Did Beeching affect Britain’s productivity?

[jon0844]

Let us not pretend the Beeching cuts were uncontroversial in their day.

Of course I'd assume (and hope) some people saw this as a bad idea and maybe had some forward thinking, but even now we have a Government suddenly promoting car usage over all else - not for logical reasoning but because it appeals to a certain base that the Government is hoping will win it the next election.

And a lot of damage is being done right now and even more if they do win.

 

[eldomtom2]

Bit difficult to go along with, when Fiennes regularly refers to him as the "Great and Good Doctor".

Dare I suggest that referring to someone with such fawning terms is perhaps a sign of dislike? The kindest word Fiennes has for Beeching is that he agreed with the broad strokes of the idea of "get rid of what you can't support, expand what you can", but that he disagreed heavily on the details of how Beeching implemented that idea.

 

[Bald Rick]

The wholesale scrappings of stock and track vastly distorted the UK price of steel and may well have precipitated the beginning of the collapse of the UK steel industry.

I think thats rather far fetched.

Similarly the reduction in coal use affecting mining, though obviously that's also due to the modernisation plan.

the rail network consumed roughly 14m tonnes of coal a year in the 1950 reducing to effectively nothing by 1970. in the same timescale the use of coal in electricity generation went from about 33m tonnes a year to 76m.…

 

[Sad Sprinter]

Dare I suggest that referring to someone with such fawning terms is perhaps a sign of dislike? The kindest word Fiennes has for Beeching is that he agreed with the broad strokes of the idea of "get rid of what you can't support, expand what you can", but that he disagreed heavily on the details of how Beeching implemented that idea.

Yes I was always confused about that phrase, it sounds a bit sneering. My father certainly never used it in a positive light when mentioning Beeching.

 

[Dr Hoo]

Let us not pretend the Beeching cuts were uncontroversial in their day.

Can you honestly claim that even in the 1960s the railways and the country would be better off without these lines, to name a few of those "not selected for development"?

• Newcastle-Berwick-Edinburgh
• Chester-Holyhead
• Plymouth-Penzance
• London-Bedford-Leicester

Fiennes was absolutely not pro-Beeching - indeed he claims that the Trunk Routes report originally lacked the "not selected for development" euphemism and outright stated such routes would be closed.

As I have responded many times before in similar threads, the Trunk Routes document was not about 'closures'. "It should be recognised that the purpose of this study is to select routes for for future intensive use, not to select lines for closure..."

The study was principally about freight. It is worth noting, for example, that despite booming oil traffic the line beyond Swansea to Milford Haven wasn't seen as a Trunk Route because it was a dead end rather than part of the 'core' network. The original Reshaping Report had outlined the first concept of Liner/container trains. This included intended routes to serve Harwich and Heysham for short sea shipment traffic but these weren't identified as Trunk Routes either. It needs to be understood that the whole concept of maritime container traffic was still in its infancy, with services via Holyhead and then deep sea services via Felixstowe soon entering the scene.

The matrices of current and forecast (1984) major traffic flows are very interesting. For example, Corby was not immediately next to a Trunk Route but was still expected to need 7 daily trains to link it with Stockton, 10 for Sheffield and 18 with Scunthorpe (out of a total of 63). Chatham (presumably representing the whole of the Medway area) was also not on a Trunk Route but would need 24 trains per day.

Taking the first of your examples - Newcastle <-> Edinburgh, it is amazing how little prospective relevant freight traffic had been identified. One train per day to link with each of Leeds, Newcastle, Nottingham, Sheffield and Stockton. Alongside a roughly two-hourly daytime passenger service this hardly appeared likely to tax the route and justify trunk status.

You get the picture?

 

[eldomtom2]

As I have responded many times before in similar threads, the Trunk Routes document was not about 'closures'. "It should be recognised that the purpose of this study is to select routes for for future intensive use, not to select lines for closure..."

The study was principally about freight.

Wrong and wrong. I repeat what I have written before about the Trunk Routes report - I would very much appreciate it if those who disagree with me actually respond to it this time:

The focus of The Reshaping of British Railways and The Development Of The Major Railway Trunk Routes was different. The focus of the first was to propose (among other things) that steps be taken in the immediate future to close a large number of lines; the focus of the second was to develop a vision of what the railway should look like in twenty years and what network would be necessary to achieve that vision.

Because of this broad-level look, Beeching's expectation was presumably that it would be followed by more detailed studies, with the possibility that these studies could lead to results that meant that which routes would be developed would change - for example, he brings up North London commuter services, heavily reliant on the main lines unlike those in the southeast, as an example of something that would have to be taken to account in more planning.

Thus the value of Trunk Routes is that it is Beeching presenting his vision of what the railway of the then-future should look like. It is through this vision that we can see why most of the routes "not selected for development" would have closed under his vision, at least to passenger traffic.

Beeching is very clear in his report that he believed the railways had too many trunk routes, and that the number of them that the railway directed trains and funds into could be greatly reduced. This, then, leaves the question of what would happen to those routes not deemed one of the trunk routes of the future.

For starters, Beeching directly states that one of the goals of publishing the report is "so that any future proposals for trunk line closure, or diminutions of line utilisation, can be seen in a broader context". This is an explicit statement of a desire for further closures than those recommended in the Reshaping report (which itself was not fully implemented).

But beyond that, we can see how most of the lines "not selected for development" do not fit into his vision of the railway. First, an important thing to understand about Beeching's selection of trunk routes is that he expected the transfer of through trains onto the selected trunk routes to be total - for instance, he proposed routing traffic from Newcastle, York, etc. to Scotland not over the ECML through Berwick but instead over the Tyne Valley line and then onto the WCML.

Thus, the only remaining traffic on the routes "not selected for development" would be local services. And it is very clear what Beeching thought of local services outside of the major cities' commuter services. He repeats over and over again that the railways need to focus on "bulk movement", and provides maps showing how the proposed trunk route network links all major centres of population. With passenger traffic he is explicit as to the meaning of this:

"The role of the railways will be to concentrate upon the provision of bulk transport over routes of heavy demand, and over medium to long distances... ...while leaving shorter distances and cross country journeys to coaches and the private car."

In other words, railways cannot compete economically with road transport over the non-trunk routes and should not bother.

In addition, Beeching is explicit that one of the key purposes of selecting trunk routes is to reduce infrastructure costs. Singling lines etc. will do very little to balance the books when a line's only left with local services...

 

[yorksrob]

Wrong and wrong. I repeat what I have written before about the Trunk Routes report - I would very much appreciate it if those who disagree with me actually respond to it this time:

Indeed. Infact how can it not be about closures. It's the logical conclusion of the "railway doing what it does best" type arguments.

 

[Dr Hoo]

Indeed. Infact how can it not be about closures. It's the logical conclusion of the "railway doing what it does best" type arguments.

Well, Rob, you and @eldomtom2 clearly believe this and draw the same erroneous conclusion.

To me it is blindingly obvious that the Development of Major Trunk Routes document was about, err, y'know, the development of major trunk routes.

Beeching wasn't one to obsess over operational detail like axleloads and train lengths and loop entry speeds. He could rely on people like Gerry Fiennes to deal with that. There were a number of background assumptions, such as population growth, 4% compound economic growth and freight modal shift from lorries through things like company block trains, liner/intermodal services and his having previously exposed the fact that lorries weren't paying their way. This could increase/recover rail freight dramatically. He was also pragmatic enough to realise that rising car ownership and increasing air competition on longer flows was likely to blunt an equivalent potential passenger growth over the 20 years to 1984.

Given that the immediate political audience was a new administration that had recently been elected on a 'halt to major rail closures' manifesto there was no obvious appetite for a further set of withdrawal plans anyway.

It has always struck me as supremely ironic that the fresh government was actually even keener than the old one to close lines, with many duplicate 'main lines' (I deliberately avoid applying the descriptor of 'trunk routes') such as the Great Central, the Peak Line, Waverley, Exeter-Plymouth via Okehampton and the Glenfarg route soon ending up in the bin, accompanied by other through lines such as Oxford-Cambridge and Harrogate-Ripon-Northallerton.

 

[yorksrob]

Well, Rob, you and @eldontom2 clearly believe this and draw the same erroneous conclusion.

To me it is blindingly obvious that the Development of Major Trunk Routes document was about, err, y'know, the development of major trunk routes.

Beeching wasn't one to obsess over operational detail like axleloads and train lengths and loop entry speeds. He could rely on people like Gerry Fiennes to deal with that. There were a number of background assumptions, such as population growth, 4% compound economic growth and freight modal shift from lorries through things like company block trains, liner/intermodal services and his having previously exposed the fact that lorries weren't paying their way. This could increase/recover rail freight dramatically. He was also pragmatic enough to realise that rising car ownership and increasing air competition on longer flows was likely to blunt an equivalent potential passenger growth over the 20 years to 1984.

Given that the immediate political audience was a new administration that had recently been elected on a 'halt to major rail closures' manifesto there was no obvious appetite for a further set of withdrawal plans anyway.

It has always struck me as supremely ironic that the fresh government was actually even keener than the old one to close lines, with many duplicate 'main lines' (I deliberately avoid applying the descriptor of 'trunk routes') such as the Great Central, the Peak Line, Waverley, Exeter-Plymouth via Okehampton and the Glenfarg route soon ending up in the bin, accompanied by other through lines such as Oxford-Cambridge and Harrogate-Ripon-Northallerton.

As you allude, with Fraser being basically Marples without the interesting social life, Beeching would have known fairly quickly that the manifesto pledge on closures amounted to nothing.

Selecting a route as not suitable for development would have amounted to a cut somewhere down the line.

The whole concept behind the report was flawed anyway. On the one hand it was extolling the efficiencies of having trains running at the same speed, on the other it was trying to cram all traffic of different speeds on a decreasing number of trunk routes.

Entirely contradictory.

 

[eldomtom2]

To me it is blindingly obvious that the Development of Major Trunk Routes document was about, err, y'know, the development of major trunk routes.

So what did Beeching want to do with routes that weren't "major trunk routes"?

Beeching wasn't one to obsess over operational detail like axleloads and train lengths and loop entry speeds. He could rely on people like Gerry Fiennes to deal with that. There were a number of background assumptions, such as population growth, 4% compound economic growth and freight modal shift from lorries through things like company block trains, liner/intermodal services and his having previously exposed the fact that lorries weren't paying their way. This could increase/recover rail freight dramatically. He was also pragmatic enough to realise that rising car ownership and increasing air competition on longer flows was likely to blunt an equivalent potential passenger growth over the 20 years to 1984.

I have no idea of the relevance of any of this to my points.

Given that the immediate political audience was a new administration that had recently been elected on a 'halt to major rail closures' manifesto there was no obvious appetite for a further set of withdrawal plans anyway.

The report would presumably have been well into production by October 1964, and so the idea that it was heavily changed in just four months - to appease a government that as you state closed lines anyway - seems dubious.

It has always struck me as supremely ironic that the fresh government was actually even keener than the old one to close lines, with many duplicate 'main lines' (I deliberately avoid applying the descriptor of 'trunk routes') such as the Great Central, the Peak Line, Waverley, Exeter-Plymouth via Okehampton and the Glenfarg route soon ending up in the bin, accompanied by other through lines such as Oxford-Cambridge and Harrogate-Ripon-Northallerton.

And your evidence that a Tory government would not have closed those lines is...? We know Fraser and Castle rejected proposals for the closure of a great many lines.

 

[Dr Hoo]

So what did Beeching want to do with routes that weren't "major trunk routes"?

I wasn't aware that Dr Beeching made any further general announcements on the future of lines beyond what was in the Reshaping Report. The Trunk Routes document isn't really an 'opinion' piece, rather a 'planning' document.

I have no idea of the relevance of any of this* to my points. [*About the Trunk Route report not being full of operational detail.]

I was trying to forestall comments about whether the envisaged 1984 traffic levels and speed mix could actually be accommodated on the proposed 3,000-mile Trunk Route network. Also whether the mix of London commuter, Intercity and Freight traffic on the Trunk Routes particularly to the north and west of London was achievable. These are comments often made about the report.

The report would presumably have been well into production by October 1964, and so the idea that it was heavily changed in just four months - to appease a government that as you state closed lines anyway - seems dubious.

I think that that is quite a bold assumption. The main work of the Trunk Routes report was undertaken by James Ness, a very experienced railway manager, including a long stint as General Manager of the Scottish Region and then brought onto the Board by Beeching to head up planning work. The planning function had been through quite a lot of turmoil over its role and interface with the regions and functions. There are various indications that it was completed in quite a hurry. It was published on 16 February 1965, only just before it was confirmed that Beeching was returning to ICI a year early following a failure to agree new initiatives with Tom Fraser. (The exact circumstances behind Beeching's departure are shrouded in mystery.) Beeching had obviously been very busy with lots of other works such as getting the Bournemouth and Glasgow-Gourock/Wemyss Bay electrifications through Ernest Marples before the general election, preparing for the launch of the British Rail corporate identity from January 1965 and getting ready for the launch of the new British Rail Research setup at Derby later in 1965, etc.. Whilst he was evidently happy to 'own' the report I am far from convinced that he had much personal input to it.

And your evidence that a Tory government would not have closed those lines is...? We know Fraser and Castle rejected proposals for the closure of a great many lines.

I wasn't aware that I had made any comment about what a (further) Conservative administration or ministers might have done.

For the record:

Subsequent to the Reshaping Report (RR) Beeching presided over 145 proposals to ministers that led to withdrawals of passenger services (some for lines and others for wayside stations on routes that would remain). Of these only four hadn't been listed in the RR. 1,326 miles of route saw passenger services withdrawn. Obviously this covered both Marples and Fraser.

The next Chairman, Stanley Raymond, appointed by Fraser, presided over 166 proposals of which 47 hadn't been in the RR. This led to withdrawal of services over a slightly higher total of 1,333 miles. Most of these occurred under Barbara Castle.

The next Chairman, Henry Johnson, appointed by Castle, presided over 96 proposals of which 43 hadn't been in the RR. This led to a further 877 miles of withdrawal. The covered cases under Castle, Marsh, Mulley (and a few under Peyton in the post-1970 Conservative administration).

Marples had accepted 141 proposals (some with modification) and rejected only 7. (The rejected ones did include Wick/Thurso, Kyle of Lochalsh, Ayr-Stranraer and Stockport-Buxton.) Some 1,436 miles saw services withdrawn.

Fraser accepted 88 proposals and rejected 9, seeing 819 miles subject to withdrawal.

Castle accepted 91 proposals and rejected 18, seeing 606 miles subject to withdrawal.

Marsh accepted 47 proposals and rejected 8, seeing 419 miles subject to withdrawal.

Mulley accepted 15 proposals and rejected 3, seeing 227 miles subject to withdrawal.

Subject to any errors in my maths, I think that that makes 2,071 miles closed under the 'no major closures' government, in response to 241 submissions from BR, most of them from their own appointees and a rejection of a total of 36 proposals. However, there were 90 'extra' closures from their own appointees. [Johnson straddled two administrations.]


I really would encourage you to read Terry Gourvish's British Railways 1948-73 - A Business History in detail. It is 781 pages of pure gold. And reading the Reshaping Report and the Trunk Routes Report with fresh eyes and an open mind too.

 

[eldomtom2]

I wasn't aware that Dr Beeching made any further general announcements on the future of lines beyond what was in the Reshaping Report.

I didn't say he did. As I said, the Trunk Routes report was setting out a broad vision for the railway to guide future studies. The point is not that he chose Line X over Line Y but rather that he thought such a choice should be made at all.

The Trunk Routes document isn't really an 'opinion' piece, rather a 'planning' document.

I have no idea what the distinction you are drawing between "opinion" and "planning" is. Beeching's reports, no matter what they said, would inherently contain opinions about the purposes of the railways and the best ways to achieve them.

I was trying to forestall comments about whether the envisaged 1984 traffic levels and speed mix could actually be accommodated on the proposed 3,000-mile Trunk Route network. Also whether the mix of London commuter, Intercity and Freight traffic on the Trunk Routes particularly to the north and west of London was achievable. These are comments often made about the report.

Beeching may not have been the one to involve himself in the details, but it was his job to know whether or not he was asking his subordinates to squeeze a quart into a pint pot (I am not saying that was what he was doing with the Trunk Routes report).

I think that that is quite a bold assumption. The main work of the Trunk Routes report was undertaken by James Ness, a very experienced railway manager, including a long stint as General Manager of the Scottish Region and then brought onto the Board by Beeching to head up planning work. The planning function had been through quite a lot of turmoil over its role and interface with the regions and functions. There are various indications that it was completed in quite a hurry. It was published on 16 February 1965, only just before it was confirmed that Beeching was returning to ICI a year early following a failure to agree new initiatives with Tom Fraser.

Unfortunately I have just read what Terry Gourvish has to say on the report, and he says a first draft was finished in October 1964, with no indication that it differed heavily from the final report. Try again.

 

[miklcct]

Leaving aside the railway's productivity, there are two possible areas to explore:

1. Did the closure of lines have a negative impact on productivity by preventing travel to work? I suspect the answer is "minimally" because the vast majority of actual closures had little commuter traffic (discounting scholars).

2. Did the absence of the former lines subsequently have that impact? I am less sure, but looking at those lines which have reopened (or are likely to reopen) I am not sure how you would argue that they have improved productivity - though I don't deny there are other benefits.

Why do you discount scholars? Doesn't preventing travel to school have a negative impact of the ability to receive higher level education, resulting in productivity loss?

But that happened quite a long time (20 years?) after Beeching. Could he have been expected to foresee that?

Every developed country see the same transition from manufacturing to service industry dominance, so it should be able to foresee that.

There have been many studies comparing productivity in major cities in the UK with comparable sized cities in Europe and demonstrating one reason for their poor performance is the lack of fast public transport. This is evidenced by how many people can access employment within a given time usually 30-45 minutes. Since Beeching's time we have moved into a service based economy with a higher proportion of jobs located in city centres which are best accessed by public transport. The ability to access those jobs has been constrained by increasing traffic congestion and lack of segregated access which can be provided by rail, trams or dedicated busways. There has been some excellent analysis undertaken by Tom Forth showing how central Birmingham's labour catchment area has shrunk over time due to increasing delays to bus services.

Did Beeching close a lot of lines which can be used for suburban rail services?

 

[Dr Day]

A good part of the differences between UK and European public network coverage can be attributed to our housing preferences, in particular our aversion to family living in city centre apartments (which in turn drives down supply at least for higher quality residences). So whilst we have moved to a more city focused jobs economy we haven’t created more family homes close enough to where people work.

As said before on these types of threads, public transport subsidies can go a lot further supporting metro systems within high density cities and then high speed railways between those cities than trying to provide a viable alternative to the car for the daily needs of low density housing estates in commuter towns up to 50 miles away from the major centres of employment.

 

[Magdalia]

Every developed country see the same transition from manufacturing to service industry dominance, so it should be able to foresee that.

How? That's only known with the benefit of hindsight, there was no indication of it looking forward from the 1960s.

 

[yorksrob]

As said before on these types of threads, public transport subsidies can go a lot further supporting metro systems within high density cities and then high speed railways between those cities than trying to provide a viable alternative to the car for the daily needs of low density housing estates in commuter towns up to 50 miles away from the major centres of employment.

By concentrating on urban transport and inter-city high speed, this does rather miss out a large chunk of what the passenger railway is for.

A lot of bread and butter work of the passenger railway is transporting people between towns, cities and honeypot areas at not necessarily high speeds. To ignore this is to invite more Beeching style mistakes.

 

[RT4038]

Why do you discount scholars? Doesn't preventing travel to school have a negative impact of the ability to receive higher level education, resulting in productivity loss?

Because in most cases the journeys were relatively short and could be undertaken by bus. Where this was not possible, they could be moved to other education centres where they could.

Every developed country see the same transition from manufacturing to service industry dominance, so it should be able to foresee that.

Most countries have had line closure programs in one way or another, some quite devastating to the passenger network.

Did Beeching close a lot of lines which can be used for suburban rail services?

Any line running into an urban area could be used for a suburban rail service. Whether it is economically sensible is another matter. Town/City sizes and journey to work areas were much smaller then. Some suburban services were discontinued, and many were proposed for closure (as they were a drain on the Railway finances) and this spawned the setting up of the Passenger Transport Executives to fund their continued operation.

== Doublepost prevention - post automatically merged: 9 Nov 2023 ==

By concentrating on urban transport and inter-city high speed, this does rather miss out a large chunk of what the passenger railway is for.

A lot of bread and butter work of the passenger railway is transporting people between towns, cities and honeypot areas at not necessarily high speeds. To ignore this is to invite more Beeching style mistakes.

Only bread. There is no butter in this activity.

 

[miklcct]

Because in most cases the journeys were relatively short and could be undertaken by bus. Where this was not possible, they could be moved to other education centres where they could.

Most commuting journeys are also relatively short but can you imagine what the congestion will be if London doesn't have the Underground?

The main purpose of urban railways is to remove road traffic. Travelling to school is a main source of traffic within an urban area.

 

[Dr Day]

By concentrating on urban transport and inter-city high speed, this does rather miss out a large chunk of what the passenger railway is for.

In this country, yes, but partially driven by how we typically live. Going off topic a bit, but part of the problem we had in Beeching's time and still today is the railways in the British Isles are trying to do things that aren't needed in other countires because people typically live differently. (Heavy) Railways are typically very efficient and cost effective at moving lots of people (or freight) between the same few (big, high density) places, but less so at moving fewer people (or freight) between lots of smaller lower density places. Other forms of public or private transport *may* be better for those other journeys, or to link people and freight into the core trunk network to make that even more effective.

But we've had plenty of these sorts of discussions on these kinds of threads before and I recognise that for many on this forum rail is sacrosanct and only expansion can be ever considered, never transfers of funding between different parts of the rail network or different elements of the overall public transport network to overall provide the optimal service for the maximum number of people/maximise trips out of cars.

 

[yorksrob]

In this country, yes, but partially driven by how we typically live. Going off topic a bit, but part of the problem we had in Beeching's time and still today is the railways in the British Isles are trying to do things that aren't needed in other countires because people typically live differently. (Heavy) Railways are typically very efficient and cost effective at moving lots of people (or freight) between the same few (big, high density) places, but less so at moving fewer people (or freight) between lots of smaller lower density places. Other forms of public or private transport *may* be better for those other journeys, or to link people and freight into the core trunk network to make that even more effective.

But we've had plenty of these sorts of discussions on these kinds of threads before and I recognise that for many on this forum rail is sacrosanct and only expansion can be ever considered, never transfers of funding between different parts of the rail network or different elements of the overall public transport network to overall provide the optimal service for the maximum number of people/maximise trips out of cars.

Your characterisation of other countries doesn't seem to fit with the majority of similar, medium sized, densely populated countries in Europe where the railways are indeed used for not particularly fast, inter-urban journeys.

In this respect, British travellers seem to be far from atypical, in that they tend to use the railways for the journeys that they want/need to use them for, rather than fitting around some sort of theoretical dream of what the railway should be for.

 

[Dr_Paul]

Strictly speaking:

1965 - new cars required to have the anchor points fitted for front seat belts
1968 - new cars required to have front seat belts fitted
1983 - wearing of front seat belts made compulsory
1986 - new cars required to have rear sear belts fitted
1991 - wearing of rear seat belts made compulsory

I bought a 1964 Riley Elf in 1973 and fitted the seatbelts for the front seats. There were top and bottom anchor points on the door columns, but I had to drill through the floor to make the third anchor points.

 

[stuu]

Your characterisation of other countries doesn't seem to fit with the majority of similar, medium sized, densely populated countries in Europe where the railways are indeed used for not particularly fast, inter-urban journeys.

Based on what? Modal share in the UK is very similar to Belgium, NL and Germany and other comparable countries

 

[yorksrob]

Based on what? Modal share in the UK is very similar to Belgium, NL and Germany and other comparable countries

The comment was in relation to this quote:

"The railways in the British Isles are typically trying to do things that aren't needed in other countries because because people typically live differently".

As you have noticed, people in those other countries don't actually live that differently, which is why, like us, they have fairly dense passenger networks linking all sorts of settlements.

The idea that the United Kingdom alone has an extensive regional passenger network is hokum.

 

[stuu]

The comment was in relation to this quote:

"The railways in the British Isles are typically trying to do things that aren't needed in other countries because because people typically live differently".

As you have noticed, people in those other countries don't actually live that differently, which is why, like us, they have fairly dense passenger networks linking all sorts of settlements.

The idea that the United Kingdom alone has an extensive regional passenger network is hokum.

Ah right yes, I agree, I thought you were saying we were different. The settlement density south of the M62 is pretty similar to our neighbouring countries, and the towns aren't noticeably different either. Its true that countries further afield like Spain and Italy have denser cities, but ours aren't very different to the Netherlands or Germany

There's a population density map here:

Mapping Population Density Across the Globe

Explore the detailed geography of population across the globe with interactive mapping and statistics. Identify global megacity regions and the growth and diversity of urban forms. Data is from the Global Human Settlement Layer 2023 by the European Commission JRC.

luminocity3d.org

 

[yorksrob]

Ah right yes, I agree, I thought you were saying we were different. The settlement density south of the M62 is pretty similar to our neighbouring countries, and the towns aren't noticeably different either. Its true that countries further afield like Spain and Italy have denser cities, but ours aren't very different to the Netherlands or Germany

There's a population density map here:

Mapping Population Density Across the Globe

Explore the detailed geography of population across the globe with interactive mapping and statistics. Identify global megacity regions and the growth and diversity of urban forms. Data is from the Global Human Settlement Layer 2023 by the European Commission JRC.

luminocity3d.org

That's a very interesting map !