Major Incident at Huntingdon (01/11/2025)

[jon0844]

So much in the way of horrible hatred comments across social media. Ive now stopped even reading anybody else’s opinion as so many are just so politically motivated. It really is showing the downside of modern life where vicious remarks can be voiced to the world in an instant.

There are people with their trousers around their ankles getting excited to hear what they want to hear, and when info isn't available within 15 seconds they call it a cover up and it being obvious who the offenders were.

The victims are ammunition for their views and social media clout, nothing more.

 

[Magdalia]

8 minutes from those 999 calls (presumably on the train) to stopping it at a place of safety and arresting the suspects is amazing work by the emergency services, the Network Rail signalling centre and the train-crew. Calmness and professionalism.

The speed of response was excellent. The train would have been south of Conington loop when the 999 call was received, and there would have been very little time to divert the train into the platform at Huntingdon. The turnout is 40 mph and has some quite severe approach control.

 

[james_the_xv]

Up train just went through BBC shot seemingly on up fast line. They have recently said forensic ppl still picking things up, hopefully not on the adjacent tracks. I was wondering if it was possible to use the two down lines as a two-track railway, does the signalling arrangement support this mode of operation?

No there's no provision for bi-di running there (other than various shunts)

 

[dk1]

There are people with their trousers around their ankles getting excited to hear what they want to hear, and when info isn't available within 15 seconds they call it a cover up and it being obvious who the offenders were.

The victims are ammunition for their views and social media clout, nothing more.

I even noticed one of the comments this morning to LNER on X mentioned it as a terrorist attack and requesting a refund for a future journey which I very much doubt was true when viewing their profile and previous posts. Just a platform for them to again get heard

 

[Archvile]

Exactly, driver would be fully aware of the implications if they pressed the red button.

They will of used the yellow 'contact signaller' button, and started the conversation with 'This is an emergency call' to signify to the signaller that is a very important call.

That's the one!

 

[hornbeampark]

8 minutes from those 999 calls (presumably on the train) to stopping it at a place of safety and arresting the suspects is amazing work by the emergency services, the Network Rail signalling centre and the train-crew. Calmness and professionalism.

They do fabulous work.

A long time ago, I called 999 due to a serious brawl on the train after a Newcastle fixture.

The train was stopped at Northallerton with police on scene within 10 minutes.

In times of doom and gloom, I and many other rail users are grateful for those who protect us.

 

[Steve Harris]

Up train just went through BBC shot seemingly on up fast line. They have recently said forensic ppl still picking things up, hopefully not on the adjacent tracks. I was wondering if it was possible to use the two down lines as a two-track railway, does the signalling arrangement support this mode of operation?

The BBC TV footage was of forensic officers in the station car park.

There was footage shown earlier of the BTP press conference/release were it was stated that the station remains closed but trains would be passing through.

So there clearly isn't any officers on the open railway lines. The only line blocked is the Up Slow and Thameslink trains are now passing Huntingdon on the Up Fast and then gaining access to the Up Slow at St Neots. Everything else is pretty much passing through in their normal paths/lines.

 

[sharpener]

The speed of response was excellent. The train would have been south of Conington loop when the 999 call was received, and there would have been very little time to divert the train into the platform at Huntingdon. The turnout is 40 mph and has some quite severe approach control.

Presumably part of the call to the signaller would be to establish whether the route into P2 could be set in time or alternatively the driver should stop short of the crossover or proceed to the subsequent one at St Neots. Maybe a consideration was that any braking from line speed would alert the miscreants that action had been taken.

No there's no provision for bi-di running there (other than various shunts)

Didn't really expect it but given the strange three track arrangement N of Huntingdon wasn't sure.

 

[MarkWi72]

An engineering train (3J30), 4L90 and numerous passenger trains went through during BBC coverage, so the line is getting back to near normal.

 

[Steve Harris]

Didn't really expect it but given the strange three track arrangement N of Huntingdon wasn't sure.

It used to be 4 track but one was removed under BR to save money. IF memory serves me correctly there was a lot of subsidence and there wasn't the traffic back then to justify keeping the Up Slow north of Huntingdon.

 

[Archvile]

I'm curious what first alerted the driver... Passcom, guard, or emergency call relayed via signaller?

Someone mentioned lessons being learnt, and one comes to mind... Current guidance from most TOCs is to only holdover a passcom to prevent stopping in an unsuitable location.

Passcoms need manually resetting, which might not be possible with a knife wielding maniac running about.

You then need to operate EBS to get moving again etc...

Perhaps better to automatically holdover whilst manually braking until you know what the problem is. This way you maintain full control.

Just a thought.

 

[norbitonflyer]

The speed of response was excellent. The train would have been south of Conington loop when the 999 call was received, and there would have been very little time to divert the train into the platform at Huntingdon. The turnout is 40 mph and has some quite severe approach control.

Indeed, RTT shows the train was on time (or actually slightly ahead (between Peterborough and Conington, and only four minutes behind when it stopped at Huntingdon.

It suggests that whenever the alert was sounded and the decision to divert made the driver was able to continue at full speed until needing to brake for the extra stop.

There are, according to Open Train Times (OTT) eight signals between Connington and Huntingdon, - presumably the route would have to have been set before the driver sighted the double yellow, or is there a flashing aspect for that turnout?

It doesn't look like the train had to wait for the points to be set Fir the platform, but could go straight in.

What we don't know is whether the call was requested from the train crew or initiated by the signaller after a request from the emergency services.

 

[duffield]

BBC News channel has reported that LNER have switched from "do not travel" to "check before travel" and are reporting 30 minute delays. Hull trains and Grand Central reported as running normal services.

As this is from the rolling news channel I can't provide a link to the source or a quote.

 

[dk1]

BBC have reported that LNER have switched from "do not travel" to "check before travel" and are reporting 30 minute delays. Hull trains and Grand Central reported as running normal services.

Services appear to be running extremely well. I wonder why LNER feel the need to be pessimistic, when other operators are encouraging travel?

 

[edwin_m]

Indeed, RTT shiws the train was on time (or actuallt slightly ahead( between Peterbirough and Conington, and only four minutes behind when it stopped at Huntingdon. It suggests that whenever the alert was sounded and the decisiin to divert made the driver was able to continue at full speed until needing to brake for the extra stop. There are, according to OTT, eight signals between Connington and Huntingdon, - presumably the routecwoyld have to have been set before the driver sighted the double yellow *or is there a flashing aspect for that turnout?

It doesnt look like the train had t owait for the points to be set Fir the platform, but could go staright in.

Even with a flashing aspect, approach locking would apply. It's possible, but unlikely, that this signal has comprehensive approach locking in which case the route could be re-set as long as the train hadn't seen the first signal that would change aspect by doing so. Otherwise there would be a 2min delay after cancelling the route via the through line before a route could be set into the platform. In this situation the signaller might cancel the route even after the train had passed the first signal that would change aspect, knowing the driver was aware already reducing speed.

It's also possible that the signaller hadn't set either route when they became aware of the incident, in which case they could just set the platform route instead of the through line.

Either way I agree that all involved should be commended on reacting immediately to bring the train to a suitable place where help was available and the incident could be resolved so quickly.

 

[800001]

I'm curious what first alerted the driver... Passcom, guard, or emergency call relayed via signaller.
Someone mentioned lessons being learnt, and one comes to mind... Current guidance from most TOCs is to only holdover a passcom to prevent stopping in an unsuitable location.
Passcom's need manually resetting, which might not be possible with a knife wielding maniac running about. You then need to operate EBS to get moving again etc...
Perhaps better to automatically holdover whilst manually braking until you know what the problem is. This way you maintain full control.
Just a thought.

If someone pulls the passcom, this alerts the driver, they can then decide to speak to the relevant person, cctv of where passcom pulled will show in drivers cab.

Driver has a large button to kick under drivers desk which over rides the passcom and prevents the brakes activating, keeping driver in control of cab.

that's my understanding of how system works.

 

[flitwickbeds]

If a flight goes down it is immediately known and confirmed which one it is. The incident train ought to have been clarified by the media very quickly. Anons on the Internet can look at Traksy or RTT and give the correct answer, properly sourced, but the media and their standards mean they took the word of a local MP and waited a couple of hours for BTP to catch up with the agenda. Understandably the police are very busy and that's no criticism of them but what is the media actually for if it doesn't report accurate facts more than people on some forum?

Flight numbers are much easier to understand, and are globally and daily unique.

There are a lot more stakeholders (airlines, airports, plane manufacturers, multiple ATC regions, and national regulators) who have more resource and capacity to share the information.

Individual flights are also much easier to describe ("the BA123 flight from Delhi to London" vs "the 1A23 LNER train which originated from Doncaster even though it usually comes from Edinburgh but not this weekend due to engineering works, made multiple station stops at multiple times, and was headed to London, was involved in an incident and has come to a stop at a station it wasn't scheduled to call at. No, not the LNER that departed at 1702 and had 4 station stops, it's the one that departed at 1712 and has 6 station stops. No, not the 1A23 from Manchester to Blackpool this afternoon, or the 1A23 from Brighton to Portsmouth this evening, or the 1A23 from Doncaster to London this morning...")

It's also worth pointing out that the last thing I read on this forum thread when I went to bed last night was a poster quoting The Sun (since deleted, it appears, but is still quoted by another poster further down) that there had been 2 fatalities. This has proven (so far) to not be the case.

I also read a lot of speculation here about marauding terrorists. While I always get frustrated about the "terrorist" term and how it is used, the police this morning are saying it is not terror related.

While in my opinion anything designed to terrify people should be labelled as terror, it's easy to see how certain media would read this page and go with the headline TERRORISTS KILL TWO INNOCENT TRAIN PASSENGERS last night, which - touch wood - is not accurate in any sense.

Which is a long way of explaining why the "traditional" media have rules in places for sourcing information from authoritative sources - and ideally multiple authoritative sources where possible - before publishing it themselves.

And, why everyone should be careful when reading certain sources of news and publishing on social media.

 

[D365]

If someone pulls the passcode, this alerts the driver, they can then decide to speak to the relevant person, cctv of where passcom pulled will show in drivers cab.

Driver has a large button to kick under drivers desk which over rides the pass on and prevents the brakes activating, keeping driver in control of cab.

that's my understanding of how system works.

PassCom (passenger communication), but yes I think you have the gist of it.

 

[455refurb]

One of the first witnesses talking on Sky News last night said they had pressed the passcom and praised the driver's response, and also said the driver did a "right thing" stopping the train where they did (which was very nice to see).

 

[800001]

PassCom (passenger communication), but yes I think you have the gist of it.

Predictive text, now amended

 

[KevinBrum12]

That’ll do as a word too I suppose.

There is a lot of engineering work going on along the ECML today plus add in that there will be crews and rolling stock in the wrong place after last nights events.

Challenging is the word that comes to mind to me but LNER, Network Rail and the other TOC's deserve a bit of credit for their service delivery today.

 

[Archvile]

If someone pulls the passcode, this alerts the driver, they can then decide to speak to the relevant person, cctv of where passcom pulled will show in drivers cab.

Driver has a large button to kick under drivers desk which over rides the pass on and prevents the brakes activating, keeping driver in control of cab.

that's my understanding of how system works.

That's how ours work.

A driver I spoke to at another TOC told me that if they don't hit the holdover within (5?) seconds, it behaves like an old school emergency plunger I.e. you're stopping and can't move again until the passcom has been reset.

This seems dangerous to me for the aforementioned reasons. Has anybody ever heard of a holdover function working that way?

 

[800001]

That's how ours work.

A driver I spoke to at another TOC told me that if they don't hit the holdover within (5?) seconds, it behaves like an old school emergency plunger I.e. you're stopping and can't move again until the passcom has been reset.

This seems dangerous to me for the aforementioned reasons. Has anybody ever heard of a holdover function working that way?

that does sound like how I understand it to operate. But couldn't remember the timescales before a full brake application is made.

 

[ACDC]

Sorry if this has not been mentioned. After leaving Peterborough this train would have been routed on the down fast which doesn't have platforms at Huntingdon, how was the train routed to the down slow in such a short space of time. Was the train travelling at 125mph and then emergency brake at Huntingdon?

 

[Bald Rick]

Layman writing; if the train was at full speed when the calls were made (120mph+??) to actually (a) become aware of what was going on fully (b) contact signallers/controllers/emergency services (c) get the train to slow quickly enough to get off the main line and into a station and stopped within 8 mins seems a remarkable achievement and I presume something that's been thoroughly trained for? As you say, amazing.

Speculaton by me:

It may have been doing around 100mph (Linepseed for the 7 miles south of Peterboro’ varies 105/115/100/105). Or it may have been on the 125 section south of Holme Crossing (just north of Connington).

Driver, having presumably been advised of an emergency on board by somebody pushing the alarm button on board, makes a Yellow button call to the Huntingdon workstation signaller. “This is an emergency call, I have an incident onboard and need to be brought into the platform at Huntingdon”. Assuming the route was already set for the Up Fast (which the signalling system will most likely have done automatically) the signaller would have cancelled the route, with the driver knowing this, as the relevant signals would revert to a more restrictive aspect in front of them. It would then take a little while for the signaller to reset the route into the platform, as the approach locking times out (approach locking has many purposes, but one is to prevent a train on the approach to a junction at speed being rerouted on to a slower speed route.)

The signaller would then have triggered a call to the emergency services, to meet the train at Huntingdon. Very fortunately, police HQ is next door.

Excellent presence of mind by driver, signaller, and probably others. it looks like they have done everything right. They will not have been trained for this specific situation, as it is extraordinarily rare. They will have relied on training for other situations which have similar component actions to deal with (making an emergency call, medical emergencies on board, short notice need to reroute a train and/ or bring a train to a stand safely where access can be given, police to train, etc).

 

[Magdalia]

Sorry if this has not been mentioned. After leaving Peterborough this train would have been routed on the down fast which doesn't have platforms at Huntingdon, how was the train routed to the down slow in such a short space of time. Was the train travelling at 125mph and then emergency brake at Huntingdon?

The train was travelling in the up direction, not the down direction. There is lots of discussion above about how the train was turned off the up fast just north of Huntingdon station to stop in the platform.

 

[towerpurgeshuf]

I am quite interested in learning about the timeline. From the police, we know the 999 calls came in around 19:39 and the police arrived around 19:50. RTT says the train rolled into Huntingdon at 19:44. Altogether, they suggest an incredibly tight sequence of events which makes the actions of everyone involved – driver, signaller, police, passengers – all the more remarkable.

 

[dk1]

There is a lot of engineering work going on along the ECML today plus add in that there will be crews and rolling stock in the wrong place after last nights events.

Challenging is the word that comes to mind to me but LNER, Network Rail and the other TOC's deserve a bit of credit for their service delivery today.

But the normal service as advertised is running. No need to put passengers off at a time when they need to be reassured.

 

[officewalla]

If someone pulls the passcom, this alerts the driver, they can then decide to speak to the relevant person, cctv of where passcom pulled will show in drivers cab.

Driver has a large button to kick under drivers desk which over rides the pass on and prevents the brakes activating, keeping driver in control of cab.

that's my understanding of how system works.

That is correct

 

[sharpener]

Altogether, they suggest an incredibly tight sequence of events which makes the actions of everyone involved – driver, signaller, police, passengers – all the more remarkable.

As an electronics engineer it is comforting to note that - even though we do not have all the details of who said what to whom and when - all the telecoms (passcom/driver/signaller/police etc) seem to have worked well and contributed to a successful outcome. Unlike the King's Cross fire and various other past incidents.