Is this what you call a SPAD?

[66701GBRF]

Can you please clarify for someone like me.

Further up suggests wrong route was set (surely this is signaller), but that a second error also occurred (driver accepted it, and went few metres beyond signal before realising)

So is it both signaller and driver error ?

Automatic Route Setting (ARS) picked up the wrong schedule (as noted above there were amendments) and set the route.

 

[LAX54]

A standard electrical connection could be designed and fitted, especially if it came with other upgrades like ECP brakes, for a price of course.

Passenger units manage the door CCTV in the cab so 2 cameras shouldn't really be that big of a problem, you could even use the DMI from ETCS for one of the pictures if you wanted (Shunting would be on SR mode).

Testing and maintenance wouldn't be too problematic, but the funding is the killer.

I'm not sure, tbh. The ongoing cost of such a system would be lower than the ongoing cost of staff, even if the initial cost is higher. It depends on whether you're fitting only a handful of trains or all c.600 Class 66s. If it's only for specific trains then yes, staff are probably easier. But if it's every train then there's a lot of different operational moves that may become available and could change rolling stock strategies.

What this system wouldn't help is anywhere that locos and wagons need to be detached or shunted, which would still need staff and is where I think the business case falls down.

You also have to weigh up how many 'wrong routes taken' actually take place, and the cost of implementing such a system, when that is worked out, it would be I think a total waste of funding and developement

 

[PM77]

ARS picked up the wrong schedule (as noted above there were amendments) and set the route.

ARS was given the wrong schedule. It doesn't pick and choose on its own. Do we know it actually was ARS, or is ARS being blamed pending a look at the data to see if it was manually routed or ARS?

 

[66701GBRF]

ARS was given the wrong schedule. It doesn't pick and choose on its own. Do we know it actually was ARS, or is ARS being blamed pending a look at the data to see if it was manually routed or ARS?

It was reported during the incident it was an ARS routing.

 

[Snow1964]

It was reported during the incident it was an ARS routing.

ARS almost certainly routed based on what was input, I doubt it invented an alternative.

It might have picked an alternative if it was given a choice because a specific line wasn't in the data and ARS was free to choose between the options it had.

 

[66701GBRF]

ARS almost certainly routed based on what was input, I doubt it invented an alternative.

It might have picked an alternative if it was given a choice because a specific line wasn't in the data and ARS was free to choose between the options it had.

I don't know why it happened, as someone else said there were 2 or 3 different schedules in place so perhaps had a bearing. The point I was trying to make was it wasn't signaller error as suggested by post 15.

 

[12LDA28C]

Can you please clarify for someone like me.

Further up suggests wrong route was set (surely this is signaller), but that a second error also occurred (driver accepted it, and went few metres beyond signal before realising)

So is it both signaller and driver error ?

In any circumstance, if a signaller sets a wrong route it is signaller error. If the driver then accepts the wrong route, that is driver error and both parties share blame / responsibility.

 

[ComUtoR]

ARS picked up the wrong schedule (as noted above there were amendments) and set the route.

ARS was free to choose between the options it had.

Both of these post suggest that there is an element of AI decision making involved. Does ARS have AI and can 'choose' what decision it makes. Or does it follow the input regardless ?

I don't know why it happened, as someone else said there were 2 or 3 different schedules in place so perhaps had a bearing. The point I was trying to make was it wasn't signaller error as suggested by post 15.

Just a couple of questions. Somebody would have uploaded the schedules to ARS. If, when uploading, there is multiple schedules, does that throw up an error ? Should the person uploading the schedule delete any instances of multiple schedules or conflicts ?

When ARS is in use, does the Signaller still have to monitor where trains are routed and have final responsbility or do/can they just sit back and let ARS do its job without oversight ?

 

[zwk500]

Both of these post suggest that there is an element of AI decision making involved. Does ARS have AI and can 'choose' what decision it makes.

ARS does not have 'AI' in the sense of being able to think intuitively. It varies between ARS systems, but they will generally pick services based on a pre determined pecking order (often UID sorted numerically and ignoring Q codes).

 

[philthetube]

Our trams are fitted with rear view monitors but they certainly don't give you a full view of what your reversing towards, while you can clearly see what is 10 foot dead behind the vehicle, you can't see what's close to either side of the camera. They are only 29m long and I certainly wouldn't reverse one reliant on the rear view camera, let alone if it was half a mile long.

It wouldn't be a big issue to fit better ones though

I’ve never been comfortable with NR MOMs being sent to this sort of job. They’re not trained and competent to undertake shunting, they don’t have suitable back to back radios (with the continuous confidence tone) and they are having to walk close to a moving train on the main line with all the hazards that presents, without any sort of planned safe system of work or suitably risk assessed walking route like groundstaff at a siding, yard or terminal would have. All it would take is one trip over a raised troughing lid or a bit of scrap rail and there could be a serious accident. See the RAIB reports for Dagenham Dock in 2006, Harlow Mill in 2007 and Dollands Moor in 2019 for examples of hpw badly wrong shunting can go in a yard, let alone on the main line.

I know the reason it’s done is because freight groundstaff are even spread even thinner than MOMs so it can be a very long wait for one to get to site depending on where the wrong route has been offered and taken. However Network Rail has a lifesaving rule (‘Never undertake any job unless you have been trained and assessed as competent’) which should tell MOMs that getting involved with this sort of activity is a very bad idea. If anything went wrong they would, assuming they had survived to give evidence to the investigation, be thrown straight under the bus along with the Controller who asked them to do it.

And don’t get me started on MOMs carrying out brake tests despite never having been trained or assessed.

all the highlighted is equally relevant to MOM's and freight ground staff.

 

[PM77]

ARS does not have 'AI' in the sense of being able to think intuitively. It varies between ARS systems, but they will generally pick services based on a pre determined pecking order (often UID sorted numerically and ignoring Q codes).

Where there are multiple schedules for a train, ARS will choose the "nearest" in time. If you have the Resonate ARS system fitted with Luminate, multiple schedules for the same train are filtered by the Luminate Traffic Management system, and only one schedule for each train is supplied to ARS.

 

[ComUtoR]

Cheers @zwk500 and @PM77

If the Signaller regulates a train in front of the expected service. Will ARS know ?

Is there anywhere I could go for some quick lessons and Q&A on ARS ? We currently have ARS issues on our patch as a fair few of our wrong routes have been put down to ARS errors. It sounds like it's the human input that is causing the problems. Not specifically ARS.

Cheers in advance.

 

[Annetts key]

Cheers @zwk500 and @PM77

If the Signaller regulates a train in front of the expected service. Will ARS know ?

Is there anywhere I could go for some quick lessons and Q&A on ARS ? We currently have ARS issues on our patch as a fair few of our wrong routes have been put down to ARS errors. It sounds like it's the human input that is causing the problems. Not specifically ARS.

Cheers in advance.

ARS is definitely not intelligent. It simply follows a set of rules.

However, it can only select routes that the interlocking allows and which are “free” (as in available). Hence if a signaller manually routes a train, if there is an alternative line (on a multiple track railway), it may be able to route a train to run parallel to the move that the signaller has made (depending on what is permitted). Otherwise, it has to wait for the route to become available, however it does not have to wait for the train to completely clear the section.

Note that by “route” I mean a signal route from one signal to another signal (or stop block).

 

[Falcon1200]

If the driver then accepts the wrong route, that is driver error

As long of course as the signalling gives the Driver sufficient warning of the impending wrong route to allow the train to stop before actually taking it! A source of interesting discussions, and Delay Attribution disputes, when such incidents occur.

 

[43066]

We currently have ARS issues on our patch as a fair few of our wrong routes have been put down to ARS errors.

You can just blame those on the drivers .

 

[Meerkat]

Are other drivers allowed to watch a train reverse?
ie if doing it lead to less delay than not doing it could a train in the other direction stop and then creep along talking the problem train's driver back?
A driver will know the route/signals etc so should be able to get a clear understanding with the signaller and problem train driver of what is to be done, has a radio to communicate, and will be safer in their cab than someone wandering about trackside.

 

[43066]

Are other drivers allowed to watch a train reverse?
ie if doing it lead to less delay than not doing it could a train in the other direction stop and then creep along talking the problem train's driver back?
A driver will know the route/signals etc so should be able to get a clear understanding with the signaller and problem train driver of what is to be done, has a radio to communicate, and will be safer in their cab than someone wandering about trackside.

Absolutely not.

 

[Surreytraveller]

Both of these post suggest that there is an element of AI decision making involved. Does ARS have AI and can 'choose' what decision it makes. Or does it follow the input regardless ?




Just a couple of questions. Somebody would have uploaded the schedules to ARS. If, when uploading, there is multiple schedules, does that throw up an error ? Should the person uploading the schedule delete any instances of multiple schedules or conflicts ?

When ARS is in use, does the Signaller still have to monitor where trains are routed and have final responsbility or do/can they just sit back and let ARS do its job without oversight ?

If a signaller had to constantly watch and monitor ARS, it would defeat the point of its existence

 

[12LDA28C]

As long of course as the signalling gives the Driver sufficient warning of the impending wrong route to allow the train to stop before actually taking it! A source of interesting discussions, and Delay Attribution disputes, when such incidents occur.

The signalling should always give the driver sufficient warning of the impending route whether right or wrong, either purely through sighting distance or via preliminary indications, the only exception to this would be a signalling reversion of some kind.

 

[Meerkat]

Absolutely not.

Why not? Is it in any way less safe than getting a MOM trackside?

 

[12LDA28C]

Why not? Is it in any way less safe than getting a MOM trackside?

A MOM is employed by Network Rail, they will automatically be charged with managing recovery in this type of situation. It is most certainly not within the procedural framework for a second driver to be involved with the setting back and so on.

 

[Meerkat]

A MOM is employed by Network Rail, they will automatically be charged with managing recovery in this type of situation. It is most certainly not within the procedural framework for a second driver to be involved with the setting back and so on.

Is there any logic to a driver not being able to do it? AIUI signallers instruct drivers past red signals to rescue other trains - I don't see that as being less risky than a signaller instructing a driver to keep watch for a reversing driver. A driver would likely have a better view from up in a cab, and a driver's understanding of what's needed.
In this example a LO driver on the other line would presumably be on site quicker, and it would be in the interest of their company to get the freight out the way and the LO service moving again.

 

[12LDA28C]

Is there any logic to a driver not being able to do it? AIUI signallers instruct drivers past red signals to rescue other trains - I don't see that as being less risky than a signaller instructing a driver to keep watch for a reversing driver. A driver would likely have a better view from up in a cab, and a driver's understanding of what's needed.
In this example a LO driver on the other line would presumably be on site quicker, and it would be in the interest of their company to get the freight out the way and the LO service moving again.

The MOM works for NR and represents NR in the recovery, liaising with the signaller and so on. Getting a third party involved would introduce a further element of risk and as I explained, the procedure doesn't allow for it, simple as that. Once an incident such as this has happened, it's in the hands of the infrastructure owner as it has happened on their network. You can't just drag in some random driver of another train to assist.

== Doublepost prevention - post automatically merged: 3 Apr 2023 ==

Are other drivers allowed to watch a train reverse?
ie if doing it lead to less delay than not doing it could a train in the other direction stop and then creep along talking the problem train's driver back?

Reducing delay after an incident is not top priority - a safe method of working and following procedure is rather more important.

== Doublepost prevention - post automatically merged: 3 Apr 2023 ==

A driver will know the route/signals etc so should be able to get a clear understanding with the signaller and problem train driver of what is to be done, has a radio to communicate, and will be safer in their cab than someone wandering about trackside.

What 'radio to communicate' does a driver have? A passenger train driver will only have the GSM-R which is fixed in the cab. Not much use if the rear of the train you want them to supervise setting back is some way ahead and a clear view is not available without leaving the train.

 

[The Puddock]

A MOM is employed by Network Rail, they will automatically be charged with managing recovery in this type of situation. It is most certainly not within the procedural framework for a second driver to be involved with the setting back and so on.

The MOM works for NR and represents NR in the recovery, liaising with the signaller and so on. Getting a third party involved would introduce a further element of risk and as I explained, the procedure doesn't allow for it, simple as that. Once an incident such as this has happened, it's in the hands of the infrastructure owner as it has happened on their network. You can't just drag in some random driver of another train to assist.

MOMs are neither trained or equipped for this role but because of the massive performance impact of these sorts of incidents, pressure is put on them to attend anyway and just muddle through. The way I see it either it should be the FOCs problem to manage (by all means have a MOM attend to relay updates to NR Control and deal with the initial investigation into the signaller error, but they shouldn't be undertaking shunting duties) or MOMs should be formally trained and assessed in the Rule Book role of Shunter as in module SS2. Working for an infratructure company many MOMs have never had anything to do with train operations at all, let alone shunting. In BR days when the operations umbrella covered the whole shebang including trains, Traffic Supervisors were passed out for these competencies - propelling, coupling, uncoupling, brake tests etc.. but that was all swept away with privatisation when the railway split into a 'train' side and an 'infrastructure' side.

 

[43066]

AIUI signallers instruct drivers past red signals to rescue other trains - I don't see that as being less risky than a signaller instructing a driver to keep watch for a reversing driver.

Fundamentally different concepts.

 

[12LDA28C]

MOMs are neither trained or equipped for this role but because of the massive performance impact of these sorts of incidents, pressure is put on them to attend anyway and just muddle through. The way I see it either it should be the FOCs problem to manage (by all means have a MOM attend to relay updates to NR Control and deal with the initial investigation into the signaller error, but they shouldn't be undertaking shunting duties) or MOMs should be formally trained and assessed in the Rule Book role of Shunter as in module SS2. Working for an infratructure company many MOMs have never had anything to do with train operations at all, let alone shunting. In BR days when the operations umbrella covered the whole shebang including trains, Traffic Supervisors were passed out for these competencies - propelling, coupling, uncoupling, brake tests etc.. but that was all swept away with privatisation when the railway split into a 'train' side and an 'infrastructure' side.

Agreed, however you'd hope that MOMs would have some experience of train operations, as they get called out to all manner of incidents and undertake other duties, as required. Certainly I've seen MOMs acting as a Pilotman during single line working and so on.

 

[Mcr Warrior]

So to recap, and in simple terms, what's happened at Canonbury on Saturday exactly, when was this (around 1300?), where was the freight travelling from/to and when was the freight eventually allowed on its way?

 

[12LDA28C]

Fundamentally different concepts.

And of course passing a signal at danger in that instance is permitted within an agreed framework, as laid out in Rule Book Module S5.

 

[The Puddock]

Agreed, however you'd hope that MOMs would have some experience of train operations, as they get called out to all manner of incidents and undertake other duties, as required. Certainly I've seen MOMs acting as a Pilotman during single line working and so on.

Yes, though the two Pilot working competencies - P1 Single Line Working and P2 Working of Single & Bidirectional Lines by Pilot - are taught formally in a classroom and recorded on Sentinel, and not every MOM holds them. Network Rail stopped doing things like snowplough courses years ago. There may be local familiarisation with trains at depots, cab rides etc.. thanks to friendly TOCs and FOCs but these are all at the whim of local management and circumstances.

 

[Dieseldriver]

The signalling should always give the driver sufficient warning of the impending route whether right or wrong, either purely through sighting distance or via preliminary indications, the only exception to this would be a signalling reversion of some kind.

I can think of several locations where if a wrong route were offered, the Driver approaching it would have insufficient time/distance to bring their train to a stand at the signal upon first being made aware of the routing beyond it