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Today is the 30th Anniversary of an head-on collision on the Uckfield line between 2 x 6car class 205 DEMUs.
5 people lost their lives including both drivers and a guard who was in one of the cabs at the time.
The cause was the SPAD of signal OD58 at Blackham Junction on to a single line section.
Of course there were several mitigating circumstances including Fog, the dirt on the signal lens and lack of a working communication system between the signal box and the drivers.
Many lessons have been learnt and our railway is gladly safer now.
A large gathering took place today at Cowden station in commemoration.
The Cowden rail crash occurred on 15 October 1994, near Cowden Station in Kent (UK), when two trains collided head-on, killing five and injuring 13, after one of them had passed a signal at danger and entered a single-line section. The cause was due to a collective of issues; the AWS being inoperative, the signal was dirty and the light intensity was low, and there were no trap points to prevent a train wrongly entering a section against the signal.
HM Railway Inspectorate RAILWAY ACCIDENT AT COWDEN A report of the Inquiry into the collision between two passenger trains which occurred at Cowden on 15 October 1994
ISTR it was concluded he was definitely in the cab. Witnesses boarding the train had seen two people in there, and the positions where the guard and driver were found indicated quite pretty conclusively they had both been in the cab. It was never more than speculation that the guard might actually have been driving, there was no evidence to support such suspicions.
What has always been perhaps more of a mystery is whether the AWS was working. The report concludes is likely was, but again there’s little to confirm one way or the other.
We will never really know the true root cause of this accident, though thankfully TPWS and the general tightening up of procedures over the years makes such an accident unlikely to happen again.
ISTR it was concluded he was definitely in the cab. Witnesses boarding the train had seen two people in there, and the positions where the guard and driver were found indicated quite pretty conclusively they had both been in the cab. It was never more than speculation that the guard might actually have been driving, there was no evidence to support such suspicions.
What has always been perhaps more of a mystery is whether the AWS was working. The report concludes is likely was, but again there’s little to confirm one way or the other.
We will never really know the true root cause of this accident, though thankfully TPWS and the general tightening up of procedures over the years makes such an accident unlikely to happen again.
The guard's van was in the third coach so, in the normal course of events, there was no reason for the guard to be near the front of the train. I've always wondered why they didn't spot the absence of the down train at Ashurst. Trains always crossed there. This was noted by the passenger mentioned in paragraph 32. I recall being horrified when I saw the pictures on the news. On a positive note, this was the last serious collision on the Southern Region.
The pictures from the report are absolutely shocking. It's incredible how much better modern rolling stock holds up in collisions compared to Mk 1 stock. It seems multiple technology issues (lack of radio signal, lack of phone signal, possibly AWS failure) contributed. Not only would more modern stock have held up better, or had the radio technology etc to prevent the crash, it would at least have had the recorded data to confirm the true cause of the accident.
I feel incredibly sorry for the signaller who could nothing to contact the drivers, and could only contact emergency services and control to report an accident he could no longer prevent. I cannot begin to imagine what being in that position must feel like.
ISTR he was definitely in the cab. Witnesses boarding the train had seen two people in there, and the positions where the guard and driver were found indicated quite pretty conclusively they had both been in the cab. It was never more than speculation that the guard might actually have been driving, there was no evidence to support such suspicions.
It's true that while the Guard was in the cab, there was no evidence that the Guard was at the controls (the coroners report was inconclusive - looking at the pictures of the extreme damage to the trains, I'm not surprised). From the report though, the Guard had been previously reprimanded for being in the front cab on more than one occasion, which is why it is certainly not inconceivable that he was at the controls if he was in the front cab and had aspirations to become a driver. Regardless, he could certainly have been a source of distraction to the driver if he was in the cab unauthorised/uncessarily - which also is not clear. Personally I think that the Wikipedia article overlooks the contribution of the guards presence at least in the cab, or possibly even at the controls.
[Ward] was aware that Guard Brett-Andrews had aspirations to be a driver but not why he had failed to become one.
80 It was Mr Ward who had first given Guard Brett-Andrews a verbal warning in mid-1992 for riding in the front cab of a train with the driver. He was later found again to have been riding in the front cab and was given a more severe warning, not amounting to a formal disciplinary action, by a senior manager. This was thought to have been sufficient but on 8 January 1994 he was again caught riding in the front cab and was formally disciplined and given a final warning on 4 February 1994. He said that it was not correct that trains inspectors had suspicions that, on occasions, Guard Brett-Andrews actually drove trains.
81 Mr Ward agreed that a propelling move was one occasion when a guard could legitimately be in the leading driver's cab. However the manoeuvres of the units on leaving Selhurst and reversing at Norwood on the morning of the accident did not involve a propelling move although the reversal at Oxted probably did.
Under these circumstances the guard might have a need to touch the brake handle but not the master controller. The latter, in any case, would be non-effective as there would be no driver's key inserted.
Trap points are fine when starting from a loop or siding. Not so much on the open line at speed, as here.
The accident report is disappointing, as I find a number are. This one seems to focus excessively on compliance with everyone, including the many not directly involved, being checked against every procedure to be found. Regarding "driver distraction" from a cab companion, this is a common thing that gets pulled out. Quite why it is not an issue when the inspector/manager rides along is to be explained. Point 131 in the report comments on having a fireman there as well, but says this ceased at the end of steam locomotives, without stating it continued on diesels for another generation.
If anyone can make sense of paragraph 28, where the guard of the Down train, the sole traincrew survivor, appears to state they walked right past the enormous wreckage twice, to the rear of the Up train, 12 cars away, thought it was the front of his own train, walked back, and only later had to be told it had been involved in a collision, I would like an explanation.
You would think it inconceivable that a driver would even contemplate allowing the guard to drive "their" train, but stranger things have happened in the past, and not just in rail. Aviation has had some rather interesting incidents/disasters which I feel might be worth bringing up.
I can think of at least 2 rather nasty accidents in aviation where unauthorised personnel were at the controls, leading to a crash. The first (and less relevant one) is Aeroflot 593, where the pilot allowed his son to fly the plane, resulting in a disaster (surprisingly, not the most idiotic cause of an Aeroflot crash! That's a story for another day though).
The other (and far more relevant to this case) accident was United Airlines 2885, which was caused by the Captain allowing the Second Officer (aka the Flight Engineer) to conduct the take-off, in contravention of both company and FAA (American equivalent to our CAA) rules.
Of note especially, is that the FE had aspirations of being a pilot, but had repeatedly failed the conversion course, resulting in a mutual agreement between him and United not to apply for any more such positions. It later transpired that, while not common, it was far from unheard of for crews to allow their Flight Engineers to fly the plane on Cargo/ferrying flights.
I don't think the aviation examples are particularly relevant. In steam loco days it was absolutely normal for the fireman, coming up to their exam for passed fireman, to be given the controls by the driver, acting as instructor. In fact the examining inspector would probably have been surprised if they hadn't.
An alternative view of the Cowden collision circumstances is in Adrian Vaughan's book "Tracks to Disaster".
Regarding "driver distraction" from a cab companion, this is a common thing that gets pulled out. Quite why it is not an issue when the inspector/manager rides along is to be explained.
It can definitely be a distraction if cab etiquette is not maintained, but you have to bear in mind that an assessor riding with the driver should be acutely aware of the distraction risk presented by conversation so will know when to shut up, and the driver, knowing that they are being assessed, will 'up their game' and drive to the best of their ability.
it was the rule (and I think it still applies) that you don't have trap points on lines used by passenger trains. Trap points are used on goods lines to protect passenger trains from converging goods trains that have passed danger signals.
A good example is Leicester, on the Up side, where there are converging lines at the South end used by passenger trains that don't have traps, but the goods line around the back (that doesn't have a platform face) has a trap when it joins passenger lines.
You would think it inconceivable that a driver would even contemplate allowing the guard to drive "their" train, but stranger things have happened in the past, and not just in rail. Aviation has had some rather interesting incidents/disasters which I feel might be worth bringing up.
I can think of at least 2 rather nasty accidents in aviation where unauthorised personnel were at the controls, leading to a crash. The first (and less relevant one) is Aeroflot 593, where the pilot allowed his son to fly the plane, resulting in a disaster (surprisingly, not the most idiotic cause of an Aeroflot crash! That's a story for another day though).
The other (and far more relevant to this case) accident was United Airlines 2885, which was caused by the Captain allowing the Second Officer (aka the Flight Engineer) to conduct the take-off, in contravention of both company and FAA (American equivalent to our CAA) rules.
Of note especially, is that the FE had aspirations of being a pilot, but had repeatedly failed the conversion course, resulting in a mutual agreement between him and United not to apply for any more such positions. It later transpired that, while not common, it was far from unheard of for crews to allow their Flight Engineers to fly the plane on Cargo/ferrying flights.
In times past this sort of thing was more common than one might think. I’m sure over the years many guards would have had the opportunity to “have a go” with a friendly and experienced driver.
Without wishing to get too far into the issue of who was actually driving, as it’s something that will never be resolved and as I said elsewhere there isn’t any positive evidence to suggest that the driver wasn’t himself driving, part of the problem at Cowden may well have been that the driver was comparatively inexperienced. Clearly whatever happened the weather conditions were problematic due to the fog, and there remains an element of doubt as to whether the AWS was functioning. For whatever reason the driver had allowed the guard to ride with him, and whatever happened he missed the red aspect. In that sense it doesn’t really matter who was actually driving, ultimately the driver missed the red aspect - even if the guard was driving one would expect the driver to be supervising him.
I guess what I’m trying to say is that the driver was presumably trying to be friendly by allowing the enthusiastic guard to be up front, but sadly put both of them in a very dangerous position. On a normal day nothing would have happened, but this time he had bitten off a bit more than he could chew, what with the fog for sure, the dodgy intensity of the red aspect, and maybe perhaps the AWS.
Perhaps too friendly to say no, but paid the ultimate price. So sad.
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It can definitely be a distraction if cab etiquette is not maintained, but you have to bear in mind that an assessor riding with the driver should be acutely aware of the distraction risk presented by conversation so will know when to shut up, and the driver, knowing that they are being assessed, will 'up their game' and drive to the best of their ability.
Agreed, it’s not the same situation as at Cowden. Where a second person in the cab is a driver themselves, they should be expected to have an understanding of what the driver’s task is, so know what to look for, when to keep quiet, et cetera.
The second person at Cowden was not a driver, so the distraction risk was rather higher.
Trap points are fine when starting from a loop or siding. Not so much on the open line at speed, as here.
The accident report is disappointing, as I find a number are. This one seems to focus excessively on compliance with everyone, including the many not directly involved, being checked against every procedure to be found. Regarding "driver distraction" from a cab companion, this is a common thing that gets pulled out. Quite why it is not an issue when the inspector/manager rides along is to be explained. Point 131 in the report comments on having a fireman there as well, but says this ceased at the end of steam locomotives, without stating it continued on diesels for another generation.
If anyone can make sense of paragraph 28, where the guard of the Down train, the sole traincrew survivor, appears to state they walked right past the enormous wreckage twice, to the rear of the Up train, 12 cars away, thought it was the front of his own train, walked back, and only later had to be told it had been involved in a collision, I would like an explanation.
If anyone can make sense of paragraph 28, where the guard of the Down train, the sole traincrew survivor, appears to state they walked right past the enormous wreckage twice, to the rear of the Up train, 12 cars away, thought it was the front of his own train, walked back, and only later had to be told it had been involved in a collision, I would like an explanation.
Confusion following trauma, perhaps some concussion after a blow to the head? it says on the first page of the report that the guard was taken to hospital suffering from shock!
I don't think the aviation examples are particularly relevant. In steam loco days it was absolutely normal for the fireman, coming up to their exam for passed fireman, to be given the controls by the driver, acting as instructor. In fact the examining inspector would probably have been surprised if they hadn't.
An alternative view of the Cowden collision circumstances is in Adrian Vaughan's book "Tracks to Disaster".
Perhaps in the steam days, but Cowden was over a full quarter of a century since the end of mainline steam. I'm not convinced such a blasé attitude to allowing a driver-to-be to take the controls would survive so long, especially since with a fireman their day-to-day duties would see them in the cab all day long, whereas the same is not normally the case for guards.
You would think it inconceivable that a driver would even contemplate allowing the guard to drive "their" train, but stranger things have happened in the past, and not just in rail. Aviation has had some rather interesting incidents/disasters which I feel might be worth bringing up.
I can think of at least 2 rather nasty accidents in aviation where unauthorised personnel were at the controls, leading to a crash. The first (and less relevant one) is Aeroflot 593, where the pilot allowed his son to fly the plane, resulting in a disaster (surprisingly, not the most idiotic cause of an Aeroflot crash! That's a story for another day though).
The other (and far more relevant to this case) accident was United Airlines 2885, which was caused by the Captain allowing the Second Officer (aka the Flight Engineer) to conduct the take-off, in contravention of both company and FAA (American equivalent to our CAA) rules.
Of note especially, is that the FE had aspirations of being a pilot, but had repeatedly failed the conversion course, resulting in a mutual agreement between him and United not to apply for any more such positions. It later transpired that, while not common, it was far from unheard of for crews to allow their Flight Engineers to fly the plane on Cargo/ferrying flights.
it was the rule (and I think it still applies) that you don't have trap points on lines used by passenger trains. Trap points are used on goods lines to protect passenger trains from converging goods trains that have passed danger signals.
A good example is Leicester, on the Up side, where there are converging lines at the South end used by passenger trains that don't have traps, but the goods line around the back (that doesn't have a platform face) has a trap when it joins passenger lines.
Your point certainly applies to main running lines, but practice regarding passenger loops must have changed over the years: the Up and Down PLs at Kent House had trap points with sand drags the in my youth, which were removed when resignalled to Victoria in the late 70s.
Confusion following trauma, perhaps some concussion after a blow to the head? it says on the first page of the report that the guard was taken to hospital suffering from shock!
You may well be right. It is difficult to make sense of this. There doesn't appear to be any indication that the guard's account was queried or challenged in any way.
Was this the last fatal accident under British Rail before privatisation? It was already in the shadow-TOC era, technically being Network SouthCentral.
Was this the last fatal accident under British Rail before privatisation? It was already in the shadow-TOC era, technically being Network SouthCentral.
Your point certainly applies to main running lines, but practice regarding passenger loops must have changed over the years: the Up and Down PLs at Kent House had trap points with sand drags the in my youth, which were removed when resignalled to Victoria in the late 70s.
Indeed it's not 100%. Back about 1970, my colleagues in the accident section discovered that there was a new late night (possibly FO) Euston - Bletchley as a bizarre way of getting a St Albans branch dmu back for maintenance, and as they lived at Leighton they decided to catch it home (it had no forward connection to Northampton til the small hours, so I didn't go). Anyway, it had an unusual finale; climbed Camden Bank on the left-most track with gusto and the driver SPADed the signal where this loop joins the DFL and indeed went through traps and into the abutment of an over bridge. So for every rule there's an exception
Indeed it's not 100%. Back about 1970, my colleagues in the accident section discovered that there was a new late night (possibly FO) Euston - Bletchley as a bizarre way of getting a St Albans branch dmu back for maintenance, and as they lived at Leighton they decided to catch it home (it had no forward connection to Northampton til the small hours, so I didn't go). Anyway, it had an unusual finale; climbed Camden Bank on the left-most track with gusto and the driver SPADed the signal where this loop joins the DFL and indeed went through traps and into the abutment of an over bridge. So for every rule there's an exception
For passenger traffic, it's still permissible to have a full, locked turnout leading to an overlap spur with suitable means of retardation just beyond a red signal destination, usually a set of friction buffer stops. That can be useful to allow unimpeded run-in to a platform where the exit is tight and a full or restricted overlap clear of the throat at the destination cannot otherwise be set without unacceptably blocking simultaneous traffic in and out of other platforms at that end. Having an overrun spur with stops or sand drag rather than a single or double switch throw-off is also the default today for freight lines and sidings at their connections to passenger lines in new installations. Running moves on freight infrastructure normally require overlap provision and facing point locks in projects today, though this can be relaxed within wholly freight areas subject to risk assessment. A flank protection turnout and spur would be possible in modern signalling outside an overlap if it was considered a suitable mitigation for a particular collision risk. Beyond the overlap cases and the statutory trapping of non-passenger lines and sidings at intersections with passenger lines, it's rarely necessary due to other mitigations such as train protection and better communications. Operators sometimes like bay and other platforms to be trapped so stock can easily be left unattended in them for long periods.
Some throw-offs and trap spurs are or were in dreadful positions, leading to a great drop down an embankment for example, or straight into a signalbox or interlocking building.
Some throw-offs and trap spurs are or were in dreadful positions, leading to a great drop down an embankment for example, or straight into a signalbox or interlocking building.
indeed, I have been intrigued the distant past by seeing examples of the strange logic where running through the traps results in exactly as you say, where the result would be likely to have a worse outcome than what it was trying to avoid. An example around 1968-9 was the 47 that was overpowered coming down the bank into Shrewsbury, ran through traps and into a signalbox with fatal results for the occupant, from my recollection
But even recently (ish) there was the driver that misunderstood a ground signal at Paddington resulting in running through traps; these aimed a run-off squarely at an OHLE support. The resulting collapse brought Paddington to a halt for quite a while, or at least that's my recollection of the events. So it's not all in the distant past
Some throw-offs and trap spurs are or were in dreadful positions, leading to a great drop down an embankment for example, or straight into a signalbox or interlocking building.
I recall an incident at Ruscombe (Twyford/Maidenhead) where a 47-hauled freight failed to stop in the Up Goods Loop and was sent by the trap points straight into the relay room, knocking out the signalling on all lines.
There's some odd things in the report, as summarised by Taunton. However, I'm also a little puzzled about why so much importance is attached to whether the A.W.S. was working. It's not like driving through Rugby on the down fast to the down Trent Valley, where the signals for two other movements (Plat 1 to down Birmingham, and freight from Down Northampton to Down T.V. slow) could also be clear as well as your own. The signal spacing the branch is quite wide, and the one passed at danger is important and un-ambiguous; it's where two tracks merge into the single line. It's not just another signal in a series. As well, the guard was said in the report to swap turns so he could work on the branch., so you would think he would be as familiar with it as a driver with route knowledge. It doesn't seem a difficult section to understand and memorise.
Regarding the report's criticism of the investigations being made immediately; in the defence of the staff, my experience in B.R. days (and it wad direct, for a period) was that people who arrived at an accident scene primarily wanted to find out what went wrong and why; the aim was to do this as quickly as possible (for instance, but not in this case, brake shoes cool down and air leaks into vac,. systems). If that showed people at fault then that was the result, but it was primarily to find out why, not how blame could be apportioned. Of course, in those days it would always be B.R.'s fault, unlike today when there's so many organisations involved. Not saying it's better or worse, just a different emphasis.
Signal OD58R was before Ashurst station having past it at yellow the driver could have forgotten about it being yellow after the Ashurst stop. Maybe a banner repeater should have been fitted at the end of the platform, you could say it was almost a ding ding and away accident.
I'm also a little puzzled about why so much importance is attached to whether the A.W.S. was working. It's not like driving through Rugby on the down fast to the down Trent Valley, where the signals for two other movements (Plat 1 to down Birmingham, and freight from Down Northampton to Down T.V. slow) could also be clear as well as your own. The signal spacing the branch is quite wide, and the one passed at danger is important and un-ambiguous; it's where two tracks merge into the single line. It's not just another signal in a series. As well, the guard was said in the report to swap turns so he could work on the branch., so you would think he would be as familiar with it as a driver with route knowledge. It doesn't seem a difficult section to understand and memorise.
In the up direction, the errant train had already passed the distant for the up signal (#58) protecting the single line northwards from Ashurst before it reached the station. If the onboard apparatus was faulty and didn't show the AWS sunflower caution reminder, crew may have been misled into thinking there was no caution required on restarting the train. On the other hand, they would have been very used to getting a warning at distant #58R, as the regular passing manoeuvre there meant the single line onwards would often be blocked on an up trains's run-in to the station, the signaller being unable to set a route forward until the scheduled passing train had cleared the single line. There might have been a level of familiarity, often getting that sequence, that numbed crew to the importance of the warning after a ding ding and away, then they only had to miss the protecting signal for disaster to ensue. At ~800m beyond the platform Signal #58 would not be classed a platform starting signal so not subject to second opinion by the guard before dispatch, as the double-to-single connection, at Blackham Junction, is over a km north of the station. I expect it would have been common to depart towards the signal at red while a down train was yet to clear the section ahead, expecting to pass the train and get the signal soon after. With the day's misty conditions and the low light output from the signal, estimated at some 13.6% of another reference signal in tests due to an 'old bulb' with much interior tungsten deposition and fly excrement contamination on the bulb exterior and inside face of the lens, it was estimated the driver had around a second to see and interpret the signal...
Signal OD58R was before Ashurst station having past it at yellow the driver could have forgotten about it being yellow after the Ashurst stop. Maybe a banner repeater should have been fitted at the end of the platform, you could say it was almost a ding ding and away accident.
As trains frequently depart the station towards the signal at red, a banner may not have helped much in this kind of incident. With its old-school 440m overlap/safe overrun before the junction, OD 58 has good TPWS protection today.
Edit. A further thought from the report: On leaving Ashurst, the cautionary AWS for OD58 should have been encountered before the red signal which would have required acknowledgement by the driver to avoid an intervention. If AWS wasn't dysfunctional or isolated, then the only explanation was another 'subconscious' cancellation.
Edit 2. Risks of cancelling repeatedly when running continually on double yellows was a major objection the Southern Region raised against the BR standard AWS when being introduced in the 60s. EMUs could run this close perfectly safely otherwise at or near full speed, and did so routinely at busy times, but so many 'false' warnings could lure a driver into missing a 'real' one. The dispute delayed fitment in the region, which lobbied unsuccessfully for a more sophisticated multi-aspect cab system that wouldn't habituate the driver so much. I'd say the Uckfield line has a high incidence of AWS warnings being received followed quickly by routes being set forward as single lines become clear. Thus, there could be a higher than typical risk of preemption of aspect change after a warning. When AWS was the only safety system, that was very concerning on a single line.
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The signalling on the line is unusual, notably the lack of signals protecting the facing points of the single to double connections at Ashurst, Blackham and Hever Junctions. Normally, the principle requires a signal within 1000m (ISTR) of a facing point on passenger lines. The idea is to have a signal proving the position of the point within a short running time so a detection loss fault has a better chance of stopping any approaching train. From OD58 to points 530 at Hever Junction, it's nearly 6km, with no signals in that distance. The same applies for the opposite direction on the same single line section and for the Up direction from Crowhurst to Ashurst. That would have required a derogation from standards, but I can see the cost savings were compelling. There's a risk from that layout which must have been considered at the time. Say a train tried to enter one of the single line sections without proper authority, tripping at the TPWS but stopping with the front just foul of the single line turnout. With an opposing train already on its way having been given its last proceed many km previously, there would be no opportunity for train detection sections and point detection around the trailed switches to replace a nearby signal and give the second train at least some warning on approach. Note with a trainstop TPWS intervention at OD58, I suspect the safe overrun is adequate to mitigate this, so again this is another risk vastly more concerning before TPWS.
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