BBC - Signalman guilty over crossing death

[Daniel]

Signalman guilty over Herefordshire crossing death

Network Rail and a signalman have been found guilty of failing to ensure the safety of a woman who was killed at a level crossing.

Jane Harding, 52, died when the car she was in was hit by a train at Moreton-on-Lugg, Herefordshire, in 2010.

Birmingham Crown Court heard safety barriers had been raised before the collision on 16 January.

Network Rail and 43-year-old Maund are due to be sentenced at the same court on 10 April.

Both had denied breaching health and safety regulations.

During the two-week trial, the prosecution told the court that Maund from Caswell Crescent, Leominster, Herefordshire, had put down the barriers as normal for a passing train.

Moments later, the jury heard the 43-year-old "got himself into a dither" when a farmer rang his signal-box for a second time asking if it was safe to walk his sheep over another crossing further up the track.

As he did not want the farmer to wait any longer, prosecutor Philip Mott QC said Maund had "panicked" and lifted the barriers, but failed to see the Manchester Piccadilly to Milford Haven train approaching around a bend.

Jurors were told the crash caused the car, which was being driven by Mrs Harding's husband Mark, to flip over.

She later died in hospital, while her husband suffered pelvic and shoulder injuries.

The Arriva Trains Wales service also hit another car being driven in the opposite direction, although the two passengers escaped with minor injuries.

Mr Mott told the court although it may be a case of "human error", Maund's former employer Network Rail was equally culpable for Mrs Harding's death because it had not fitted an automatic-locking device at the Moreton-on-Lugg crossing as part of improvement works there.

He said: "Network Rail took the decision not to install this device because it would cost £40,000. That device could have saved a life."

The court heard the company decided not to install the safety device as part of a £1.2m project at Moreton-on-Lugg three months before the crash.

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-hereford-worcester-21503798


A stark reminder of how a simple mistake can have grave consequences...

 

[thelem]

Network Rail took the decision not to install this device because it would cost £40,000. That device could have saved a life.

Isn't hindsight a wonderful thing? Obviously in this case it would have been the right thing to do, but how many other places were similar devices not installed where there haven't been any accidents?

 

[RPM]

I have to say as a driver I was shocked to find out that it was possible for a signaller to raise the barriers in front of an approaching train. I had always assumed there must be some locking/interlocking device to prevent this. I still can't quite believe this is not the case in the 21st century, especially within an industry that is sometimes prepared to spend vast sums of money on very marginal safety improvements.

I feel very sorry for the signaller in question. He was let down by the system. I have heard both official and anecdotal evidence that signaller's workload issues are a growing safety concern. Responsibility for this tragedy cannot be allowed to fall entirely on the shoulders of one man.

 

[rebmcr]

I have to say as a driver I was shocked to find out that it was possible for a signaller to raise the barriers in front of an approaching train. I had always assumed there must be some locking/interlocking device to prevent this. I still can't quite believe this is not the case in the 21st century, especially within an industry that is sometimes prepared to spend vast sums of money on very marginal safety improvements.

I feel very sorry for the signaller in question. He was let down by the system. I have heard both official and anecdotal evidence that signaller's workload issues are a growing safety concern. Responsibility for this tragedy cannot be allowed to fall entirely on the shoulders of one man.

It would be interesting to find out whether the farmer also had some amount of liability, for repeatedly pestering an individual whom he should have a reasonable expectation to be in a safety-critical role.

 

[NSEFAN]

I have to say as a driver I was shocked to find out that it was possible for a signaller to raise the barriers in front of an approaching train. I had always assumed there must be some locking/interlocking device to prevent this. I still can't quite believe this is not the case in the 21st century, especially within an industry that is sometimes prepared to spend vast sums of money on very marginal safety improvements.

I too was quite surprised at this. I previously thought that all automatic barriers had interlocking where there is a signal protecting the crossing. It seems bizarre that it wasn't installed when the crossing had its manual gates replaced all those years ago.

 

[soil]

It would be interesting to find out whether the farmer also had some amount of liability, for repeatedly pestering an individual whom he should have a reasonable expectation to be in a safety-critical role.

The farmer is unlikely to be aware that the signalman had the power to raise a crossing in front of an oncoming train.

 

[Smethwickian]

Don't know whether the interlocking was actually considered for this site. The Hereford Times of January 14 reported: "David Jones, principal level crossing engineer for NR, told the court that the crossing at Moreton was not mentioned during a meeting in 2007 with the Office of Rail Regulation when discussing which ones should be improved. He added that installing an approach locking system there was not discussed at the meeting. The court heard at the time Mr Jones was in charge of a specialist team looking to develop new technology and improve level crossings. He said that this included developing obstacle detection technology that would prevent trains travelling over a level crossing if an obstacle was present."

http://www.herefordtimes.com/news/10247274.Jury_considers_verdict_in_level_crossing_trial/

http://www.herefordtimes.com/news/1...ial__Signalman_apologies_for_his_fatal_error/

http://www.herefordtimes.com/news/1...at_locking_device_would_have_prevented_death/

 

[merlodlliw]

It would be interesting to find out whether the farmer also had some amount of liability, for repeatedly pestering an individual whom he should have a reasonable expectation to be in a safety-critical role.

The farmer did the correct thing he followed procedure in my opinion ,rang the keeper again to see if it was safe to cross,I don't follow your" Repeatedly pestering an individual" comment.

 

[asylumxl]

I'm inclined to agree that the system has failed the signaller. While my sympathies are with the bereaved, it's becoming increasing obvious that many signallers are being put under too much pressure by their employers.

There was a report published by the RAIB regarding a near miss at Ufton I believe, and it echoed exactly the same sentiment.

It's just typical of Britain though. Treat the symptoms and not the cause, as always.

 

[341o2]

I have to say as a driver I was shocked to find out that it was possible for a signaller to raise the barriers in front of an approaching train. I had always assumed there must be some locking/interlocking device to prevent this. I still can't quite believe this is not the case in the 21st century, especially within an industry that is sometimes prepared to spend vast sums of money on very marginal safety improvements.

I feel very sorry for the signaller in question. He was let down by the system. I have heard both official and anecdotal evidence that signaller's workload issues are a growing safety concern. Responsibility for this tragedy cannot be allowed to fall entirely on the shoulders of one man.

Fully agree with this. I likewise thought gates are interlocked with signalling going back to the days of a physical prescence pulling levers

 

[sheff1]

Isn't hindsight a wonderful thing? Obviously in this case it would have been the right thing to do, but how many other places were similar devices not installed where there haven't been any accidents?

According to an article published shortly after the incident, pre existing Group Standards meant protection should have been fitted as a matter of course when work was undertaken there.

 

[Tomnick]

Fully agree with this. I likewise thought gates are interlocked with signalling going back to the days of a physical prescence pulling levers

A common source of confusion - interlocking between signals and the barriers was provided at Moreton-on-Lugg, and indeed is a basic principle of interlocking going back many years. That would have prevented the barriers being raised with any of the protecting signals cleared. What wasn't provided was approach locking, without which the barriers were able to be raised (immediately) after the protecting signal had been replaced to Danger, but with a train approaching at speed that wasn't able to stop in time (approach locking would have prevented the barriers being raised until either the train had been proved to have passed clear or sufficient time had elapsed for it to have come to a stand).

 

[Zoidberg]

It would be interesting to find out whether the farmer also had some amount of liability, for repeatedly pestering an individual whom he should have a reasonable expectation to be in a safety-critical role.

The farmer is unlikely to be aware that the signalman had the power to raise a crossing in front of an oncoming train.

Yes, and the farmer's awareness of the signaller's duties is irrelevant, I think. He's just making a phone call.

The farmer did the correct thing he followed procedure in my opinion ,rang the keeper again to see if it was safe to cross,I don't follow your" Repeatedly pestering an individual" comment.

Indeed. It's part of the signaller's role to deal with telephone calls and there is no evidence in the report of "repeatedly pestering ..."

But I really do feel sorry for the signaller. He made a mistake but was not supported by the technology available to mitigate against the outcomes of such a mistake.

The RAIB report is here - http://www.raib.gov.uk/cms_resources/110228_R042011v2_Moreton_on_Lugg.pdf - if anyone's interested.

 

[marlane]

I am sister to the signalman.
I just found out about the verdict, I live in the USA Pacific time.
We are hoping that Adrian will not go to prison for two years.
We have to wait until April the 10th to find out the sentence.
In response to the remarks about the farmer and the phone calls.
The farmer was IRATE on the phone.
How could my brother have made a trained calculated response as reported when he made a mistake and he did not have time to think. I am just hoping that the sentence reflects this.
Adrian has already been left without an income and his name and where he lives have been made public. My mother who is elderly is taken care of by him.
I am sorry but I think that Network Rail are totally at fault, but there is nothing that I can do except express my opinion.

 

[thelem]

According to an article published shortly after the incident, pre existing Group Standards meant protection should have been fitted as a matter of course when work was undertaken there.

If that's the case then I withdraw my earlier statement. It seems strange that the prosecution would bring up the cost of the equipment though, when they could have said Network Rail weren't following Group Standards.

 

[rebmcr]

In response to the remarks about the farmer and the phone calls.
The farmer was IRATE on the phone.

That's what I inferred from its presence in, and the language used, in the report.

Hopefully the sentence isn't harsh, it sounds like a nightmare situation with all sorts of conflicting viewpoints/arguments.

 

[Tomnick]

I am sister to the signalman.
I just found out about the verdict, I live in the USA Pacific time.
We are hoping that Adrian will not go to prison for two years.
We have to wait until April the 10th to find out the sentence.
In response to the remarks about the farmer and the phone calls.
The farmer was IRATE on the phone.
How could my brother have made a trained calculated response as reported when he made a mistake and he did not have time to think. I am just hoping that the sentence reflects this.
Adrian has already been left without an income and his name and where he lives have been made public. My mother who is elderly is taken care of by him.
I am sorry but I think that Network Rail are totally at fault, but there is nothing that I can do except express my opinion.

My sympathies are with Adrian and your family. I've seen no suggestion of anything other than a momentary lapse - certainly not so much of a hint of improper working which is all too often present in such cases. As a Signalman in a broadly similar sort of location, albeit over the other side of the country, it's rather close to home - we all go to work every day to carry out our duties conscientiously and in accordance with the Rules & Regulations, and it's well worth taking a moment to consider that any one of us could find ourselves in a similar unfortunate situation at the drop of a hat. Nobody's perfect (there'd be no need for interlocking at all otherwise!), and I do feel that the lack of approach locking rather let him down!

 

[marlane]

I am grateful to the general mood of sympathy here at this forum. Adrian is going to stay with relatives for a while to stay out of the public eye. Hopefully the judge will be understanding and lenient

 

[6Gman]

I am grateful to the general mood of sympathy here at this forum. Adrian is going to stay with relatives for a while to stay out of the public eye. Hopefully the judge will be understanding and lenient

Having read the RAIB report this was clearly a momentary slip which any of us could so easily have made. Perhaps Marlane, you could let Adrian know that many of us sympathise and understand the horror of what he is suffering.

 

[marlane]

Thanks so much !! yes I will pass along the message. It means a lot that there is understanding.

 

[MCW]

I just want to echo the sympathies from the other members here as well. I Quite understand how such a situation can be very difficult for a family and the person themselves, to deal with.

 

[sheff1]

If that's the case then I withdraw my earlier statement. It seems strange that the prosecution would bring up the cost of the equipment though, when they could have said Network Rail weren't following Group Standards.

I agree it does seem strange. If I remember correctly, a follow up article by Alan Williams appeared in Modern Railways, after the RAIB report was issued, in which he challenged some of the statements in para 41 et seq. Now the court verdict has been reached I would not be surprised to see another follow up article.

 

[Flamingo]

Thanks so much !! yes I will pass along the message. It means a lot that there is understanding.

Pass on my best wishes to him as well.

What a horrible situation for everybody connected to the incident, two families placed in impossible situations.

Take care.

 

[swj99]

According to the RAIB report (dated April 2011), there are 54 MCB type level crossings without approach locking, or with only partial protection.

Does anyone know if the recommendations made by RAIB in the report been implemented yet ?

I feel very sorry for the signaller in question. He was let down by the system...............Responsibility for this tragedy cannot be allowed to fall entirely on the shoulders of one man.

Have to agree there.

It would be interesting to find out whether the farmer also had some amount of liability, for repeatedly pestering an individual whom he should have a reasonable expectation to be in a safety-critical role.

I guess it would be unlikely, and I’m not aware of a prosecution or civil claim against him, although like you, I’d be interested to hear if there were or are any claims.

I am sister to the signalman.
I just found out about the verdict, I live in the USA Pacific time.
We are hoping that Adrian will not go to prison for two years.
We have to wait until April the 10th to find out the sentence.
In response to the remarks about the farmer and the phone calls.
The farmer was IRATE on the phone.
How could my brother have made a trained calculated response as reported when he made a mistake and he did not have time to think. I am just hoping that the sentence reflects this…………

My sympathies go to all the people involved in this, including the family of the deceased, Jane Harding, the signaller, and anyone else affected by what happened.
To my mind, it would seem a great shame if the signaller was to be given a custodial sentence. It probably wouldn't serve any useful purpose or be in the public interest.

I think there is a significant difference between the actions of the signaller, and the acts or omissions of Network Rail. For the signaller, it would appear to be a momentary lapse of concentration, whereas for Network Rail, this accident could be said to have been an accident ‘waiting to happen’, in that it could very well have been prevented if NR had provided Approach Locking. It sounds like the signaller, under a great deal of pressure, made an honest mistake, whereas NR had previous opportunities over many years to put safeguards in place which would have prevented such an accident from happening at all. Network Rail made a decision not to install approach locking, but all the signaller has done is made a single mistake as a result of what the RAIB report explains as the signaller “failing to re-orientate to the original task of monitoring the passage of train 1V75 after being interrupted by a telephone call, and then, mistakenly thinking that the train had passed over the crossing”.

I can’t help feeling that the signaller is, to some extent, also a victim of very unfortunate circumstances that arose that day.

I believe there are many mitigating factors in favour of the most lenient sentence possible for the signaller in this case.

 

[martybabes]

It would be interesting to find out whether the farmer also had some amount of liability, for repeatedly pestering an individual whom he should have a reasonable expectation to be in a safety-critical role.

Tosh, utter tosh. Let's knock this on the head right now. The farmer has absolutely no liability in relation to the criminal charges brought against each defendant.

Whether it can be proved in any subsequent civil claim that he, the farmer, had any influence over the actions taken (or the absence of any action that should have been taken) will be very interesting, if only to establish whether he owed anyone a duty of care (and how remote a person can be and still be subject to a duty of care).

 

[RPM]

Thanks so much !! yes I will pass along the message. It means a lot that there is understanding.

Here's hoping for a sensibly lenient sentence. A custodial term would achieve absolutely nothing in my opinion.
Lots of us in the railway "family" feel angry about this verdict and desparately sorry for Adrian. I'd be very grateful if you could pass on my best wishes to him too.

 

[khib70]

Here's hoping for a sensibly lenient sentence. A custodial term would achieve absolutely nothing in my opinion.
Lots of us in the railway "family" feel angry about this verdict and desparately sorry for Adrian. I'd be very grateful if you could pass on my best wishes to him too.

You're absolutely right about the sentence. No purpose would be served by further punishing the signaller. As a non-railwayman, I feel desperately sorry for him and hope he can come to terms with it all. A custodial sentence would simply increase his pain and suffering to no useful end.

But why would you "feel angry" about the verdict? Surely it's the only verdict that could be arrived at under the circumstances. As the RAIB report clearly points out, though, there are a very large number of mitigating circumstances in the case of the signaller which I very much hope the sentencing judge takes into consideration.

And I hope they throw the book at NWR.....

 

[RPM]

But why would you "feel angry" about the verdict? Surely it's the only verdict that could be arrived at under the circumstances. As the RAIB report clearly points out, though, there are a very large number of mitigating circumstances in the case of the signaller which I very much hope the sentencing judge takes into consideration.

And I hope they throw the book at NWR.....

Simply because I believe this tragedy was completely down to Network Rail's staggering failure to fit approach locking to the crossing. This was a classic "accident waiting to happen" because the system was seriously flawed. It was only a matter of time before a signaller became sufficiently over-workoaded to make a split second mistake. This should have been a danger apparent to any signalling engineer, manager or safety auditor. It is not a small shortcoming of the system, it is a massive and obvious one. I find it incredible that we spend so much time in this industry dabating the minutuae of safety systems any yet until it ended in tragedy, this great elephant in the room had been missed or ignored by everyone at NR.

Please don't run away with the idea that I'm the type of railwayman who thinks front line staff can never be at fault and it is all down to the management. I take a different line with the Liverpool guard's case; though I believe his sentence was far too harsh his guilty verdict was correct and unavoidable. However this case is different. I repeat what I said in an earlier post, this man was let down by the system - a system that was not fit for purpose.

 

[khib70]

Simply because I believe this tragedy was completely down to Network Rail's staggering failure to fit approach locking to the crossing. This was a classic "accident waiting to happen" because the system was seriously flawed. It was only a matter of time before a signaller became sufficiently over-workoaded to make a split second mistake. This should have been a danger apparent to any signalling engineer, manager or safety auditor. It is not a small shortcoming of the system, it is a massive and obvious one. I find it incredible that we spend so much time in this industry dabating the minutuae of safety systems any yet until it ended in tragedy, this great elephant in the room had been missed or ignored by everyone at NR.

Please don't run away with the idea that I'm the type of railwayman who thinks front line staff can never be at fault and it is all down to the management. I take a different line with the Liverpool guard's case; though I believe his sentence was far too harsh his guilty verdict was correct and unavoidable. However this case is different. I repeat what I said in an earlier post, this man was let down by the system - a system that was not fit for purpose.

No that's fair enough. Reading everything again, the signaller (and any other person working the box) was put in a perilous position by NWR's desire to save £40,000. Now one life is gone, and several others, including the signaller's blighted as a result.

As I said before, I hope a rational and compassionate view is taken in sentencing the signaller, and as I also said, I hope they throw the book at NWR.

 

[martybabes]

Let us not forget this though:

West Midlands Crown Prosecution Service said Maund and Network Rail had both played a part in Mrs Harding's death. "His momentary error, his failure to follow procedures and checks, as he had been trained to do, has rightly resulted in his conviction."

And this cannot go unpunished.

The punishment may well be considered by the Judge to be his, Maund's, current and future suffering as a result of knowing his failure to act cost an innocent person her life. The Judge is also entitled to consider imprisonment, either immediate or suspended, to reflect the harm caused by Maund's inaction and the duty upon the Judge to protect the public and punish an offender.

I have no doubt pre-sentence reports will have been obtained in order to assist the Judge in determining what is the right thing to do in the circumstances (and the entirety of those circumstances are not known to all of us, but they are to him. He has been sitting listening to all the evidence while we have only picked up on the snippets we choose to highlight).