Trains all at a stand in the Manchester area... (Thursday afternoon 06AUG2026)

[dosxuk]

But it sounds like they use a pretty limited UPS for a short period of time, to allow the switching of power to another source (generator). What I'm talking about is a large battery that can switch instantly to another power source - the battery. It has the inverter and UPS functionality, but is essentially the generator but instantly available at any moment (so is as good as having a second mains power supplier). It can also monitor the power to switch if the incoming supply has issues.

You'd still keep the UPS. Industrial sized UPS's already contain large batteries capable of powering significant loads for extended periods, but their key purpose is to keep the power going when the incoming supply has issues and to deal with all the switching and synchronisation needed. For a use like the ROC, think a large room full of batteries and switch gear, not a little black box at the bottom of a pile of computers.

If you were going to implement a large battery storage system it would likely replace the generator in this sort of system, rather than the UPS. A separate component designed to provide longer term power. The big issue though is charging - once the batteries in this sort of device have run out, that's it - you're out of power - and it's going to take a while to recharge for it's next use too. Generators for backup power are designed to be refuellable while running - so can provide power indefinitely.

The only real way to solve it is to insert a permanent battery bank between whatever supplies you have (main grid, generators, whatever) and so if one supply fails then you're already connected to your battery supply so no immediate switching required and you've time to problem-solve.

But then your battery becomes the single point of failure instead. Designing resilient power systems is hard work, and relies as much on operating process as it does system design - you've basically got to design a system where every single component can be swapped out while the system stays operating - and you've got to do it in a way that is safe both for people and the equipment it's powering.

 

[Spartacus]

From what's starting to come out it appears that while the backup switched in, something, or likely a few things, including I think coms, broke, and needed replacing, which would explain why different areas came back online at vastly different times. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/live/cwy0d0wgy4xt 09:59 & 09:38 updates

 

[kkong]

I see that as simply a pretty standard quote for the press rather than an appraisal.

Even doing that seems to be beyond what ScotRail senior management have said in the last nine days since their app launched.

 

[Starmill]

Whatever the truth of the matter this is a classic case of the law of unintended consequences. I remember when regulations were introduced that every train with a toilet must have one which is disabled accessible. The latter are bigger and more expensive, so it just encouragd some train companies (on shorter routes) to take out the toilets completely.... A similar thing probably applies to footbridges, if they say all footbridges must be disabled accessible (much bigger and way more expensive) it must decrease the number of footbridges they'll put in.....

Not really. Almost no trains had their toilets permanently removed. Only some class 153s were affected.

 

[Harpo]

Network Rail's North West route director, Chris Wright………..says engineers have been working hard overnight to build "additional resilience" into Network Rail's signalling systems and ensure this doesn't happen again.

BS version of ‘putting things right’.

Train delays latest: Services largely restored but passengers still facing some disruption

It comes after a 90-second power failure in Manchester affected a communications centre on Thursday, causing widespread delays and cancellations.

www.bbc.co.uk

 

[Mcr Warrior]

So, almost 24 hours now after Thursday's outage, are rail services more or less back to 'normal' in Greater Manchester and the immediately surrounding area? Or are there any residual issues?

 

[Spartacus]

Not really. Almost no trains had their toilets permanently removed. Only some class 153s were affected.

Quite a few were built without them, replacing trains which did have toilets though. Was is SWT who openly admitted the regulations resulted in their new order having no toilets due to the seatspace a wheelchair one would take up was unjustifiable, but had they been allowed a 'traditional' one would have been okay?

Regarding the bus situation, were I a TOC controller during the recent disruption the reduced chances of being able to get compliant rail replacement at short notice could well put me off even trying, after all there's plenty of other things to be doing rather than ringing round bus companies to be given the same answer time after time. Especially during the summer holidays; either everything's booked up & out or the drivers are on their hols themselves.

 

[AndrewE]

"Network Rail's North West route director, Chris Wright………..says engineers have been working hard overnight to build "additional resilience" into Network Rail's signalling systems and ensure this doesn't happen again. "

BS version of ‘putting things right’.

Train delays latest: Services largely restored but passengers still facing some disruption

It comes after a 90-second power failure in Manchester affected a communications centre on Thursday, causing widespread delays and cancellations.

www.bbc.co.uk

so, if they could build additional resilience in just by working overnight, why on earth wasn't it built in originally?

 

[Harpo]

"Network Rail's North West route director, Chris Wright………..says engineers have been working hard overnight to build "additional resilience" into Network Rail's signalling systems and ensure this doesn't happen again. "

so, if they could build additional resilience in just by working overnight, why on earth wasn't it built in originally?

The point of my derogatory comment was that nothing gets ‘built’ overnight and alterations are long-lead work.

At best, (for example) it’s possible to hire in a generator set fairly quickly but anything else overnight is just putting things right.

 

[sharpener]

From what's starting to come out it appears that while the backup switched in, something, or likely a few things, including I think coms, broke, and needed replacing, which would explain why different areas came back online at vastly different times. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/live/cwy0d0wgy4xt 09:59 & 09:38 updates

BS version of ‘putting things right’.

Train delays latest: Services largely restored but passengers still facing some disruption

It comes after a 90-second power failure in Manchester affected a communications centre on Thursday, causing widespread delays and cancellations.

www.bbc.co.uk

"Network Rail's North West route director, Chris Wright………..says engineers have been working hard overnight to build "additional resilience" into Network Rail's signalling systems and ensure this doesn't happen again. "

so, if they could build additional resilience in just by working overnight, why on earth wasn't it built in originally?

BBC lunchtime news has confirmed equipment had to be replaced as per this item:

Following the power cut, some of the systems controlling the signalling were damaged, so parts had to be replaced. That's why it's taken so long to fix the problem.

Maybe they weren't working before, that's why there was no resilience at all yesterday.
So replacing them will lead to "additional resilience" i.e. some.

 

[The Planner]

The Times :

Thousands of rail replacement buses set to be pulled from service

Government changes to accessibility rules means many private operator vehicles are no longer eligible

www.thetimes.com

Not sure what your point is. The TOCs have no control over whether suppliers are compliant or not in terms of PSVAR or the newer PSVAIR. They will just use third parties to aggregate them.

 

[Elecman]

Something as major as this should have two separate supplies from different substations, hopefully sufficiently isolated from each other so an electricity network problem affecting both would be rare.

Surely this should have been thought of and identified in a risk assessment?

It will be interesting to see who signed this off and whether cost saving had anything to do with the decision. Will the Government be bothered though? Certainly getting a second supply from a separate independent substation would be a costly business depending on geography.

It was that area of Manchesters Primary substation that was affected hence whole swathes of East Manchester went off supply. The ROC does have 2 independent HV supplies

 

[jon0844]

One massive problem is that you have to take a long-term view. You can only design, build, install & maintain whats available today. You can't rip it all out and replace every year or so as technology steps forward - the risks and costs would be stupidly high. You also can't implement the latest technology as it appears - you have to implement a mature tested solution (which in the NR case appears to have failed the swiss cheese test).

As for doing it in-house that would be crazy - where would you get the experts from and what do you do with them once implemented? There are companies that specialise in this (as in other fields), have all the expensive resources (technical and personnel) to hand and you make use of their expertise. Let them carry out the testing and risks of new technologies.

As others have said comparing heavy industrial supplies and backup to domestic scenarios simply isn't valid and seriously too many people grab snippets of info off the 'net and think that they're fit for the real world. They're not by a long shot.

Battery storage is mature enough that you can invest today and not need to worry about what's coming. This isn't about 'snippets of info off the net' which, frankly, is rather patronising.

I really don't think we need to be using diesel generators to provide power (which can be dirty by its very nature) combined with UPS systems that fail when needed (sometimes not being able to maintain power for long enough) in this day and age. Batteries are proven technologies used in homes, cars, offices and industry - as well as providing power to the national grid.

 

[jfollows]

Battery storage is mature enough that you can invest today and not need to worry about what's coming. This isn't about 'snippets of info off the net' which, frankly, is rather patronising.

I really don't think we need to be using diesel generators to provide power (which can be dirty by its very nature) combined with UPS systems that fail when needed (sometimes not being able to maintain power for long enough) in this day and age. Batteries are proven technologies used in homes, cars, offices and industry - as well as providing power to the national grid.

Whilst I'm sure you're right, and I'm aware we're moving off-topic of course, my experience (which isn't current) is that data centre providers are incredibly conservative and reluctant to implement new technologies. I wasn't directly responsible for the data centre I mentioned above, and my suggestions of using adiabatic cooling and DC power fell on deaf ears - "not invented here", "not proven" etc. For a public sector academic service it seemed like a perfect proving ground to me, but it wasn't my battle and I didn't fight it.

 

[jon0844]

Whilst I'm sure you're right, and I'm aware we're moving off-topic of course, my experience (which isn't current) is that data centre providers are incredibly conservative and reluctant to implement new technologies. I wasn't directly responsible for the data centre I mentioned above, and my suggestions of using adiabatic cooling and DC power fell on deaf ears - "not invented here", "not proven" etc. For a public sector academic service it seemed like a perfect proving ground to me, but it wasn't my battle and I didn't fight it.

They key systems that can't cope with being turned off are the ones you protect first. An instant switch over to large capacity batteries skips the risk of a UPS standing in while you try and power up your power. If the batteries are calculated to last for xx hours, you may still need a generator (which I'd argue could be used to charge the batteries, so the key systems still pull power from the batteries, not the generator).

 

[Dan G]

Manchester ROC has 2 independent 6.6kV DNO intake feeders fed from a primary substation either of which can feed the entire building by closing the relevant bus bar couplers on the HV panels ( there are some reports of a large part of Ardwick also bring without power) do sounds like it’s a SPENWL issue.

6.6 kV? That's a bit old school, isn't it?

I think you're saying power from two different primary substations was lost, which points to an outage at a bulk supply point. But the ROC's failure to fall back to UPS and, if needed, generators, is very much a Network Rail problem

 

[JamesT]

They key systems that can't cope with being turned off are the ones you protect first. An instant switch over to large capacity batteries skips the risk of a UPS standing in while you try and power up your power. If the batteries are calculated to last for xx hours, you may still need a generator (which I'd argue could be used to charge the batteries, so the key systems still pull power from the batteries, not the generator).

Something that switches over to batteries is a UPS!. The generator may well be fed through the UPS, but that's irrelevant to the point that batteries are not necessarily at the scale to provide power for a long-lasting outage, and certainly weren't in 2012 when the ROC opened.

 

[68000]

They key systems that can't cope with being turned off are the ones you protect first. An instant switch over to large capacity batteries skips the risk of a UPS standing in while you try and power up your power. If the batteries are calculated to last for xx hours, you may still need a generator (which I'd argue could be used to charge the batteries, so the key systems still pull power from the batteries, not the generator).

A UPS is made up of batteries

 

[bahnause]

This shows the problem with what might be regarded as overcentralisation. Historically the local signal boxes were too labour intensive and there was rightly seen as a need to get away with that. What did other countries do? I know Switzerland has signal panels in stations and people seem to appear from other jobs to set routes.

That hasn't been the case for years, except perhaps for local service disruptions. It simply doesn't have enough staff to handle anything more than that. SBB is centralized and operates four major control centers (West in Lausanne, Central in Olten, South in Pollegio, and East at Zurich Airport). These are structured—both technically and organizationally—in such a way that they can mirror and support one another. The server architecture is designed to be redundant. If, for example, the Central Operations Center in Zürich goes down, parts of the control system can be switched over to the screens at one of the other three centers (e.g. Olten, but who wants to go to Olten...). Staff would then be reassigned to workstations at the other operations center.

 

[Elecman]

6.6 kV? That's a bit old school, isn't it?

I think you're saying power from two different primary substations was lost, which points to an outage at a bulk supply point. But the ROC's failure to fall back to UPS and, if needed, generators, is very much a Network Rail problem

Most of Manchester City Centre is fed of a 6.6kV DNO distribution system!

 

[ox_chap]

In a situation like this, the idea that replacement buses may suddenly be possible, and cover a vast number of unavailable train journeys, is a non-starter. But what might help is making it clearer how to get from A to B using the buses that already run their standard routes and timetables. Maybe we need some sort of interactive form of https://busatlas.uk, that works within the National Rail website. So the journey planner has a button "Alternative by bus" option, that at least points to the routes and where the timetables might be found.

 

[sharpener]

It was that area of Manchesters Primary substation that was affected hence whole swathes of East Manchester went off supply. The ROC does have 2 independent HV supplies

As you said in post 150 they are separate 6.6kV feeders from alternate busbars in the same substation. Not what I would call truly independent though it might save you from a rogue pneumatic drill (if the routes are sufficiently well segregated).

Something that switches over to batteries is a UPS!. The generator may well be fed through the UPS, but that's irrelevant to the point that batteries are not necessarily at the scale to provide power for a long-lasting outage, and certainly weren't in 2012 when the ROC opened.

Also this.

 

[Justin Smith]

Not really. Almost no trains had their toilets permanently removed. Only some class 153s were affected.

I am not sure you can make that comment, as it could also affect the decision whether to bother putting toilets in ore not, for trains into the future. any train And how many in the future ? It's basic business / human nature : if stuff becomes more difficult and/or expensive people try to avoid it.

== Doublepost prevention - post automatically merged: 7 Aug 2026 ==

Not sure what your point is. The TOCs have no control over whether suppliers are compliant or not in terms of PSVAR or the newer PSVAIR. They will just use third parties to aggregate them.

My point is, as the Times article states, there will inevitably be fewer repalcement buses available.

 

[Horizon22]

But also, nothing is ever 100% reliable. You can build massively redundant systems, but sometimes things fail in a way that the standby doesn't kick in. From what has been said in this thread, the ROC appears to have reasonable redundancy (multiple feeds, UPS, generator), but for some reason it hasn't worked.

Then brutally, it isn't a "reasonable redundancy". As you say it's clear something has gone wrong but if the redundancy hasn't kicked in, it is hard to call it that, whatever the cause (human error or otherwise).

 

[JamesT]

Then brutally, it isn't a "reasonable redundancy". As you say it's clear something has gone wrong but if the redundancy hasn't kicked in, it is hard to call it that, whatever the cause (human error or otherwise).

I don't think something going wrong necessarily means preparation was incorrect. From the description we've had, NR had put in redundancy that should have been able to cope with a failure like this. I would consider that reasonable.
If they've undersized it or done something else that means it could never have worked then that wouldn't be reasonable and they should be hammered for that.

 

[jon0844]

Something that switches over to batteries is a UPS!. The generator may well be fed through the UPS, but that's irrelevant to the point that batteries are not necessarily at the scale to provide power for a long-lasting outage, and certainly weren't in 2012 when the ROC opened.

The UPS element is just the switch within the battery inverter element. There's no separate UPS. It's a switch that takes power from the battery instead of the grid within a matter of milliseconds. It can swap back and forth and, unlike a UPS, it doesn't act as an effective gateway until you can set up an alternative power source.

 

[Lawrence18uk]

It was that area of Manchesters Primary substation that was affected hence whole swathes of East Manchester went off supply. The ROC does have 2 independent HV supplies

Sounds like what happened at Heathrow where Hayes substation went down and the airport ground to a halt. (2025)

 

[hwl]

6.6 kV? That's a bit old school, isn't it?

I think you're saying power from two different primary substations was lost, which points to an outage at a bulk supply point. But the ROC's failure to fall back to UPS and, if needed, generators, is very much a Network Rail problem

SPENW has already said it was an outage in very much higher voltage cable over 2miles away

I don't think something going wrong necessarily means preparation was incorrect. From the description we've had, NR had put in redundancy that should have been able to cope with a failure like this. I would consider that reasonable.
If they've undersized it or done something else that means it could never have worked then that wouldn't be reasonable and they should be hammered for that.

There are certain kinds of cable fault (e.g. something affecting a single phase and/or earthing) that could easily leave the "brains" in a UPS /generator control or protection systems confused so they take no action as the fault doesn't fit the criteria they have been designed for or programmed with.

 

[Horizon22]

I don't think something going wrong necessarily means preparation was incorrect. From the description we've had, NR had put in redundancy that should have been able to cope with a failure like this. I would consider that reasonable.
If they've undersized it or done something else that means it could never have worked then that wouldn't be reasonable and they should be hammered for that.

Again "should"; at the literal time the redundancy was needed, it didn't work as intended. That, to me, is a failure and there's no other way of dressing it up.

If it had been successful, this wouldn't even be a thread currently numbering 11 pages on RailUK Forums because the public wouldn't have even noticed.

 

[JamesT]

The UPS element is just the switch within the battery inverter element. There's no separate UPS. It's a switch that takes power from the battery instead of the grid within a matter of milliseconds. It can swap back and forth and, unlike a UPS, it doesn't act as an effective gateway until you can set up an alternative power source.

You're just playing with semantics. A UPS also switches to providing power from the batteries within milliseconds, when it works. It will all be the same parts (some of the same companies serve both markets). Generally UPSes go inline because you want other features such as line conditioning of the power supply. What happens to your battery supply if the switch doesn't work?

Again "should"; at the literal time the redundancy was needed, it didn't work as intended. That, to me, is a failure and there's no other way of dressing it up.

If it had been successful, this wouldn't even be a thread currently numbering 11 pages on RailUK Forums because the public wouldn't have even noticed.

I'm not disagreeing that it's a failure. But that from what we currently know it's not one that was obviously preventable.