Overspeeding at Cambridge Junction (Hitchin) -- 11/12/25

[zwk500]

Sorry, but if you are out on your own, they you are presumably competent to be so. In other words, you sign the route and know the meaning of signals, where speed limits are etc etc. That’s why training takes so long!

This assumes that the process and assessors verifying that drivers are competent to be out on their own are fit for purpose.

 

[choochoochoo]

This assumes that the process and assessors verifying that drivers are competent to be out on their own are fit for purpose.

This too. Given the job of the Driver Manager isn't exactly that well rewarded it often doesn't attract the high calibre of applicant.

Drivers earn more money than their managers. Most managers I know do it for the convenience of a mainly weekday 9-5 role (with on call sometimes) and a small level of autonomy about their working day.

 

[John R]

Sorry, but if you are out on your own, they you are presumably competent to be so. In other words, you sign the route and know the meaning of signals, where speed limits are etc etc. That’s why training takes so long!

I would have thought the tragic experience of Driver Hodder would have made it clear that the industry can and should look beyond suggesting it was all the driver’s fault.

 

[ainsworth74]

I would have thought the tragic experience of Driver Hodder would have made it clear that the industry can and should look beyond suggesting it was all the driver’s fault.

The industry I think (at least from the people I talk to at least!) generally does, but there are some people who seem to prefer blaming individuals rather than looking at systemic issues which might have put the individual into the place for them to make the mistake. Perhaps it makes it easier for them to think that it's simple failure of one person rather than there being more complex and difficult issues at the root.

 

[Twotwo]

It does seem like all the work done after Ladbroke Grove on driver training seems to be, in places at least, now unravelling. After many years where there seemed to be few incidents due to driver errors, we seem to be seeing this creeping in again. As with many things, Covid won’t have helped.

Specifically to GTR, as a regular GN user I’ve noticed a gradual decline in the standard of driving over recent years. Go back 10-15 years to FCC days and pretty much every train was driven the same, now there’s a lot of variability crept back in. Had one driver on an early-morning service a couple of weeks ago who seemed flustered that the PIS wasn’t working (379s), didn’t exactly inspire confidence that she manually announced the list of stations in the wrong order, and on several occasions announced “This is X” station when the train was actually somewhere else!

Was this on the 30th and the 06 01 departure from kings cross?

 

[SuspectUsual]

Is there not a bit of a design gap here where the PRI (preliminary route indicator) deliberately doesn't show the intended route unless a proceed aspect is showing on the junction signal, ie effectively making them redundant in the case of an approach controlled route? Surely it would be better, given that the fact that approach control is in use means "the system" knows what's planned, if the PRI also showed the intended route? Is there any possible downside to this?

 

[whoosh]

You only need a preliminary route indicator if a high speed (not approach released) junction. Then you have extra warning of the routing before you see the actual signal (which may be too late to stop at if a 'wrong route' is given).

Approach released from red gives plenty of time to stop if a wrong route is given.

 

[SuspectUsual]

You only need a preliminary route indicator if a high speed (not approach released) junction. Then you have extra warning of the routing before you see the actual signal (which may be too late to stop at if a 'wrong route' is given).

Approach released from red gives plenty of time to stop if a wrong route is given.

I appreciate that.

But would using it as a reminder of the intended route cause any other issues? If there's no downside, why wouldn't you do it? And it makes more sense in cases like this one where (i) its acknowledged that the sighting of the junction signal isn't great, and (ii) the route being taken is (nowadays) relatively unusual

Its an extra warning, just of something a bit different

 

[bramling]

Was this on the 30th and the 06 01 departure from kings cross?

Possibly, though I think it was more likely to be the previous week. It would have been that service though.

 

[johnnymo]

I can remember when WAGN (pre FCC) Cambridge Cruisers would approached Hitchin almost flat out (over 90), break hard as they went through the station and take the points so fast than anyone standing and not holding on would be flung across the carriage. This was the only service I have seen where most "standing" passengers regularly sat on the floor.

I am not sure what speed the train did take the points at (I assume 40) but was always worried that if the brakes failed there was no way to take the points or avoid them. After FCC took over the franchise drivers would coast into Hitchin and break gently and takes the points much slower.

 

[edwin_m]

Is there not a bit of a design gap here where the PRI (preliminary route indicator) deliberately doesn't show the intended route unless a proceed aspect is showing on the junction signal, ie effectively making them redundant in the case of an approach controlled route? Surely it would be better, given that the fact that approach control is in use means "the system" knows what's planned, if the PRI also showed the intended route? Is there any possible downside to this?

If no route has been set by the time the train passes the PRI, then the PRI can't show anything because it doesn't know what route is going to be set. Illuminating it when an approach-controlled route is set therefore creates an anticipation hazard, as the driver knows that if the PRI is set the signal will clear from red on approach. Except when for some reason it doesn't.

 

[Magdalia]

I can remember when WAGN (pre FCC) Cambridge Cruisers would approached Hitchin almost flat out (over 90), break hard as they went through the station and take the points so fast than anyone standing and not holding on would be flung across the carriage.

I commuted on the GN for 25 years, covering both the WAGN and FCC periods. This is not my recollection.

This was the only service I have seen where most "standing" passengers regularly sat on the floor.

That was because most GN commuters knew that there were people who died at Hatfield and Potters Bar because they were standing up.

 

[John R]

The industry I think (at least from the people I talk to at least!) generally does, but there are some people who seem to prefer blaming individuals rather than looking at systemic issues which might have put the individual into the place for them to make the mistake. Perhaps it makes it easier for them to think that it's simple failure of one person rather than there being more complex and difficult issues at the root.

Agree. Sorry, I was being critical of the poster who I quoted, but should have made that clearer.

 

[Twotwo]

Possibly, though I think it was more likely to be the previous week. It would have been that service though.

Haha okay, as this was me driving it on this day and the manual annoucements were not working. I deffo announced the correct station and the next stop as this had a random calling pattern fpk stevenage hitchin letchworth baldock ashwell royston and cambridge.

 

[bramling]

I commuted on the GN for 25 years, covering both the WAGN and FCC periods. This is not my recollection.

There was definitely a softening of driving during the late WAGN / early FCC days, but not quite as dramatic as suggested.

In olden days trains would likely still have been doing upwards of 75 mph by the time they encountered the single yellow at Hitchin South, which would be followed by a hefty brake application bringing the train down to 40-50 mph by bridge 99A (the footbridge), which was about the point the junction signal would clear if it was going to. It was then a case of coast through Hitchin and take the turnout (I guess a few drivers might have reaccelerated and braked again, but this would be the minority), or slam on the brakes to stop at K699.

What changed was defensive driving which would mandate a significant reduction in speed immediately upon encountering the double yellow.

Likewise, there was also a change for trains taking the 70mph DF to DS crossover at Hitchin South. In old days trains would hold their speed as long as possible (potentially 100mph), slam on the brakes on the approach to the points, pass over the crossover at 70 mph, and still have plenty of room to brake for Hitchin station. You don’t tend to see that now, though it does very occasionally happen. Now it’s much more common to pass over the crossover at about 40-50 mph. Again, defensive driving because the junction signal will have been showing a single yellow. This crossover is quite rarely used nowadays.

 

[Efini92]

In olden days trains would likely still have been doing upwards of 75 mph by the time they encountered the single yellow at Hitchin South, which would be followed by a hefty brake application bringing the train down to 40-50 mph by bridge 99A (the footbridge), which was about the point the junction signal would clear if it was going to. It was then a case of coast through Hitchin and take the turnout (I guess a few drivers might have reaccelerated and braked again, but this would be the minority), or slam on the brakes to stop at K699.

Tpws stopped that.