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Report of collision Bedford (Elstow) - 19/06/26

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AlterEgo

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This is a very interesting, not merely hypothetical, question. I don't know if such a scenario was considered when the standards covering front end visibility from the track/ lineside were amended, and this concerns rear-end visibility, so I would rate this question as extremely relevant.

Perhaps a topic for a separate thread.
It's one of the more interesting questions which has been asked. It may or may not be considered by RAIB depending on the behaviour of the Class 360 and whether there is evidence the obstructing train was seen at all, or seen in good time, and what speed the 360 was doing.

These incidents always throw up a lot of edge cases and human factors; my mistaken impression - which has been helpfully corrected in the thread - was TPWS was fitted to all signals which were carried SPAD risk either by way of "likely serious consequence" (junction/crossing/terminus) or "simple higher risk of SPAD despite lower risk of serious consequences" (first signal after crossing from slows to fasts for example). It may transpire that there are further learnings on human factors which precipitate from this accident; the railway has done a lot of work on this in the past 20 years but in my view the focus still falls short of the gold standard - aviation.
 
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bengley

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Yes the questions which mainly need to be asked are

- What aspect was WH154 displaying
- If it was at danger as it should have been, why did 1H46 fail to stop at it?

These questions will be answered in due course and the facts of the incident will all line up.
 

mrshed

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Utter layperson here so please disregard as appropriate.

But having read in detail I don't see a lot of discussion about the AWS failure reported by the leading train, other than the obvious point of potentially what caused the train to stop.

But, my question is, is it a reasonable assumption that this fault was called because the visual (the signal) and the system (AWS) were reporting contradictory information? And if so does this have any implications for potentially a similar mismatch for the following train, on the same track?

In addition, is it standard procedure to stop the train in the event of such a failure? My reading says clear driver led decision making here but generally not *if* the failure was a clear train system fault, and to proceed with restrictions.

TL;DR could the AWS failure call possibly imply an issue with systems track side?

Again sorry if this is a naive question and I don't see it above.
 

bengley

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It's one of the more interesting questions which has been asked. It may or may not be considered by RAIB depending on the behaviour of the Class 360 and whether there is evidence the obstructing train was seen at all, or seen in good time, and what speed the 360 was doing.

These incidents always throw up a lot of edge cases and human factors; my mistaken impression - which has been helpfully corrected in the thread - was TPWS was fitted to all signals which were carried SPAD risk either by way of "likely serious consequence" (junction/crossing/terminus) or "simple higher risk of SPAD despite lower risk of serious consequences" (first signal after crossing from slows to fasts for example). It may transpire that there are further learnings on human factors which precipitate from this accident; the railway has done a lot of work on this in the past 20 years but in my view the focus still falls short of the gold standard - aviation.

To be honest there is an incredibly low risk indeed after crossing from the slows to the fasts as normally the train in front on the fasts would not stop following the junction. I would hazard a guess that almost every time a train crosses from the slows to the fasts there, WH154 would be displaying either a green or two yellows. I did used to sign this route, but it was a long while ago and I most often went Up Slow - Up Slow so don't have a huge amount of experience of this particular move (although I have done it)
 

Taunton

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Is there any knowledge of what the AWS issue was, presumably from the preceding signal, that caused the initial train to pull up quite sharply to report it?

It does seem a little coincidental to have two signalling inconsistencies at that same preceding signal for consecutive trains, firstly to cause a train to pull up, and then for the train behind to run at speed past the protection it should give for the train ahead.
As far as I understand EMR are running a full service today with the engineering block planned south of Bedford this weekend, for those wondering
Any preparations being done the previous evening in advance of this?
 

bramling

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I understand that this has not yet been confirmed.

The investigation will look into all possibilities.

Edit: just to add, the post you refer to can only be read in the context of what the replay system shows; no other inferences can be made, as the matter needs to be fully investigated.

It is often the case that knowledgeable internal railway sources divulge some relevant information before it's released, but we are keen to avoid speculation, and to stick to what is known. It is a difficult balancing act at times.

Worth remembering that after the Clapham Junction collision the signalman defended the signals to the last, essentially expressing doubt that the signal could possibly be displaying a proceed aspect even though a driver had just told him it was.

So I wouldn’t be ruling *anything* out until something official is released.

Of note is that Clapham was also triggered by an out-of-course stop, albeit a different cause. Whatever happened yesterday, it isn’t and won’t be a good look than an unreliable piece of equipment was the trigger for a chain of events.
 

norbitonflyer

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RTT doesn't show anything having passed Bedford South junction southbound in the previous 15 minutes before the 810 did so, except two Thameslink services which I would assume would have used the slow lines, so it does seem strange that the 810 had to stop at all.
 

yorkie

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Can I ask that just new information/updates are posted from now on please. This is to avoid duplication, speculation etc.

If it becomes too difficult to moderate, we will be forced to lock the thread.

Any concerns must be reported and no concerns should be replied to or referred to other than through the report system.

Any questions are best avoided because they will either be answered up thread or the answer will not yet be known.

Do we know why the Nottingham train had stopped in the first place? RTT doesn't show anything having passed Bedford South junction in the previous 15 minutes, except two Thameslink services which I would assume would have used the slow lines.
AWS fault as described earlier in the thread
 

DadimF

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Yes, the GWML ATP is still operational, both the track mounted and track side equipment and the class 80X trains. I use the term obsolete because it's not realistic to fit it anywhere else (the technology is out of date and it would have to be re-engineered using modern semiconductor parts), the better solution is to fit ETCS/ERTMS.


SPAD alarm equipment is a relativity new thing. Unless there has been a determination of a requirement to provide it because a signal has been identified as high risk, there will be no such equipment or systems fitted to conventional interlocking systems (relay / route relay / geographical etc.).

On these signalling systems, the only indication to the signaller that a train has passed a signal at red are noticing that either the track circuit(s) / axle counter section(s) beyond a red signal has/have become occupied when it/they should not have, or the berth track circuit / axle counter (that is on approach and leading up to the signal) has gone clear when it should not have.

Sometimes the Train Describer can help, but it depends on how it gets it's stepping information.
Just to add for others benefit, when adding TPWS to existing layouts our usual practice is to either cut the VCR into the lamp proving circuits or signal indications back to the panel only. This only gives either a blank or red signal indication to the signaller if TPWS has failed, but will not provide any alarm if a train spads as that would require additional alterations which is separate and usually deemed too costly to be considered.

Additionally, the GWML ATP system is a bit of a black art with few people who have in-depth knowledge of the system nowadays. My involvement with it is pretty much identifying if it's going to be affected by works and contacting those who do know to advise, otherwise we aim to leave it alone as far as possible.
 

CeeJ

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From the BBC, statement from Buckingham Palace:

His Majesty is greatly saddened by the rail crash in Bedford yesterday evening and is being kept regularly updated on developments.

His thoughts and sympathies are with the family of the deceased and with all those injured or affected by such a tragic incident.
 

hwl

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AWS fault as described earlier in the thread
Whether the fault was train or track side and the type of fault are some of the key questions. Certain types of track side fault may also have given the Cl. 360 driver no restrictive aspect warning.

A key learning may be that coming to a halt in the shortest distance possible after a suspected AWS fault may not be the best practice as the following train could also be impacted by a trackside fault. Possibly better to slow and contact signaller while proceeding at low speed if the signals infront permit to reduce the risk of being rear ended.
 

Omnishambles

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Looking back over the comments here and whilst questioning, inquisitive, curious, speculative, just to echo Yorkie’s requests above, this is just 16hrs after the incident, the RAIB report into Talerddig was only issued this week some 18 months post incident so this will not be concluded any time soon and definitive information will not be drip fed during that time.
 

yorkie

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A key learning may be that coming to a halt in the shortest distance possible after a suspected AWS fault may not be the best practice as the following train could also be impacted by a trackside fault. Possibly better to slow and contact signaller while proceeding at low speed if the signals infront permit to reduce the risk of being rear ended.
Would you like to post this as a new thread, and edit the above one to link to it?

(Failing that if anyone wants to explore this further please create a new thread in the appropriate forum section , and link to the above post)
 

bengley

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Looking back over the comments here and whilst questioning, inquisitive, curious, speculative, just to echo Yorkie’s requests above, this is just 16hrs after the incident, the RAIB report into Talerddig was only issued this week some 18 months post incident so this will not be concluded any time soon and definitive information will not be drip fed during that time.
Key facts will likely be released by RAIB very shortly (within a couple of weeks at most) which will answer most of the questions people are asking. The intricacies and recommendations will obviously not be published for a long while, unless a serious safety defect with a train or signal is found in which case urgent repairs will be required.
 

Deepgreen

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Was the question asked sympathetically or sneeringly?
Either way it is a very lazy question to ask - the stats are easily accessible and speak for themselves. Another factor that I haven't seen mentioned (but may have missed) is the weather and lighting - clear skies and bright sunshine from the side, so on the face of it excellent signal (and train ahead) viewing conditions.
 

Omnishambles

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Key facts will likely be released by RAIB very shortly (within a couple of weeks at most) which will answer most of the questions people are asking. The intricacies and recommendations will obviously not be published for a long while, unless a serious safety defect with a train or signal is found in which case urgent repairs will be required.
Agreed, RAIB statement, “we are investigating etc, etc“ detailing facts in the public domain alongside areas of investigation in particular
 

thedbdiboy

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The RAIB report on Talerddig came just a day before this terrible event and reading it is a reminder of just how thoroughly these things are investigated.

When it is eventually concluded we can expect not just a complete explanation of the sequence of events and immediate causes but also an analysis of a whole range of related factors, for example the behaviours of both types of rolling stock under collision conditions; how and what caused the various types of injuries and to what extent interior furniture of each train contributed to or mitigated these; and the cognitive load on drivers navigating the layout at this location (for example Fast > Slow > Fast working via Bedford with approach controlled signals).
 

MarkyT

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Signals are either 'Controlled' or 'Automatic'.
Controlled signals normally show a Red aspect and will only clear when the signaller has set a route from them (and the interlocking has determined it is safe to do so), and are required where there are points ahead of the signal.
Automatic signals operate purely from the train detection system, though there may be an Emergency Replacement facility on the panel which allows the signaller to hold them at Red. They normally display a proceed aspect and are replaced to Red by the passage of a train and remain so until the train has exited the section (to the next signal, plus it overlap). These can only be used to protect plain line, where the only obstruction ahead is another train.
The historic rule book distinction between automatic and controlled signals was removed some years ago and new plain line signals between junctions no longer carry the old 'auto' plate supplementing the number. In the days when Signal Post Telephones were the only voice comms between driver and signaller, this signage formerly allowed drivers to pass a signal at danger and proceed at caution if they couldn't contact the signaller.

Today's plethora of wireless communications makes that unnecessary, though many older 'auto' signals still carry the distinctive plate. it has no special meaning today. Such modern signals without auto plates may still operate automatically by default, however.

All signals on modern schemes must have a replacement facility, either individually or in groups. Very early colour light schemes did not have this at all, then after some incidents, a rule was introduced that a replacement facility must exist every so often (I think it was at least one signal every 5 miles).
When TPWS was fitted originally, the focus was on junctions, which were perceived to present a greater consequential risk in the event of a SPAD than a signal protecting just plain line, so those signals weren't generally required to be fitted with it.
In the risk model, head-on, crossing and merging conflicts are assigned a higher risk ranking than rear enders.
The risk assessment carried out when TPWS was rolled out determined that the cost does not justify the expense of fitting them.
Originally, each signal was assessed using a standardised process using statistical movement data, length, weight, speed, type and passenger occupancy of all trains that could plausibly conflict in the junction area protected by that signal to determine a risk score.

A threshold figure was agreed that would trigger fitment. It was set so that all signals protecting conflicting junctions and single lines would definitely qualify (Note existing flank protection measures in the interlocking that physically divert a runaway away from the conflict zone can avoid the need for TPWS protection, and junctions that allow divergences only are typically not equipped).

Some other plain line signals did qualify originally, notably those protecting selected platforms with a very busy mixed pattern of stopping and non-stopping services. Subsequent fitment concentrated on buffer stop approaches, permanent speed restrictions and additional overspeed protection at higher speed junctions (TPWS+). ~11000 of the ~40000 signals on the Great British national network are equipped to some extent today.
 
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Twingo37175

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I will add, I think an excellent job done by the moderators last night and today. Similar to Huntingdon, a lot happening in a short space of time and considerate moderation done through the forum (can't have been easy)
 

CalderRail

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The entire sequence from leaving the Bedford stop will be very relevant.
RAIB are nothing if not exhaustive. They will be looking at everything, including even things that aren't immediately obvious.

I do wonder if the other units that had been connected to these two involved earlier in the day will be looked at in case something was amiss there. It's notable that the service 1D43 that 1B67 was formed from also ran late for no casually obvious reason, and that the other 360 of the pair that normally run together was removed from service earlier in the day. But as I say, RAIB are thorough, they'll have it in hand.

The immediate question does seem to be coalescing around what aspect signal 154 was showing, but that might not be the only important factor; if for some reason the train didn't respond to driver controls, for example.
 

Mag_seven

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Would you like to post this as a new thread, and edit the above one to link to it?

(Failing that if anyone wants to explore this further please create a new thread in the appropriate forum section , and link to the above post)

@D365 has started a thread that is addressing this issue - it can be found here:

 

Haywain

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Either way it is a very lazy question to ask - the stats are easily accessible and speak for themselves. Another factor that I haven't seen mentioned (but may have missed) is the weather and lighting - clear skies and bright sunshine from the side, so on the face of it excellent signal (and train ahead) viewing conditions.
Such a question may well be asked in order to inform the wider public rather than because the answer isn't known.
 

Signal Head

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A historic rule book distinction between automatic and controlled signals was removed some years ago and new plain line signals between junctions no longer carry the old 'auto' plate supplementing the number.
Quite, I was trying to keep the explanation simple, I nearly included that but decided against it, particularly because this incident involves older signalling which will follow the original principles.

In the days when SPTs were the only voice comms between driver and signaller, this signage formerly allowed drivers to pass a signal at danger and proceed at caution if the SPT had failed and they couldn't contact the signaller. Today's plethora of wireless methods makes that unnecessary, though many older 'auto' signals still carry the distinctive plate; it has no special meaning today. Such modern signals without auto plates may still operate automatically by default, however. All signals on modern schemes must have a replacement facility, either individually or in groups. Very early colour light schemes did not have this facility at all, then after some incidents, a rule was introduced that a replacement facility must exist every so often (I think it was at least one signal every 5 miles).
I remember 'one signal in five' as the rule, and any others protecting hazards, such as a tunnel, or on electrified lines - a neutral section.
Still got my old books of BR principles and regional instructions around so I could probably check.
 

Haywain

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In terms of passengers this weekend, there were already planned Engineering works, so at least alternative routes and RRBs were already in place. However, will those Engineering works be cancelled (I assume yes, because RAIB won't want anything changing while under investigation) and what will the knock-on impact of that be?
Depends what works are - I believe at least part of it is work related to the new accessible footbridge at Luton which has no impact on the track or signalling but can't happen when trains are running.
 

bengley

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Quite, I was trying to keep the explanation simple, I nearly included that but decided against it, particularly because this incident involves older signalling which will follow the original principles.


I remember 'one signal in five' as the rule, and any others protecting hazards, such as a tunnel, or on electrified lines - a neutral section.
Still got my old books of BR principles and regional instructions around so I could probably check.

I'm sure someone will be along to correct me if I'm wrong, but I am sure there are signals on my route card which are plain line controlled signals as per the new standards, but still do not have TPWS.
 

adc82140

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I will add, I think an excellent job done by the moderators last night and today. Similar to Huntingdon, a lot happening in a short space of time and considerate moderation done through the forum (can't have been easy)
Seconded. There were at one point over 900 "guests" reading the forum, many of those will have been journalists trawling for info, which is why speculation needed to be kept off the thread.
 

Twingo37175

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Depends what works are - I believe at least part of it is work related to the new accessible footbridge at Luton which has no impact on the track or signalling but can't happen when trains are running.
Another was meant to be at Hendon as my lad was meant to be working tomorrow there. Not formally cancelled yet, but no blockades showing on signalmaps so assuming cancelled as the materials have not been able to get through.
 
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