Breckland Line

[Tomnick]

Yes, I'll accept that OD removes the opportunity for human error - in the short term, I'm not convinced that that outweighs the risk from almost routinely talking past some signals at danger, but it'll hopefully prove to be a decent system before too long.

 

[w0033944]

Unfortunately the MkI human eyeball is fallible, particularly when linked to the MkI human brain. In my time looking after a large number of signal boxes I would have a signaller trapping a pedestrian inside closed barriers and crossing clear given about once a month. Never intentionally, and there were usually mitigating circumstances, but it happened nevertheless. I'm not aware of an MCB-OD ever doing this.

Similarly (and just on the Breckland line) there were two examples in two recent years of signallers having gates open in front of approaching trains, in both cases causing the unplanned removal of said gates (shortly followed by a tea no biscuits conversation).

There is no doubt that MCB-OD are at least as safe as MCB / CCTV, otherwise they would have not got through the exhaustive approval process.

You place an awful lot of trust in the process; can we be sure that all such introductions have been well-planned, or is there room for someone high-up within NR putting pressure on those performing the H&S role to get "the right result"?

 

[Baxenden Bank]

Unfortunately the MkI human eyeball is fallible, particularly when linked to the MkI human brain. In my time looking after a large number of signal boxes I would have a signaller trapping a pedestrian inside closed barriers and crossing clear given about once a month. Never intentionally, and there were usually mitigating circumstances, but it happened nevertheless. I'm not aware of an MCB-OD ever doing this.

Similarly (and just on the Breckland line) there were two examples in two recent years of signallers having gates open in front of approaching trains, in both cases causing the unplanned removal of said gates (shortly followed by a tea no biscuits conversation).

There is no doubt that MCB-OD are at least as safe as MCB / CCTV, otherwise they would have not got through the exhaustive approval process.

Thanks for the responses, all very interesting, now I know a little more.

The mitigating circumstances presumably including not having enough time to properly scan the CCTV what with all the other tasks - basically a management failure to be covered up, rather than a signalman failure!

The mk1 human eyeball is a fantastic piece of kit but it needs time to properly look at things and similarly for the mk1 human brain to interpret what it is being told.

I don't mean that in any form of personal criticism - given your role overseeing boxes, its just that managers (or usually the accountants sat in a cosy office) always want more work for less cost and never offer less for more!

 

[Bald Rick]

You place an awful lot of trust in the process; can we be sure that all such introductions have been well-planned, or is there room for someone high-up within NR putting pressure on those performing the H&S role to get "the right result"?

Well I didn't see any pressure from up high; bear in mind those approving the product's operational safety will be those who have to stand in the dock to explain themselves to the man in the funny wig if it goes wrong, so are rather thorough.

Also ORR (safety side) were very supportive, in writing, of the principles. I don't think it credible that the technology would have been approved had they had any concerns.
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Thanks for the responses, all very interesting, now I know a little more.

The mitigating circumstances presumably including not having enough time to properly scan the CCTV what with all the other tasks - basically a management failure to be covered up, rather than a signalman failure!

The mk1 human eyeball is a fantastic piece of kit but it needs time to properly look at things and similarly for the mk1 human brain to interpret what it is being told.

I don't mean that in any form of personal criticism - given your role overseeing boxes, its just that managers (or usually the accountants sat in a cosy office) always want more work for less cost and never offer less for more!

Without going into individual cases, the mitigating circumstances were usually related to the individual pedestrians concerned 'hiding' themselves in blind spots (and then appearing) or CCTV picture quality, often caused by external effects such as very particular sun angles. Ie in such cases the signaller simply could not see the person trapped. It had nothing to do time available to scan the crossing. Trust me, with the paperwork involved in investigating and reporting such an incodent, the last thing any manager wants is for siggys to skimp on the job.

Interesting to note that the incidents where siggys didn't have mitigating circs were more often than not at crossings directly outside the box.