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Feels as though the Sixfields gates were opened to protect the town but they couldn't open the south gates until Billing Aquadrome had been warned and given time to evacuate? Seems as to me as if natural events took over too quickly for the flood defences in which case liability could be difficult to prove.
Forgot to say. It would seem a good idea to raise S&T installations in lower lying areas so that equipment and cable ends are at a decent height above the ballast. I assume that for the S&T most damage is caused to equipment BUT also water ingress at the ends of a cable - so it does not matter how low most of the cable run is as long as the open ends don't get a drink.
This is what they did at Dovey Jcn. following repeated flooding. The trackside equipment cases are the most important things to get clear - not only do they contain equivalent (such as relays) that are particularly vulnerable to water damage, but these cases are bespoke items purpose built for each site, so cannot just be replaced from stores.
Unfortunately things like point machines can't be moved away, and these are some of the most expensive and also time consuming items to replace. At least one end of most cables will be connected to something on the track (point machine, track circuit, AWS, etc) so will inevitably get flooded. However, provided the ends have been correctly sealed, they should be okay, although obviously it will be necessary to check each cable.
Track circuits are particularly vulnerable to flooding. Not only does the equipment get damaged, but the saturated ballast effectively acts as a short circuit between the rails, making it difficult if not impossible for the track circuit to work.
A previous poster mentioned that there was an incredible amount of rubbish washed into the bay platforms. This suggests that water won't be the only problem, if silt and other contaminants have also been washed into the train electrics, S&T equipment, and contaminated the ballast.
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It sounds as if it was an evolving situation? If so, you’d have expected the relevant authorities involved in managing the water to be in constant touch with NR and other agencies at gold control level as with most major incidents.
This is the critical thing. It would take some time to find someone suitable and send them to site to just raise the pans, let alone move the units. And you aren't going to send someone into an area that is being evacuated - much earlier warning would have been needed.
It would be interesting to see the flood warning area chart; did it reflect the contours? I would have thought that, if it did, it would show the higher ground at the station as above the flood level.
Flooding information and advice for the area: St James, Far Cotton and Cotton End areas of Northampton including St Leonards Road, Euston Road, Richmond Terrace, Parkwood Street and St James Mill Road.
check-for-flooding.service.gov.uk
River Nene and tributaries in Northampton, including low-lying areas adjacent to the river flood warning area
I do have some familiarity with the rivers and drainage in the area, though not the same as the locals!
The map looks to me consistent with a flooding risk caused by water backing up at the confluence of the two branches of the river, with water gradually rising from the south.
But the descriptions of what happened, particularly in bay platforms 4 and 5 at the station, suggest floodwater ingressing from the north.
That suggests to me that the trigger was something on the Brampton Nene upstream from the station, not what happened downstream.
Flooding information and advice for the area: St James, Far Cotton and Cotton End areas of Northampton including St Leonards Road, Euston Road, Richmond Terrace, Parkwood Street and St James Mill Road.
check-for-flooding.service.gov.uk
I do have some familiarity with the rivers and drainage in the area, though not the same as the locals!
The map looks to me consistent with a flooding risk caused by water backing up at the confluence of the two branches of the river, with water gradually rising from the south.
But the descriptions of what happened, particularly in bay platforms 4 and 5 at the station, suggest floodwater ingressing from the north.
That suggests to me that the trigger was something on the Brampton Nene upstream from the station, not what happened downstream.
This is what I think, too; as I mentioned above (and I appreciate there's a maze of information) the work around Harlestone Firs in connection with the new Northern ring Road might be the reason; seems circumstantial that there was no station flooding until this work was done. Building an embankment across a flood plain and improving the flow of the river downstream; what can go wrong - someone else's problem...
Clearly it was no more than railway rumour/wibble. No way would an assessment on write-offs be made in that time and it looks all the more daft that three units “beyond repair” are in service. It’s the same nonsense we get after every incident like this - someone says “it’s a write off” and everyone assumes it is correct without stopping to think.
The gate was certainly opened late! As the NR guy says the river was rising from around 8pm on the Sunday night however the floodgate downstream was not opened until 3am on Monday morning. The water was backing up into town at this point and the gate was opened to alleviate the flooding in the town. The alarms were sounded at Billing Aquadrome from around 0030-0100 telling them to evacuate ahead of the deluge expected once the gates were opened.
It was the sheer amount of rain with nowhere to go once the rivers were full, the down river Northampton Washlands flood storage reservoir was already full by this point thanks to the wet summer and previous heavy rain.
I do think we in the UK are seeing repeated attempts by the weather to cause disruption. Storms more frequent means the water courses have not recovered from the first heavy rains before more are piled on top.
Feels as though the Sixfields gates were opened to protect the town but they couldn't open the south gates until Billing Aquadrome had been warned and given time to evacuate? Seems as to me as if natural events took over too quickly for the flood defences in which case liability could be difficult to prove.
It is beginning to look like some where had to take the hit.
Back on insurance is £7.5m worth claiming for ?. I mean it is going to put the premiums up.
Of course there is also the cost of damage to the S&T.
We could suggest that Northampton station is no longer a good stabling location. BUT how often is this going to happen at the same location ?. There must be many possible flooding locations on the railways as they have a habit of following rivers !. So where next is likely to get hit ?.
Looking at it realistically, there's only a few of options...
1, Repair the damaged units
2, Re-lease 5 350/2's long term, refit to 350/1 standard
3, Purchase 5 additional 730/2
4, Do nothing, don't question who has claimed what, passengers suffer in the long run...
Sadly, I doubt number 4 is a totally unrealistic option.
There is a fifth option.
Wait for the 730/2s to enter service. They are intended to replace the 350/2s anyway and three of the five water damaged 350s are 350/2s.
But the 350s will all require repair as they are still an asset of the Rolling Stock Company so do nothing only applies if the ROSCO is prepared to write them off in favour of damages from the TOC (WMT).
Option 2 only really requires two to be re-fitted as 350/1s as the other three are 350/2s which are going.
I'm glad that from the start of the thread to the latest postings some common sense and actual factual information came to light. The five 350's in the bay platforms were worst affected because as the water came in it had nowhere to go once it reached the wall at the end of the bay platform. The amount of rubbish and debris which ended up in the bays too was unbelievable.
The units can be repaired but its not going to be an easy job, and yes there is the dispute mow about who pays out for this as the floodgates were not operated correctly. As posted opening one of them actually saved the town centre and Far Cotton from a repeat of flooding seen in years gone by, but the water backed up in a particular area, which just happened to be around the railway station!
Water levels in the bay saw the water half way up the wheels, behind which is various equipment including traction motors, this equipment didn't take too kindly to being saturated!
The units themselves now currently sit behind the stored class 321 units in Northampton Up sidings having been dragged out and are being assessed.
Ref the previous post, yes the 730's which were stabled in the Riversidings over that weekend, as they often are to maximise space at Bletchley Carriage Sidings for 350 traction running on the rest of the WCML when Northampton is blocked due to planned engineering work, made their way back to Bletchley under their own power and have seen use since.
The Environment Agency opened the flood gates at Sixfields on the Nene, which caused flooding of the station. There’s obvious questions about that decision and what advice was given during the weather warning that this was a possibilty.
At the Riverside Sidings, flood water came up above the railhead, however the units stabled there are fine and moved under their own power.
There were five units in the bays with pans up, where flood water came up to solebar level. These were:
So as long as 350113 and 377 are repaired and put back into service as those are the 350s designations staying long term.
Whereas the argument could be made by TOC since the other 3 are 350/2s which will soon go off lease there is less pressing urge for those particular units to return to service?
So as long as 350113 and 377 are repaired and put back into service as those are the 350s designations staying long term.
Whereas the argument could be made by TOC since the other 3 are 350/2s which will soon go off lease there is less pressing urge for those particular units to return to service?
If the TOC actually owned the three 350/2s your logic in that second para might be acceptable. The ROSCO which does actually own them is doubtless working on finding a new home for them. Why should it just accept its property being destroyed without proper compensation? No chance!
I am still wondering if £7.5 million is small fry in the grand scheme of things.
Plus the cost of fixing the Signalling and Telecommunications.
Of course the disruption caused is a little harder to "manage".
So as long as 350113 and 377 are repaired and put back into service as those are the 350s designations staying long term.
Whereas the argument could be made by TOC since the other 3 are 350/2s which will soon go off lease there is less pressing urge for those particular units to return to service?
I suspect that 350113 and 350377 will be fixed first. That is assuming they are in no worse condition than the three 350/2s. Then perhaps three off lease 350/2s will get a temporary use until the 730/2s come into service.
But then the three damaged 350/2s will need repairing to a standard acceptable to the Rolling Stock Company before they are handed back. Alternatively the Rolling Stock Company may agree compensation from the Train Operating Company (then Network Rail then whoever else can be blamed) and thus write them off or flog them to Brodies.
For axle counters, I happen to have a spec. for the Thales (as was) Az LM:
Rail contact (bolted to the rail) - IP 67. They are manufactured with their cables as sealed units, and
should be fine for submersion to 1 m depth for many days.
Electronic unit EAK (yellow mushroom) - IP65. As a guarantee, that only covers water spray not immersion. So for shallow floodwater (but it's on a 0.32 m stalk, so more than that) for a day or two some will survive OK, some won't.
Axle counter evaluator and all the other electronics are in a lineside cabinet, so with the same risks as any other similar signalling cabinets.
I imagine that's typical for lineside S&T kit. For things like the EAK, where cables are fed through sealing glands and then the case is closed with a sealing gasket, the quality of the work must be quite important.
Will Siemens be able to repair these at Northampton or will they have to return them to Germany, as they did with the Watford tunnel crash units, if I remember correctly?
Will Siemens be able to repair these at Northampton or will they have to return them to Germany, as they did with the Watford tunnel crash units, if I remember correctly?
I suspect repairs will be carried out inside the country, swapping bogies and equipment cases is something that can be done at most overhaul depots. The other 350s went to Germany as the aluminium extruded bodywork required repair, and likely had to be done under controlled environments and standards high enough to restore crashworthyness.
I suspect repairs will be carried out inside the country, swapping bogies and equipment cases is something that can be done at most overhaul depots. The other 350s went to Germany as the aluminium extruded bodywork required repair, and likely had to be done under controlled environments and standards high enough to restore crashworthyness.
I would have thought that ownership of the different stock might be an issue there. Certainly the owners of the 350/2s won't want to be the ones stuck with all of the duff stock.
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Weather resistant doesn't mean 100% waterproof, I've 0 knowledge of how badly they were but if the water was deep enough then damage to the chassis wouldn't be a surprise.
I am still wondering if £7.5 million is small fry in the grand scheme of things.
Plus the cost of fixing the Signalling and Telecommunications.
Of course the disruption caused is a little harder to "manage".
I suspect that 350113 and 350377 will be fixed first. That is assuming they are in no worse condition than the three 350/2s. Then perhaps three off lease 350/2s will get a temporary use until the 730/2s come into service.
But then the three damaged 350/2s will need repairing to a standard acceptable to the Rolling Stock Company before they are handed back. Alternatively the Rolling Stock Company may agree compensation from the Train Operating Company (then Network Rail then whoever else can be blamed) and thus write them off or flog them to Brodies.
I suppose one way to gauge whether it is small fry is to look at whatever the bill for trains repairs is against the annual revenue and profit of the TOC.
I would have thought that ownership of the different stock might be an issue there. Certainly the owners of the 350/2s won't want to be the ones stuck with all of the duff stock.
The owner of the 350/2s may well be pragmatic and take the money for selling the relevant components, probably well above normal price, rather than just no income from an off-lease unit. Presumably they can replace them in time.
The owner of the 350/2s may well be pragmatic and take the money for selling the relevant components, probably well above normal price, rather than just no income from an off-lease unit. Presumably they can replace them in time.
All depends of financial aspects I imagine. The 350/2s were bult 2008-2009 so are 15-16 years old. Probably now at half life stage, but we don't know what the future holds. The flood damaged ones could be withdrawn and stripped to feed the parts into refurbishment scheme to repair the others Desiros, but AIUI the 350/2s are owned by Porterbrook whereas the remainder of the 350s are owned by Angel Trains. Pretty sure the sister class 350s are owned by Angel Trains, so Porterbrook's class 350/2 fleet might be standalone
Looking at it realistically, there's only a few of options...
1, Repair the damaged units
2, Re-lease 5 350/2's long term, refit to 350/1 standard
3, Purchase 5 additional 730/2
4, Do nothing, don't question who has claimed what, passengers suffer in the long run...
Sadly, I doubt number 4 is a totally unrealistic option.
Services have ended up short formed as a result of the units gone, the 15:36 Birmingham-London has disappeared from the timetable today, so they’re definitely struggling to resource units for the current service levels.
In all honesty, that service proposal can get in the bin, Euston-Crewe is hellish enough at the moment with the overcrowding it receives - it’ll end up like when they joined the Birminghams up with the Liverpool’s, Crewe’s and Rugeley’s. Though that’s a topic for another thread…
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