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Of course, but these planes are very manoeuvrable. If they're equipped with even rudimentary defences, there's also a good chance that they'll be able to spot and kill an interceptor drone in time.
Interceptor drones are also highly manoeuvrable, and if that doesn't work Russia fires an air to air missile instead. If it's in Polish airspace then the Russians probably won't attack it, but using light aircraft in Ukrainian airspace is inviting them to take a shot and claim they assumed it was Ukrainian.
Forcing them to do that does have some benefit, by increasing the cost to Russia and forcing them to make the decoys using facilities that would otherwise be making the lethal versions.
Interceptor drones are also highly manoeuvrable, and if that doesn't work Russia fires an air to air missile instead. If it's in Polish airspace then the Russians probably won't attack it, but using light aircraft in Ukrainian airspace is inviting them to take a shot and claim they assumed it was Ukrainian.
And how is Russia going to control an interceptor drone in western Ukraine? You need a suitable radio link back to the controller. That's a long range for a radio signal.
In addition, there will be a response delay due to the distance, even more if the signal is going via a "booster" repeater station (such as another drone).
It's possible to detect and jam a long range radio signal anyway.
Or an artificial intelligence-based auto-targeting system trained to recognise the aircraft you want it to target. Even then you need suitable radar systems to direct the drone towards the target. Difficult when Ukraine is actively destroying as many as they can find.
And that's all assuming the interceptor drone has enough fuel or energy in its power system to get to western Ukraine.
Interceptor drones are different to the long distance Shahed-type drones typically used for these long range attacks.
Air to air missiles also have problems. They are primarily designed to attack jet aircraft and may have difficulty tracking small aircraft that have a smaller heat signature. Plus, they are range limited. They have to be launched from a Russian aircraft and the Russian air force is not flying over Ukrainian controlled territory because of the risk of being shot down by Ukraine's air defence systems.
So Russia can't get air to air missiles anywhere near to western Ukraine.
The only options for Russia to get these near western Ukraine would be to use Belarus territory.
Accidental - possible if they were all launched from the same site, but it would be incompetence, and Russia would never admit to that.
Jamming by Ukraine - possible, but they were all cheap decoys (maybe more susceptable?). Ukraine wouldn't admit to that either, as a deliberate incursion suits them.
Testing defences - possible, but as a real attack would involve very large numbers they'd just go ahead with it anyway, and a test will (has?) reveal shortcomings which is to Polands/Nato's advantage.
A warning - very possible.
But what puzzles me is, given that these decoys presumably are just set on a course with no end target (except to fly over one), why hasn't this happened before in such numbers?
Latest update: 16 drones have been found. I think the previous theory that they were overflying Polish territory to reach Ukraine can be discounted, as it's clear from the latest map that they were flying far more inland than they needed to for an attack on Ukraine. The one in the north (near Elbląg) and the one near Warsaw may have been subject to Ukrainian countermeasures, but the general spread of the drones shot down south/south east of Warsaw suggests that they were very much headed inland.
On the night of September 9-10, 2025, during a massive Russian attack on Ukraine, about 19 drones flew into Polish territory from Ukraine, but also directly from Belarus. The search for the crash sites of these objects is ongoing.
miejsce znalezienia szczątków dronów - location where drone wreckage was found
It's confirmed that the Polish F-16s, Dutch F-35s, the Italian radar monitoring aircraft and the German (but based in Poland) Patriot systems were involved.
It's not confirmed one way or another. The Polish media hasn't reported any warheads however, and journalists are generally saying that these were all decoys, but that decoys themselves are problematic as they need to be treated as 'live' until military sappers can confirm otherwise. I suspect that it's true that they were decoys, but then this lends itself strongly to being a planned attack and not simply a case of Ukrainian/NATO defences being able to counter them.
Testing defences - possible, but as a real attack would involve very large numbers they'd just go ahead with it anyway, and a test will (has?) reveal shortcomings which is to Polands/Nato's advantage.
Depending on what you listen to, there is a strong argument that this attack has proven that NATO is vulnerable to drone attack. Certainly if someone wanted to attack targets in/around the eastern border, then this has shown that we're vulnerable. However, this is Russia, and I strongly suspect that this attack has come about because they know that the Polish public are growing increasingly weary of Ukraine and Ukrainian refugees. There's a clear narrative among the far right in Poland to suggest that Ukraine is to blame for this situation, and it's also finding support among the harder right as well.
In the afternoon, this graphic was published which shows what Russia is really doing in Poland:
They checked Facebook, X, YouTube, Instagram and TikTok, and on those platforms, 38% of comments blamed Ukraine for the drones, 34% Russia, 15% Polish government, 8% the media, and 5% NATO/the West. It's very obvious that Russian propaganda tricks are working in Poland, because you could see a substantial amount of comments on the Polish internet immediately blaming Ukraine. Far right wing politicians were also spreading nonsense about the drones only having a 300km range, as the conspiracy theory is that Ukraine (or Ukraine's agents) have launched these drones to try and force Poland into the war. It's very similar to the narrative found in Hungary, and reflects the fact that the "patriotic" far right is actually quite terrified of war and they certainly don't want to fight in it, not even to defend the country.
The EU is now talking about a complete ban on issuing visas to Russian citizens, and I think it couldn't come soon enough. Frankly speaking, the borders should now be completely shut after this, there's absolutely no reason to maintain an open border between NATO/EU and Russia/Belarus.
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Struggling to keep up with the flow of information here, but here goes.
General Kukuła, the Chief of the General Staff of the Polish Army has confirmed a few things:
- The pilots took off with the green light to shoot down drones
- The Operational Command of the Branches of the Armed Forces ignored (could be a bad translation or misinterpretation of his words) decoys and allowed them to keep flying, only those with warheads were shot down
- A warning was received from Belarus that drones were headed towards Poland over Belarusian airspace (!)
- The military was prepared for a much larger amount of drones, hence why NATO allies were informed and why they assisted with the operation
- The F-35 radars detected drones that were invisible to ground-based radars
In general, this raises even more questions than it answers. The confirmation that some of these drones had warheads is something new, but judging by the map, it's possible that the ones with warheads are the ones that were shot down close to the border, while the other ones were allowed to fly, possibly to ascertain the actual capabilities of these drones and to see what their target might have been. We won't find out for sure, but I think it's possible that the ones with warheads were intended for Ukraine, while the decoys were to try and throw off the NATO air defences so that the drones could get through. A risky tactic for sure, but I can see the operational sense in it, as sending drones over Belarus and Poland before returning into Ukrainian air space to strike would force Ukraine to use precious resources on guarding the previously unguarded Western borders.
I'm still not 100% about the source of this information as it was an interview on Polish TV tonight, but I haven't seen the source video and so I can't confirm that any of it is true.
I'd actually argue that this is a very good argument for smaller NATO members to develop fleets of small turboprops that can be used for air defence against slow moving drones. Of course it's not realistic that countries like Estonia will have fighter jets, but they can certainly develop their own fleets of turboprops that can also be deployed elsewhere within NATO.
There are plenty of Cessna 185s and the like available for purchase second hand for very little money, and a squadron of 16 turboprops could easily be acquired and converted to military use for no more than $25-30m USD. It would also give those countries a chance to develop pilots with experience of military operations, which could come in very handy in the event of any conflict where there's a need to produce more pilots.
The cost per hour of an F-35 is around $40,000 USD, whereas you can fly a Cessna for about $120 an hour.
I agree in principle as there are NATO members with no fixed-wing combat aircraft at all. Whilst purchase and operating cost are obviously an important consideration, I do think stretching to something like a PC-9 would be beneficial over a lightweight Cessna. Even better would be a light jet (something like a Hawk) but I suppose it’s a case of where do you stop.
The Operational Command of the Branches of the Armed Forces ignored (could be a bad translation or misinterpretation of his words) decoys and allowed them to keep flying, only those with warheads were shot down
This does indicate that the West has a means of telling which is which, probably not just flying up and having a look. Which should be good news if Ukraine is able to make use of it.
I agree in principle as there are NATO members with no fixed-wing combat aircraft at all. Whilst purchase and operating cost are obviously an important consideration, I do think stretching to something like a PC-9 would be beneficial over a lightweight Cessna. Even better would be a light jet (something like a Hawk) but I suppose it’s a case of where do you stop.
Yes, there's the where do you stop issue, but also there's benefit to maybe having them specialise in the "low and slow" stuff like observation, forward air control and drone warfare. That would be a very useful contribution to combined NATO operations in a low/medium intensity conflict.
This does indicate that the West has a means of telling which is which, probably not just flying up and having a look. Which should be good news if Ukraine is able to make use of it.
I reckon it's more likely that we've benefited from Ukrainian operational experience enabling us to identify the different types of Russian drone. Doubt there's much we can teach them about fighting long range drones at this point.
I agree in principle as there are NATO members with no fixed-wing combat aircraft at all. Whilst purchase and operating cost are obviously an important consideration, I do think stretching to something like a PC-9 would be beneficial over a lightweight Cessna. Even better would be a light jet (something like a Hawk) but I suppose it’s a case of where do you stop.
I think jets have the problem of maintenance and being quite difficult to fly in terms of training, whereas Cessnas and the like are very easy to learn to fly. You could get a whole squadron of Cessna pilots qualified in a short space of time, whereas flying a light jet will require much more training. The other thing is that it's harder to find trainers for jets.
With the PC-9, it might be more beneficial, but I'm thinking about supply: Cessnas are two a penny, whereas the PC-9 isn't very commonly available. Still, no harm in having a mixed fleet, especially for more ambitious pilots who could transfer the turboprop experience from the PC-9 to commercial flying afterwards.
This does indicate that the West has a means of telling which is which, probably not just flying up and having a look. Which should be good news if Ukraine is able to make use of it.
From what I've read in the Polish media, those with warheads look differently on radar, so it's very easy to determine what to do with them once you've detected them. The issue seems to be that ground radars are quite weak against this type of drone, so you need to fly up and confirm it manually.
What is disturbing is that despite the NATO response, it seems that the Dutch F-35s were using missiles as opposed to cannon fire to destroy these drones. It points at a massive weak point in the defence of NATO, that is, we somehow haven't learnt anything from Ukraine where they've developed a range of low cost ways to take down drones. We certainly shouldn't be using $2-3m missiles against drones.
Yes, there's the where do you stop issue, but also there's benefit to maybe having them specialise in the "low and slow" stuff like observation, forward air control and drone warfare. That would be a very useful contribution to combined NATO operations in a low/medium intensity conflict.
Yes, I'm not really that much of a fan of the current NATO air policing setup, because it means a lot of it is simply delegated to richer countries. We should be engaging the Baltic States in observation and drone warfare, as this is within their budgets, and there's no reason why the Baltic states couldn't create an effective drone warfare battalion by themselves. They do some observation, but I think it's reasonable that they should be developing more of an air force than they currently have.
The Estonian Air Force only has four planes, which is really pathetic, even for a small country of one million people. I like the country, but for the amount of money they lost on Estonian Air / Nordica, they could easily have created a well equipped air force.
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While I'm at 1 on the scale of 1-10 in terms of being bothered here in SW Poland, things are not getting quieter in general.
A Russian drone entered Romania airspace and was intercepted, while in Poland, a state of emergency was briefly declared in some eastern counties located in the Lublin Voivodship along with Lublin Airport being briefly closed. Air raid sirens sounded too, and an emergency text message alert was sent saying:
Threat of air attack. Exercise extreme caution. Follow the instructions of the services. Wait for further announcements.
According to the joint command, nothing crossed into Polish airspace, but ground-based air defence systems were activated and fighter jets were scrambled.
On unrelated news, Ukraine continues to strike straight at Russia's oil exporting capabilities. Two tankers belonging to the shadow fleet have been hit and damaged, the Novo-Ufimsky oil refinery in Ufa has been hit, and there is possible (but unconfirmed) damage to the pumping station in Primorsk, Leningrad Oblast, which is Russia's largest oil export port on the Baltic Sea. Ukraine may also have hit oil transfer stations on the pipeline towards Primorsk. This is probably the most important export port for Russia, and it generates (according to the Polish Gazeta Wyborcza) around $15bn in revenues yearly.
Interestingly, Russia apparently has asked Turkiye to let them buy back the S-400 air defence systems that they sold to Turkiye in 2017. The two systems were sold for $2.5 billion,
Poland has also shut the border completely to Belarus for three months as a result of the Zapad-2025 exercises, and Lithuania is contemplating doing the same. Russia is protesting and whining as always, but to be quite honest, I think it's time to do the same along the entire NATO border. There's absolutely no reason to keep border crossings open with Russia and Belarus right now, with the exception of allowing crossings for humanitarian reasons.
Warsaw already agreed to send people to Ukraine to learn about air defence, and it seems that we're heading towards a situation where at least part of Western Ukraine will be covered by a no-fly zone. For me, the sensible thing would be to ensure that Lviv is protected, by putting a no-fly zone in place that reaches to the east of Rivne (where the nuclear power plant is), Ternopil and Chernivtsi. Russia has been hitting the western part of the country hard in recent days, probably in light of Ukraine hitting their oil infrastructure at will as well as inflicting defeats in the east.
Russia has been parading an Isklander missile around Kaliningrad today, so it's clear that they're trying to rattle people. Nothing worthy of attention, but it shows that they're still very much trying to convince everyone that Russia is unbeatable and frightening.
Slight correction from my last post: it wasn't a state of emergency, but a state of alarm that was declared and then cancelled.
There are sizeable ethnic Russian populations in most of the ex-USSR countries, with close ties to family in Russia. Closing the border crossings would seriously antagonise them, which would be playing straight into Putin's hands.
There are sizeable ethnic Russian populations in most of the ex-USSR countries, with close ties to family in Russia. Closing the border crossings would seriously antagonise them, which would be playing straight into Putin's hands.
Russian drones over Poland or other Eastern European countries.
It is becoming increasingly clear that the drones that recently flew into Polish territory were intended by Russia to do this. It was no accident. Some of these drones appear to have extended range extra fuel storage instead of warheads and there are reports that some had Polish SIM cards.
This could be an attempt by Russia to try to get countries that have been supplying weapons and ammo to Ukraine to instead reduce or discontinue theses supplies or reduce the financial support.
As governments in these countries instead are distracted by increased calls to save weapons and ammo for their own use just in case they have to defend themselves from a Russian attack.
Let’s be clear here, Russia does not want to start a war with well armed NATO counties at the moment. They know they have their hands full with the war that they started with Ukraine. But they do want to try to find ways of reducing the flow of weapons and ammo into Ukraine.
Rather than playing to the Russian game rules, instead, we should use our own. European countries near Ukraine and other European NATO countries should cooperate with Ukraine to improve air defences against drones and missiles. Including assisting Ukraine within the western area of the country.
Every time that a Russian drone is found to be heading towards a European NATO country (even if it has not yet crossed the border), not only should it be shot down as soon as possible (ideally using low cost systems like Ukraine is using), but that should trigger further sanctions on Russia.
In addition, every time that a Russian drone is found to be heading towards a European NATO country, the counties that are supporting Ukraine should announce increased supplies of additional weapons and ammo for Ukraine
If this is done, Russia will soon stop playing games with these drones that they are deliberately sending towards European NATO countries.
Russian drones over Poland or other Eastern European countries.
It is becoming increasingly clear that the drones that recently flew into Polish territory were intended by Russia to do this. It was no accident. Some of these drones appear to have extended range extra fuel storage instead of warheads and there are reports that some had Polish SIM cards.
This could be an attempt by Russia to try to get countries that have been supplying weapons and ammo to Ukraine to instead reduce or discontinue theses supplies or reduce the financial support.
As governments in these countries instead are distracted by increased calls to save weapons and ammo for their own use just in case they have to defend themselves from a Russian attack.
Let’s be clear here, Russia does not want to start a war with well armed NATO counties at the moment. They know they have their hands full with the war that they started with Ukraine. But they do want to try to find ways of reducing the flow of weapons and ammo into Ukraine.
Rather than playing to the Russian game rules, instead, we should use our own. European countries near Ukraine and other European NATO countries should cooperate with Ukraine to improve air defences against drones and missiles. Including assisting Ukraine within the western area of the country.
Every time that a Russian drone is found to be heading towards a European NATO country (even if it has not yet crossed the border), not only should it be shot down as soon as possible (ideally using low cost systems like Ukraine is using), but that should trigger further sanctions on Russia.
In addition, every time that a Russian drone is found to be heading towards a European NATO country, the counties that are supporting Ukraine should announce increased supplies of additional weapons and ammo for Ukraine
If this is done, Russia will soon stop playing games with these drones that they are deliberately sending towards European NATO countries.
And now we have reports of drones reaching Romania.
We do have a problem with 2 of Ukraine's other neighbours, Hungary and Slovakia. No reports of drones there. Trump won't extend sanctions unless all NATO countries do too. These two won't because they're still using Russian oil and gas.
How does it get there? It used to be through Ukraine. So many complications!
That includes Turkey, who are unlikely to source their fuels elsewhere, and unlike Hungary and Slovakia are not EU members so less able to be pressured. Quite possibly Trump knows he's setting a condition that will never be satisfied.
That includes Turkey, who are unlikely to source their fuels elsewhere, and unlike Hungary and Slovakia are not EU members so less able to be pressured. Quite possibly Trump knows he's setting a condition that will never be satisfied.
How far into Ukrainian airspace could friendly aircraft operate without risking direct engagement with Russian aircraft or air defences?
I appreciate there’s going to be a whole load of variables and considerations here so I don’t expect a definitive answer, but could it be viable to declare a no-fly zone west of say Ternopil, with anything entering being engaged by said friendly aircraft? It seems a proportionate response to Putin’s latest provocations.
I appreciate there’s going to be a whole load of variables and considerations here so I don’t expect a definitive answer, but could it be viable to declare a no-fly zone west of say Ternopil, with anything entering being engaged by said friendly aircraft? It seems a proportionate response to Putin’s latest provocations.
That would be an interesting one - would Putin claim that NATO aircraft operating over Ukraine are an act of war against Russia? That would be some pretty impressive mental gymnastics, even for him.
How far into Ukrainian airspace could friendly aircraft operate without risking direct engagement with Russian aircraft or air defences?
I appreciate there’s going to be a whole load of variables and considerations here so I don’t expect a definitive answer, but could it be viable to declare a no-fly zone west of say Ternopil, with anything entering being engaged by said friendly aircraft? It seems a proportionate response to Putin’s latest provocations.
The answer will depend on whatever the actual maximum effective range of the air to air missiles that Russian aircraft can carry. The Russian air force is extremely reluctant to fly over Ukrainian controlled territory because of their air defence systems.
So I would say that if allied aircraft stay at least 250 miles from the front line or Russian / Belarusian border they will be relatively safe from being attacked by the Russians.
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That would be an interesting one - would Putin claim that NATO aircraft operating over Ukraine are an act of war against Russia? That would be some pretty impressive mental gymnastics, even for him.
Russia will whine and complain, but in practical terms, aside from launching more drones and missiles at Ukraine, I think it is very unlikely that they will do anything else militarily.
So I would say that if allied aircraft stay at least 250 miles from the front line or Russian / Belarusian border they will be relatively safe from being attacked by the Russians.
Putin has not only waved around the nuclear threat so many times and it turned out to be empty, he hasn't even tested weapons in the last 3 years. This gives the strongest impression Putin is not confident his weapons are still usable. Therefore, I think any level of no-fly zone provided by NATO over Ukraine will not be met with more than some attempts at sabotage (that we really need to be on top of anyway).
This is true. However, in practice, if the allies operate AWACS or similar aircraft over Poland, then the positions of any Russian aircraft that may be a threat within Belarus would be known.
And an air to air missile launched from Belarusian air space would bring Belarus into the war. Would Lukashenko agree to this?
Secondly, although the Russians have long range air to air missiles, in practice, they would need their own airborne radar to reliably detect allied aircraft. Otherwise allied aircraft could fly below the radar range of the Russian fighter aircraft. This moves the relatively safe distance much closer towards the Belarusian border.
Also, some European NATO countries have systems to deal with incoming air to air missiles.
In practical terms, it's unlikely that fast jet allied aircraft would be used to take out slow moving drones. The Ukrainian interceptor drones are likely the better answer for these. The allies should assist Ukraine as much as possible with this.
The fast jet allied aircraft would be most useful dealing with cruse missiles and helping to relieve the Ukrainian air force in deterring and defending against any Russian aircraft from trying to enter Ukrainian territory.
I appreciate there’s going to be a whole load of variables and considerations here so I don’t expect a definitive answer, but could it be viable to declare a no-fly zone west of say Ternopil, with anything entering being engaged by said friendly aircraft? It seems a proportionate response to Putin’s latest provocations.
I think this is exactly what's needed at this time. It wouldn't be a problem as long as they didn't cross the Belarusian border, and even then, it's unlikely that Belarus has any meaningful air defences. Russia would cry about it, but there's not much they could likely do about it, especially as there's no way that they're going to risk their air resources in direct combat with NATO. We know that they've failed miserably when it comes to air dominance over Ukraine, and they also have severe problems even keeping their air force fleet flying, let alone actually engaging in combat.
One thing to point out is that Russia really doesn't have the resources right now. They're using drones and infantry attacks because they really don't have very much else to use, and they certainly don't have the capability to take on NATO enforcing a no-fly zone over Western Ukraine. The only thing they have in their favour is the old WW2 tactic: huge amounts of infantry that can be lost when trying to gain a few metres.
Putin has not only waved around the nuclear threat so many times and it turned out to be empty, he hasn't even tested weapons in the last 3 years. This gives the strongest impression Putin is not confident his weapons are still usable. Therefore, I think any level of no-fly zone provided by NATO over Ukraine will not be met with more than some attempts at sabotage (that we really need to be on top of anyway).
He's got a very good reason not to be confident about them. There's no guarantee that those weapon systems have survived the mass looting of the 90s, nor whether they've really received the financing that they were supposed to have received in the 2000s. Some reasonable analysis suggests that the ICBMs are no longer usable, and their missile tests have been ending in failure too. They also lost a lot to brain drain in the 1990s, combined with the issue that the missiles were partially developed and built in newly independent Ukraine.
My feeling is that the tactical nukes are likely still operational, but using them would be essentially sacrificing the Russian economy for a generation for very little gain.
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Lukashenko knows fine well that his position depends entirely on keeping Belarus out of this war. His entire reputation is built on a largely pacifist stance towards wars, and the Belarusian society is well aware that Russia is hurting badly in Ukraine. This is not the same society as in Russia, even if they speak the same language.
In the earlier days of the conflict Russian forces utilised Belarus territory to launch attacks. Acts of sabotage occurred. Lukashenko looked vulnerable but seems to have tightened his grip. It may be interesting to note how that wily dictator responds if Russian drones accidentally fall on his populated areas. Probably claim they'd been jammed by Ukraine (or Poland), or were from Ukraine!
Putin has not only waved around the nuclear threat so many times and it turned out to be empty, he hasn't even tested weapons in the last 3 years. This gives the strongest impression Putin is not confident his weapons are still usable. Therefore, I think any level of no-fly zone provided by NATO over Ukraine will not be met with more than some attempts at sabotage (that we really need to be on top of anyway).
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