GWR Class 769 information. (Units no longer with GWR - Off Lease March 23)

[FGW_DID]

Rip 769s 2019-2022

Not exactly true, considering Northern's and TfW's are still in service...?

Plus GWR’s 769s are still part of the fleet until they are returned once the lease expires end of March 2023.

 

[RPI]

Thinking pragmatically, the 769 fiasco could be a blessing in disguise, they never actually entered service and by sending them off lease could take a huge chunk of the savings required by the DfT, it may stave off any major service reductions in the West.

Thats me trying to be positive!

 

[Deepgreen]

Plus GWR’s 769s are still part of the fleet until they are returned once the lease expires end of March 2023.

Meanwhile they are presumably just taking up stabling space.

 

[Greybeard33]

Im not sure that is the case they all have the additional bus because the motor alternator sets ate on a different vehicle to the choppers/motors and they aren't allowed to use the running rails as a return path because the running rails are bonded for small signalling currents only.

As previously discussed in this thread:

• 319s have a single bus to connect the third rail shoes to the motor coach.
• The Northern and TfW 769s have two buses, supply and return from the gensets to the motor coach.
• The GWR 769s have three buses, one for the third rail shoes and the two for the gensets.

 

[Benjwri]

Meanwhile they are presumably just taking up stabling space

Most are at Long Marston I believe, the only ones stabled at active depots are a few at Reading and Oxford, neither of which are particularly short of space.

 

[Razorblades]

Most are at Long Marston I believe, the only ones stabled at active depots are a few at Reading and Oxford, neither of which are particularly short of space.

Quite, and as Porterbrook owns the storage space at Long Marston, when the Oxford and Reading outliers join their brethren in Warwickshire, the burden on space within GWR vanishes, along with cost to the operating railway.

 

[Benjwri]

when the Oxford and Reading outliers join their brethren in Warwickshire, the burden on space within GWR vanishes

Exactly, and as I say, neither depot is strapped for space, with them using the non electrified sidings at Reading, which have plenty of spare space, and the Oxford sidings being used for the sim of pretty much nothing other than the 769s and turning trains around.

 

[FGW_DID]

Meanwhile they are presumably just taking up stabling space.

In that respect, the sooner they’re gone the better, it will be nice to have some wiggle room back

Most are at Long Marston I believe, the only ones stabled at active depots are a few at Reading and Oxford, neither of which are particularly short of space.

It might seem like it but that space soon runs out! Reading TCD is close to capacity most nights and especially at weekends.
If everything came in and went out in the same formation and order, then it would be fine but you need space for the flexibility of shunting, reforming, stabling of stopped & spare units without blocking in the units required for service etc etc.
Having 3 769s on depot was a necessary evil whilst the program was still going ahead but now they're just taking up badly needed space.

== Doublepost prevention - post automatically merged: 29 Dec 2022 ==

Exactly, and as I say, neither depot is strapped for space, with them using the non electrified sidings at Reading, which have plenty of spare space, and the Oxford sidings being used for the sim of pretty much nothing other than the 769s and turning trains around.

All of Reading TCD is electrified (AC) with the exception of the heavy maintenance / lifting road (Shed Road 4) and the Wheel Lathe Road. There is most definitely not plenty of spare space.

 

[Snow1964]

Quite, and as Porterbrook owns the storage space at Long Marston, when the Oxford and Reading outliers join their brethren in Warwickshire, the burden on space within GWR vanishes, along with cost to the operating railway.

Why do the costs end upon moving to Warwickshire, and not continue until the lease end date 31st March 2023 regardless of location

 

[Razorblades]

Why do the costs end upon moving to Warwickshire, and not continue until the lease end date 31st March 2023 regardless of location

I think Porterbrook rather than GWR is bearing the cost of warm storage at its own facility, and as others have intimated, there is an opportunity cost and operational cost that GWR must bear when its own facilities and siding space are used to store the units.

 

[Annetts key]

I remember the days when the local and regional trains for Bristol and surrounding areas were so unreliable, that it became an increasingly common sight to see dead first generation DMUs being hauled by class 47 locos.

Later on, when extra capacity was needed, the only practical option was to run a class 47 loco hauling a rake of mark 2 carriages. With the loco having to run around at the terminal station.

Neither of these options are available with our so called ‘modern’ railway.

 

[Deepgreen]

Quite, and as Porterbrook owns the storage space at Long Marston, when the Oxford and Reading outliers join their brethren in Warwickshire, the burden on space within GWR vanishes, along with cost to the operating railway.

The ongoing cost to the operating railway may now be minimal, but the overall cost of the abortive project will still be one borne by the wider railway 'industry' in some form, as these things don't come for free.

 

[AM9]

The ongoing cost to the operating railway may now be minimal, but the overall cost of the abortive project will still be one borne by the wider railway 'industry' in some form, as these things don't come for free.

The impact is minimal. Porterbrook's gamble was a calculated technical risk and if successful would have brought in some additional profit. It's naïve to see this as a loss to all things UK railway other than a delay in the inevitable introduction of a suburban/regional bimode multiple unit that moves rail travel forward along the path of decarbonisation. A failed gamble on a RoSCo's accounts is not a financial loss to the whole industry because there's little chance of the profit, had it occurred being sent anywhere other than shareholders' and staffs' pockets.
Overall it was stymied by some technical issue delays, poor communication on technical requirements particularly not involving the end users, and ultimately COVID. Had either of the second or third issue not occurred, I think that the trains would have been in service by now, and their future more as planned, i.e. bridging the gap until genuine planned replacements* were available rather than yet another backward step with single-use DMUs.

* i.e. new suburban/regional bimodes

 

[JonathanH]

A failed gamble on a RoSCo's accounts is not a financial loss to the whole industry because there's little chance of the profit, had it occurred being sent anywhere other than shareholders' and staffs' pockets.

Not really. Porterbrook will be under pressure from investors to maintain its dividend and consequently need to recover losses from other income. Clearly that will average out over time and income can be retained for other reasons. However, ultimately to recover a loss and maintain a dividend, higher prices or profit on other services would need to be generated.

Analysing the direct impact of the 769 project on Porterbrook's business performance is very difficult though, and may be relatively small change.

 

[Mag_seven]

Whilst I appreciate there are implications for other GWR stock types it would be great if we could limit discussion in this thread to the GWR Class 769s.

If anyone would like to speculate as to the implications of the 769s going off lease then they are more than welcome to either find or start a new thread in the Speculative Ideas section of the forum.

Edit: some posts have been split to https://www.railforums.co.uk/thread...k-of-too-few-units-in-the-near-future.241392/

Thanks

 

[Deepgreen]

The impact is minimal. Porterbrook's gamble was a calculated technical risk and if successful would have brought in some additional profit. It's naïve to see this as a loss to all things UK railway other than a delay in the inevitable introduction of a suburban/regional bimode multiple unit that moves rail travel forward along the path of decarbonisation. A failed gamble on a RoSCo's accounts is not a financial loss to the whole industry because there's little chance of the profit, had it occurred being sent anywhere other than shareholders' and staffs' pockets.
Overall it was stymied by some technical issue delays, poor communication on technical requirements particularly not involving the end users, and ultimately COVID. Had either of the second or third issue not occurred, I think that the trains would have been in service by now, and their future more as planned, i.e. bridging the gap until genuine planned replacements* were available rather than yet another backward step with single-use DMUs.

* i.e. new suburban/regional bimodes

To me, naive or not, it seems to be yet another failure that has arisen largely because of the fragmented railway, Covid aside. I have tried to think of another entire sub-class of train/loco that has been produced like this and which has completely failed to enter service, and cannot, although I won't be surprised to hear of others.

 

[Nicholas Lewis]

To me, naive or not, it seems to be yet another failure that has arisen largely because of the fragmented railway, Covid aside.

Is it though. Porterbrook took a commercial decision to upcycle its units into something that could provide ongoing lease income. The three operators that elected to take leases took so off their own backs mainly as they offered a quick route to increasing capacity for high ridership at the times. At the time it looked a good idea and i for one thought the engineering would be straightforward but it hasn't been and its been there downfall. In some respects it surprising GWR stuck with it especially post covid as the DfT have been picking up the bill for sometime which you can see if you interrogate the DfT spending over £25k reports where its been running at 300-400k/month. The DfT have gone to ground recently with these reports as last one was for June 22 to know how much more has been expended on training and introduction costs.

 

[Deepgreen]

Is it though. Porterbrook took a commercial decision to upcycle its units into something that could provide ongoing lease income. The three operators that elected to take leases took so off their own backs mainly as they offered a quick route to increasing capacity for high ridership at the times. At the time it looked a good idea and i for one thought the engineering would be straightforward but it hasn't been and its been there downfall. In some respects it surprising GWR stuck with it especially post covid as the DfT have been picking up the bill for sometime which you can see if you interrogate the DfT spending over £25k reports where its been running at 300-400k/month. The DfT have gone to ground recently with these reports as last one was for June 22 to know how much more has been expended on training and introduction costs.

In terms of the seemingly tortuous communications route from producer to user, yes, I see it as a fragmented railway problem. I wonder, too, what the special run along the NDL a month or so back for dignitaries was actually for - to say goodbye formally, perhaps?

 

[Nicholas Lewis]

I wonder, too, what the special run along the NDL a month or so back for dignitaries was actually for - to say goodbye formally, perhaps?

Doubt it this is simple economics as GWR takes a fair amount of subsidy and it needs to cut its cloth to appease DfT funding constraints so its an easy target to drop them given they aren't yet in traffic. Personally im disappointed as a regular user of the route and although the principle was sound execution has gone awry and its certainly cost Porterbrook a pretty penny.

 

[Doctor Fegg]

Most are at Long Marston I believe, the only ones stabled at active depots are a few at Reading and Oxford, neither of which are particularly short of space.

One of the Oxford ones appeared to have been quite comprehensively graffitied before Christmas.

 

[Clarence Yard]

Doubt it this is simple economics as GWR takes a fair amount of subsidy and it needs to cut its cloth to appease DfT funding constraints so its an easy target to drop them given they aren't yet in traffic. Personally im disappointed as a regular user of the route and although the principle was sound execution has gone awry and its certainly cost Porterbrook a pretty penny.

Every DfT TOC requires subsidy now as the revenue ends up with the DfT. TOCs are being managed by the DfT on cost targets, not net contribution targets.

Like every other DfT TOC, GWR have suggested a host of schemes that could save money and then the DfT chooses which ones to implement.

I wonder if Porterbrook have actually lost much money in the 769 project. They have had three operators paying lease charges and we are not privy to how the project was funded or what the payback period was.

 

[Nicholas Lewis]

Every DfT TOC requires subsidy now as the revenue ends up with the DfT. TOCs are being managed by the DfT on cost targets, not net contribution targets.

The last set of DfT payments to operators data certainly showed some operators not needing much subsidy vs the ones like Northern who need a vast subsidy although to be fair even in its franchise form it received the biggest subsidy. So i do hope DfT don't undermine the ability of those that are good revenue generators in pursuit of across the board cutbacks.

Like every other DfT TOC, GWR have suggested a host of schemes that could save money and then the DfT chooses which ones to implement.

Thats as i hoped so good to hear but does it also forecast revenue impact?

I wonder if Porterbrook have actually lost much money in the 769 project. They have had three operators paying lease charges and we are not privy to how the project was funded or what the payback period was.

I guess its possible their suppliers have taken contractual hits and given them liquidated damages but can't see how they haven't lost money here but they've got deep pockets.

 

[Wyrleybart]

The last set of DfT payments to operators data certainly showed some operators not needing much subsidy vs the ones like Northern who need a vast subsidy although to be fair even in its franchise form it received the biggest subsidy. So i do hope DfT don't undermine the ability of those that are good revenue generators in pursuit of across the board cutbacks.

Thats as i hoped so good to hear but does it also forecast revenue impact?

I guess its possible their suppliers have taken contractual hits and given them liquidated damages but can't see how they haven't lost money here but they've got deep pockets.

We just don't know the financials do we. All we know is 35 class 319s were overhauled at Wolverton then fitted with 70 rafted diesel GUs, fuel tanks, exhaust systems, substantial rewiring, TCA fitment blah blah blah, and then dragged or low loadered around England and Wales a few times. I imagine Wabtec have spent several thousand man person hours on the project, but we know nothing of how it is all accounted for - and probably best we don't !!!

 

[Anonymous10]

Every DfT TOC requires subsidy now as the revenue ends up with the DfT. TOCs are being managed by the DfT on cost targets, not net contribution targets.

Like every other DfT TOC, GWR have suggested a host of schemes that could save money and then the DfT chooses which ones to implement.

I wonder if Porterbrook have actually lost much money in the 769 project. They have had three operators paying lease charges and we are not privy to how the project was funded or what the payback period was.

Worth remembering porterbrook have had to lease and revamp to tfw a additional fleet of 153s to cover for unreliable 769s

 

[Bald Rick]

Thats as i hoped so good to hear but does it also forecast revenue impact?

Yes every proposal has forecast revenue impacts, both to the TOC concerned and the industry as a whole.

 

[squizzler]

To me, naive or not, it seems to be yet another failure that has arisen largely because of the fragmented railway, Covid aside. I have tried to think of another entire sub-class of train/loco that has been produced like this and which has completely failed to enter service, and cannot, although I won't be surprised to hear of others.

Eurotunnel night star stock - and I think a few locos were also refurbished in anticipation.

 

[Towers]

Eurotunnel night star stock - and I think a few locos were also refurbished in anticipation.

Although the coaches were at least resold abroad (to Canada, ISTR) for use there!

 

[delticdave]

Although the coaches were at least resold abroad (to Canada, ISTR) for use there!

'Tis not really relevant but back in June 2003 I managed to take a triangular round trip from Montreal (Dorval) & the 1st leg (to Ottawa) was a GE P42DC loco (908) & a rake of Renaissance ex. Chunnel Night Star seated, (not sleeper) cars. The 2nd leg from Ottawa to Brockville was another GE (903) with LRC cars, too wide for the UK ( a very low tilting profile, much smaller than N. American passenger cars.). The last leg was back to Montreal with an EMD F40PH-2 & a rake of 2nd hand stainless purchased in the USA. All quite comfortable, 2+1 from the ex UK cars & 2+2 in the other trains.

Also managed a ride in a Renaissance train from Montreal to Quebec City a few days later, with a GE P42 upfront, but returning in a very 2nd hand Russian Hydrofoil back up the St. Lawrance River Montreal.

 

[RPI]

Having only now returned to work for the new year, I read the internal "Connect" email today and Mark Hopwood makes comment about the 769 situation, I can't link to it so I'll quote the relevant piece -

"Last week we made the difficult decision to halt our planned rollout of the class 769 tri-mode trains. This is not a decision we have taken lightly, and a number of factors - including production and implementation delays, a fall in customer numbers and budgetary pressures - has influenced this outcome."

"The predicted 12% yearly increase in passengers has, since the pandemic, turned into a real 3% decline in annual numbers - and we feel our existing fleet is appropriate for current levels of customer demand."

"That said, the team involved has worked incredibly hard to get these class 769s to a service-ready position and their efforts will help the ongoing review of our fleet as we look to plan for the future."

Not sure exactly what that means but thought may be of interest!

 

[XCTurbostar]

Having only now returned to work for the new year, I read the internal "Connect" email today and Mark Hopwood makes comment about the 769 situation, I can't link to it so I'll quote the relevant piece -

"Last week we made the difficult decision to halt our planned rollout of the class 769 tri-mode trains. This is not a decision we have taken lightly, and a number of factors - including production and implementation delays, a fall in customer numbers and budgetary pressures - has influenced this outcome."

"The predicted 12% yearly increase in passengers has, since the pandemic, turned into a real 3% decline in annual numbers - and we feel our existing fleet is appropriate for current levels of customer demand."

"That said, the team involved has worked incredibly hard to get these class 769s to a service-ready position and their efforts will help the ongoing review of our fleet as we look to plan for the future."

Not sure exactly what that means but thought may be of interest!

Interesting use of words.. he isn't saying it will never happen but more, not 'yet'? If it was completely over wouldn't he say 'terminate' or 'cancel'?