Collision with tractor near Leominster (22/05/25)

[hornbeampark]

I can't see the tractor driver winning a "wrongful arrest" suit.

You’d be surprised. This is exactly the kind of claim the police settle every time to keep out of court.

 

[Tim P-H]

You must also remember that being arrested gives you protection under PACE, free legal support and other protection.

Not very nice, but..

 

[AdamWW]

It has been.

Leominster rail crash tractor driver to face no further action

The Department for Transport say the investigations into the crash are still ongoing.

www.bbc.co.uk

I did see that but it appears to be the only evidence - none of the direct communciations from the BTP seem to say who was arrested.

I agree that it's probably correct but I don't have sufficient faith in the media to take this as conclusive.
It doesn't seem out of the question that a journalist could have jumped to the same conclusion that the police are being accused of.
If I recall correctly the description of casualties in that article doesn't appear to be consistent with the RAIB report.

 

[35B]

I did see that but it appears to be the only evidence - none of the direct communciations from the BTP seem to say who was arrested.

I agree that it's probably correct but I don't have sufficient faith in the media to take this as conclusive.
It doesn't seem out of the question that a journalist could have jumped to the same conclusion that the police are being accused of.
If I recall correctly the description of casualties in that article doesn't appear to be consistent with the RAIB report.

Following the Cliff Richard case, police forces are increasingly cautious about naming those they've arrested. A single person arrested for an incident like this, and then released without charge, is never likely to reach that threshold.

 

[Annetts key]

But relying on the capability of the supposed professional staff involved didn't exactly 'help' with the safety of this crossing, did it.

And the failure of the signaller needs looking at.

The industry already knows that human error by signallers can and does lead to dangerous situations.

Unfortunately Network Rail's system for deciding which crossings need improvement work or even just proper maintenance is IMHO not fit for purpose. The assessment must be more than just a prescribed procedure that ends up just being a tick box exercise.

Part of the problem is that Network Rail has a limited budget for crossing improvements and the government reducing the funding for the railway has not helped.

High risk occupation / accommodation (user worked) crossings are having improvements carried out, in many cases, this is the installation of a VaMoS MSL (VAlue for MOney System Miniature Stop Light) system. These are overlay automatic MSL crossings that operate completely independently from any existing signalling system and cost far less than traditional MSL level crossing systems.

In addition to the limited funding, as I have hinted at, I think the assessment of which crossings are high risk is flawed.

There should be more than one person carrying out the assessment and each should do this completely independently from any other person and on a different day.

In addition, the type of signalling system and the method of protection should be included in the assessment, as should consideration of the past history of both the crossing (including levels of use throughout the year), the signalling system and any other thing that is relevant.

The land owner who has access rights should also be consulted.

Plus the staff carrying out the assessment must be encouraged to think outside the box so that it's not just a tick box procedure. No predefined procedure can cope with the realities of the real world where some circumstances may be unusual.

A VaMoS MSL system may not be appropriate or suitable for all occupation / accommodation (user worked) crossings. In which case other solutions would need to be considered.

 

[TheLastMinute]

Given there was no evidence of any sort of misuse on the part of the tractor driver, and multiple witnesses who saw the incident, what other explanation could there be? Even posters here are saying "well they were driving a vehicle that got hit by a train, why wouldn't you arrest them?" (while not considering alternatives like "the driver is telling the truth and the signaller did give permission to cross") which is simply a massive presumption. Nobody thought about arresting the signaller "just in case they had committed an offence".

This presumption is baked into attitudes elsewhere mostly as a by-product of NR's consistent campaign about how it's always the stupid irresponsible public causing danger at crossings. That's not a criticism of the campaign - it is quite right for them to educate and deter the public from very risky behaviour. But the most dangerous factor at level crossings is actually the people in charge and the systems at play, which can be overriden or ignored, and lax management who are either complicit to this behaviour or blind to it. There is a much bigger picture to consider.

I can think of several valid reasons why such an arrest would be warrantied and lawful and state that it was wholly down to assumption made by BTP on the day is rather unfair.

There are two tests that have to be applied for an arrest to be lawful. Firstly, there must be reasonable suspicion that the person has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an office. Note that this is not the same thing as proof or evidence. I'd suggest that if a driver is involved in a serious collision, it's not unreasonable to suspect that they may have done something wrong. I don't agree that the witnesses were enough to remove the suspicion as they all knew each other and therefore weren't independent.

The second requirement is the arrest must be necessary in order to prevent the person causing injury to themselves or others; preventing damage to property; protecting a child or vulnerable person; allowing a prompt and effective investigation; preventing the person from fleeing before questioning or trial. It may well be that the driver was refusing to talk or other cooperate with the police, or perhaps they were refusing to attend an interview at the station which BTP no doubt wanted to do. If, and it is an if, this was the case, BTP would have no choice but to arrest the driver in order to get a formal statement and recorded interview. This would also be the reason why the siginaller wasn't arrested when there was a suspicion that he had done something wrong, i.e. he may well have attended a voluntary interview thus an arrest wasn't necessary.

All of us are in the dark over the material facts of the case, what was said on the day and too whom and if there were any other factors that didn't affect the outcome. Without that knowledge, none of us can say if the arrest was warranted or not.

I don't know, but given that none of us were there and we're going by rather limited reporting I don't feel comfortable in making assumptions as to what the logic of the police was.

Skimming back through this thread it still doesn't seem to be entirely established that it was the tractor driver.



I'm not sure that it would be reasonable to consider them independant witnesses given they were involved in the crossing process.

Well, quite.

 

[35B]

I can think of several valid reasons why such an arrest would be warrantied and lawful and state that it was wholly down to assumption made by BTP on the day is rather unfair.

There are two tests that have to be applied for an arrest to be lawful. Firstly, there must be reasonable suspicion that the person has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an office. Note that this is not the same thing as proof or evidence. I'd suggest that if a driver is involved in a serious collision, it's not unreasonable to suspect that they may have done something wrong. I don't agree that the witnesses were enough to remove the suspicion as they all knew each other and therefore weren't independent.

The second requirement is the arrest must be necessary in order to prevent the person causing injury to themselves or others; preventing damage to property; protecting a child or vulnerable person; allowing a prompt and effective investigation; preventing the person from fleeing before questioning or trial. It may well be that the driver was refusing to talk or other cooperate with the police, or perhaps they were refusing to attend an interview at the station which they no doubt wanted to do. If, and it is an if, this was the case, BTP would have no choice but to arrest the driver in order to get a formal statement and recorded interview. This would also be the reason why the siginaller wasn't arrested when there was a suspicion that he had done something wrong, i.e. he may well have attended a voluntary interview thus an arrest wasn't necessary.

All of us are in the dark over the material facts of the case, what was said on the day and too whom and if there were any other factors that didn't affect the outcome. Without that knowledge, none of us can say if the arrest was warranted or not.

That's entirely reasonable. The nagging question, given the general pattern of events and the conclusions of the investigations, is why the pattern is as it is.

 

[josh-j]

The police are well known in activist circles to arrest people and then release "under investigation" for the maximum legally permitted time (I think a year) before pressing no charges. They will do this even if there could be no possible charges to press and no possible "investigation" to be undertaken

I can sortof understand the initial arrest, even if just because it could have appeared momentarily at the time that the driver had done something wrong. But it shouldn't have been left hanging over the guy for such a long time when clearly he did everything correctly.

 

[IanXC]

It's not about that, it's about the fact the police arrested the tractor driver when it turns out the person who actually caused the accident was miles away, because of their own preconceptions about who would be to blame, absent any evidence to support it. In fact, where vehicles have been struck by a train, it is frequently the case that the railway has been to blame and not the vehicle driver.

Report 04/2017: Collision at Hockham Road user worked crossing

Collision between a train and tractor at Hockham Road user worked crossing, Thetford on 10 April 2016.

www.gov.uk

Report 12/2018: Collision at Frognal Farm User Worked Crossing

Collision at Frognal Farm User Worked Crossing, 23 October 2017.

www.gov.uk

https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5b5891d740f0b6338b116dd3/R082018_180719_Stainforth_Road.pdf

Report 05/2025: Passenger train collision with a road vehicle at Redcar level crossing

Passenger train collision with a road vehicle at Redcar level crossing, Redcar and Cleveland, 1 May 2024.

www.gov.uk

Report 07/2016: Collision between train and tractor at Oakwood Farm User Worked Crossing

Collision between a train and a tractor at Oakwood Farm User Worked Crossing, Knaresborough, 14 May 2015.

www.gov.uk

Just a few non-exhaustive examples skimmed off RAIB's database which involved actual collisions in the last 9-10 years.

It's notable that the public gets told everyone misuses crossings all the time - maybe 3000 times a year - yet this method of working was patently unsafe, routine, and an accident waiting to happen. How many times a year did this happen at this signalbox alone? The call is coming from inside the house from NR's management, I think.

I suspect you may be falling into Confirmation Bias here, if the vehicle driver is at fault there will rarely be an RAIB investigation, whereas if the railway is at fault there will usually be one.

 

[AlterEgo]

I suspect you may be falling into Confirmation Bias here, if the vehicle driver is at fault there will rarely be an RAIB investigation, whereas if the railway is at fault there will usually be one.

There are only a handful of actual collisions each year so it is quite significant that there are about a dozen RAIB reports on this in the last decade. Yes, it is frequently the case that in the event of a collision the railway is responsible. Even posters here appeared open minded about this from the outset.

And before we say "well there are near misses too which are important" - It is actually the railway which is tending to suffer from confirmation bias, because I bet they don't count the however many hundreds of times those signallers operated their UWCs in such a grossly unsafe way every year as crossing misuse. And that's just the two boxes mentioned in the report. There is likely to be serious misuse in some other areas.

NR's safety culture is patchy at management level and many risks are in my view wrongly appraised. I am also not just sounding off about this becuase I feel like it, I used to work for NR and dealt specifically with safety related internal comms - including around public misuse of crossings (back then the boiling frog around safety was contractors on zero hours contracts unable to challenge the COSS).

 

[saltywalrus]

I'm actually quite worried, yet again, by both the frankly dangerous way in which the crossing was being protected in the run up to the accident and the fact that the RAIB haven't really dealt with that in their investigation. I place the blame for that with the signalling regs and the signaller's training (and possibly inexperienced management too?).

The simplest and most robust way to ensure signal protection is provided to a UWC in the middle of an Absolute Block section is to ensure that no train is accepted from the box at the other end of the section (as well as obviously maintaining one's own section signal at danger). If a 'line clear' hasn't been given, the section signal will be at danger. There is no need for a multitude of phone calls. To freely give a 'line clear' whilst still relying on a phone calls to arrange and remove signal protection is just a nonsensical way of working. No wonder the poor signaller's workload was through the roof. Giving permission to cross before arranging signal protection (and with a train accepted) is just the icing on the cake.

It genuinely terrifies me to think that crossings that I drive (trains) over elsewhere on the network are being managed in the same way.

Sorry to necropost, but why the hell isn't this the standard operating procedure? Why rely on verbal agreement between two signallers to provide full protection when there is already (150 year old!!) equipment that allows one signaller to be ultimately responsible for protecting both running lines?? Bizarre.

 

[Krokodil]

Yes, it is frequently the case that in the event of a collision the railway is responsible. Even posters here appeared open minded about this from the outset.

Probably because this isn't the first tractor/train collision at an occupation crossing where the signaller was found to be at fault.

Sorry to necropost, but why the hell isn't this the standard operating procedure? Why rely on verbal agreement between two signallers to provide full protection when there is already (150 year old!!) equipment that allows one signaller to be ultimately responsible for protecting both running lines?? Bizarre.

And why don't the modern block instruments have a reminder device to prevent line clear being given like some of the older ones did?

 

[35B]

Sorry to necropost, but why the hell isn't this the standard operating procedure? Why rely on verbal agreement between two signallers to provide full protection when there is already (150 year old!!) equipment that allows one signaller to be ultimately responsible for protecting both running lines?? Bizarre.

If you look at the report, you’ll see that the 7 UWCs between Leominster and Wooferton are shared between the boxes, in no particular order. Someone built in the need to coordinate to the design of that installation

 

[Swedenorer]

In addition to the limited funding, as I have hinted at, I think the assessment of which crossings are high risk is flawed.

Surely in a sense all occupation/user worked crossings are high risk? It doesn't matter how many times they are used and by what in each use the hazards are exactly the same even if the risks - line speed etc - may differ. In this case in the twenty first century we are left here with 9 in four miles which might have been fine in 1852 but now?

 

[saltywalrus]

If you look at the report, you’ll see that the 7 UWCs between Leominster and Wooferton are shared between the boxes, in no particular order. Someone built in the need to coordinate to the design of that installation

Having the UWCs be split between the boxes is obviously a silly arrangement, but I don't see how it prevents either signaller from using the block instrument to provide protection whenever one of their crossings is in use

 

[Krokodil]

If you look at the report, you’ll see that the 7 UWCs between Leominster and Wooferton are shared between the boxes, in no particular order. Someone built in the need to coordinate to the design of that installation

There's no need to coordinate anything. You just don't give "line clear" if you've authorised someone to cross, and you don't authorise someone to cross if you've given "line clear".

 

[Annetts key]

Surely in a sense all occupation/user worked crossings are high risk? It doesn't matter how many times they are used and by what in each use the hazards are exactly the same even if the risks - line speed etc - may differ. In this case in the twenty first century we are left here with 9 in four miles which might have been fine in 1852 but now?

Generally speaking for the whole of the network, occupation / accommodation user worked crossings are not all exactly the same though are they? Some are available to be used by the public, while others are only available to land owners or people working for or on behalf of land owners (there being no public right of way, the crossing having been provided because the railway cut private land in two).

Some are only for pedestrians while others are designed for road vehicles. Some are used every day, while others are only used occasionally, sometimes only a handful of times a year, if that.

With a limited amount of money available to spend on improvement works, how do you decide which to spend the limited funds on?

Keep in mind that there are thousands of this category of crossing.

 

[norbitonflyer]

Some are used every day, while others are only used occasionally, sometimes only a handful of times a year, if that.

This is a particualrly difficult example, as the report suggests usage is very "lumpy". It is only used a handful of times a year, but most of that handful occur within the space of a few hours - so it becomes a high risk on just one or two days a year.

The report says that in the previous 11 months there had only been 18 individual days on which any crossing requests had been made, with a total of 47 crossings (an average of less than three).

On the day of the accident, there had been six crossing requests in 35 minutes.

 

[TrainOnLine]

This is a particualrly difficult example, as the report suggests usage is very "lumpy". It is only used a handful of times a year, but most of that handful occur within the space of a few hours - so it becomes a high risk on just one or two days a year.

The report says that in the previous 11 months there had only been 18 individual days on which any crossing requests had been made, with a total of 47 crossings (an average of less than three).

On the day of the accident, there had been six crossing requests in 35 minutes.

A way forward for these less used , mostly dormant crossings could be perhaps requesting a crossing attendant (LXA) or MOM when usage becomes high after a pre determined trigger point of crossing requests is reached in a 12 hour period. Perhaps even a farmer calling control in advance of days where crossing usage could be high.

The risk factor of a crossing changes dramatically when heavy machinery is frequently crossing so a trained member of staff on site temporarily would be of use to help ease the burden on the signaller, hopefully(?) improved safety critical comms and general reassurance for everyone involved.

Seems a far cheaper option than infrastructure upgrades at every single UWC.

 

[35B]

A way forward for these less used , mostly dormant crossings could be perhaps requesting a crossing attendant (LXA) or MOM when usage becomes high after a pre determined trigger point of crossing requests is reached in a 12 hour period. Perhaps even a farmer calling control in advance of days where crossing usage could be high.

The risk factor of a crossing changes dramatically when heavy machinery is frequently crossing so a trained member of staff on site temporarily would be of use to help ease the burden on the signaller, hopefully(?) improved safety critical comms and general reassurance for everyone involved.

Seems a far cheaper option than infrastructure upgrades at every single UWC.

I see that being a challenge during harvest - what happens if NR can't provide the attendant on the day when the farmer needs to shift the crop? Especially if the farmer is dodging the weather to try to get the crop while it's actually marketable.

 

[Dave W]

Perhaps a middle ground - which I believe from reading other reports does happen - is for the farmer to designate a member of his own staff to operate the crossing on behalf of other users. First of all it would reduce gate misuse, and secondly would increase focus on one task as opposed to being one of several things to do, plus an extra pair of eyes.

You couldn't mitigate safety critical risk with it I guess. And the fact I've read it happens in other accident reports rather suggests it's not infallible, either...

 

[Krokodil]

Perhaps a middle ground - which I believe from reading other reports does happen - is for the farmer to designate a member of his own staff to operate the crossing on behalf of other users. First of all it would reduce gate misuse, and secondly would increase focus on one task as opposed to being one of several things to do, plus an extra pair of eyes.

But the signaller still needs to authorise the crossing to be used between each train so this doesn't reduce their workload in the slightest.

During harvest season many farmers already employ someone to work the crossing.

 

[Dave W]

But the signaller still needs to authorise the crossing to be used between each train so this doesn't reduce their workload in the slightest.

During harvest season many farmers already employ someone to work the crossing.

Fair enough, but is that not also true of deploying a MOM to the location? The local knowledge might give them a bit more understanding, but if the procedure in place to maintain safety is that every crossing must be phoned in, then the MOM should still be doing that too. I'd say it's inviting trouble to temporarily diverge from the local instructions in this way - it may have been workload which caused the signaller to forget this time, but what if another distraction meant he sent a train towards a crossing where a MOM was obliviously waving farm traffic back and forth because he wasn't expecting a train for another 10 minutes, or expecting to come to an understanding with the signaller beforehand?

Even if it was an agreed and understood process, a temporary, once or twice a year deviation from standard procedure is risky. Not that I have an alternative!

 

[Krokodil]

but is that not also true of deploying a MOM to the location?

Yes. One way or another the workload on the signaller (and hence the potential for a mistake) isn't being reduced by any of these ideas.

 

[35B]

Perhaps a middle ground - which I believe from reading other reports does happen - is for the farmer to designate a member of his own staff to operate the crossing on behalf of other users. First of all it would reduce gate misuse, and secondly would increase focus on one task as opposed to being one of several things to do, plus an extra pair of eyes.

You couldn't mitigate safety critical risk with it I guess. And the fact I've read it happens in other accident reports rather suggests it's not infallible, either...

The bit that suggestion does deal with, and was picked up in the report, is the sudden spike in workload. Making that more visible, so that the signaller knows they're in for a heavy shift, and so that the extra workload is visible to local management, would be a benefit.

As you say, though, it wouldn't address the safety critical risk

 

[Dai Corner]

The bit that suggestion does deal with, and was picked up in the report, is the sudden spike in workload. Making that more visible, so that the signaller knows they're in for a heavy shift, and so that the extra workload is visible to local management, would be a benefit.

As you say, though, it wouldn't address the safety critical risk

How about an extra signaller in the box to answer the crossing phones? Would he be able to observe train movements and give authority to cross?

 

[PhilipRdNGauge]

Yes. One way or another the workload on the signaller (and hence the potential for a mistake) isn't being reduced by any of these ideas.

The telephones on all these UWC could be routed to a single handset & if the Up/down block instruments show Line Clear or Train in Section, as that phone rings a big sign lights up saying "Reminder, Block Occupied Say NO". A little ESP32 & a cheap LED sign from Temu would do the job for £30, although Westinghouse or Siemens will probably charge £30,000 for it.

It seems that the main job of the signaller in this box is to answer that phone. They aren't working a complex junction or regulating a busy commuter line, they are accepting a train from up the line, setting their instruments & signals & passing it on to the next box. Due to fatigue, distraction or being told by a superior to ignore the rules they forgot they had accepted a train & that it was in section when answering that one call.

 

[IanXC]

The telephones on all these UWC could be routed to a single handset & if the Up/down block instruments show Line Clear or Train in Section, as that phone rings a big sign lights up saying "Reminder, Block Occupied Say NO". A little ESP32 & a cheap LED sign from Temu would do the job for £30, although Westinghouse or Siemens will probably charge £30,000 for it.

This is quite interesting actually - there are examples of gate boxes where examining the block indicator is the method used to determine whether it is safe to cross or not. So assuming it is relatively normal to insert another repeater block instrument into the block circuit then you could add something like a coded lock to a POGO crossing, with the phone call giving you a code to enter to enable the gate to open.

I'm no expert in Absolute Block signalling mind...

 

[Krokodil]

This is quite interesting actually - there are examples of gate boxes where examining the block indicator is the method used to determine whether it is safe to cross or not.

How do they handle unusually large or slow vehicles?

Do they have their own protecting signals, are they slotted with the controlling box's signals, or is there no signal protection at all, barring phoning the controlling box and asking for a block?

 

[Annetts key]

The telephones on all these UWC could be routed to a single handset & if the Up/down block instruments show Line Clear or Train in Section, as that phone rings a big sign lights up saying "Reminder, Block Occupied Say NO". A little ESP32 & a cheap LED sign from Temu would do the job for £30, although Westinghouse or Siemens will probably charge £30,000 for it.

It seems that the main job of the signaller in this box is to answer that phone. They aren't working a complex junction or regulating a busy commuter line, they are accepting a train from up the line, setting their instruments & signals & passing it on to the next box. Due to fatigue, distraction or being told by a superior to ignore the rules they forgot they had accepted a train & that it was in section when answering that one call.

Many signallers spend a high percentage of some shifts dealing with safety critical telephone conversations, that includes signallers in PSBs and signalling centres.

The problem with any technical / equipment solution is that what failure modes does it have / can it have? If it fails in such a way that it misleads a signaller, is that increasing the risk of leading the signaller to make an unsafe decision or action or inaction?

And any signalling equipment including level crossing telephone equipment has to comply with the industry standards. It takes a lot of effort for an equipment manufacturer or supplier to go through the procedure to get safety case acceptance.