HSTEd
Veteran Member
- Joined
- 14 Jul 2011
- Messages
- 20,354
I believe I read the report at the time, and I am aware there is more than enough blame to go around. For example the silly requirement for 140mph operation (and multiple pantograph 140mph operation at that!), the desire to jettison all previous experience in favour of a first principle approach and spiralling design requirements.I agree that the cost estimates in the paper now appear hopelessly optimistic, but the HOPS train was only one of a number of factors - see below.
It was a lot more complicated than that, and in fact the spec seems to have been changed several times. And why NR decided to design a new system rather than adopt one of the proven designs that were available is hard to get a grip on. Anyone who wants to get better understanding of the problems with the OLE programme between 2012 and 2017 should read the RIA "Electrification Cost Challenge" - freely available in the public domain. To quote from the "what went wrong" section of the Exec Summary:
But please read the full report!
For example designing a cantilever for the shortest achievable mast height.... and putting giant mast extensions on top for overhead bare ATF conductors!
The problem with the report is its conclusion is essentially that the taxpayer should pay billions more on a decade long programme of electrification in the hope that it will be cheaper at the end. Given the extreme timescales associated with the TPRU I am very doubtful much could really be achieved in a decade, and 10 years from now a non decarbonised railway will not be in a great political position.
There honestly does not seem to be any way to get a useful quantity of 25kV in time to matter for guaranteeing the place of the railway in the post-carbon age
EDIT:
Special mention to the ORR and its insane interpretation of the Electricity at Work Regulations and attempted imposition of onerous risk assessments that drove very expensive engineering solutions to avoid them
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