Report of collision Bedford (Elstow) - 19/06/26

[styles]

Seems like this will be a messy outcome.

 

[thenorthern]

Just out of interest, is TPWS fitted on the Midland Main Line?

 

[TreacleMiller]

This is why factors like signal sighting will form part of the investigation

Absolutely. But we both know it won't stop the usual "case closed" attitude from many on here and the press when they read that initial briefing.

 

[zwk500]

Just out of interest, is TPWS fitted on the Midland Main Line?

Yes, but only for signals protecting conflicting movements or crossovers, in line with the national standards.

 

[Signal Head]

I'd ask people to keep in mind there are many reasons why a spad can occur, beyond just driver error.

I do not know haw far the Hitachi unit was into the section either.

The report says it was standing next to signal WH152 (next one ahead of 154).

To have accelerated to 76mph having passed a Yellow aspect is strange, to put it mildly.

Also noting the estimated collision speed as 49mph, the Hitachi unit has been pushed over 3 carriage lengths beyond the signal at which it was standing, not exactly a low speed collision as has been suggested in some quarters from the damage sustained.

For comparison, Clapham was estimated at 35mph, the fact that the vehicles here are mostly structurally intact is testament to the huge steps forward that have been made in modern rolling stock design.

 

[Nicholas Lewis]

I think a SPAD was pretty much what we all expected.

We still dont why the 810 got got an incorrect warning though

The question remains, and hopefully the investigation determines, why he didn’t see or react to the red signal.

Going to be supposition though given the tragic cirumstances

 

[GraphitProjekt]

I do not know haw far the Hitachi unit was into the section either.

We do know it must have been ahead of WH154's overlap as the RAIB mention 1H46 passed the signal protecting Bedford S junction at yellow (that's WH356)

 

[AlterEgo]

I think a SPAD was pretty much what we all expected.

The question remains, and hopefully the investigation determines, why he didn’t see or react to the red signal.

The key question indeed. We do know the driver was alert and reacted to the sight of the train ahead, by applying the brake and reducing the speed of the train. We do not know about the driver's inputs or actions at the time they passed the red signal.

This will be a very long investigation and I expect a heavy focus on human factors on the risks of underload and the psychology of changing routes from a more intensive method of work involving a station stop onto a faster line where a driver may expect a clear run for 20 miles. Let's hope for a positive set of learnings from the incident, whatever the case, and for those still injured to make a recovery.

 

[Dave W]

We still dont why the 810 got got an incorrect warning though

I don't think their preliminary article suggested the warning was "incorrect", did it?

 

[VP185]

The key question indeed. We do know the driver was alert and reacted to the sight of the train ahead, by applying the brake and reducing the speed of the train. We do not know about the driver's inputs or actions at the time they passed the red signal.

This will be a very long investigation and I expect a heavy focus on human factors on the risks of underload and the psychology of changing routes from a more intensive method of work involving a station stop onto a faster line where a driver may expect a clear run for 20 miles. Let's hope for a positive set of learnings from the incident, whatever the case, and for those still injured to make a recovery.

Still a lot of unanswered questions. What about the signallers role? Were they aware? Was an emergency stop message sent?

 

[jfollows]

I don't think their preliminary article suggested the warning was "incorrect", did it?

No, just

The train had come to a stop unexpectedly because a fault had developed with the Automatic Warning System (AWS) equipment fitted to it, which caused the brakes to apply.

 

[ponponjo]

We do know the driver was alert and reacted to the sight of the train ahead, by applying the brake and reducing the speed of the train. We do not know about the driver's inputs or actions at the time they passed the red signal.

The report states

OTDR shows that there was a brake activation around 9 seconds before the collision

It doesn't confirm it was initiated by the driver - it could have been a DVD/DSD activation.

 

[Banana]

To have accelerated to 76mph having passed a Yellow aspect is strange, to put it mildly.

The driver would have been expecting a green like he would have got every other time he traversed that crossover

Hence he moved over the crossover and then acclerated like he did every other time. He was "in automatic mode"

 

[djw]

I don't think their preliminary article suggested the warning was "incorrect", did it?

The interim report says:

[1B67] had come to a stop unexpectedly because a fault had developed with the Automatic Warning System (AWS) equipment fitted to it, which caused the brakes to apply.

Unless I am misunderstanding, the AWS fault on 1B67 forced that train to stop. RAIB lists the investigation of this forced stop as one of the issues to cover in their ongoing investigation.

 

[AlterEgo]

That’s the risk which you crossover. You focus attention on the crossover speed, forget the previous signal was a single yellow and just power up once you know you’ve cleared the crossovers. That’s why TPWS should be installed at signals following a crossover.

Add to that, he’d probably done that move so many times, but never on a single yellow. Normally the fast trains would be well clear of the sections ahead.

Very much where I am on this. You then risk an immediate prejudgement of underload once clear of the crossover, and psychological relief, which could feed into the propensity to make an error by notching up automatically without taking into account the next signal aspect.

This is like navigating a tricky roundabout in a car - you have had to get into the correct lane, then jockeyed with traffic, then had to choose the correct moment to safely emerge, then perform lane discipline as going around the roundabout, and once you're off, you may fail to notice a hazard.

Still a lot of unanswered questions. What about the signallers role? Were they aware? Was an emergency stop message sent?

All to be investigated by RAIB, I am sure. As we now have the proximate cause, I think this will satisfy most observers for the time being, not least traincrew, who may have wanted assurance this was unlikely to be a rogue aspect or setback of signal.

 

[LNW-GW Joint]

Is the signalling at this location 3- or 4-aspect?
I can't see any reference to double yellow aspects in the initial RAIB report.

 

[AlterEgo]

It doesn't confirm it was initiated by the driver - it could have been a DVD/DSD activation.

Thanks, that's important - and noted. Though I would expect any DVD/DSD activation to birth a RAIB investigation strand on the medical history of the driver, which is not a listed part of the investigation.

 

[MadCommuter]

The driver would have been expecting a green like he would have got every other time he traversed that crossover

Hence he moved over the crossover and then acclerated like he did every other time. He was "in automatic mode"

We don't know this for sure but it does seem the likely reason.

 

[ainsworth74]

Is the signalling at this location 3- or 4-aspect?
I can't see any reference to double yellow aspects in the initial RAIB report.

4-aspect signalling as per the update today:

WH154 is a four-aspect automatic signal.

 

[soccermad]

The preliminary report says

AIB’s preliminary examination has found that train 1B67 was standing next to WH152 signal when the accident occurred. The train had come to a stop unexpectedly because a fault had developed with the Automatic Warning System (AWS) equipment fitted to it, which caused the brakes to apply.

 

[ainsworth74]

I would suggest that we have probably gone as far as is appropriate or reasonable regarding the drivers role in this. We know the signal was passed at danger, we know that the brakes activated 9 seconds before collision. We do not know why they activated when they did, why they didn't activate earlier or anything else. I think at this point it's best to leave that for the RAIB.

 

[VP185]

Is the signalling at this location 3- or 4-aspect?
I can't see any reference to double yellow aspects in the initial RAIB report.

Largely irrelevant at the 810 hadn’t cleared enough sections for a double yellow to show.

Had the 810 come to a stand at the next signal instead, or TPWS was fitted, I’m sure this incident wouldn’t have happened.

 

[AlterEgo]

Also noting the estimated collision speed as 49mph, the Hitachi unit has been pushed over 3 carriage lengths beyond the signal at which it was standing, not exactly a low speed collision as has been suggested in some quarters from the damage sustained.

For comparison, Clapham was estimated at 35mph, the fact that the vehicles here are mostly structurally intact is testament to the huge steps forward that have been made in modern rolling stock design.

I hope there are significant learnings about the crashworthiness of the stock as my initial reaction was this was a very hard hit, and for all vehicles to remain upright and intact is, as you say, testament to significant improvements. The lack of overriding of carriages saved numerous lives here, no doubt.

 

[Nicholas Lewis]

I don't think their preliminary article suggested the warning was "incorrect", did it?

No it didn't just that it had come to stand unexpectedly from a fault with its AWS system. Again RAIB will want to know why that happened and whether it was self contained to the train or initiated by an interaction with passing over an AWS inductor.

 

[4069]

Thanks, that's important - and noted. Though I would expect any DVD/DSD activation to birth a RAIB investigation strand on the medical history of the driver, which is not a listed part of the investigation.

The investigation will cover

the actions of those involved and any factors that may have influenced them

That will include the competence and fitness of the driver.

 

[Snow1964]

Still a lot of unanswered questions. What about the signallers role? Were they aware? Was an emergency stop message sent?

They would have not been aware of the train accelerating after passing over the crossover until it reached the next signal. It would just have been within the section (not where or what speed within the section). Unlikely anyone would notice reached next signal early if on single amber, if that matched default duration time for a train accelerating away under green.

There is separate question regarding if or when the crew of the 810 informed signallers it had come to a stop. Possibly if crew thought quick reset and restart they didn't tell signallers, as would have been concentrating on getting train problem sorted, and on way again. If they did inform signallers unclear where other train was at time of message.

No doubt answers will follow in due course

 

[E100]

Best to avoid speculation as to why the Corby train did what it did with driver input or otherwise.

The thing that is 'reassuring' is that it appears the signalling system was working even if there is still questions to be answered around siting, could the yellow have been interpretated as a green etc etc. The other 'reassuring' aspect is how different this could have been with older rolling stock and that it has structurally withstood the impact.

I would welcome insight with the investigation as to the impact of luggage space or lack their of in modern trains on safety following several reports that many injuries were caused by luggage and 'furniture' and if it is felt this may have had an impact.

I do have full confidence in RAIB as their professionalism is second to none.

 

[Signal Head]

Is the signalling at this location 3- or 4-aspect?
I can't see any reference to double yellow aspects in the initial RAIB report.

All four aspect, so far as I know. No double- yellow aspects involved in the relevant sequence.

Single yellow leaving the station is consistent with the junction signal ahead being approach released (which the report doesn't mention). Junction signal clears up to Y because 154 ahead is being held at R.

 

[dk1]

All four aspect, so far as I know. No double- yellow aspects involved in the relevant sequence.

Single yellow leaving the station is consistent with the junction signal ahead being approach released (which the report doesn't mention). Junction signal clears up to Y because 154 ahead is being held at R.

Yes there was no mention of the route indicator either which surprised me.

 

[AlterEgo]

I would welcome insight with the investigation as to the impact of luggage space or lack their of in modern trains on safety following several reports that many injuries were caused by luggage and 'furniture' and if it is felt this may have had an impact.

I do have full confidence in RAIB as their professionalism is second to none.

Several eyewitnesses reported seats having been thrown about, so I expect there to be some focus on this. RAIB as you say are very good and they also understand the media landscape they now operate in. I think the industry has responded very well to the incident.