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Yesterday, I saw a High Peak Solo leaving Derby on the 114 service to Ashbourne. I noticed that the legal lettering stated the bus belonged to Eric W Bowers Ltd. Seems High Peak like to hang on to these defunct operators names!
www.railforums.co.uk
This thread should now only be used to discuss the wound down operation
Yesterday, I saw a High Peak Solo leaving Derby on the 114 service to Ashbourne. I noticed that the legal lettering stated the bus belonged to Eric W Bowers Ltd. Seems High Peak like to hang on to these defunct operators names!
www.railforums.co.uk
This thread should now only be used to discuss the wound down operation
The latest video by the London Transport Museum Friends is a talk by Austin Blackburn of Go Coach, who sold his business to Hulleys (staying on as Engineering Director for the combined operation) before later buying it back. Around 5 minutes of this much longer but insightful presentation talks quite openly about the period he was involved with Hulleys.
9m25 to 14mins - Talks about the sale of his Go Coach business to Hulleys, how it came about, how the company was then run (including talk of tax/bill/accounting), a request from Hulleys' owner to lend him £40k, and Austin subsequently acquiring Go Coach back for £1 ("and about £1.2m of debt").
17m35 to 18m55 - Talks briefly about what he feels Hulleys were doing wrong.
Austin Blackburn, Engineering Director at Go Coach of Swanley, a qualified engineer also assisting at the LTM Acton Depot sets the scene on the latest challe...
The latest video by the London Transport Museum Friends is a talk by Austin Blackburn of Go Coach, who sold his business to Hulleys (staying on as Engineering Director for the combined operation) before later buying it back. Around 5 minutes of this much longer but insightful presentation talks quite openly about the period he was involved with Hulleys.
9m25 to 14mins - Talks about the sale of his Go Coach business to Hulleys, how it came about, how the company was then run (including talk of tax/bill/accounting), a request from Hulleys' owner to lend him £40k, and Austin subsequently acquiring Go Coach back for £1 ("and about £1.2m of debt").
17m35 to 18m55 - Talks briefly about what he feels Hulleys were doing wrong.
Austin Blackburn, Engineering Director at Go Coach of Swanley, a qualified engineer also assisting at the LTM Acton Depot sets the scene on the latest challe...
First of all, it is good to get the version of events from the horse's mouth... confirming a lot of what suspected. The latter bit about what Hulley's were doing wrong... There's a good few posters on this forum who would do well to take that in.
Very interesting, but it would also be good to hear the other side of the story. In particular, was this all Alf's doing, or did he accept 'advice' he'd have been better avoiding. I'll be careful how I phrase this, but he seemed to feel he was doing his best to provide a bus service. Whether he intentionally made dubious decisions, or whether he was sold a vision and didn't take a step back before jumping in affects how you view this period. I'm quite surprised there was nothing further after the TC made their report to be honest.
It's interesting that he chose a picture of the 257 going up Winnats in explaining what went wrong - that service usually did seem well filled, at least in good weather. I'm also not 100% sure he's right in his view on what they were doing wrong. Most decisions on what routes to run were with the aim to maximise revenue. The problem was they couldn't timetable properly, leading to times changing frequently. What should have been viable services ended up alienating passengers and the revenue that should have been there never materialised. Certainly there were a few 'vanity' services, but they weren't the problem, not being able to maximise revenue of the core commercial routes due to poor management was.
First of all, it is good to get the version of events from the horse's mouth... confirming a lot of what suspected. The latter bit about what Hulley's were doing wrong... There's a good few posters on this forum who would do well to take that in.
Yes, Austin doesn't hold back with his opinions. I've been told exactly the same about what went on at Hulley's by another industry source, with added, "With what he's done he should be in jail".
Very interesting, but it would also be good to hear the other side of the story. In particular, was this all Alf's doing, or did he accept 'advice' he'd have been better avoiding. I'll be careful how I phrase this, but he seemed to feel he was doing his best to provide a bus service. Whether he intentionally made dubious decisions, or whether he was sold a vision and didn't take a step back before jumping in affects how you view this period. I'm quite surprised there was nothing further after the TC made their report to be honest.
It's interesting that he chose a picture of the 257 going up Winnats in explaining what went wrong - that service usually did seem well filled, at least in good weather. I'm also not 100% sure he's right in his view on what they were doing wrong. Most decisions on what routes to run were with the aim to maximise revenue. The problem was they couldn't timetable properly, leading to times changing frequently. What should have been viable services ended up alienating passengers and the revenue that should have been there never materialised. Certainly there were a few 'vanity' services, but they weren't the problem, not being able to maximise revenue of the core commercial routes due to poor management was.
Clearly, Austin was quite certain about where he stood and the accuracy of his facts to not only say them out loud, in public, but on camera too!
Ah yes... the old nugget of "why are they withdrawing that.... it's always full when I see it". Well, that's usually a very small sample set. A fairly busy journey of ENCST pass holders on a nice sunny day isn't going to pay for a brand new leased Evora on those days when the rain is sideways, or a midweek afternoon in June when many are at work, or the other more lightly loaded journeys even on a nice sunny Saturday.
I think Austin's overall point was partly aligned to what you say. They didn't focus on the core business enough, make sure it was managed closely enough to maximise revenue and ratchet down on costs. Instead, there was a constant need to "innovate" and as Austin said, if they ran more miles, they thought they'd make more money. Of course, they ended up running more miles on longer routes with leased vehicles is an expensive business and to get the revenue on new services from day one is a big ask. In the end, it was almost like a Ponzi scheme where new services and revenue was brought in to service existing debt but the new costs weren't being paid.
Given his comments about what went wrong, and how it wasn't immediately apparent, it seems fairly clear that he did subsequently identify what the issues were.
The latest video by the London Transport Museum Friends is a talk by Austin Blackburn of Go Coach, who sold his business to Hulleys (staying on as Engineering Director for the combined operation) before later buying it back. Around 5 minutes of this much longer but insightful presentation talks quite openly about the period he was involved with Hulleys.
Austin Blackburn, Engineering Director at Go Coach of Swanley, a qualified engineer also assisting at the LTM Acton Depot sets the scene on the latest challe...
Thank you for sharing. While I've little to share on the Hulleys going on, Austins comments are certainly very insightful on various topics. Glad to finally see someone speaking up on so many important issues.
That's the reason I'm wondering where these schemes came from. While I don't know Alf, from what I've seen and the limited interactions I've had with him, it doesn't seem likely that someone who spent most of their career driving buses can suddenly come up with various financial tricks and cons to keep things afloat for 5 years. My suspicion is he's listened to the wrong people and turned a blind eye. Doesn't make him any less liable, but does make him a fool rather than malicious.
And this is the reason for my comment about being surprised nothing further happened - it certainly seems like someone should be in jail if what has been reported is true. Not just the tax part, operating vehicles without insurance and so on.
The X57 Sheffield - Manchester was prime example of what went wrong, it was launched at the worst time to launch a route because of Covid, so carried fresh air, it was then extended to Manchester Airport (which it then became X1 to Ashbourne) before being withdrawn in 2022, oh & add in staff shortages Hulley's had to go with it that no wonder it failed.
A Sheffield - Manchester bus route via the A57 sounds great on paper, but there's nothing between Glossop & Sheffield, that such a route in future won't viable without funding from local authority.
There has been a Sheffield - Manchester coach route, (National Express, 350) but that operated further north, through Crowden, Langsett & Stocksbridge rather than the A57.
Ah yes... the old nugget of "why are they withdrawing that.... it's always full when I see it". Well, that's usually a very small sample set. A fairly busy journey of ENCST pass holders on a nice sunny day isn't going to pay for a brand new leased Evora on those days when the rain is sideways, or a midweek afternoon in June when many are at work, or the other more lightly loaded journeys even on a nice sunny Saturday.
Ah yes, the old nugget of having a generalised go at someone. The 257 up Winnats was Sundays only, aimed at a very specific market. You could argue that beyond Glossop (heading to Sheffield) it was harder to justify, but the Castleton to Glossop section filled a large gap in provision and was decently well used. There was an obsession with running buses over the Snake though - maybe two a day on summer weekends could work, but not a regular service.
Where you do have a point is things like getting brand new leased E200MMCs for the 55 - a service which could turn a small profit with paid-off buses and some council subsidy. Extending it to MacArthur Glen as part of this 'update' was more farcical.
I think Austin's overall point was partly aligned to what you say. They didn't focus on the core business enough, make sure it was managed closely enough to maximise revenue and ratchet down on costs. Instead, there was a constant need to "innovate" and as Austin said, if they ran more miles, they thought they'd make more money. Of course, they ended up running more miles on longer routes with leased vehicles is an expensive business and to get the revenue on new services from day one is a big ask. In the end, it was almost like a Ponzi scheme where new services and revenue was brought in to service existing debt but the new costs weren't being paid.
I think if the business had been properly run and funded from the outset much of what they ended up trying would have been viable. Indeed, I feel if they had the capacity to expand the number of vehicles they could have taken on more - having to give up tendered work to have enough buses to run commercial services never made sense to me.
From what I've been told, it started out in debt - although that doesn't actually seem to have ever been paid back - and never got on to the stable footing it needed.
My ultimate judgement - and in a way this aligns with my belief that Alf wasn't the mastermind of the financial scheming - is that it was in effect someone playing buses who didn't have enough business sense. Without Covid I'm sure it would still be going, but what played out in 2024 and 2025 would be starting to unfold now with the latest crisis foisted upon us by the Orange one.
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A Sheffield - Manchester bus route via the A57 sounds great on paper, but there's nothing between Glossop & Sheffield, that such a route in future won't viable without funding from local authority.
It actually only bridges a small gap, between Ladybower and Glossop, rather than Sheffield. The 257, which was extended every other hour, was actually run commercially by Hulleys prior to this. That there is demand for a fast Glossop to Manchester service isn't really in question, but how that is provided would be. I'd argue as much that starting such a service before the Mottram bypass was built was as much of a folly, as journey times were so unpredictable. Even then, improvements at Denton Island would really be needed to be able to have any control over journey times.
Operating such a long route when your depot isn't even on it, and with a small fleet and limited resources is never going to work either.
The Sheffield to Manchester coach route would arguably be less viable as a bus route as you are running further with fewer traffic sources in-between. Woodhead is probably a more reliable route time-wise as you avoid Glossop, but doing so deprives you of a significant traffic source on the way. Ladybower is also a big draw for walkers and tourists - markets a coach isn't really aimed at.
I suspect with franchising at both ends there never will be a service on this route, but something operated as a joint service between a Sheffield and a Manchester operator would make more sense. Having depots better placed on the route to fill in where traffic issues delay buses is pretty much a must.
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It would appear that Alf was declared bankrupt last year - I don't think this has been reported elsewhere on here. As he appeared to resort to personal loans to prop things up towards the end I guess this isn't too much of a surprise.
Leaving the small sections about Hulley's to one side, it's a very interesting talk.
How such a sensible sounding operator as Austin Blackburn was taken in shows how enthusiastic and convincing Alf was. I feel sorry for him insofar as his excessive optimism has left him bankrupt and in ill health - and destroyed a well respected small company leaving significant debts with those who trusted and supported him. Unfortunately that's so often the case when longstanding businesses fold as desperate fire fighting takes priority.
(I'd add that I saw a proposal for quite a long suburban route in Sheffield that never got off the ground. Looked good on a map, perhaps, but the timings would have been hard to achieve and unlikely to appeal to enough likely users to be viable. The enthusiasm for operating the buses exceeded the market and financial considerations.)
Ah yes, the old nugget of having a generalised go at someone. The 257 up Winnats was Sundays only, aimed at a very specific market. You could argue that beyond Glossop (heading to Sheffield) it was harder to justify, but the Castleton to Glossop section filled a large gap in provision and was decently well used. There was an obsession with running buses over the Snake though - maybe two a day on summer weekends could work, but not a regular service.
Where you do have a point is things like getting brand new leased E200MMCs for the 55 - a service which could turn a small profit with paid-off buses and some council subsidy. Extending it to MacArthur Glen as part of this 'update' was more farcical.
Sorry you took offence personally as it does relate to a common view espoused by many on this forum. Similarly, I wasn't just referring to the 257 but to all the flights of fancy that Hulleys embarked upon (or didn't in the case of the still born run...was it the X1?). However, if we do look at the 257 in isolation... even one full load on a good day doesn't offset the poor days when the weather is rubbish and passengers are thin on the ground.
As for new fleet on a service that was highly marginal like the 55... well, it was never going to justify that level of cost. There was a reason why for years under previous regimes, Hulleys had made very judicious use of the secondhand market.
think if the business had been properly run and funded from the outset much of what they ended up trying would have been viable. Indeed, I feel if they had the capacity to expand the number of vehicles they could have taken on more - having to give up tendered work to have enough buses to run commercial services never made sense to me.
From what I've been told, it started out in debt - although that doesn't actually seem to have ever been paid back - and never got on to the stable footing it needed.
My ultimate judgement - and in a way this aligns with my belief that Alf wasn't the mastermind of the financial scheming - is that it was in effect someone playing buses who didn't have enough business sense. Without Covid I'm sure it would still be going, but what played out in 2024 and 2025 would be starting to unfold now with the latest crisis foisted upon us by the Orange one.
Alf will have bought the business from the previous owners (Eades) and whether that was because the business was failing then (and so had debt) or was a decent business and he borrowed to pay for it, it will have started off with debt. If he bought it almost a leveraged buyout (in that he had little capital invested and therefore the business trading was servicing the borrowing) then it was always an uphill battle...although the TC stated that it did have sufficient financial standing so perhaps Alf did have the funding? C
The fact that Covid came as it did was obviously a massive impact. However, most operators did the sensible thing of battening down the hatches, and trying to weather the storm. Not Hulley's - they expanded with ever more high risk services - the Snake Pass route was one but then the abortive X1 Manchester to Leek and all the other forays which I forget about.
There were no other directors listed so not certain who would've been involved. From what was said by Austin, and the evidence of what we saw, it seems that there wasn't the financial rigour, and overly optimistic view of what could and should be done without sufficient business acumen. Covid wouldn't have helped the situation but I suspect the outcome may have been more protracted and perhaps a sale rather than outright collapse.
Sorry you took offence personally as it does relate to a common view espoused by many on this forum. Similarly, I wasn't just referring to the 257 but to all the flights of fancy that Hulleys embarked upon (or didn't in the case of the still born run...was it the X1?). However, if we do look at the 257 in isolation... even one full load on a good day doesn't offset the poor days when the weather is rubbish and passengers are thin on the ground.
As for new fleet on a service that was highly marginal like the 55... well, it was never going to justify that level of cost. There was a reason why for years under previous regimes, Hulleys had made very judicious use of the secondhand market.
Alf will have bought the business from the previous owners (Eades) and whether that was because the business was failing then (and so had debt) or was a decent business and he borrowed to pay for it, it will have started off with debt. If he bought it almost a leveraged buyout (in that he had little capital invested and therefore the business trading was servicing the borrowing) then it was always an uphill battle...although the TC stated that it did have sufficient financial standing so perhaps Alf did have the funding? C
The business was sold as a financially viable, going concern when the Eades Family sold it due to age/wanting to step back. Alf of course was a driver at Hulley's. I strongly suspect money was borrowed to facilitate that purchase.
The fact that Covid came as it did was obviously a massive impact. However, most operators did the sensible thing of battening down the hatches, and trying to weather the storm. Not Hulley's - they expanded with ever more high risk services - the Snake Pass route was one but then the abortive X1 Manchester to Leek and all the other forays which I forget about.
100%. Was the industry brilliantly supported during covid? No. Several other businesses went to the wall during/immediately after. Austin Blackburn is spot on... the operators who survived/prospered were the ones who got control of their costs (and maximised income, where possible, though that wasn't easy during the pandemic for obvious reasons).
Launching a new service with (I think) 3 PVR, having branded "the snake" logos printed/applied to every stop during a global pandemic when passenger numbers had dropped off a cliff... in control of costs?
Post the pandemic leasing brand new vehicles for routes that neither need or justify them... in control of costs?
Various vehicles purchased/painted/sold soon after... in control of costs?
An open topper bought / painted and put on a service with an unrealistic timetable... in control of costs?
There were no other directors listed so not certain who would've been involved. From what was said by Austin, and the evidence of what we saw, it seems that there wasn't the financial rigour, and overly optimistic view of what could and should be done without sufficient business acumen. Covid wouldn't have helped the situation but I suspect the outcome may have been more protracted and perhaps a sale rather than outright collapse.
Regardless what "advice" he was given, be it financially or commercially by well meaning enthusiasts, The Companies Act (2006) requires Directors of a company to exercise independent judgement.
I don't know Austin Blackburn, but i know of him. He has a good name in the industry, he has a clean bill of health with the regulatory authorities. I have no reason to doubt the content of his speech.
Some of the allegations he makes are serious, especially the "selling" of vehicles from Hulley's to Go-Coach at inflated prices (on paper) to make the value of the assets held by Go-Coach look higher than they actually are, and thus being able to borrow higher amounts, and would be of interest to the relevant authorities I'm sure.
As for new fleet on a service that was highly marginal like the 55... well, it was never going to justify that level of cost. There was a reason why for years under previous regimes, Hulleys had made very judicious use of the secondhand market.
Hulleys had actually bought plenty of new buses as well, but it looks like they'd bought one every year or two and kept it for a long time. The initial outlay to buy will be higher, but overall it's a better investment. I'm not a fan of relying on credit as it leaves you exposed if circumstances change. Used carefully it can be a good way to expand, but carefully is the operative word there. Leasing vehicles was a new thing brought in when Alf took over.
Alf will have bought the business from the previous owners (Eades) and whether that was because the business was failing then (and so had debt) or was a decent business and he borrowed to pay for it, it will have started off with debt.
I'm only going on what I've been told, but apparently Richard Eades actually loaned Alf the money to buy the business. This, and the fact no rent was ever paid on the depot, left him as a significant creditor.
My understanding is that the business as it stood was doing perfectly well running mostly tendered and school services - I think the 170 was their only commercial offering. There was a limited coaching operation which Alf closed down as he wasn't a fan of coaches. Alf got involved in running things under Richard Eades, kicked off the X70 which I actually felt was a decent idea and carried reasonable loads. This seemed to convince Richard he was the man for the job - there seems to be a pattern here, or people being convinced Alf knew how to run a bus company!
They closed because they weren't able to afford insurance for the fleet. I'm not sure how that ties in with having sufficient financial standing? Unless the TC also didn't get the full picture.
Austin seemed to reference dodgy accounting practices. I wonder if there is any link to the fact I recall the in-house accounts lady retired not that long after Alf took over. I'd imagine the average person is going to have no idea how to manipulate numbers to allow the various things that went on. It seems likely there was someone able to offer Alf the money he wanted to carry on playing. Having someone sensible looking after the money is maybe as important.
They closed because they weren't able to afford insurance for the fleet. I'm not sure how that ties in with having sufficient financial standing? Unless the TC also didn't get the full picture.
To satisfy the TC you are of good financial standing means you have to demonstrate you have money in the bank to the tune of £8,000 for your first vehicle and £4,500 for every additional vehicle. If you can evidence that, generally speaking you meet the TC requirement.
But that of course doesn't guarantee you've got enough money to cover your debts. You get a few bills in close together - loan repayments, insurance bill etc and thats the contents of your bank account gone...
Austin seemed to reference dodgy accounting practices. I wonder if there is any link to the fact I recall the in-house accounts lady retired not that long after Alf took over. I'd imagine the average person is going to have no idea how to manipulate numbers to allow the various things that went on. It seems likely there was someone able to offer Alf the money he wanted to carry on playing. Having someone sensible looking after the money is maybe as important.
Accounts must be independently audited. The "in house accounts lady" would not have been able to provide that independent audit.
Accounts are only audited annually. A lot can change in 12 months. A lot can be deliberately changed very quickly after the auditor has given your last set of accounts the once-over, should you want it to.
There are many companies out there who will loan you money. Banks at sensible interest rates, alternative lenders at less sensible rates where banks and other mainstream lenders consider you too risky to lend to.
Hulleys took out a £100,000 from thr Northern Powerhouse Investment Fund, backed by Government funding, in 2022.
They took out a further, substantial loan from "Finbiz Funding" who are an "award winning bad credit business loans service" in August 2024.
It's interesting that he chose a picture of the 257 going up Winnats in explaining what went wrong - that service usually did seem well filled, at least in good weather. I'm also not 100% sure he's right in his view on what they were doing wrong. Most decisions on what routes to run were with the aim to maximise revenue. The problem was they couldn't timetable properly, leading to times changing frequently. What should have been viable services ended up alienating passengers and the revenue that should have been there never materialised. Certainly there were a few 'vanity' services, but they weren't the problem, not being able to maximise revenue of the core commercial routes due to poor management was.
Regarding the bit in bold, Austin runs a successful bus company that is still in business, whereas Hulleys collapsed quite spectacularly, I think he knows what he's taking about.
No, but she, or someone like her, might have been in a position to question spending and be listened to, or at least open a crack of doubt. Someone offering loan after loan is maybe less likely to highlight the consequences of spending what you can't afford.
Interestingly, while browsing bankruptcies (slow day...) I spotted another company I was rather surprised to see listed, who also had large debts to several lenders, including these people.
I have no idea how much credence to give this, but there are a few comments on the post Bus and Train User did on the demise of Hulleys which suggest there may have been a degree of coordination in forcing the issue. If that is the case then Austin may not have a completely unbiased view on the matter. There are also a few posts which read as if they've come from Alf suggesting those responsible will be 'suitably dealt with'...
I caught a mid to late afternoon 257C (as the Sunday version was known) in decent weather from Castleton to Sheffield. Firstly it ran late, secondly it got stuck by the narrow turn off towards Winnatts and thirdly I was the only person on much of the way. Only me until Chapel then another person boarded going a short distance, then just me to a large Tesco somewhere past Chapel (Whalley?) where 2 more boarded who got off at New Mills. One small family boarded at Hayfield and got off at Glossop, one man boarded at Glossop and got off a few stops just up the road then apart from a couple of odds and sods it was just me. We arrived 30 minutes late into Sheffield by the way! Paints a picture in one journey of how bad this service was despite all the miles of leisure opportunities and towns with shopping facilities.
I caught a mid to late afternoon 257C (as the Sunday version was known) in decent weather from Castleton to Sheffield. Firstly it ran late, secondly it got stuck by the narrow turn off towards Winnatts and thirdly I was the only person on much of the way. Only me until Chapel then another person boarded going a short distance, then just me to a large Tesco somewhere past Chapel (Whalley?) where 2 more boarded who got off at New Mills. One small family boarded at Hayfield and got off at Glossop, one man boarded at Glossop and got off a few stops just up the road then apart from a couple of odds and sods it was just me. We arrived 30 minutes late into Sheffield by the way! Paints a picture in one journey of how bad this service was despite all the miles of leisure opportunities and towns with shopping facilities.
Maybe potential customers had little faith that the operator would turn up. After all, if you lack that confidence, for a trip into the Peak District you aren't going to choose the bus. I recall one journey from Chesterfield to Bakewell where I caught the 170.. it was clear my bus was the only one on the route. In Bakewell I looked to catch the 218 (from another operator). That seemed just as bad. High Peak appeared enough route to Buxton, so I just went there instead.
Maybe potential customers had little faith that the operator would turn up. After all, if you lack that confidence, for a trip into the Peak District you aren't going to choose the bus.
That's pretty much what I mean when I say I feel Austin is slightly wide of the mark. He's correct that the services being run weren't bringing in revenue to cover their costs, but to me there was an underlying issue with passenger retention. Many of the services should have been viable for a lower cost operator such as Hulleys, but they simply weren't run well enough to instill passenger confidence.
Maybe the solution was to run fewer routes and concentrate more on the most profitable ones. I think the fact Hulleys felt the need to stretch to run things like the 55 and 80 shows there is an opening in this area for a lower cost commercial operator, however that may change if the East Midlands mayor is prepared to pump money in to the system to cover the costs of the larger operators to provide the same services.
I agree. It was about an hour long, and I was only going to listen to the Hulley bits, but it was so interesting, I listened to it all. Austin made several good points about where the bus industry was heading - staff retention, impact of diesel price increases on small operators who can't afford to hedge contracts, the prohibitive cost of installing electric chargers for small companies, the difficulties in recruiting potential managers etc etc.
That's pretty much what I mean when I say I feel Austin is slightly wide of the mark. He's correct that the services being run weren't bringing in revenue to cover their costs, but to me there was an underlying issue with passenger retention. Many of the services should have been viable for a lower cost operator such as Hulleys, but they simply weren't run well enough to instill passenger confidence.
Maybe the solution was to run fewer routes and concentrate more on the most profitable ones. I think the fact Hulleys felt the need to stretch to run things like the 55 and 80 shows there is an opening in this area for a lower cost commercial operator, however that may change if the East Midlands mayor is prepared to pump money in to the system to cover the costs of the larger operators to provide the same services.
I'd say Austin's record speaks for itself. An operation built up over 16/17 years from one vehicle now providing a lot of commercial school services with a solid revenue base.
Over time it's proved a relatively stable network to which local bus services have been added.
Hulleys on the other hand had a good rump of work, commercial and tendered local bus yet chose to expand without the resources or capital to sustain that. It takes many years for a new service to become commercially sustainable and it works on the bus being visible. It therefore needs to turn up when the timetable says it will, day in day out. That is a lot of sunk cost being put into a service. In my experience, most small independents do not have the financial capability to sustain this - which is why their new services don't survive. It's a long gap to bridge between starting up and being viable. Think three to four years.
Had Hulleys wanted to expand their operation into new markets, they needed to open up another site and establish a long term base in that area so they could attract drivers. They could then have retained what was there and added to it rather than the course they took.
The fleet composition was an issue too - plethora of mid to end life buses which ran until expiry, or new ones on lease which couldn't be paid for. The random selling of vehicles pointed to cashflow issues well before the end and ISTR making a prediction that the business would simply run out of cash and stop trading around 12-18 months before it happened.
It's depressing how a lot of bus enthusiasts enter the world of bus operation with grand ideas yet fall flat on their faces. I say a lot as some do manage to succeed.
I'd say Austin's record speaks for itself. An operation built up over 16/17 years from one vehicle now providing a lot of commercial school services with a solid revenue base.
Over time it's proved a relatively stable network to which local bus services have been added.
Hulleys on the other hand had a good rump of work, commercial and tendered local bus yet chose to expand without the resources or capital to sustain that. It takes many years for a new service to become commercially sustainable and it works on the bus being visible. It therefore needs to turn up when the timetable says it will, day in day out. That is a lot of sunk cost being put into a service. In my experience, most small independents do not have the financial capability to sustain this - which is why their new services don't survive. It's a long gap to bridge between starting up and being viable. Think three to four years.
Had Hulleys wanted to expand their operation into new markets, they needed to open up another site and establish a long term base in that area so they could attract drivers. They could then have retained what was there and added to it rather than the course they took.
The fleet composition was an issue too - plethora of mid to end life buses which ran until expiry, or new ones on lease which couldn't be paid for. The random selling of vehicles pointed to cashflow issues well before the end and ISTR making a prediction that the business would simply run out of cash and stop trading around 12-18 months before it happened.
It's depressing how a lot of bus enthusiasts enter the world of bus operation with grand ideas yet fall flat on their faces. I say a lot as some do manage to succeed.
Hulleys had their core routes and their bread and butter but chose to chase new opportunities which effected the level of service they delivered to the services and passengers they should have been looking after.
It was clear on their social media page the frustration from local passengers annoyed when buses didn’t turn up, or for a bus to break down and not be replaced because there was nothing available.
They had it and let it slip away.
The X57 could have worked and I honestly think there was potentially a market to link the likes of Glossop to Sheffield but it would have required time and reliability to get off the ground - and of course no travel limitations with Covid etc.
As for your last point, having worked in the industry for many years, a very good friend and former manager of a large independent firm now long gone used to say all the time that bus enthusiasts will never make decent managers/owners because they are too sentimental, I can fully understand that given the recent company’s that have ceased trading!
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That's pretty much what I mean when I say I feel Austin is slightly wide of the mark. He's correct that the services being run weren't bringing in revenue to cover their costs, but to me there was an underlying issue with passenger retention. Many of the services should have been viable for a lower cost operator such as Hulleys, but they simply weren't run well enough to instill passenger confidence.
I used to be horrified at some of the complaints on their Facebook page and now they responded to them. Absolutely shocking!
Seem to remember several complaints about the last trip of the day failing because the windscreen wipers on the bus stopped working so the entire trip was cancelled without a drop of consideration for the people relying on that service.
Couldn’t a replacement vehicle have been sent out someone asked, the reply was yes but that would have been at an extra cost to us.
It’s the not the way to do things.
Never met or spoke to ‘Alf’ but from the way he handled social media he came across as someone with no empathy or care for his passengers.
It's depressing how a lot of bus enthusiasts enter the world of bus operation with grand ideas yet fall flat on their faces. I say a lot as some do manage to succeed.
When learning the first principles of running a business the first lesson should point out the three factors vital to success.
1. Making or buying the product to be sold.
2. Selling it
3. Accounting for it.
4 is good or bad luck.
In Hulley's case they had a product but they couldn't provide it at the times and places they said they would.
They tried to sell a product they couldn't reliably provide - and then tried to create more!
They seemed to have only rudimentary awareness of financial realities.
However we now know that "they" was largely one man with an immense enthusiasm for running bus services who was probably a good driver but found he couldn't manage to do all those 3 elements by himself and found it difficult to manage others to do so.
He wasn't the first, and certainly won't be the last, to find there's a whole lot more to effective management of any business than it seems looked at from the perspective of employees and customers!
A few people on here seem to think I'm criticising Austin. I'm not, I'm just saying that the reason many services were running below a viable level is that passengers gave up or wouldn't trust them. In most cases the revenue base was there and services had been commercially sustainable, but that was undone by trying to cover too many routes.
Other than the X57, most of the mileage introduced was to cover services which a larger operator had deemed unviable. Things a smaller, lower cost, operator should be able to at least break even on and for which there was already an established customer base. They made it work on the 55, the 84 was doing well and of course the 170 is now run commercially by Stagecoach so that shows there is a market where they could easily have made money.
Even the 80 should have worked out well - Stagecoach had tinkered with the route a few times to make it viable to them but ultimately failed. Some of the mileage was already covered by the 84, so extending it made sense. But they tried to eeke too much out of too few buses, and had dropped guaranteed income by handing a tender back to free up resources.
Evening and Sunday work was also added, but this was in the main BSIP funded so should have been profitable if they'd asked for the right amount of money to provide it.
The problem, to me at least, seemed to be that in trying to cover so much they left themselves in a position of not being able to respond when things went wrong. There wasn't a spare bus / disc / driver when the 80 was delayed by roadworks, or to cover the 172 when the usual Saturday traffic caused chaos. Drivers got tired of being run ragged trying to keep it all going so left for other operators. I'm told also that Alf wasn't the best person to work for unless you were someone he liked.
All this led up to what Austin diagnosed - buses not covering their costs - but without that context you might just think they were running what they liked with no regard for whether there was demand or not.
Yes, there were services that would never be viable, but they tended to be fairly niche and take limited resources. The 7 ran once a day on Saturday. The 257C covered a route Hulleys had previously run as a tender (the Sunday 61) and attracted enthusiasts who would at least cover some of the costs. But did these really account for more than a small proportion of the debt? Would Hulleys still be here if they hadn't run what you could call 'vanity' services at the weekend? To me, they didn't help, but failing to run the core network reliably was what killed them.
I do recall when the X57 was originally announced Alf claimed to have 3 years funding. How true that was only he knows, and how much that was banking on money from TfGM that they didn't receive is another question. The mistake of course was pressing on when Covid hit.
It's interesting to note that most of the fleet that Andrews took on it still in service, but it's much less intensively worked and Andrews seem to have good engineering facilities so are able to better maintain the buses. Indeed, compared to the existing Andrews buses the Hulleys fleet was fairly new!
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