears to rely wholly on the contractor supplying the as-built drawings, which is to say that the contractor effectively has to remind NR of the fact that the new asset even exists.

As I understand things, NR has basically contracted out quite a large chunk of their back office admin functions and I cannot say that this is a good idea as it does result in a loss of oversight on even the most basic paperwork.

I'm not completely sure, but a bit of online digging suggests that Carillion used the exact same back office subcontractor and it is one which I have no confidence at all in.

 

[Crossover]

Area between the driving cab and engine compartment. Houses alternator, electrical equipment and various air and brake systems. Separated by bulkheads.

Thanks

This is ludicrous. I agree they should be replaced (for lots of reasons, not just this one) but something more realistic such as "an order must be placed in the next 6 months for replacement stock, or an agreement for stock to be moved from another TOC must be concluded within that time" would be a better thing to push for.

Agreed - being a cynic, it'll be done so noises can be made further down the line when the unrealistic requests aren't fulfilled (due to being so unrealisitic!)

 

[Ex-controller]

Because there was no known reason to instruct the driver to run at caution. There was no evidence or report of any landslips between Carmont and Stonehaven. Landslips can happen at any time, so really nothing will be completely safe unless trains always run at a reduced speed.

This is pure hindsight here, but I think we should be saying that if multiple land slips occur in the same area, that should be a known reason to caution until a train has confirmed the line clear.

But even that would be imperfect.

 

[LOL The Irony]

Having now had a chance to read the report, I'm amazed anyone survived in Coach D. This does seem like the death knell for the HSTs and Mk3 stock in general, possibly even all stock designed prior to 1994.

Have a look at the crash reconstruction video of the leading power car and then tell me if you still agree with your statement.

Does anyone have the link to this?
Nevermind, found it -

 

[swt_passenger]

Having now had a chance to read the report, I'm amazed anyone survived in Coach D. This does seem like the death knell for the HSTs and Mk3 stock in general, possibly even all stock designed prior to 1994.

Does anyone have the link to this?

It’s on the same RAIB web page as the reports, but you need to scroll right down. The link is in post #1056.

 

[Dieseldriver]

This is pure hindsight here, but I think we should be saying that if multiple land slips occur in the same area, that should be a known reason to caution until a train has confirmed the line clear.

But even that would be imperfect.

I think this is an important aspect of any opinions/replies to this event.

We all now possess ‘post Stonehaven hindsight’. Speaking as a Driver, this incident has reinforced certain risks into the forefront of my mind. In the future, in similar circumstances I will probably act in a different manner to the people involved in August 2020. However, prior to this incident, I think I would have acted in the same way as those involved.
Certain scenarios that can be encountered on the railway are prefixed with ‘remember what happened at so and so’.
From this point onwards, in extreme weather events I believe most Drivers and other operational staff will think ‘remember Stonehaven’….
That is a luxury not afforded to the Driver, Signaller and other staff involved on that dark day. It’s the same luxury not afforded to the Drivers and other staff involved in the running of an HST from Swansea to Paddington in 1997 and it’s the same luxury not afforded to staff involved in other incidents throughout the history of our railway.

Stonehaven could have involved any Driver/Signaller who happened to be in the wrong place at the wrong time. We must now use that hindsight going forward to remember the brutal lessons that this tragedy has provided us with and make sure that if anything positive can come of such a tragic and awful event, it is that our improved consciousness and understanding can mitigate against or even prevent such a horrific event in the future.

 

[adrock1976]

How I interpret the findings is that it seems the primary cause that led to the accident was inadequate drainage installed by a company that has gone into liquidation.

Somebody's signature is on the documents, and ideally, should face trail and be sent to jail. Although if this is deemed a corporate crime, it may be unlikely anyone will be sent to jail, basing this on a non railway corporate crime of Union Carbide who were responsible for the Bhopal disaster in 1984 as non of the big wigs were ever sent to jail for it.

A way forward maybe is for further detailed inspections of the existing drainage infrastructure so as to make sure it functions properly.

 

[158756]

Modern cabs all have a crumple zone designed to protect the driver. The cab structure itself is steel/aluminium, effectively built like a tank, and hidden from sight by fibreglass panelling. The fibreglass panelling (which is all you normally see from the outside of the cab) is intended to come out badly damaged in a crash.

For example on an 800 (you could probably also use this example on all 125mph UK trains newer than the HST, even the 91s and Mark 3/4 DVTs), the fibreglass nose provides a buffer zone between the location of first impact in a head on collision and the structure of the cab itself. The fibreglass will take a lot of the impact, protecting the cab structure itself to an extent.

Of course the prospects for the driver in any cab during a crash like that are incredibly bleak, but with a modern cab would they likely would ‘only’ be severely injured as happened at Grayrigg, as opposed to dead.

The cab is getting a lot of attention here, understandably given the dramatic outcome in this crash, but unfortunately I don't think the chances of a driver surviving an impact like that are great in any train.

What I find more concerning are the broken couplers and the lack of anti-climb and bogie retention features. If there had been more passengers on board these factors could have contributed to a much larger number of deaths. The RAIB report references standards on these dating from 1994 - how many trains built prior to that date have the same issues. Do we need an immediate stop of all 15x and Mk-3 derived EMUs?

 

[LOL The Irony]

Do we need an immediate stop of all 15x and Mk-3 derived EMUs?

I don't think there will be much action taken on that front, most Mk3 based stock are on their way out anyways. I do think that there will be a greater push to get rid of pre-94 stock though.

 

[thejuggler]

I think overall we are concentrating too much on the the crashworthiness aspect as the report says

The more important areas are the poor control of the civil engineering and the operational control by Network Rail. It is easier to concentrate on something we are all familiar with ie HST rather than the more esoteric details of Construction Design and Management and Emergency Management.

Agreed. The issue with any construction is it needs far more than one person to check and sign off work has been done to spec and design as anything hidden will generally take years to be found. It also needs someone who can happily tell contractors to rip it up and start again. Sometimes finding it is chance, sometimes its as a result of a tragedy.

Some examples I have come across.

A five story Yorkshire stone facing wall affixed to the original building using door frame fixings and 25mm number 8 screws at half the centres they should have been rather than the specified fixing. movement noticed about 15 years after construction, engineers coukdn't believe the wall hadn't been blown off.

Blocked road gullies, water not draining, washing away road edges. Camera inspection showed at some point a utility company had laid services and in doing so had to disconnect the road drainage to make room and then reroute the road drainage. It never got reconnected.

A building built in the 1970s with a ground anchor system for a complex roof. Building now being demolished. The anchors were grouted in to the concrete, but the anchors were still wrapped in plastic so the grout wasn't doing anything.

Grenfell Tower is probably one of the greatest examples of how badly it can go wrong when somebody asks anybody to do something and what happens is nobody does it.