Tavistock - Bere Alston Feasibility Study in jeopardy. But what could be done if the money was available?

[Stephen42]

Ignoring post 712 that makes clear that it is the Gov who have stopped the process and the Councils have suspended work until the political climate changes, which it will at the next election, although not necessarily in rail's favour of course. Rishi Sunak killed it by calling an early election, when the business case was incomplete and no decision was taken either way.

What business case was in progress at the time of the election? Typically anything already funded and in progress continues (sometimes publication might be delayed).

The Restore your Railways allocated funds were mostly already spent. Much on projects that were well progressed before the fund was announced that got rebadged under it. At cancellation there was £85million, not enough to fund the current estimate for Tavistock let alone all the other projects competing over the same funding pool. The fund always seemed likely to create false hope for schemes selected with only a tiny proportion that would ever be delivered.

Since cancellation extra railway funding to reopen Portishead has been announced. While there may not be a railways named programme, the government could fund a reopening for Tavistock if they were convinced a sufficient case existed. Network Rail's comment was only that they should find a funding mechanism before progressing to a detailed study.

Which returns to the biggest issue for this reopening is that it's not good value for the investment. There can't be many successful rail opening business cases where the biggest benefits are to car users rather than rail ones (which is the case for Tavistock in the 2022 SOBC).

 

[Bald Rick]

As for a 'net improvement to society,' society won't notice any difference, unless the specific Tav budget is tracked, to find out what it has been spent on instead.

There ha snever been a specific budget for Tavistock. There is never a specific budget for anything until it is formally announced to go ahead.

The Ashington reopening makes no difference at all to Tavistock. It is purely a local benefit.

Most projects are for local benefit. But that benefit improves society overall more than the cost of providing it. Overall, the UK is better off.

May I ask if you have read the Green Book?

 

[uglymonkey]

Surely no railway in the country even breaks even? They are all " Shored up" by taxpayers as the fare box doesn't even begin to cover it. Perhaps we need another Beeching ( or Serpell?) to try and balance the books?

 

[martin butler]

Surely no railway in the country even breaks even? They are all " Shored up" by taxpayers as the fare box doesn't even begin to cover it. Perhaps we need another Beeching ( or Serpell?) to try and balance the books?

That's most likely a subject for another thread, But I don't think any government would want the political fallout from mass closures again.

 

[zwk500]

Surely no railway in the country even breaks even? They are all " Shored up" by taxpayers as the fare box doesn't even begin to cover it. Perhaps we need another Beeching ( or Serpell?) to try and balance the books?

Theres a very good argument that a significant amount of the network should be reappeared against the green book criteria.

However, it is false to say that only a railway that covered its farebox costs would receive a positive appraisal.
It is also important to note that an existing line would not need to account for the infrastructure to be built for it to operate, so the vast majority of the rail network as is would likely receive a positive appraisal as well.

Tavistock's issue is the up front capital cost of being able to access a useful station site.

 

[Bald Rick]

Surely no railway in the country even breaks even? They are all " Shored up" by taxpayers as the fare box doesn't even begin to cover it. Perhaps we need another Beeching ( or Serpell?) to try and balance the books?

It depends what you are measuring. Complete guess by me, but I should think that around 90% of route mileage and stations, and 99% of passenger journeys, are made on railway that would break even or better on the socio-economic appraisal methodology in the Green Book.

 

[Xavi]

Surely no railway in the country even breaks even? They are all " Shored up" by taxpayers as the fare box doesn't even begin to cover it. Perhaps we need another Beeching ( or Serpell?) to try and balance the books?

It’s logical to say that no UK railway covers all costs if costs are apportioned fairly, but being ‘shored up’ is illogical. Tax revenues would plummet without rail and road infrastructure. Remember, roads typically take 100 years to pay for their capital cost, even without any finance or maintenance contributions. I prefer the German approach, where public infrastructure is seen as an essential economic enabler rather than a tax burden.

 

[duffield]

That's most likely a subject for another thread, But I don't think any government would want the political fallout from mass closures again.

A far right government with an extreme hatred of the unionised railways might take up the old route favoured by Daily Telegraph letter writers: Phase 1, mass closures of "unprofitable" routes, Phase 2, (totally impractical) convert some of them to express coachways etc. With phase 2 never happening. I wouldn't rule anything out with the current political situation.
Anyhow I suppose this is getting offtopic, although it is sort of relevant in that the chances of a future government being more favourable to any reopenings is probably zero

 

[Brush 4]

Yes, this isn't really about Tavistock or any rail line, it is about how society should be run. I can't accept that fiscal criteria should be the only criteria or, that it should be the top priority either. As Xavi said, thinking of expenditure as a tax burden is the problem. It is, indeed an economic enabler.

Fiscal policy alone takes no account of social benefits, they are seen as irrelevant and a side issue. The ethical and moral aspects are similarly brushed aside, because it can't be quantified. Hard monetary dogma doesn't take any of that into account, except in purely financial terms. If only UK governments would stop bad mouthing taxes as a Bad Thing, we would have a far healthier and fairer world. They ie we, pay for the good stuff that we use and benefit from. Completely logical really.

Whoops, way off topic.

 

[35B]

Yes, this isn't really about Tavistock or any rail line, it is about how society should be run. I can't accept that fiscal criteria should be the only criteria or, that it should be the top priority either. As Xavi said, thinking of expenditure as a tax burden is the problem. It is, indeed an economic enabler.

Fiscal policy alone takes no account of social benefits, they are seen as irrelevant and a side issue. The ethical and moral aspects are similarly brushed aside, because it can't be quantified. Hard monetary dogma doesn't take any of that into account, except in purely financial terms. If only UK governments would stop bad mouthing taxes as a Bad Thing, we would have a far healthier and fairer world. They ie we, pay for the good stuff that we use and benefit from. Completely logical really.

Whoops, way off topic.

The point is that the Green Book does take those other factors into account. It does so in a way you disagree with, but the choices about priorities still have to be made somehow.

 

[grahamshevlin]

Has there ever been a feasibility study specifically for Bere Alston to Tavistock?

 

[Magdalia]

I prefer the German approach, where public infrastructure is seen as an essential economic enabler rather than a tax burden.

However much public infrastructure is regarded as an economic enabler, it still has to be paid for, and up front, while the benefits arrive later, usually much later.

That funding for the up front costs can come from taxation, but, for public infrastructure, borrowing is more usual. Here the contrast between Germany and the UK is marked. Germany's debt is just over 60% of their GDP, the UK is almost 100%. The bond markets charge Germany less than 3% for 10 year money, but they charge the UK way over 4% for 10 year money.

Whether you like it or not, the interest on that borrowing is a tax burden, it is much bigger for the UK than for Germany, and the UK's existing financial position means that its ability to borrow more to fund public infrastructure is severely constrained. That means that the UK has to be very choosy on which projects to fund and which projects have to wait, even if they are economic enablers.

 

[Bald Rick]

Yes, this isn't really about Tavistock or any rail line, it is about how society should be run. I can't accept that fiscal criteria should be the only criteria or, that it should be the top priority either. As Xavi said, thinking of expenditure as a tax burden is the problem. It is, indeed an economic enabler.

Fiscal policy alone takes no account of social benefits, they are seen as irrelevant and a side issue. The ethical and moral aspects are similarly brushed aside, because it can't be quantified. Hard monetary dogma doesn't take any of that into account, except in purely financial terms. If only UK governments would stop bad mouthing taxes as a Bad Thing, we would have a far healthier and fairer world. They ie we, pay for the good stuff that we use and benefit from. Completely logical really.

Whoops, way off topic.

I asked a few hours ago if you had read the Green Book. Evidently the answer is no, otherwise you wouldn’t have written this latest post, as it is wrong. Look it up and read it.

 

[Brush 4]

If there is a link, please post it. It sounds like an explanation of the status quo though. If so, it is that I disagree with.

 

[Bald Rick]

If there is a link, please post it. It sounds like an explanation of the status quo though. If so, it is that I disagree with.

The Green Book

UK government guidance on appraisal.

www.gov.uk

Not sure how you can disagree with somethign you havent read.

 

[Xavi]

However much public infrastructure is regarded as an economic enabler, it still has to be paid for, and up front, while the benefits arrive later, usually much later.

That funding for the up front costs can come from taxation, but, for public infrastructure, borrowing is more usual. Here the contrast between Germany and the UK is marked. Germany's debt is just over 60% of their GDP, the UK is almost 100%. The bond markets charge Germany less than 3% for 10 year money, but they charge the UK way over 4% for 10 year money.

Whether you like it or not, the interest on that borrowing is a tax burden, it is much bigger for the UK than for Germany, and the UK's existing financial position means that its ability to borrow more to fund public infrastructure is severely constrained. That means that the UK has to be very choosy on which projects to fund and which projects have to wait, even if they are economic enablers.

The better German position (debt and interest) is only a relatively recent trend. German debt (59% of GDP) was greater than UK debt (38%) in 2000, so it is not the main driver of the relatively lower transport infrastructure investment in the UK during the last 25 years.

 

[martin butler]

If Government debt is 100 per cent of GDP, Then the answer is to cut all government expenditure, except, no government can, imagine if suddenly the state pension, and the NHS, being the two major drains on expenditure, were to stop overnight, there would be riots.

I had a quick scan of the green book, and was left a bit confused by it, but it was really just a quick read of the guidelines, later i will look a bit closer, but as Okehampton showed, in its upgraded expectations, isn't it just guess work? until an re opening has been achieved and trains are running, people are using those trains, and actual numbers are known, then no one really knows if its money well spent,

I come back to the strategic case for reopening the line, given that the only route available has what can be described as an unstable land mass, I refer to the sandstone, the section is built on from Starcross to Dawlish and the exposed nature of it, and the effect inclement weather can have, all it takes is sea water ingrestation, to stop modern trains , blocking the route, and the ballast getting washed out in storm conditions, and thats the line effectively closed until conditions ease, what cost is it to bus passengers , each time, and the disruption caused? does the cost, balance out the minuses on reopening first to Tavistoke, then on to Okehampton?

 

[BayPaul]

I come back to the strategic case for reopening the line, given that the only route available has what can be described as an unstable land mass, I refer to the sandstone, the section is built on from Starcross to Dawlish and the exposed nature of it, and the effect inclement weather can have, all it takes is sea water ingrestation, to stop modern trains , blocking the route, and the ballast getting washed out in storm conditions, and thats the line effectively closed until conditions ease, what cost is it to bus passengers , each time, and the disruption caused? does the cost, balance out the minuses on reopening first to Tavistoke, then on to Okehampton?

Not remotely! As has been explained multiple times on this thread already. Firstly you have to consider that you are describing two virtually independent projects. A 'fairly simple' reopening to Tavistock would cost around £150M. This would be single track, bare minimum signalling etc. To upgrade this line, plus upgrade Exeter - Okehampton, plus join the two, you are looking at around £1bn. That would give you a line with enough capacity to allow diversions of some of the mainline service. But it wouldn't in any way be an acceptable diversion. Firstly it is very much slower than going via Newton Abbot. It's also slower than a rail replacement bus from Tiverton Parkway to Newton Abbot (which is dual carriageway virtually platform to platform, and takes about the same time as the existing train). Secondly, it misses out a massive proportion of the traffic - Newton Abbot, Torbay and Totnes stations are very busy stations.

So the operational cost of diverting trains via Okehampton is almost certainly higher than the cost of bustitution, without even beginning to pay the capital cost, especially since you would still need to run the bus service to serve other stations.

This study has been carried out in detail - the option of providing a full line via Okehampton has a BCR of 0.14, which is terrible. That does include society benefits. You may not agree with the methodology, but effectively even if the actual benefits are 6 times what the study suggested, the UK as a whole would still be better off not building it.
https://peninsularailtaskforce.co.u...y-consultation-draft-v1-5-5-16-clean-copy.pdf

Have you ever walked along the new sea wall in Dawlish? It is massive - completely different to the old line. Even a hurricane isn't going to wash it away. Yes a storm can still cancel a few trains, or a landslide close the line for a week, but it is still the right route. If and when it stops being the right route, the only possible solution would be a new line inland via Newton Abbot, nothing else would provide a viable transport link to the west country.

 

[Magdalia]

The better German position (debt and interest) is only a relatively recent trend. German debt (59% of GDP) was greater than UK debt (38%) in 2000, so it is not the main driver of the relatively lower transport infrastructure investment in the UK during the last 25 years.

During that period there was Crossrail, Thameslink, the start of HS2, and many other smaller projects. See Dawlish above as an example.

But the important point is where the UK is starting from now, and how that constrains what it can do in the future, not what happened in the past.

 

[Xavi]

During that period there was Crossrail, Thameslink, the start of HS2, and many other smaller projects. See Dawlish above as an example.

But the important point is where the UK is starting from now, and how that constrains what it can do in the future, not what happened in the past.

There is a general reluctance to fund transport infrastructure in the UK, irrespective of the examples mentioned. Cancelling Phase 2 of HS2 being a primary example. For the past 50 years, the UK has spent well below the OECD-recommended 1.5-2.0% of GDP required to maintain suitable infrastructure for economic growth, which has undoubtedly contributed to poor growth, increasing debt, etc. The benefits of investment are long-term, and we’re feeling the pain.

 

[35B]

There is a general reluctance to fund transport infrastructure in the UK, irrespective of the examples mentioned. Cancelling Phase 2 of HS2 being a primary example. For the past 50 years, the UK has spent well below the OECD-recommended 1.5-2.0% of GDP required to maintain suitable infrastructure for economic growth, which has undoubtedly contributed to poor growth, increasing debt, etc. The benefits of investment are long-term, and we’re feeling the pain.

That is true. Whether it has any relevance to the particular case in discussion is less clear

 

[Magdalia]

There is a general reluctance to fund transport infrastructure in the UK, irrespective of the examples mentioned. Cancelling Phase 2 of HS2 being a primary example. For the past 50 years, the UK has spent well below the OECD-recommended 1.5-2.0% of GDP required to maintain suitable infrastructure for economic growth, which has undoubtedly contributed to poor growth, increasing debt, etc. The benefits of investment are long-term, and we’re feeling the pain.

We can all have our own views on how the UK came to have debt at nearly 100% of GDP, without having more in the way of infrastructure investment to show for it, but it is where the UK is now. The constraint on funding for transport infrastructure now is not "general reluctance", it is real and financial. That will only change when debt and/or long term interest rates come down to levels that Germany has.

 

[Dr Hoo]

Well the entire thread is predicated on “if the money was available”. As such it should be seen as [Fantasy]. See also inadequate finance for water, electricity distribution, hospitals, schools, prisons, housing, defence, insulation, etc., etc.. Let alone current expenditure on welfare, social care, subsidies and so on.

== Doublepost prevention - post automatically merged: 15 Dec 2025 ==

Well the entire thread is predicated on “if the money was available”. As such it should be seen as [Fantasy]. See also inadequate finance for water, electricity distribution, hospitals, schools, prisons, housing, defence, insulation, etc., etc.. Let alone current expenditure on welfare, social care, subsidies and so on.

 

[Xavi]

We can all have our own views on how the UK came to have debt at nearly 100% of GDP, without having more in the way of infrastructure investment to show for it, but it is where the UK is now. The constraint on funding for transport infrastructure now is not "general reluctance", it is real and financial. That will only change when debt and/or long term interest rates come down to levels that Germany has.

You are very reluctant to consider political factors and history alongside present financial data. All three have relevance.

 

[Magdalia]

You are very reluctant to consider political factors and history alongside present financial data. All three have relevance.

I do consider them, and the financial markets consider them too. The political factors and the history of how we got here are priced into the interest rates that the financial markets charge on UK government debt.

 

[6Gman]

So, little new signalling if the present timetable is maintained....

Plymouth is behind the plan at least, as in this from October 2025

Council leader briefs rail minister on city's growth ambitions | PLYMOUTH.GOV.UK

www.plymouth.gov.uk

Councils are always in favour of (other people's) money being spent on their patch.

== Doublepost prevention - post automatically merged: 15 Dec 2025 ==

Before posting #700 is reached, does anyone contributing to this thread have the slightest idea where the money is coming from (and when) that will allow the feasibility study to take place?

Well, I think this thread started when West Devon Council asked Devon County Council to stump up 75% of the Section 106 money (money paid by developers for infrastructure) it holds to pay for a feasibility study. Devon declined to do so, partly because Network Rail pointed out that in the absence of the c.£150M needed to build the thing a feasibility study would be pointless, as by the time funds were found the study would be out of date!

 

[BrianW]

It was the mid-00s that the project was first being seriously mapped out. 20 years later and we're still no further on!

750 posts in just over a month and ... we're still no further on
As a previous PM was used to saying 'nothing has changed'.
and as Sir Geoffrey Cox, the MP for West Devon and one-time Attorney General said in a similar context 'What are you doing?'

I found, by 'Googling' this 'quote'f from someone called 'Tavi': I love the Internet, but I think you have to only use it in the ways that are good for you. I think there's so much speculation that happens. Share this Quote Tavi Gevinson
Read more at https://www.brainyquote.com/topics/speculation-quotes_2

So much fun, and waste of time (and energy, if not money?).

 

[Brush 4]

This may lead to a new Green Book thread.

Well, I'm working through the Green Book. I tend to go to the ending first. Disappointing, no car chase or any explosions.

On the plus side, it does acknowledge that some things can't be monetised, which is encouraging.

It has also provided definitions of Value For Money and Optimism Bias. VFM is always mentioned by politicians trying to avoid spending on almost anything, from NHS to social services to schools and of course rail and road.

Make of these what you will...... Easy to imagine Sir Humphrey saying these exact words.....

The Green Book

UK government guidance on appraisal.

www.gov.uk

Box 18. A Definition of Value for Money
Value for Money as mentioned in chapters 2, 3, 4, 6 and 8 is a judgment about the optimal use of public resources to achieve stated objectives embodied in the SMART objectives of a proposal (be it a policy, a portfolio, a programme, or a project), based on consideration of the following factors:

Performance against SMART objectives. Each shortlisted option must achieve the SMART objectives, options which do not deliver against SMART objectives cannot be included in a shortlist, or represent value for money for the proposal being considered

Net present value to society of all social, economic and environmental benefits – these may be qualitative or quantitative

Net present public resource costs as measured by whole life costs, including capital and operating costs and the opportunity cost of existing assets employed

Risk costs associated with managing and mitigating risks that are associated with a proposed option

For each shortlisted option a quantified net present social value and the relevant cost to the public sector are estimated as set out in chapters 4, 5 and 6 and combined in a benefit cost ratio (BCR) to support an initial first ranking of options or proposals based on quantifiable factors. As set out above all shortlisted options must meet the SMART objectives to be considering public/social value for money. Additional features with benefits which are not readily or credibly quantifiable or monetisable, but which are considered decisively important enough to be taken into account must be dealt with at the longlisting stage as follows:

If they are regarded as essential to provision of the objectives’, then they are a constraint and they must be incorporated into all of the options.

If they are regarded as desirable but not essential, then two versions of the option with the most favourable BCR should be prepared, one with and one without the inclusion of the features concerned. The resulting disparity in costs will enable decision makers to consider if the increase in cost associated with the inclusion of this desirable feature is a price worth paying in terms of public value for money.

Residual hard to quantify risk and uncertainty where it is likely to be significant should also be considered as part of the value for money judgment.

Proposals that are part of a larger programme need to be understood and appraised for public value and value for money in the light of their role in the overarching programme. If such an enabling or supporting proposal has high levels of risk and uncertainty the issue must be referred upwards to the overarching programme for assessment. This may result in the need to consider the effects of delay on the programme or a reassessment of the projects initial SMART objectives and specification.

There are shortlists and logically, longlists

Optimism bias is the demonstrated systematic tendency for appraisers to be over-optimistic about key project parameters, including capital costs, operating costs, project duration and benefits delivery. Over-optimistic estimates can lock in undeliverable targets.

To reduce this tendency appraisals should make explicit adjustment for optimism bias. The Green Book recommends applying overall percentage adjustments at the outset of an appraisal. The initial optimism bias estimate should not be “locked in” but can be reduced as an appraisal develops and the cost of specific risks are identified.

Ideally adjustments should be based on an organisation’s own evidence base for historic levels of optimism bias. In the absence of robust organisation-specific estimates generic values are provided in Annex 5. There are currently no generic values available to be applied to benefits, however an adjustment should be applied based on an organisation’s own evidence base.[footnote 13]

Optimism bias is a form of reference class forecasting which predicts future outcomes based on the outcomes for a group of similar past projects. It is important to note that adjustments for optimism bias are not the same as financial contingency (a concept explained above).

 

[Magdalia]

750 posts in just over a month and ... we're still no further on

So much fun, and waste of time (and energy, if not money?).

Charge £2k per post and there's your £1.5 million.

 

[Brush 4]

Well, for those who were tired of this thread going on and on....I found the way to kill it. Just quote sections of the Green Book and silence will reign. Just to finally stamp on the thread to finish it off, here is another bit.

This book should be passed on to the Reduced Shakespeare Company, who reduce his plays to a couple of paragraphs. Make of the below what you will......

The Green Book

UK government guidance on appraisal.

www.gov.uk

Business As Usual

establish rationale for intervention including the Evidence based Logical Change Process
determine whether Place Based, Equalities, and/or Distributional Appraisal is required
ensure Strategic Fit and identify SMART objectives (outcomes and outputs) for intervention

Longlist appraisal

identify Constraints and Dependencies
consider Place Based, Equalities, and/or Distributional objectives
identify Critical Success Factors (CSFs)
consider unquantifiable and unmonetisable factors
consider a longlist of option choices with the Options Framework-Filter
consider Place Based, Equalities, and Distributional effects
using the Options Framework-Filter create a viable shortlist and preferred way forward

Shortlist appraisal

Select Social Cost Benefit Analysis or Social Cost Effectiveness Analysis

Identify and value costs and benefits of all shortlisted options

Estimate the financial cost to the public sector

Ensure all values in the economic dimension are in real base year prices with inflation removed

Qualitatively assess non-monetisable costs and benefits

Apply appropriate Optimism Bias

Maintain Risk and Benefits Registers

Assess Avoidable, Transferable and Retained Risk, build in additional Risk Costs and reduce Optimism Bias accordingly

Sum the values of costs and benefits in each year

Discount the yearly sums of costs and benefits in each year to produce Net Present Social Values (NPSVs)

Add the NPSVs over time to produce The Net Present Social Value (NPSV) of each option

Calculate Benefit Cost Ratios (BCRs) if using CBA or Social Unit Costs if using CEA as appropriate

Identification of the preferred option

Identify preferred option considering NPSV, BCR, unmonetisable features risks and uncertainties

Conduct sensitivity analysis and calculate switching values, for each option

Monitoring and evaluation
during implementation – inform implementation and operational management
in the operational phase – inform both operational management and evaluate the outcome and lessons learned to improve future decisions.

Contingency is an allowance made for the cost of residual known risks in case they occur. These are risks that cannot be avoided, shared or managed; they are added to residual optimism bias (OB), which is what remains of OB after the risk costs that can be avoided, shared or otherwise managed have been deducted. This remaining OB is an allowance for uncertainty which by its nature is unknown (see Uncertainty, Risk and Optimism Bias, paragraphs 5.41 to 5.52 below). In the financial case this residual sum is converted into nominal prices and is used to estimate the contribution to the reserves required to allow the approving authority to provide for its risk liabilities. This is required because government is effectively self-insured. This contingency sum should not therefore be allocated to the programme or project.