Has the railway got the right balance to Health & Safety?

[sh24]

Moderator note: split from

Report of collision Bedford (Elstow) - 19/06/26

Hearing reports of a collision between two trains at Bedford with one train now derailed

www.railforums.co.uk

After a totally unrelated to the railway H&S meeting where we were discussing emergency lighting. It's mandatory under UK law to have independent battery powered emergency lighting in any commercial premises.

That lead me to ponder how the railway decides that GSM-R doesn't require an independent power source but we should shout and wave at passengers who place their foot on a platform yellow line... H&S culture might not be quite right.

 

[35B]

After a totally unrelated to the railway H&S meeting where we were discussing emergency lighting. It's mandatory under UK law to have independent battery powered emergency lighting in any commercial premises. That lead me to ponder how the railway decides that GSM-R doesn't require an independent power source but we should shout and wave at passengers who place their foot on a platform yellow line... H&S culture might not be quite right.

Or perhaps more relevant, that the same radios that don't have an independent power source can be the sole form of emergency communication when signal post telephones are removed.

System thinking does seem to be missing

 

[Horizon22]

Or perhaps more relevant, that the same radios that don't have an independent power source can be the sole form of emergency communication when signal post telephones are removed.

System thinking does seem to be missing

I am surprised because when OHLE is switched off / damaged modern rolling stock will “load-shed” and one of the last things to go is GSMR which can last for maybe an hour.

 

[sharpener]

Or perhaps more relevant, that the same radios that don't have an independent power source can be the sole form of emergency communication when signal post telephones are removed.

And when the track clips don't work as the track circuits have been replaced with axle counters.

How do the on-train crew know which is the case? Deploying the clips is not without personal risk, particularly when they will not be effective.

I am surprised because when OHLE is switched off / damaged modern rolling stock will “load-shed” and one of the last things to go is GSMR which can last for maybe an hour.

From other posts that depends on the trains cabling being intact between the cabs and the batteries in a different vehicle. And on the management computer prioritising the loads correctly. Neither of which is a given after a crash or derailment.

 

[Recessio]

In a previous job I had to have both a CB radio and a car phone installed in my vehicle for emergencies, both of which had their own internal batteries (and they would also trickle charge off of the car's battery).

I'm astonished to hear that the GSM-R units don't appear to have their own internal battery? Even something as small as a mobile phone battery?

 

[Horizon22]

And when the track clips don't work as the track circuits have been replaced with axle counters.

How do the on-train crew know which is the case? Deploying the clips is not without personal risk, particularly when they will not be effective.

I would expect them to know as part of their route knowledge which areas have axle counters. This would no doubt be briefed out when there was such a change.

 

[driver9000]

And when the track clips don't work as the track circuits have been replaced with axle counters.

How do the on-train crew know which is the case? Deploying the clips is not without personal risk, particularly when they will not be effective.

Knowing which type of signalling and train detection system is in operation is part of the route knowledge.

 

[68000]

After a totally unrelated to the railway H&S meeting where we were discussing emergency lighting. It's mandatory under UK law to have independent battery powered emergency lighting in any commercial premises. That lead me to ponder how the railway decides that GSM-R doesn't require an independent power source but we should shout and wave at passengers who place their foot on a platform yellow line... H&S culture might not be quite right.

GSM-R was designed with backup batteries to provide emergency power to GSM-R in circumstances such as this. It was called a 'UPS' back in the days of early GSM-R rollout and the batteries had to be replaced every five years (I think) / when the battery test indicated failure. I don't know why they were not fitted or if fitted why they did not work.

 

[Archvile]

Just a gentle reminder that the Rule Book does not differentiate between track circuit and axle counters regarding the use of TCOCs when not able to contact the Signaller.

They MUST be placed down regardless.

The logic is that in a stressful situation, recalling the detection type is not reliable enough to decide whether to do so or not.

 

[Harpo]

Or perhaps more relevant, that the same radios that don't have an independent power source can be the sole form of emergency communication when signal post telephones are removed.

System thinking does seem to be missing

Somewhere in the past, there will have been a detailed risk assessment around SPT removal, post-GSMR. It will be interesting to see if RAIB dig into that to understand the assumptions it made, and whether any of those failed to become embedded in rolling stock standards.

 

[brad465]

This I think is one of those areas where it's lacking on one side but overdone on another, which you can probably apply to just about any industry.

 

[HSTEd]

The railway does seem to have ended up with odd incongruities in its safety approach, with some things being given backups and positive control, but other things not. I assume this is largely because of historical factors.

For example, the Caledonian sleeper set that had that overrun incident on approach to Edinburgh in 2020 had a lever in the wrong position that essentially disabled the continuous train brake, the position of which could not be determined from the cab or whilst the train was moving. There was also no other means to activate the main train brake from the cab, despite the stock being fitted with a Class 92 compatible 61-way control jumper (apparently) fitted with pins for TDM multiple-unit control.

A position switch would have prevented that incident, as would have fitting the stock to respond to electrical control signals from the locomotive. Either implementation would have cost less than many of the systems on the railway that have very carefully considered backups and proving arrangements. Instead the railway, in this case, relied on procedural controls by fallible human beings. Just seems odd to me.