Washington DC Plane Crash - PSA Airlines

[Cloud Strife]

I wondered why some of the released ATC audio made no sense to me without subtitles.

Try ATC from JFK. It's an absolute nightmare, and they're notoriously horrible to foreign crews who need them to speak slower or more clearly.

 

[edwin_m]

I wondered why some of the released ATC audio made no sense to me without subtitles.

Much of it was, but the recordings I've hear make it very clear that the helicopter was to avoid the CRJ and they confirmed they were doing so. This was repeated just after the ATC would have got the conflict alert on their screen.

I'm not sure how looking at a different plane explains this though. They were told to pass behind the CRJ but there were no planes ahead of it that they could have confused it with. If they confused it with the next plane on the same approach then they must have been trying to pass ahead of it instead. I need to go back to the videos and see whether the next plane was using the other runway or something.

 

[scotrail158713]

The standard of US ATC has been concerning for some time

ATC is nowhere near an area of expertise for me, but from what I do know I would tend to agree with this. I know of someone on another forum I’m on who used to work as a controller in the US and the example shift pattern he posted once was horrendous - especially for a role as mentally demanding as ATC.

 

[Cloud Strife]

I'm not sure how looking at a different plane explains this though. They were told to pass behind the CRJ but there were no planes ahead of it that they could have confused it with. If they confused it with the next plane on the same approach then they must have been trying to pass ahead of it instead. I need to go back to the videos and see whether the next plane was using the other runway or something.

There was a plane taking off from another runway at the time, and I think one line of thought right now is that they were focusing on that. It is really quite crazy that ATC is relying on visual identification of other aircraft though, especially as most pilots wouldn't be able to differentiate between a CRJ and other planes at night with the very low levels of external lighting that they have.

I've watched the new video that's become available, and it seems that the helicopter just charged straight into the plane. I really cannot work out how this happened, as it means that they were not only paying attention to the altitude, but also not paying attention to what was right in front of them.

 

[edwin_m]

There was a plane taking off from another runway at the time, and I think one line of thought right now is that they were focusing on that.

Possible, but the controller gave them information on where the other plane was (passing the Woodrow Wilson bridge and heading for runway 33) that was totally inconsistent with something taking off northwards. Although it's reported they have the flight recorders this time, like Jeju Air this may be another one where the full story can never be told.

 

[ainsworth74]

Possible, but the controller gave them information on where the other plane was (passing the Woodrow Wilson bridge and heading for runway 33) that was totally inconsistent with something taking off northwards.

The theory I've heard isn't wasn't a taking off plane but the next one approaching for landing that might have caused the confusion. The incident plane had been supposed to land on Runway 1 but late in their approach was redirected to land on Runway 33. This means that the incident aircraft had to manoeuvre quite late to change their approach to line up on Runway 33. Meanwhile, of course, the next landing flight is coming in behind them continuing its approach to Runway 1 (and probably about to be directed to change to Runway 33 but, of course, the accident happened before that instruction could be given).

So the helo crew probably had eyes on the flight that was still further back in its approach having not realised that there was another flight approaching them and may have found it hard to pick out the aircraft they were about to collide with due to the background lighting and darkness. Particularly if they thought they had spotted the right aircraft it's not like they'd be looking carefully for another one.

 

[edwin_m]

The theory I've heard isn't wasn't a taking off plane but the next one approaching for landing that might have caused the confusion.

I can't see how that one works either, for reasons I explained in #32 and which I still hold to having since seen another ATC video.

 

[ainsworth74]

I can't see how that one works either, for reasons I explained in #32 and which I still hold to having since seen another ATC video.

I still reckon you're underselling the impact of it being night and the amount of different light sources in the area on the helo crews ability to clearly identify what they're supposed to be looking at. But I guess the NTSB report will likely eventually give us a fairly good idea of what happened.

 

[AlterEgo]

There was a plane taking off from another runway at the time, and I think one line of thought right now is that they were focusing on that. It is really quite crazy that ATC is relying on visual identification of other aircraft though, especially as most pilots wouldn't be able to differentiate between a CRJ and other planes at night with the very low levels of external lighting that they have.

I've watched the new video that's become available, and it seems that the helicopter just charged straight into the plane. I really cannot work out how this happened, as it means that they were not only paying attention to the altitude, but also not paying attention to what was right in front of them.

I would be surprised if that helo was much above 200 feet, if at all - the collision was at a low altitude.

My reckoning is the helo misidentified an aircraft further back in the approach for RWY 33 - AAL3130 - and said they had visual. It is very difficult to determine distance and aircraft type at night, just from landing lights, and the request to pass behind may have confused the military helo pilot. The crew on the helo likely were concentrating on AAL3130, and I can imagine "did they ask us to pass behind him? Is that a CRJ? Do we have the right aircraft? How far away is he? Looks kinda far, no? Well can we go in front? We have visual here" all the while AA5432 was bearing down on them. I can literally picture those guys pointing and squinting and trying to figure things out.

Meanwhile, AA5432 has made a left banking approach to RWY 33, the left bank "hiding" the helicopter for the duration of the turn. The crew will then be fixated on the runway after levelling out. The location of the helicopter, which is at a lower altitude and to the right, may have still rendered it invisible - below the "dashboard" or instrument control panel of an aircraft which will be in a level or moderately nose up position to land, or at the least hard to see.

These pilots didn't see each other until the collision, I am sure. Tragic, and such unnecessary risk, that even I as a layperson had wondered about in many landings at DCA.

 

[Dr_Paul]

What baffles me is that a helicopter was allowed to fly around so close to the approach to an airport and a very busy one at that, and at night. I'm sure that this would not occur around a British airport.

 

[Cloud Strife]

I would be surprised if that helo was much above 200 feet, if at all - the collision was at a low altitude.

From what I've pieced together, it seems that the plane was at around 350 feet when it was hit, meaning that the helicopter was around 150 feet too high. But then: they really thought it was appropriate to not only allow the helicopter to fly visually at night, but also only around 150 feet below a jet? The lack of separation here is just ridiculous and unreal, and I find it absurd that there is actually a published helicopter route that intersects landing at Runway 33 like that.

There are some graphics floating around claiming that the helicopter made a right turn just before impact, along with climbing from 200 feet to 350 feet. If this is true, then something has gone badly wrong on board the helicopter, as the published charts make it clear that it's a 200ft maximum for helicopters there. I've seen suggestions that helicopters are routinely breaking the 200ft restriction there, which would fit with the general view that the military does what they want there.



If this graphic is accurate, it means that the helicopter crew surely must have seen the jet ahead of them for at least 1.5 miles, if not more. The last minute evasive move by the helicopter is very odd as well.

 

[edwin_m]

My reckoning is the helo misidentified an aircraft further back in the approach for RWY 33 - AAL3130 - and said they had visual. It is very difficult to determine distance and aircraft type at night, just from landing lights, and the request to pass behind may have confused the military helo pilot. The crew on the helo likely were concentrating on AAL3130, and I can imagine "did they ask us to pass behind him? Is that a CRJ? Do we have the right aircraft? How far away is he? Looks kinda far, no? Well can we go in front? We have visual here" all the while AA5432 was bearing down on them. I can literally picture those guys pointing and squinting and trying to figure things out.

That's plausible. What isn't plausible is that they were certain that the plane to avoid was AAL3130 (still a couple of minutes from landing) but they were also obeying the "pass behind". In that situation they would have either queried with ATC or hovered before reaching the runway centreline until that flight had passed them. There may be some in-cockpit conversation but otherwise we may never know.

 

[thejuggler]

If an aircraft is side on there is little to see and in the dark and field of depth is lost, especially as aircraft internal lights are also dimmed when landing in the dark.

You will see some beacon and marker lights, but travelling at 100+mph things happen quickly.

 

[Ediswan]

There was a plane taking off from another runway at the time, and I think one line of thought right now is that they were focusing on that. It is really quite crazy that ATC is relying on visual identification of other aircraft though, especially as most pilots wouldn't be able to differentiate between a CRJ and other planes at night with the very low levels of external lighting that they have.

I don't believe ATC were expecting the helicopter crew to identify the CRJ as a CRJ. Rather, ATC have advised the position and course of another aircraft, along with its type. The type gives a good idea of size and speed. After that, saying 'CRJ' is to save time.

 

[whoosh]

I wondered why some of the released ATC audio made no sense to me without subtitles.

I think it says rather a lot, when subtitles are needed to ascertain what has been said in safety critical communications.

 

[Peter Mugridge]

From what I've pieced together, it seems that the plane was at around 350 feet when it was hit, meaning that the helicopter was around 150 feet too high. But then: they really thought it was appropriate to not only allow the helicopter to fly visually at night, but also only around 150 feet below a jet? The lack of separation here is just ridiculous and unreal, and I find it absurd that there is actually a published helicopter route that intersects landing at Runway 33 like that.

There are some graphics floating around claiming that the helicopter made a right turn just before impact, along with climbing from 200 feet to 350 feet. If this is true, then something has gone badly wrong on board the helicopter, as the published charts make it clear that it's a 200ft maximum for helicopters there. I've seen suggestions that helicopters are routinely breaking the 200ft restriction there, which would fit with the general view that the military does what they want there.

Apparently there's four helicopter routes in that area, two of which commercial pilots have been complaining about for years... and there was a near collision just 24 hours earlier in similar circumstances.

There was something on the news this morning about two of those four routes, including the one involved in this collision, are to be closed so maybe the whole issue is now - belatedly - going to get looked at.

 

[Watershed]

I think it says rather a lot, when subtitles are needed to ascertain what has been said in safety critical communications.

Two things are worth pointing out. Firstly, the quality of the recording (taken from a ground station) will often be worse than what can be heard from the air. In-air reception is markedly better, especially close to the transmitter as is the case here.

Secondly, pilots get used to the quick and clipped style of communication used on the radio. It's something you get used to as you learn to fly. The fact it's tricky to understand for a layperson doesn't mean that the crew didn't understand it.

Indeed, in this case there seems to be little doubt the Army helicopter crew understood what was being said - but that they misidentified the aircraft they were supposed to be avoiding.

Of course there are still problems when it comes to the way that US ATC works, but I don't think this is the main issue for this accident.

 

[WelshBluebird]

I think it says rather a lot, when subtitles are needed to ascertain what has been said in safety critical communications.

I don't think it does at all.
You or I are not trained in ATC communications. It isn't surprising that we struggle to understand what is being said.

 

[jfollows]

I don't think it does at all.
You or I are not trained in ATC communications. It isn't surprising that we struggle to understand what is being said.

No, but people who are trained say that the standard of ATC communications in the USA can be poor.

 

[Ediswan]

No, but people who are trained say that the standard of ATC communications in the USA can be poor.

True, but there are two issues which should not get mixed up:
* ATC speak is not intended to be readily comprehensible to the general ppublic, even when 100% by the book
* Some US ATC is nowhere near to 100% by the book, neither the language used nor the instructions given

 

[jfollows]

True, but there are two issues which should not get mixed up:
* ATC speak is not intended to be readily comprehensible to the general ppublic, even when 100% by the book
* Some US ATC is nowhere near to 100% by the book, neither the language used nor the instructions given

Of course, but it’s your second point I’m primarily agreeing with. From what I’ve read, not from personal knowledge of course.

 

[WelshBluebird]

No, but people who are trained say that the standard of ATC communications in the USA can be poor.

Indeed. But that has literally nothing to do with subtitles being needed for the layperson to understand what is being said.

 

[bahnause]

Just wait for all the swiss german dialects on GSM-R communication…

 

[Cloud Strife]

* ATC speak is not intended to be readily comprehensible to the general ppublic, even when 100% by the book

Air traffic communication is really quite easy to understand once you know a few basic bits of terminology. The issue in the US is that they don't do it by the book, and there's a lot of flawed processes that would never be accepted in Europe. For instance, changing runway at the last minute from 1 to 33. A sidestep move (i.e. 1L to 1R) is one thing, but this involved a significant change of plan at the last minute.

From what has been said, changing from Runway 1 to 33 like this also means that the plane approaching 33 is much lower than it normally would be.

Of course there are still problems when it comes to the way that US ATC works, but I don't think this is the main issue for this accident.

Of course, ATC isn't to blame here, the controller was doing the jobs of two controllers, and it's really not that their fault that someone thought it was a good idea to allow helicopters to fly under approaching planes. It seems that the supervisor permitted someone to leave early, meaning that the controller had to handle both planes and helicopters. A ridiculous scenario. Having said that, the helicopter was off-route by least half a mile, while also being above the 200ft limit for helicopters on that route.

The crew of the CRJ appear to have flown an almost textbook visual approach, so this is really on the crew of the helicopter.

Oh, and this just popped up:

The National Transportation Safety Board, the federal agency tasked with investigating civil aviation accidents in the U.S., including the Jan. 29 disaster involving an American Airlines passenger plane and U.S. Military Blackhawk helicopter in Washington, D.C., that resulted in the deaths of 67 people, will no longer send out email updates to members of the media.

In a Feb. 1 social media post, the NTSB announced that all future media updates on the accident, and others, would be posted on X, the former Twitter platform owned by Elon Musk, whom President Trump appointed to run the unofficial “Department of Government Efficiency.”

NTSB No Longer Emailing Press Aviation Accident Updates, Using X Social Media Platform - Media Play News

The National Transportation Safety Board, the federal agency tasked with investigating civil aviation accidents in the U.S., including the Jan. 29 disaster involving an American Airlines passenger plane and U.S. Military Blackhawk helicopter in Washington, D.C., that resulted in the deaths of 67...

www.mediaplaynews.com

It is truly disgusting how low this administration has already fallen.

 

[BananaRepublic]

No, but people who are trained say that the standard of ATC communications in the USA can be poor.

True, but there are two issues which should not get mixed up:
* ATC speak is not intended to be readily comprehensible to the general ppublic, even when 100% by the book
* Some US ATC is nowhere near to 100% by the book, neither the language used nor the instructions given

Whatever the failings on behalf of the helicopter crew, ATC, the ATC procedures and flight rules are also culpable in this tragic acc.

Speaking as someone who spent nearly 40 years as an ATCO at a very busy front line unit and as a former PPL.
I have flown in and out of several major US airports as supplementary flight crew and experienced their r/t from the front end.

Although not being totally intimate with the very different ATC methods of operation between Europe and the US, I will say as a generalisation, US ATC has always been appallingly lax when it comes to r/t and the flight rules they work to and some of the ATC procedures could be regarded as deficient.
Despite the huge amount of air traffic movements that are regularly handled in the US, it’s a miracle that more of these serious mishaps don’t occur.

I could write reams about it, but despite many background factors at play in this tragic case, the cheese slices, the fundamental element is that the helicopter should have been nowhere near the final approach path for DCA, regardless of altitude, nor should have been attempting to take visual separation, particularly at night.

From the r/t released, the controller clears the helicopter to proceed from beyond Haines Point (presumably the previous clearance limit on helicopter route 1), onto helicopter route 4.
This route 4 cuts right across the final approach path to RW 33, very close to the runway threshold.
The 200 ft max altitude on this section of route 4 is neither here nor there in this situation, as there is no separation being provided whatsoever.

In this US Class B airspace, ATC must provide separation between VFR traffic (assuming the helicopter was operating under their VFR rules?) and IFR traffic, such as the American Eagle CRJ, either by…
a) 1.5 miles lateral separation, or
b) 500 ft vertical, or
c) Visual separation

a & b we’re not applied.
c, visual separation was being relied on, even though it was at night.
The controller gave scant traffic information to the helicopter and apparently, non to the CRJ.
He transferred responsibility for visual separation to the helicopter, whilst simultaneously clearing them to fly right across the final approach path to RW33.
This appears to have been compounded by insufficient traffic information (e.g. referring to an aircraft type in the dark and no positional information).
What resulted looks likely to be a combination of poor procedures, being inappropriately, even recklessly applied.


Had the helicopter kept to the correct route (assuming the reports that it deviated are correct) and remained below 200 ft, then the tragedy may have been averted, but that doesn’t make it less of a totally unsafe, or reckless situation.


.

 

[Cloud Strife]

Couldn't agree more with the analysis above. The more I look at the helicopter route maps, the more I'm bewildered by the fact that this was ever permitted with Runway 33 in use. DCA doesn't appear to get any arrivals between around half 12 at night until half 6 in the morning, so there's plenty of time there for night time military training.

the fundamental element is that the helicopter should have been nowhere near the final approach path for DCA, regardless of altitude, nor should have been attempting to take visual separation, particularly at night.

It would be interesting to know why this helicopter route exists in the first place. I'm guessing that it was a military demand, but really, whoever thought it was a good idea?

 

[BananaRepublic]

…..It would be interesting to know why this helicopter route exists in the first place. I'm guessing that it was a military demand, but really, whoever thought it was a good idea?

It isn’t purely a military route.
The helicopter routes are available for civil traffic too.
The procedures apply to all users.
Obviously, DC has a disproportionate amount of military activity, compared with almost every other city.

If you look at the helicopter route map for the area, you will note that the routes closely follow the rivers and major roads.
This is for safety reasons…engine failure and the ability to “alight” relatively safely, clear of built up areas, in the event of an emergency.

Unfortunately, route 4 follows the eastern shore of the Potomac River, cutting across short finals for RW33 and running very, very close to the centreline of the approach to RW01 **.
It’s incredible to think that this route could be used, simultaneously with IFR arrivals into DCA.


(** One of the many differences from international standards that the US uses, is abbreviating runway designations that should begin with a zero. e.g. RW 9 instead of RW 09.
RW designations are to the nearest 10 degrees of magnetic heading)

Note that due to the location of the airport, right near the heart of the city and in a densely populated area, the alignment of the main runway puts the approach centreline for RW01, right down the river.
A normal extended centreline and normal approach for RW33 would involve overflying the built up area to the SE, hence this was banned many years ago.
This is why they adopted the visual switch and tactical approach to RW33, to allow for increased movements on the main runway.
Pilots are asked if they can accept the switch and are not compelled to do so.
I assume that the procedure has to be approved and trained by each airline using the airport, under their licenced, standard operating procedures (SOPS).


.

 

[GRALISTAIR]

I can't believe that 18 hours later, they are getting ready to reopen the airport.

I say kudos.

Should they not wait for the initial search & rescue or first incite into what caused this?

I think that is OTT

USA- All they care about is the money......$$$

That is very unfair.

 

[mpthomson]

I can't believe that 18 hours later, they are getting ready to reopen the airport. Should they not wait for the initial search & rescue or first incite into what caused this?

How are the air controllers supposed to manage having had such a major disaster impact everyone.

I certainly, wouldn't want to fly into that airport at the moment!

USA- All they care about is the money......$$$

Meanwhile, it takes a few days/ weeks before we consider reopening anything in the UK after a major incident.

It certainly doesn't take anything like that to reopen an airport if the crash wasn't on the site...

 

[edwin_m]

Assuming the rescue isn't causing any hazard to approaching or departing aircraft, and nothing to do with the airport is suspected to have contributed*, the main constraint may just be to ensure that the fire and rescue is again able to respond to any new incident that might take place.

*Leaving aside that the the overall location and alignment of DCA are arguably contributory here