Yep, some good info in these slides backing that up https://www.thepwi.org/wp-content/u...-applying-within-Network-Rail_Niall-Fagan.pdf
McNaughton quoted here https://x.com/philatrail/status/1847175990126006489?t=0SY5n5qBDnRcSkz0WrjdRQ&s=19
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Restarting HS2a
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Yep, some good info in these slides backing that up https://www.thepwi.org/wp-content/u...-applying-within-Network-Rail_Niall-Fagan.pdf
McNaughton quoted here https://x.com/philatrail/status/1847175990126006489?t=0SY5n5qBDnRcSkz0WrjdRQ&s=19
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Snow1964
Established Member
Couple of written Parliament answers on HS2 phases
www.theyworkforyou.com
www.theyworkforyou.com
Find it slightly strange that 6 properties were sold back in 2022, unless they were not really needed for proposed route
High Speed 2 Line
Department for Transport written question – answered at 2 December 2025
www.theyworkforyou.com
High Speed 2 Line
Department for Transport written question – answered at 2 December 2025
www.theyworkforyou.com
Find it slightly strange that 6 properties were sold back in 2022, unless they were not really needed for proposed route
chris2
Member
Completely agree.
Hopefully they will find a way to quietly extend the powers in the same spirit as…
Snow1964
Established Member
I think we are going to see a toned down version for HS2 north, especially now the East Coast route is seeing capacity problems.
It is interesting that HS2 media releases in recent weeks all mention adding capacity to congested network first, and faster journeys are now almost at bottom of the list of benefits. I suspect the new management wants to both get costs under control and justify why it needs the northern sections, pending releasing the pause review.
By toned down I mean a 320-350km/h line, rather than one engineered to be 400km/h capable. Slightly tighter curves, no need for the extended anti supersonic sound tunnel portals etc. Basically cheaper to build.
My own feelings is a section to just south of Crewe with spurs to existing line and a short extension of eastern spur to join existing rail line will happen. And I wouldn't rule out a new eastern line on a cheaper simpler alignment either.
It is interesting that HS2 media releases in recent weeks all mention adding capacity to congested network first, and faster journeys are now almost at bottom of the list of benefits. I suspect the new management wants to both get costs under control and justify why it needs the northern sections, pending releasing the pause review.
By toned down I mean a 320-350km/h line, rather than one engineered to be 400km/h capable. Slightly tighter curves, no need for the extended anti supersonic sound tunnel portals etc. Basically cheaper to build.
My own feelings is a section to just south of Crewe with spurs to existing line and a short extension of eastern spur to join existing rail line will happen. And I wouldn't rule out a new eastern line on a cheaper simpler alignment either.
Farnborough
Member
Much of this London investment has been funded by local surcharges, and community infrastructure levies from other developments. eg for the Elizabeth Line, London contributing about 70% of the costs.
weeklycommuter
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The following answer given by the Rail Minister Lord Hendy at the Transport Select Committee on 9 July 2025 (Oral evidence: Delivering major infrastructure: learning from HS2) shows the Government view is HS2 should be fast and not ultra fast and that the original objective of ultra fast was a mistake.
Given that this is a railway forum (and that I am ashamed to say that I hadn't heard of the gent) I did wonder whether somebody with a Spoonerish turn of mind had edited the quote... It would be a great synonym for someone from the steam age!
weeklycommuter
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The House of Commons Transport Select Committee has the following eleven members including Baggy Shanker MP for Derby South. The Headquarters of Great British Railways will be in Derby which is also the site of the Alstom factory at Litchurch Lane.
Hendy and Wild then go on to claim that the bat shed was one of the expensive structures required because they couldnt avoid sheephouse wood at those speeds, which is total nonsense for several reasons. They were also seemingly unaware of what the norm for alignment speeds were in europe at the time.
However, I think this talk of speed and why didnt they build a slower line is a sop to the treasury to say they know how to keep costs under control. Changing the alignment now makes no sense: if they are building it, it will still be 400kmh alignment, very likely without slab and probably for a 300/320 design speed, though it'd be capable of more even without slab.
especially given all the land-take work already done, however I can't help feeling that relaxing the vertical curvature limit using the existing route might reduce the height of embankments and depth of cuttings and hence require less spoil movement.
Equally, I hate to suggest anything which causes a redesign and yet more money flowing out for no rail reward!
HSTEd
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Of all the "gold plating" on the alignment, slab track is one thing that actually provides operational benefits.
Wasn't a Phase 2a slab track contract already signed? If so, trying to get out of it would seem to be a fools errand.
If Phase 2a does take place, we will also have all the plant and machinery from phase 1 to install slab track.
I can't see the saving from abandoning slab now being significant, personally.
However, I think its probably moot.
If there was a serious chance of HS2 Phase 2a continuing, it probably would have happened by now.
Wasn't a Phase 2a slab track contract already signed? If so, trying to get out of it would seem to be a fools errand.
If Phase 2a does take place, we will also have all the plant and machinery from phase 1 to install slab track.
I can't see the saving from abandoning slab now being significant, personally.
However, I think its probably moot.
If there was a serious chance of HS2 Phase 2a continuing, it probably would have happened by now.
Snow1964
Established Member
They have been carrying on with the complicated bridges at main roads, motorways and railways on section north of delta junction. They might have moved earthworks equipment further south.
There are very few big structures between Hansacre and Crewe, so should be much quicker to build that section, perhaps just 3-4 years for a trackbed. Virtually all the earthworks on Southern section will be completed during 2026 (already started landscaping in parts) and they is a vast amount of newish excavators and ADT (articulated dump trucks) that can be used on HS2a if go ahead happens during 2026
Does phase 2a need to go beyond the Norton Bridge area? It seems that bypassing Stafford is agreed to unlock more capacity, but does joining the WCML at Crewe South have any benefits over joining just north of Norton Bridge?
I also wonder whether the greater capacity constraint is the layout of Crewe station. To me, I'd rather spend the money on totally remodelling Crewe instead of an extra pair of tracks between Norton Bridge and Crewe (which may be required eventually, but I would argue that even phase 2b should come higher up the priority list than the northernmost part of phase 2a, in terms of capacity benefits).
I also wonder whether the greater capacity constraint is the layout of Crewe station. To me, I'd rather spend the money on totally remodelling Crewe instead of an extra pair of tracks between Norton Bridge and Crewe (which may be required eventually, but I would argue that even phase 2b should come higher up the priority list than the northernmost part of phase 2a, in terms of capacity benefits).
Trainbike46
Established Member
Changing routes costs money, so you should only do it if you have a very good reason. That's why I'm very sceptical a slightly shorter phase 2a will actually save any costs.
I do agree remodeling Crewe, including an appropriate number of 400m platforms to enable splitting joining is a good idea.
Snow1964
Established Member
From memory really need to join north of Baldwins Gate as line is lot straighter after that, don't really want to come off a 200mph line just before a speed restricted curved section.
Yes, ideally Crewe needs some 405m platforms (two units are normally nearer 402m over couplers, and need a couple of extra metres if joining/splitting). There is a trade off of the cost of not providing these platforms vs expensively varying the rolling stock order which is based on 200m units. Without them would need some units that are around 260-280m units. The pendolinos probably have another 13-18 years life, so what happens needs to be considered soon.
Alternative is some fancy cascade under GBR, eg order 280m high speed sets for continuation beyond HS2, and reallocate some 390s (perhaps London to Cardiff, or electrified Bristol), then releasing bimodes to replace voyagers which by then will be 30+ years old. But discussing cascade possibilities is going into speculation, so not for this thread. However it does demonstrate extending HS2a but not completing it becomes interlinked with discussing suitable stock for services continuing beyond the end of what is built.
Peter Sarf
Established Member
It does seem likely that changes to the design of Phase 2a at this stage is too late.
What went wrong perhaps was that no one was prepared to dive in and start looking at problems earlier, when changes to outline plans could be made.
One thing I dread is downgrading the alignment in a way that stifles performance later. BUT a decision has to made on all things as to how much to future proof the infrastructure.
I think one thing to hang on to would be passive provision. For example a perfect alignment but without slab track, just ballasted track. Slab track is a costly disruptive thing to add later (decades later) but does not completely destroy the capability to be added later. Realigning the route, once open, for higher speeds, is impossibly complex I would assume.
How much was wasted on HS2 being future proofed ?.
Obviously George Stephenson and friends got it wrong when laying out the WCML. BUT would the thing have got built if they had gone for a straighter faster and more expensive route in the first place ?.
What went wrong perhaps was that no one was prepared to dive in and start looking at problems earlier, when changes to outline plans could be made.
One thing I dread is downgrading the alignment in a way that stifles performance later. BUT a decision has to made on all things as to how much to future proof the infrastructure.
I think one thing to hang on to would be passive provision. For example a perfect alignment but without slab track, just ballasted track. Slab track is a costly disruptive thing to add later (decades later) but does not completely destroy the capability to be added later. Realigning the route, once open, for higher speeds, is impossibly complex I would assume.
How much was wasted on HS2 being future proofed ?.
Obviously George Stephenson and friends got it wrong when laying out the WCML. BUT would the thing have got built if they had gone for a straighter faster and more expensive route in the first place ?.
Technologist
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Asking a slightly different group of people selected by the same systems and culture that gave us HS2 is unlikely to result in the cost savings we need to make rail construction costs politically palatable. The line speed of the track is about reason 43 as to why HS2 was so expensive, the leading reasons are basically that our construction industry is pretty inefficient and our planning system slow and disjointed.
One of the best examples of how to do big stuff is the US Ballistic Missile program in the 1950's (they built 3 types of ballistic missiles and fielded them in about 5 years), the general in charge mapped the process to try to work out how it could get done but then essentially demonstrated that it couldn't be done with the existing process. So they ripped up the process where they could and used work arounds where there was statute law in the way. That is how you actually get stuff done, old systems need to die.
If you actually want to do high speed rail the following is probably required.
1: Have an actual strategic plan, e.g. national strategic network which connects all conurbations with 500,000 people to 300kph high speed rail, those conurbations all have a mass transit system, everything over 100,000 has a 200kph connection to the network. GBR should do this, said plan could actually be created in about 2-3 weeks if you really wanted to.
2: Appoint some people who have actually built some infrastructure quickly and cheaply (in global terms, not people who have sorted CrossRail), e.g. get the people who built AWS or similar, pay them what the market demands, let them hire who they want, sack them if they don't work. The rail industry people are there to solve problems not to lead, at least not until stage 5.
3: Do what the people who have built AWS advise, particularly re: scheduling, funding method, contracts and where technical expertise is built.
4: Have a rapid escalation route when what they want to do conflicts with other government departments, all of them have royally messed up so frankly they should defer to he methods that have been proven to work. The project is being done for the government, it can change the law and in most cases a minster can overrule or expedite virtually every process. You can do things quickly if you want to see COVID measures, and in this context quick also means cheap.
5: Start off with a containable project with a willing local or regional area, success breeds momentum and authority. Rinse and repeat.
This should actually be a core government policy, HS2 is part of the national malaise, "we can't even build a railway" is one of the most frequently quoted reasons for despair with politics. Actually demonstrating that you can build a railway is actually more politically important than the actual economic benefits or costs of the railway itself.
One of the best examples of how to do big stuff is the US Ballistic Missile program in the 1950's (they built 3 types of ballistic missiles and fielded them in about 5 years), the general in charge mapped the process to try to work out how it could get done but then essentially demonstrated that it couldn't be done with the existing process. So they ripped up the process where they could and used work arounds where there was statute law in the way. That is how you actually get stuff done, old systems need to die.
If you actually want to do high speed rail the following is probably required.
1: Have an actual strategic plan, e.g. national strategic network which connects all conurbations with 500,000 people to 300kph high speed rail, those conurbations all have a mass transit system, everything over 100,000 has a 200kph connection to the network. GBR should do this, said plan could actually be created in about 2-3 weeks if you really wanted to.
2: Appoint some people who have actually built some infrastructure quickly and cheaply (in global terms, not people who have sorted CrossRail), e.g. get the people who built AWS or similar, pay them what the market demands, let them hire who they want, sack them if they don't work. The rail industry people are there to solve problems not to lead, at least not until stage 5.
3: Do what the people who have built AWS advise, particularly re: scheduling, funding method, contracts and where technical expertise is built.
4: Have a rapid escalation route when what they want to do conflicts with other government departments, all of them have royally messed up so frankly they should defer to he methods that have been proven to work. The project is being done for the government, it can change the law and in most cases a minster can overrule or expedite virtually every process. You can do things quickly if you want to see COVID measures, and in this context quick also means cheap.
5: Start off with a containable project with a willing local or regional area, success breeds momentum and authority. Rinse and repeat.
This should actually be a core government policy, HS2 is part of the national malaise, "we can't even build a railway" is one of the most frequently quoted reasons for despair with politics. Actually demonstrating that you can build a railway is actually more politically important than the actual economic benefits or costs of the railway itself.
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stevieinselby
Established Member
I hesitate to say they "got it wrong" – the circumstances 150 to 200 years ago were very different to what they are today. The requirements on a railway when trains can reach the dizzying speeds of 75mph but struggle on any kind of gradient, and civil engineering is done by hand rather than by machine, mean that the route they built probably was the right one for the time. No point in spending lots of money creating a straight line route when your trains can cope with curves easily – planning for a 200mph railway in the middle of the 19th century would be like us building HS2 on a 500mph alignment today, if not even more preposterous.
One of the biggest problems now is sunk costs – every time we go back to the drawing board, we incur a load more costs. That's why the continued downgrading of the scope never realised any meaningful savings, because if we cut the plan down to something that was ostensibly cheaper to build, the re-design and all associated consultation and legal work had to be done again and negated the savings that could have been made. Any further de-scoping of the project is likely to come up against the same issue – you'll effectively be starting from scratch, but bearing the weight of all the costs of the project so far, and what you'll get out of it will bring significantly fewer benefits than the original plan, making it harder to get through a cost-benefit analysis.
There's some decades-old joke format where a lesson is passed from predecessor to follower but never put into practise. 'Ultra' fast speed may be one of them, that we will say in the future we wish we'd listened to those who told us to do it.
They had a consistent plan while the price was theoretical, followed by a mess of changes as costs became real and a short termist need to reduce yearly spending at the expense of overall spending came in from above. The people who were prepared to dive in were not told to cheapen it, they were told to future proof the infrastructure. It was lauded as a product to last 200 years. I doubt they are allowed to factor in another few billion in the costs of national level politicking, plus the increased exposure to inflation.
There are no UK proven methods for going through a town or national park at surface level. This only works in China, which does stick to its original plans with their idea of how well thought out it was at the start. A core government policy here has to survive multiple PMs, and too many don't on the grounds of yearly spending.
joieman
Member
I might add that YouTuber Jago Hazzard suggested having a permanent state-owned civil engineering company so that a civil engineering team doesn't have to be assembled from scratch every time a railway gets built.
Snow1964
Established Member
By far the best example I know of was the CEGB (Central Electricity Generating Board, back in 1960s and 1970s. It went something like need 100 power stations each with 30 years life, so every 4 months teams moved onto specifying, planning, designing etc the next one.
No hiring in consultants or wasting time start/stopping, just building up skilled knowledge in house, feeding back to minimise problems on next one, keeping the process going.
To some extent BR's electrification teams in early 1960s worked like that on rolling basis, with enough autonomy and knowledge to alter the odd mast or gantry if local problem was found to provide a solution. Not the modern fad of stopping, rehiring an outside consultant designed, and expensively going back months later to fit the missing mast.
Basically and projects undertaken on a rolling basis, always faster and cheaper than intermittent start/stop approach. Also it makes no economic sense to set up a production line or invest in high output equipment if not sure if it will be needed in 2 years time.
But who else will hire all those consultants?!
Perhaps some will return to the world of 'regular'/ 'permanent employment' from which they were 'let go' as a consequence of 'stop-go' decision-making/ indecision??But who else will hire all those consultants?!
It would be better and some say that the alignment may need to change slightly if not slab (so extra cost, changes to the hybrid bill), but it could be where a lot of the open section costs are. There were reports it needs a lot of piling and in the NAO report of 2019 suggests that the depth of the railway and the need for the soil to settle for the more precise earthworks slab requires was a factor in delay and cost. It may be that the slab adds more cost upfront hidden in the cost of earthworks separate from installing the system. The government & treasury are going to want to show some saving even if it makes no long term sense.
The contract was the same one as phase 1, would have covered both phases. Wonder what the cost of reducing it down to phase 1 was.
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Its quite common to future proof the alignment - most continental mainlines being designed around the time or since were 350+. HS2 supposedly did a comparison of a 360 route compared to 400 and supposedly wasn't a lot in it. I do feel whilst there may be a little extra there, its not significant in the overall costs.
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The downgrading of scope was part of an overall plot to devalue the project, rather than realise savings. Given who wrote the reports that explained the reasoning and was the adviser at the time. Some of the claims in those papers are highly questionable and I'll maintain were intentional misinformation.
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HSTEd
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Of course it will be difficult to determine whether or not that accuracy was truly a result of specifying slab track, or whether it was the result of attempting to specify such a comically high speed.
I personally believe the slab track is being scapegoated for the costs associated with the speed and other specifications.
Of course, 400kph, even assuming magical instantaneous acceleration, would save a grand total of 160 seconds over a 360kph alignment over the 160km or so between London and Birmingham.
Even compared to 320kph it saves only six minutes.
The NAO are scapegoating? I think that's rather fanciful. Its not a well known point, so they failed in their devious mission to hoodwink the public if so.
Slab has far tighter tolerances, that isn't speculation or opinion, and digging down into the soil as much as they are will have consequences. Piling will be expensive and time consuming.
HSTEd
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I don't think NAO have the resources required to launch a truly independent investigation of the costs of every engineering decision made on the project (vs the alternatives), many of which are interlocking. To do so would require time and resources comparable to that required to design the project in the first place
They will be heavily dependent on calculations and analyses provided by HS2 itself.
EDIT: Do you have a copy of this report, I must admit I don't recall reading it, but then it was many years ago at this point!
EDIT #2: The NAO report from 2020 does mention that slab track is more expensive, but only as one of several factors is increased costs, without any attempt to quantify them. From a skim of the text they don't appear to claim that it is a particularly important factor, but I may have missed it.
To clarify: I don't think the NAO are scapegoating, but I think the backers of restarting HS2 are searching around for a totemic scapegoat that can be axed in the hopes that this will be enough to get the politicians to restart the scheme. I do not think that this approach will work.
Slab has far tighter tolerances, true, but slab has far tighter tolerances when designed for 400kph than when designed for 320kph.
I'm arguing that the latter is the dominant factor, in so far as track systems have increased the project cost.
The apparently ruinous cost of slab track hasn't been cited in many of the other schemes to use it in the past, so I remain skeptical.
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joieman
Member
Precisely: Jago's idea was to keep all the talent in one place.
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