Report of collision Bedford (Elstow) - 19/06/26

[CalderRail]

What will also be of note would be at what point the signaller was aware that WH154 had been passed at danger and what - if any - action they took. I imagine we’re talking seconds, in which case there was nothing further they could do to intervene. Perhaps they were on with the driver of the 810 discussing the AWS issue.

I don't think there's a lot of distance between WH154 and WH152.

 

[yorkie]

This thread is now temporarily locked until further information comes to light.

There are other related threads that currently remain open, such as:

Following the Bedford incident, should TPWS - or something providing an equivalent level of protection - be fitted to all remaining unfitted signals?

Moderator note: Split from https://www.railforums.co.uk/threads/report-of-collision-bedford-elstow-19-06-26.303537/ The likelihood of a signalling system error causing WH154 to display a proceed aspect always seemed incredibly remote. So as expected, this was a SPAD. Obviously we must maintain...

www.railforums.co.uk

Should the responsibility for warning about speed restrictions ahead be separated from the system which warns that there is another train ahead?

Moderator note: Split from https://www.railforums.co.uk/threads/report-of-collision-bedford-elstow-19-06-26.303537/ Should the responsibility for warning about speed restrictions ahead be separated from the system which warns that there is another train ahead?

www.railforums.co.uk

The Bedford collision, recovery process discussion.

This is obviously going to be quite a complex operation and a couple of people have requested that we have a discussion about this, but we felt it better to have it in a new thread. From Network Rail itself...

www.railforums.co.uk

 

[Cowley]

A little bit of extra information provided to us by @liamf656 that we felt might be worth adding.

Not sure if this requires a new thread or if it can be added here but as of 29/06/26 EMR have retired the headcodes 1B67 and 1H46. Their new headcodes are 1B69 and 1H47. The change has been inputted in all systems and thus is viewable on realtimetrains.co.uk

Edit: and a bit more information

Bedford train crash: No passengers remain in a critical condition

The update follows the fatal crash which resulted in more than 100 people being taken to hospital.

www.bbc.co.uk

All the passengers taken to hospital after last month's Bedford train crash are out of a critical condition.

The day after the crash, British Transport Police said nine people had been critically injured, but the most seriously hurt people are improving.

 

[Mag_seven]

An update on the deceased driver:

A train driver died from traumatic injuries to the brain and chest in the Bedfordshire train crash, an inquest has heard.

Shaun Burton, 60, died when his train ploughed into the back of another service at Elstow, near Bedford, on 19 June. It left 162 people injured, including 102 who required hospital treatment.

Bedford train crash driver died from brain and chest injuries

An inquest hears Shaun Burton died in the collision in which 102 people needed hospital treatment.

www.bbc.co.uk

 

[ainsworth74]

The RAIB have today published an interim report in this accident:

Introduction

1 At around 17:13 on Friday 19 June 2026, train reporting number 1H46, the 16:40 passenger service from Corby to London St Pancras, collided with the rear of train reporting number 1B67, the 15:50 passenger service from Nottingham to London St Pancras. Train 1B67 was stationary when the accident occurred. Both trains were operated by East Midlands Railway (EMR).

2 The collision took place on Network Rail’s Midland Main Line approximately 2.5 miles (4 km) south of Bedford station (figure 1). The driver of train 1H46 suffered fatal injuries in the collision. Of the estimated 257 people on board the two trains, more than 160 were injured. Significant damage was caused to the trains, both of which derailed.

3 Train 1B67 was stationary beneath the gantry supporting signal WH152 when the accident occurred (figure 2) and had come to an unexpected stop following an automatic emergency brake application. As train 1B67 was occupying the track in the vicinity of signal WH152, the preceding signal, WH154, was displaying a red (danger) aspect to protect the train from other movements on that line.

4 Forward-facing CCTV (FFCCTV) footage from train 1H46 shows that, as it approached and passed signal WH154, the signal was correctly displaying a red aspect. Train 1H46 was travelling at approximately 58 mph (93 km/h) and accelerating when it passed this signal.

5 Having passed signal WH154, train 1H46 proceeded towards train 1B67, approaching it on a right-hand curve. Analysis of data downloaded from the on-train data recorders (OTDR, sometimes called ‘the black box’) fitted to train 1H46 shows that the driver first applied the brakes around 10 seconds before the collision, while the train was travelling at approximately 76 mph (122 km/h). OTDR data also indicates that the speed of the train had reduced to around 50 mph (80 km/h) at the point of collision.

6 RAIB investigations, like many others, start by examining the immediate events around an accident and then working outwards to determine why they occurred, and to find any underlying factors. That means that a report published at the early stages of an investigation may contain information about immediate events without necessarily providing an explanation as to why they occurred. The reasons why train 1H46 passed signal WH154 at danger continue to form part of the ongoing investigation.

Interim report 01/2026: Collision between passenger trains near Elstow

Collision between passenger trains near Elstow, Bedfordshire, 19 June 2026.

www.gov.uk

 

[HC1998]

The RAIB have today published an interim report in this accident:

Interim report 01/2026: Collision between passenger trains near Elstow

Collision between passenger trains near Elstow, Bedfordshire, 19 June 2026.

www.gov.uk

I’ll have a read later. Thanks for posting this, was meaning to check if there were updates. So I guess we have a very rough sketch of the facts. Will be interesting to see the root cause and if it leads to new recommendations etc.

 

[Snow1964]

I’ll have a read later. Thanks for posting this, was meaning to check if there were updates. So I guess we have a very rough sketch of the facts. Will be interesting to see the root cause and if it leads to new recommendations etc.

It seems the AWS electromagnet on the track had been installed low, 16mm lower than the permanent magnet on the track, but work is ongoing to see if this caused the 810 to get the AWS fault as AWS triggered on the 810 but signal was green) that led to its emergency braking and 810 stopping.

Seems also driver of 360 acknowledged the AWS at red signal, but continued to accelerate, based on data logging. But no suggestions at this stage as to why.

 

[DDB]

I was surprised to read that the loss of the power to the train meant GSM-R calls couldn't be made or received. I would have assumed that a battery backup would be fitted?

 

[Haywain]

The RAIB have today published an interim report in this accident:

Thanks for posting this. It makes interesting reading. I suspect that the biggest question - why the driver of 1H46 continued to accelerate after passing a red signal - will never be answered, but the interim report does raise some other questions. I guess we'll wait many months for the final report.

Will be interesting to see the root cause and if it leads to new recommendations etc.

That, of course, is for the final report.

 

[edwin_m]

Based on a quick scan, unsurprisingly no root cause. The main item I haven't seen before was more details on why the 810 stopped unexpectedly. The AWS electromagnet at the previous signal was positioned out of tolerance, possibly leading to the false caution indication that was recorded, and the driver under training on the 810 may have got confused between its AWS/TPWS panel and the type they were more used to. My own comment is that this fault could not have contributed to the subsequent failure of the 360 to stop at that signal, as it would only come into play when that signal was green.

There are also photos of each car to car interface, showing that the "crumple zones" on the 360 deformed fairly consistently, probably as designed, but that all cars of this unit thus have significant structural damage that may be uneconomic to repair. Deformation of the 810 structure is less obvious. I didn't see any comment on how one car of the 810 was derailed and apparently foul of the adjacent track.

I was surprised to read that the loss of the power to the train meant GSM-R calls couldn't be made or received. I would have assumed that a battery backup would be fitted?

I assume this is one of the issues leading up to the recent strikes by on-train staff.

 

[AlterEgo]

It's interesting the signaller received the first report of an accident from a passenger using a signal post telephone. Wonder if the passenger was (ex?) Train crew or operational staff.

 

[Haywain]

Based on a quick scan, unsurprisingly no root cause.

I believe that interim reports only ever tell us what actually happened and what is going to be investigated for the full report.

I assume this is one of the issues leading up to the recent strikes by on-train staff.

Given that the same problem applied to the considerably older class 360, and it therefore is not a new problem solely associated with the class 810, that would be rather strange.

 

[HC1998]

It's interesting the signaller received the first report of an accident from a passenger using a signal post telephone. Wonder if the passenger was (ex?) Train crew or operational staff.

Good presence of mind either way. What would they need to do? Presumably it’s locked? I guess you could improvise and tell the signaller the ID plate attached to the signal and explain what happened?

 

[baz962]

Thanks for posting this. It makes interesting reading. I suspect that the biggest question - why the driver of 1B67 continued to accelerate after passing a red signal - will never be answered, but the interim report does raise some other questions. I guess we'll wait many months for the final report.

That, of course, is for the final report.

The driver of 1B67 didn't pass a red signal.

 

[Haywain]

Presumably it’s locked?

I don't believe they are - I can't recall ever seeing a lock on the door of the box containing a signal post phone.

The driver of 1B67 didn't pass a red signal.

My error, now corrected.

 

[edwin_m]

Good presence of mind either way. What would they need to do? Presumably it’s locked? I guess you could improvise and tell the signaller the ID plate attached to the signal and explain what happened?

I don't think they are locked but they are somewhere the public shouldn't have access to. The system should tell the signaller which signal the call is coming from, although rules require drivers phoning in also to confirm where they are.

 

[millemille]

I was surprised to read that the loss of the power to the train meant GSM-R calls couldn't be made or received. I would have assumed that a battery backup would be fitted?

GSM-R is powered from the train batteries as a back up in the event of a loss of traction power but I would presume that the damage to both trains was so significant that battery power was lost (short circuits in cabling etc.).

 

[Iskra]

GSM-R is powered from the train batteries as a back up in the event of a loss of traction power but I would presume that the damage to both trains was so significant that battery power was lost (short circuits in cabling etc.).

There is an ongoing issue where, when rebooted; 810’s lose GSMR. This takes longer than you would expect to reinstate.

 

[sh24]

The interim report has a lot to unpack and consider. Several Swiss cheese moments

 

[fishwomp]

I was surprised to read that the loss of the power to the train meant GSM-R calls couldn't be made or received. I would have assumed that a battery backup would be fitted?

_both_ trains: the 360 and 810. That's of no bearing to the cause of the incident - but it is a staggering vulnerability. That the on board passengers' and crew's mobiles work, but safety critical comms does not.
.

* [..]collided with the rear of train 1B67 at around 17:13:35.
* Bedfordshire Fire and Rescue Service was notified of the accident at 17:14 by a 999 call from the train and passed this information to Network Rail’s control room in Derby.
* the 1B67 driver and guard applied track circuit clips - it doesn't say when, but it does say 'immediate aftermath'.
* At 17:19, the signaller received the first report of the accident from a passenger who was using a signal post telephone at the gantry for signal WH152.
* This was followed shortly thereafter by another call from the same signal post telephone from the driver of train 1B67 who also reported the accident.
* Signaller confirmed to driver OLE power was isolated [must've been ~17:20].
* First emergency on site: police 17:24, fire and rescue 17:28, ambulances 'by' 17:35

We are very lucky nothing on other running lines struck.

 

[Haywain]

I was surprised to read that the loss of the power to the train meant GSM-R calls couldn't be made or received. I would have assumed that a battery backup would be fitted?

I imagine that will be addressed in the full report, although GSM-R is due to be replaced.

 

[CalderRail]

I don't see how the AWS fault on 1B67 has anything to do with the spad by 1H46.

 

[Harpo]

My biggest takeaways from this are that the SPAD driver (the 360) acknowledged the AWS at the red signal, so was conscious and able to react quickly. A slow reaction would have caused AWS to apply the brakes.

Secondly, the loss of power to GSMR on the 810 preventing an emergency call is deeply worrying. The result is a 5.5 minute lag between the collision and first report to the signaller. It’s incredibly lucky that there was nothing on the down fast in that time.

 

[ainsworth74]

I don't see how the AWS fault on 1B67 has anything to do with the spad by 1H46.

Because without the fault 1H46 wouldn't have had anything to run into the back of. Obviously 1B67's fault didn't cause the SPAD but it's the reason why the consequences of the SPAD were so severe.

 

[edwin_m]

I don't see how the AWS fault on 1B67 has anything to do with the spad by 1H46.

It didn't contribute to the SPAD but if it hadn't happened, the accident wouldn't have happened either.

 

[driver9000]

I don't believe they are - I can't recall ever seeing a lock on the door of the box containing a signal post phone.

I don't know the area this tragic collision happened but there's lots of SPTs on the network which need a BR1 key to open the locked case the phone is in. The report says a passenger was able to make a call so it suggests the SPT is in an unlocked case or they were off duty railway staff with keys on them. Either way they made a prompt call to stop other trains and alert the Signallers.

 

[Haywain]

Either way they made a prompt call to stop other trains and alert the Signallers.

To alert the signaller, yes, but the driver and train manager of 1B67 took immediate steps to stop other trains.

there's lots of SPTs on the network which need a BR1 key to open the locked case the phone is in.

Fair enough. Years ago I used a SPT* not that far away from the crash site and the case didn't have a lock.

*Probably wrong to do so, but hey ho.

 

[NSEWonderer]

Chain of events that once again led to a collision had anyone of them been broke, the collision doesn't happen.
I found it interesting that the right side failure lead the 1B67 drivers to confused potentially and not acknowledge the AWS indication leading to the emergency brakes applying.

Interestingly same signal, same traction this fault occured again and the driver there seemed to react on time

 

[tram21]

We are very lucky nothing on other running lines struck

It’s incredibly lucky that there was nothing on the down fast in that time.

There were trains on both lines approaching the area very rapidly at the time of the collision. Had it not been for the heroic actions of the Train Manager of 1B67 putting the track clips down, the accident could have been much, much worse.

It's always been good to see both EMR & RMT commending the train crew of 1B67.

 

[GadgetMan]

I was surprised to read that the loss of the power to the train meant GSM-R calls couldn't be made or received. I would have assumed that a battery backup would be fitted?

There are Two versions of GSMR units available.

One has a back up battery, these are fitted to the less reliable old diesel trains. So in the event the train loses electrical power the battery in the GSMR will supply power to it.

Then there's the version without fitted to most trains. These trains are very vulnerable as although their electrical systems are more reliable, the trains batteries are usually on one of the middle carriages, so if the carriages separate for any reason then all power including to the GSMR is lost.

I can only assume the GSMR units with back up batteries cost more.