Can you imagine trying to run those calculations back in the 60s?
Today, you'd grab the passenger data and costs then run a quick pivot table in excel.
sorted.
Back then...
An army of clerks and Comptometers.
I can't believe no one has mentioned Woodhead . I know it wasn't Beeching, so this comes under the 'and beyond' bit.
I see that no-one has mentioned the M & GN? Yet another cross-country route that was lost; though i doubt the practicality of the route would make it a cost effective re-opening.
It isn't closed, it is out of use, there is a difference and it is still in the sectional appendix.
I agree that minimum-cost operating methods weren't really considered, as things like Paytrains and bus shelter stations only really came in later on those lines that were still running. These could have made a difference on some lines but I think others were real no-hopers, including several named on this thread! .
Beeching ended the passenger service via Woodhead, which left it ripe for closure under Maggie though... The Leeds 'new' line as mentioned earlier would be useful and possibly very busy now, as would the Holmfirth branch. That's another one that won't sadly ever see trains again- perhaps if alignments had been protected many of the short-sighted closures would already have been reversed, and no-one would even remember the name of Dr. Richard Beeching...
Not sure I agree with your assessment.
It was inevitable one of the Sheffield - Manchester routes would lose its passenger service - the question is which.
Initially the Hope Valley line was to be closed, but since it served more settlements en-route, BR were obliged to retain it, hence Woodhead lost its passenger service.
However the closure of Woodhead in 1981 was purely a BR initiative, not unlike the Stratford - Honeybourne route and several others. Whilst it is true the electrification infrastructure was life expired, BR could have retained the line as a diesel only route. It chose not to. You can't blame Beeching for decisions which BR management took almost 20 years later - Beeching made recommendations which on the whole were sensible and practical at the time and it should be remembered that most of the closures actually took place after Labour took power in 1964 - yet they'd campaigned to reverse many of Beeching's proposals......
Not sure I agree with your assessment.
It was inevitable one of the Sheffield - Manchester routes would lose its passenger service - the question is which.
Initially the Hope Valley line was to be closed, but since it served more settlements en-route, BR were obliged to retain it, hence Woodhead lost its passenger service.
However the closure of Woodhead in 1981 was purely a BR initiative, not unlike the Stratford - Honeybourne route and several others. Whilst it is true the electrification infrastructure was life expired, BR could have retained the line as a diesel only route. It chose not to. You can't blame Beeching for decisions which BR management took almost 20 years later - Beeching made recommendations which on the whole were sensible and practical at the time and it should be remembered that most of the closures actually took place after Labour took power in 1964 - yet they'd campaigned to reverse many of Beeching's proposals......
That is the largest flaw in the way the "Beeching Closures" were handled, IMO. There is no doubt that many rail routes were hopelessly uneconomic. Yet the places served would have been served just about as well using buses operated by the Railway at a fraction of the cost. Sadly, the best that was provided was a short-term subsidy for buses operated wholly separately by bus companies (many of which were, of course, nationalised businesses at the time); services which themselves demised five years later when subsidies ran out and their separate nature meant nobody used them.Where bus replacement took place (rightly or wrongly) it was badly done. Maybe it would have worked if properly integrated with the remaining train service......
....and an agenda; a conclusion that had already been largely made and simply had to be justified.Back then...An army of clerks and Comptometers.
AHBs wouldn't have made the slightest bit of difference - the level crossing in the middle of Sheringham would never have been suitable for conversion, and in any case there were plenty. I don't think there'd ever have been justification for retaining the line to Holt - it'd have required a third unit to maintain a roughly hourly service, and the long single line from Cromer to Holt would be a serious constraint on the timetable (unless a crossing loop - two signal boxes or some resignalling - was retained at Sheringham too). Once the decision's been made to cut back the service to Sheringham, there'd have been no sense in keeping (and modifying, to allow the closure of the controlling signal box?) the level crossing just to access the terminus immediately beyond it.One reason why there are now two stations in Sherringham because of the busy road between both sites, this meant the line to Holt had to close, should we of had AHB back then GA would still be running trains there, having said that though the building at the original station in Sherringham might be in a bad shape
That is the largest flaw in the way the "Beeching Closures" were handled, IMO. There is no doubt that may rail routes were hopelessly uneconomic. Yet the places served would have been served just about as well using buses operated by the Railway at a fraction of the cost. Sadly, the best that was provided was a short-term subsidy for buses operated wholly separately by bus companies (many of which were, of course, nationalised businesses at the time); services which themselves demised five years later when subsidies ran out and their separate nature meant nobody used them.
Fair point. It's all pie in the sky thinking now, but perhaps the solution would've been to use Woodhead for expresses and Hope Valley for locals? Seeing as even under Beeching both ended up being retained initially. Beeching turned out to have been short sighted of course, but the real villain of the period was Marples.
AHBs wouldn't have made the slightest bit of difference - the level crossing in the middle of Sheringham would never have been suitable for conversion, and in any case there were plenty.
This! Belching was simply brought in to carry out the agenda of Marples and the road lobby. That's why closures were pursued even for lines with a marginal case for closure where costs could have been reduced and closure avoided.
Penarth - Cadoxton. Here was an example of a route deliberately set up for closure by slapping a pair of buffer stops in the middle of Penarth Town station to destroy it as a through route. From then on services were operated between Cadoxton and Penarth at inconvenient times and serving no one in particular. Even at that time, it was obvious that Sully was growing from a small village to prime commuter land. It was an alternative route between Barry and Cardiff and should have been developed, with the re-opening of Lower Penarth station and Sully would have been an even more attractive dormitory. Second generation DMUs would have made mincemeat of the existing schedule and could probably have achieved similar timings to the route via Dinas Powys. It was only a mile and a half longer.
Balls - the problem was BR had consumed huge amounts of money for its Modernisation Plan yet revenues were plummeting. Put simply the country couldn't afford to keep the rail network at the level it was and BR had wasted the opportunity it had been given.
If it hadn't been Marples and Beeching, then it would have been somebody else making the same decisions.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Beeching_cuts
"The 1955 Modernisation Plan promised expenditure of over £1,240 million; steam locomotives would be replaced with diesel and electric locomotives, traffic levels would increase and the system was predicted to be back in profit by 1962.[5] Instead losses mounted, from £68 million in 1960 to £87 million in 1961, and £104 million in 1962.[6][7] The BTC could no longer pay the interest on its loans. The government lost patience and looked for radical solutions."
"Beeching first studied traffic flows on all lines to identify 'the good, the bad, and the indifferent'.[note 5] His analysis showed that the least-used 1,762 stations had annual passenger receipts of less than £2,500 each (£48.7 thousand as of 2013[7]), that over half of the 4,300 stations open to passengers in 1960 had receipts of less than £10,000,[note 6] that the least-used 50% of stations contributed only 2% of passenger revenue[note 7] and that one third of route miles carried just 1% of passengers.[note 8]"
I seem to recall (perhaps from Ian Hislop's TV programme?), a good summary of the situation:
1/3 of lines closed should never have been built
1/3 of lines closed probably were right for closure
1/3 of lines closed probably should have been kept.
Balls - the problem was BR had consumed huge amounts of money for its Modernisation Plan yet revenues were plummeting. Put simply the country couldn't afford to keep the rail network at the level it was and BR had wasted the opportunity it had been given.
If it hadn't been Marples and Beeching, then it would have been somebody else making the same decisions.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Beeching_cuts
"The 1955 Modernisation Plan promised expenditure of over £1,240 million; steam locomotives would be replaced with diesel and electric locomotives, traffic levels would increase and the system was predicted to be back in profit by 1962.[5] Instead losses mounted, from £68 million in 1960 to £87 million in 1961, and £104 million in 1962.[6][7] The BTC could no longer pay the interest on its loans. The government lost patience and looked for radical solutions."
"Beeching first studied traffic flows on all lines to identify 'the good, the bad, and the indifferent'.[note 5] His analysis showed that the least-used 1,762 stations had annual passenger receipts of less than £2,500 each (£48.7 thousand as of 2013[7]), that over half of the 4,300 stations open to passengers in 1960 had receipts of less than £10,000,[note 6] that the least-used 50% of stations contributed only 2% of passenger revenue[note 7] and that one third of route miles carried just 1% of passengers.[note 8]"
The same could be said of many coastal locations. Barnstaple - Ilfracome is just a few miles, yet in the summer it is absolutely choked with traffic.I'd suggest Barnstaple - Ilfracombe, which although recommended for closure by Beeching, actually survived till 1970. Given the sparseness of rail links in North Devon, an Exeter-Barnstaple-Ilfracombe stopping service supplemented by holiday trains from London and Birmingham would be well-patronised these days.
You'll spoil all of the conspiracy theory stuff with these facts...![]()
There is enough within the report itself to condemn Dr Beeching.
I'd suggest a comparison between the Swaffham - Dereham case study and that for the York - Beverley route for a contrast between a route which probably should have closed and one which should have been rationalised. The delay in building stations for newtowns such as Milton Keynes was another symptom of a lack of vision. As I say, a one trick pony.
The other issue that affected the railways then and afterwards was that a criteria of "hardship" alone was clearly inadequate to assess the strategic value of a passenger route to the local economy and society as a whole. This is specifically the fault of Governments rather than the Doctor.
I'd suggest Tunbridge Wells - Eridge - Uckfield - Lewes.
Passengers from places like Maidstone or Canterbury would benefit from travelling to Tonbridge then changing.
The same could be said of many coastal locations. Barnstaple - Ilfracome is just a few miles, yet in the summer it is absolutely choked with traffic.
The Bodmin to Padstow line and Lostwithiel - Fowey line would likely now have as strong a business case as the Falmouth, Looe or St. Ives branches enjoy.
Meldon Quarry to Bere Alston was another short-sighted closure which effectively made two dead-ends.
Given the limitations the good Doctor was working to - namely limited time to draw up a strategy, relatively unsophisticated survey methods etc, I think most of the supposed 'errors' aren't unreasonable and with more sophisticated survey and analysis methods now, you could come to a different conclusion.
You can't really blame the lack of stations at places like MK or Telford on the Beeching though - MK started being built in 1967, two years after Beeching went back to ICI, yet MKC station wasn't built until 1982 despite the fact it was on a major route - that is poor management from BR, nothing else. Exactly the same is true of Telford.
York - Beverley is one, of a number of routes, which always get raised. The issue I have with that one is it's not serving anywhere significant en-route. Beverley retained it's rail links to Hull from where access to York and beyond was easy. OK, the journey time is longer than a direct route would have been, but the connection remains.
But you have to 'value' these things on something. There is, and always has, only ever been finite resources available for anything governments do. To have retained more of the routes would have meant effectively giving massive subsidies to certain areas - at the expense of someone or something else.