How was it moved in the end?
Track was jacked up to a more reasonable level, train was then either pulled or reversed while bogie winched laterally to keep it on rail.
Norwich to Lowestoft services diverting to Great Yarmouth today with a shuttle bus service running between Great Yarmouth and Lowestoft, not sure how frequent this is.
Hourly Lowestoft to Norwich Via Oulton Broad North also running.
Not quite. Jacking the track was attempted but the ground was so wet all the jacks did was push the sleepers they were sat on into the mud. Eventually a large HGV recovery truck was sourced, anchored into the land next to the line and the train was driven forward very slowly while the recovery truck kept the rear vehicle upright and in line until it eventually found some level track.
They are now on Tyrell again.Ah fair enough, must have missed some updates! Cheers
Only the 05:40 cancelled for operational reasons. Everything resumed from the 06:50 ex-Norwich.Passenger trains operating this morning.
At around 07:45 hrs on 30 January 2022, the 07:25 hrs Greater Anglia service from Norwich to Lowestoft ran onto a section of track between Reedham and Haddiscoe stations where the supporting ballast and embankment was being washed out by water. This water was flowing from the Haddiscoe New Cut waterway, which is on the north-east side of the railway, across the line and into the Haddiscoe Marshes.
As the train approached the section of track concerned, the driver of the train noticed what appeared to be standing water on the line ahead and started braking. The train, which was formed of three passenger vehicles and a power car, stopped with its front carriage above the flowing water. Over the next twenty minutes the flowing water caused all support for the track to be lost and the track sank significantly, causing the front carriage to tilt forwards and sideways. The driver attempted to move the train back clear of the damaged section of track, but this proved impossible because of the angle of the front carriage. The driver and guard evacuated the five passengers from the train onto the track, and a rescue train was arranged to convey them back to Reedham station.
No one was hurt in the incident and the train was subsequently recovered undamaged. However, the washout caused damage to the track and supporting formation and the line was closed for a week while these were repaired.
The incident occurred following a significant tidal surge, which impeded drainage from the Broadland rivers and raised the level of the Haddiscoe New Cut at the location of the accident to the extent that water overtopped the flood defences. The Environment Agency had issued a Flood Warning covering the area, but the water level at Reedham and Haddiscoe was not predicted to be higher than the flood defences.
Our investigation will seek to identify the sequence of events which led to the accident. It will also consider:
- the management of the flood defences in the area
- the adequacy of the flood warning systems used by the railway industry
- Network Rail’s knowledge of the condition of assets external to the railway, such as flood defences, whose condition and management can affect the safety of the railway
- any underlying factors.
Summary
At about 07:45 hrs on Sunday 30 January 2022, a passenger train, which was travelling from Norwich to Lowestoft, ran on to a washed out section of track between Reedham and Haddiscoe stations. The train, which was crewed by a driver and a guard, was carrying five passengers. The driver had seen that the track was flooded ahead of the train and so brought it to a stand. Once the train had stopped, the driver noticed that the ballast was washing away under the train. While the driver was preparing to drive back towards Reedham, the situation worsened and a section of ballast washed away, leaving a large void under the track on which the train was standing. As the driver moved the train it started to lean over. The driver therefore made the decision that it was too dangerous to continue moving the train, and they and the guard evacuated the five passengers.
RAIB’s investigation found that unusually high water levels existed on the day of the incident due to a combination of tidal surge and tidal locking. Localised low spots in the flood defences next to the track concerned then allowed this water to enter the railway. The train involved was not prevented from entering the flooded section of track because Network Rail was not aware that water was entering the railway at this location. RAIB also found that Network Rail’s flood risk management processes were not effective at warning that the track at Haddiscoe was at serious risk of flooding.
Underlying factors were that the Environment Agency’s management of flooding risk in the area did not account for, and was not required to account for, the impact of localised flooding on the railway, and that Network Rail was not effectively managing the risks to its assets and services associated with third party flood defences. A possible underlying factor was that no joint strategy was in place to protect the railway from flooding at this location due to the Environment Agency and Network Rail not effectively collaborating.
Recommendations
As a result of the investigation RAIB has made five recommendations. The first is made to the Environment Agency and Network Rail and aims to ensure that railway‑related flood risk is managed appropriately alongside Haddiscoe Cut. The second and third recommendations are made to Network Rail and concern the integration of flood risk into their weather management strategies. The fourth recommendation is intended to improve interaction between Network Rail and those organisations responsible for tidal flood defences in England and Wales, while the final recommendation is intended to improve these interactions in Scotland.
It's TCB down there using Axle Counters.I note from the report that the line was worked by 'track-circuit block'. Was it actually TCB or is that line equipped with axle counters? Just wondered if the floodwater might have been detected by the TC being 'shorted' by the water; but the report makes no mention of that happening or if it could have happened.
Track Circuit Block is the name for the regulations under which the line is worked, regardless of the method of train detection.I note from the report that the line was worked by 'track-circuit block'. Was it actually TCB or is that line equipped with axle counters? Just wondered if the floodwater might have been detected by the TC being 'shorted' by the water; but the report makes no mention of that happening or if it could have happened.
It's TCB down there using Axle Counters.
Thanks for the clarification regarding the way in which the TCBs there are worked.Track Circuit Block is the name for the regulations under which the line is worked, regardless of the method of train detection.