Flying_Turtle
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Not even if the dead-man of a trainactuates and it is not reset within a certain period? (One minute I believe)
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Report of collision Bedford (Elstow) - 19/06/26
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I thought that too. But however the question was framed, the answer remains the same.
bengley
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No, that doesn't make an emergency call. It does make an automatic call, but not an emergency call.
Annetts key
Established Member
It doesn't really matter what type or class of signal it is, the principle is the same. If there is no risk of a point of conflict at a junction or points because there is no junction or points, and there is no other reason for the signal to be high risk, then no TPWS will have been fitted.
bengley
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Just one example of a controlled signal in a brand new scheme which is not fitted (Standedge Tunnel on the Down Huddersfield)
bengley
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Aye, but I have seen suggestions elsewhere and possibly earlier in this thread that modern schemes have all signals fitted.
357
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After a minute then GSMR will bounce into life with it's own alarm and warning before making a special type of call to the signaller. The signaller can then speak to the driver or make a PA announcement on the train.
Especially as the train in front had stopped to report an AWS issue. No doubt this will be a key part of the investigation as to how the train has proceeded - and at a considerable speed. It will of course be some time (months at a minimum) before any of this is known.
Ultimately thoughts are with the driver’s friends and family and colleagues at this tragic time and all those injured. Let’s really hope there are no more fatalities from the serious injuries.
Annetts key
Established Member
I think that may just be confusion between automatic signals (as they were called when plated as automatics) and controlled signals.
Signal Head
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You're correct. TPWS is provided on the basis of the assessed risk, it wasn't feasible to fit every one as part of the original programme some 25 years ago, so it was limited (in the main) to those protecting junctions or other clear hazards.
Not all plain line signals are (were) automatic, but they typically have the same, lower, risk so they were excluded from fitment on that basis.
There are a few defined instances where fitting to plain line or Auto signals is specified, to provide mitigation in cases where the SPAD risk is considered higher than normal, so it is possible to find them with it fitted, but they are in the minority, certainly for Autos.
CalderRail
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Police on BBC news https://www.bbc.com/news/live/cy8dy2pr8ymt#player
Which is bad, but an improvement on earlier reports of 11.
Also asking people not to speculate.
Which is bad, but an improvement on earlier reports of 11.
Also asking people not to speculate.
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Seconded.
bramling
Veteran Member
I would prefer any journalists to be able to read some informed, sensible, discussion. Since yesterday evening I’ve had messages from about 20 different people (none of them with an interest in railways) asking for information about this, all along the lines of “how could this happen?”. I’d prefer people to get sensible information rather than the nonsense they are likely to pick up from other sources. The main thing is that people don’t pass their opinion off as fact.
I get rather sick of the comments that arise after every single incident like “oh well no need for the RAIB to investigate then”. People have a legitimate interest in these sorts of unfortunate incidents.
The discussion here has been very sensible compared to elsewhere.
bengley
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Indeed, I don't actually see any harm in a bit of healthy, informed speculation by professionals who know what they are talking about - many of whom are contributing to this thread.
The quality of the Journalism I have seen is appalling including from supposed 'rail experts'. This forum is a community of a lot of very knowledgeable and enthusiastic individuals and it should be cherished and preferably not censored where possible.
Depends on your definition of modern but Trafford Park re-signalling in 2021, which was a total re-signalling not a relock or recontrol, has multiple automatic signals with no TPWS provided.
OK folks I am going to call a halt to this until there is a further update from an official source.
To add to the above. Here’s a statement from Network Rail that people have asked us to include.
www.networkrailmediacentre.co.uk
Media statement: Bedford train crash – essential travel only as passengers warned to expect disruption for the majority of next week
Rail passengers planning to travel through Bedford next week are being warned by the rail industry to expect disruption to train services until the end of next week (28 June) and to only travel on this route if their journey is essential.
www.networkrailmediacentre.co.uk
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The driver that was killed on Friday has now been named.
www.bbc.com
Driver killed in Bedford train crash named
The driver killed in the Bedford train crash has been named as Shaun Burton and his family have said they are devastated.
British Transport Police (BTP) confirmed the 60-year-old died following Friday's collision, in which 100 people were injured.
In a tribute, his family said: "We are devastated by his loss. Our thoughts are also with those affected by this incident."
BTP added its thoughts remained with the man's family and his colleagues at East Midlands Railway (EMR).
A major incident was declared when two EMR services to London St Pancras collided at 17:15 BST, just south of Elstow, near the road interchange of the A421 and A6.
Eleven people were very seriously injured, a further 32 were described as injured and 57 had minor injuries, East of England Ambulance Service confirmed.
Police said 28 people remained in hospital, including nine in a critical condition.
Driver killed in Bedford train crash named
The family of Shaun Burton, say they are "devastated" by the loss.
www.bbc.com
The current service situation as notified to us by @Starmill is here
www.nationalrail.co.uk
Incident: Luton | National Rail
Major disruption between London St Pancras International and Bedford expected until at least Friday 26 June: only travel if it is essential. Find details of all current incidents on National Rail Enquiries.
Just in case anyone hasn’t seen it yet, there’s a thread below to discuss the recovery operation.
www.railforums.co.uk
The Bedford collision, recovery process discussion.
This is obviously going to be quite a complex operation and a couple of people have requested that we have a discussion about this, but we felt it better to have it in a new thread. From Network Rail itself...
www.railforums.co.uk
The RAIB have now issued an update providing more information about what happened and also their continuing lines of enquiry for their full report in due course:
www.gov.uk
View of the accident site – train 1H46 is to the left and train 1B67 to the right of the image.
At around 17:15 on Friday 19 June 2026, train 1H46, the 16:40 East Midlands Railway service from Corby to London St Pancras, collided with train 1B67, the 15:50 service from Nottingham to London St Pancras, also operated by East Midlands Railway. The collision took place on Network Rail’s Midland Main Line approximately 2.5 miles (4 km) south of Bedford station.
The driver of train 1H46 died as a result of the accident. 162 people were injured, 102 of whom required hospital treatment. At the time of writing, 53 people remain in hospital, 8 in a critical condition. Significant damage was caused to both trains, which also partially derailed.
Aerial view of the accident site – train 1H46 is to the left and train 1B67 to the right of the image.
RAIB was notified of the accident at 17:27 and immediately deployed a team to the site, with the first inspector arriving at 18:26. RAIB continues to work alongside the British Transport Police, the Office of Rail and Road, and the railway companies involved to secure the necessary evidence to support our independent safety investigation.
The on-train data recorders (OTDR, sometimes called ‘black boxes’) from the trains have been recovered. Some of these recorders were located within damaged parts of the trains and could only be extracted during recovery operations. CCTV recordings, signalling data and recordings of radio communications have also been obtained. The vehicles involved have been surveyed for internal and external damage including using laser scanning, and an aerial survey. RAIB inspectors are also overseeing the testing of signalling equipment in the area.
The recovery of the trains involves vehicles being lifted by crane and moved by road to secure storage. RAIB inspectors are liaising with rail industry recovery teams to ensure access is available to them to undertake this work, which is expected to take several days. RAIB is also liaising with Network Rail to facilitate the repair work needed to restore railway operations.
The accident took place on the Midland Main Line between Bedford and Flitwick stations. The railway here has four tracks consisting of the Up and Down Fast lines (which direct trains towards London, and away from London, respectively) and the Up and Down Slow lines. The collision took place on the Up Fast line on approach to WH152 signal, which is located at 47 miles and 29 chains. The maximum permissible speed for trains at this location is between 125 mph (201 km/h) and 100 mph (161 km/h) depending on the type of train.
Train 1H46 was a four-car class 360 electric multiple unit. Train 1B67 was a five-car class 810 bi-mode multiple unit.
RAIB’s preliminary examination has found that train 1B67 was standing next to WH152 signal when the accident occurred. The train had come to a stop unexpectedly because a fault had developed with the Automatic Warning System (AWS) equipment fitted to it, which caused the brakes to apply.
Data from railway systems recorded that the track circuit for the section of track on which train 1B67 was standing was shown as occupied. The signal interlocking would have therefore changed the signal behind the train, WH154, to display a red (danger) aspect, with the intention of protecting train 1B67 from other train movements.
WH154 is a four-aspect automatic signal. This means that the aspect it displays changes automatically depending on the occupation of track circuits by trains, without the intervention of the signaller. WH154 signal is fitted with AWS track equipment which provides an audible and visual warning to train drivers on the approach to infrastructure features, including signals. AWS uses track-mounted magnets which trigger receivers fitted on trains. The system on board the train sounds a bell or chime when approaching a signal displaying a green aspect, and a horn when approaching a signal displaying any other aspect. This warning is intended to alert the driver to the upcoming signal or speed change. When receiving a horn warning, a driver must acknowledge this by pressing a button in the cab. After an AWS warning is acknowledged, a visual indicator will appear in the cab as a reminder of the warning. If the warning is not responded to within a short timeframe, the train’s emergency brake is applied.
Data from railway systems records train 1H46 leaving platform 1 at Bedford station at 17:10 on the Up Slow line. As it left the platform, forward-facing CCTV (FFCCTV) images show that the train passed a yellow (caution) signal (which signifies that the driver can pass the signal but should be prepared to stop at a red signal ahead).
Train 1H46 continued on the Up Slow line until it reached Bedford South Junction where it crossed onto the Up Fast line. The signal protecting the junction was also displaying a yellow aspect as the train passed it.
Having entered the Up Fast line, train 1H46 then approached signal WH154. FFCCTV shows that this signal was displaying a red aspect as the train approached and then passed it. The data downloaded from the OTDR on the front vehicle of this train is still being analysed, as the recorder could not be accessed until the vehicle was recovered. This means that it is not yet possible to say what indication the driver received from the AWS equipment on the train or how they responded to this.
The OTDR from the rear vehicle of train 1H46 has been recovered and downloaded. While this OTDR does not record AWS activity, it does record the train’s speed and braking commands. Preliminary analysis of data from this OTDR shows that there was a brake activation around 9 seconds before the collision, while the train was travelling at approximately 76 mph (122 km/h). Preliminary analysis of OTDR data also indicates that the train was travelling at around 49 mph (79 km/h) at the point of collision.
Some of this information may be refined as RAIB’s investigation progresses. RAIB continues to analyse evidence relating to the sequence of events, the performance of the signalling system and the speed at which the collision occurred, all of which remain under investigation.
Our investigation will seek to identify the sequence of events which led to the accident. It will include consideration of:
- the actions of those involved and any factors that may have influenced them
- the status and performance of the braking, AWS and other safety systems on train 1H46
- the reason train 1B67 stopped
- the status of signal WH154 and its AWS equipment, as well as its positioning, visibility, and conspicuity
- the crashworthiness performance of both trains during the collision
- the emergency response to the accident
- the processes used to assess the risk of overrun at this location, and the effectiveness of any control measures intended to address this
- any relevant underlying factors, including any actions taken in response to previous relevant safety recommendations.
Collision between two passenger trains near Elstow
Investigation into a collision between two passenger trains near Elstow, Bedfordshire, 19 June 2026.
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soccermad
Member
Just seen that , seems they already know a lot of the detail of the incident, more to come when OTMR retrieved from front vehicle cab is analysed
Includes the key point that forward facing cameras on 1H46 (16:40 Corby to Saint Pancras) showed the train passing WH154 displaying a red aspect. The indication from AWS for this red signal and the driver’s reaction to it has not yet been possible to ascertain.
TreacleMiller
Member
I'd ask people to keep in mind there are many reasons why a spad can occur, beyond just driver error.
I do not know haw far the Hitachi unit was into the section either.
I do not know haw far the Hitachi unit was into the section either.
TreacleMiller
Member
Thanks, I'd just read that. Point still stands but at the very least we "know" the signal aspects approaching 1B67 were displayed correctly.
Still a good many reasons why these incidents occur.
No TSS or TPWS or TPWS+ on this signal, which if working correctly, would have at least mitigated the speed and possibly prevented the collision and it's good to see ASLEF have highlighted this already.
Still a good many reasons why these incidents occur.
No TSS or TPWS or TPWS+ on this signal, which if working correctly, would have at least mitigated the speed and possibly prevented the collision and it's good to see ASLEF have highlighted this already.
This is why factors like signal sighting will form part of the investigation
Nicholas Lewis
Established Member
Im sure RAIBs review will look into the normal aspect sequence that trains departing P1 across to the Up Fast normally receive such that a default behaviour is potentially instilled in drivers mind. Also the time has now come surely to acknowledge that AWS is only a "warning" system and that all running signals should have some form of automatic train stop fitted which in reality has to be TPWS. Yes thats costly but compared to ETCS its the only quick and economical solution.
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