Salisbury to Exeter, duplicate route Beeching.

[nw1]

In the alternative history where Waterloo - Exeter is the mainline, it's instructive to look at the lack of stations between Westbury - Exeter and Totnes Plymouth. Places such as Somerton, Wellington, Cullompton, South Brent and Plympton have no station (and Ivybridge was without for many years) in order that fast services could run without being held up by stopping services.

I guess it didn't help that such local services would in those days have been run by first-gen DMUs, which would have been less likely to keep ahead of the fast trains than Sprinters.

However I can see that if they ran a DMU out of Westbury immediately after a fast to Plymouth or beyond, connecting from a London service, it could presumably have made all the stops and still be ahead of the next fast, an hour later, at Exeter. It would terminate at Exeter, and then another (separate) Exeter-Plymouth stopping DMU could run immediately behind the fast from Exeter. Same logic could have been applied to maintain a Swindon-Bristol stopping DMU, keeping places like Corsham on the rail network.

 

[Gloster]

Around 1983, which was not a good period for BR, there was a proposal to close Castle Cary-Cogload Junction and send all the West of England trains via Bristol. It got as far as asking how much equipment being installed for the Westbury area resignalling would be written off or could be recovered. How much of this was a serious consideration and how much was BR going through the motions with a proposal that it knew was politically unacceptable I know not, but the question was asked.

 

[Taunton]

* I suspect it might still be quicker to go to Paddington via Bristol than reverse & cope with the twistier bits of the WoE. I've been on a fair number of scheduled trains in the past which did that anyway ( and one which went Paddington--Swindon-Westbury-Taunton, although that really doesn't sound like a regular service! )

-

Actually routing this way, via Melksham, has a longstanding history, and in earlier HST days there was at least one regular service that went this way. It's not a huge amount further distance, and the 125mph east of Chippenham makes up for the twisty section from Pewsey to Newbury, and indeed all the way to Reading.

Reversing at Exeter St Davids, plus the grind up the hill to Central, does knock out an amount of time. For whatever reason Britain as a whole has always seemed unable to do reversal of main line trains efficiently long term.

 

[stuu]

Around 1983, which was not a good period for BR, there was a proposal to close Castle Cary-Cogload Junction and send all the West of England trains via Bristol. It got as far as asking how much equipment being installed for the Westbury area resignalling would be written off or could be recovered. How much of this was a serious consideration and how much was BR going through the motions with a proposal that it knew was politically unacceptable I know not, but the question was asked.

Was it ever considered for singling or other rationalisation? It's a bit of an outlier in terms of 100mph railways, being used by 1/2 tph each way at most, which is a lot more than in the recent past. I guess there would have been some freight in the past as well though

 

[Gloster]

Was it ever considered for singling or other rationalisation? It's a bit of an outlier in terms of 100mph railways, being used by 1/2 tph each way at most, which is a lot more than in the recent past. I guess there would have been some freight in the past as well though

It may have been, but the circa 1983 question was about straightforward closure. By then just about the only revenue earning freight was the Westbury-Exeter Central cement, which was supposed to go down via Yeovil to avoid the climb up from St David’s: all general traffic went via Severn Tunnel and the Fawley-Tiverton Junction had ceased, while the Italian china clay hadn’t yet started. There were a few ballast workings to and from Exeter or Meldon, one of which went down via Yeovil, and trips from Taunton Fairwater to Yeovil tip. Passengers was roughly one an hour reach way with a couple of extras plus the Newspapers and return vans.

 

[nw1]

Was it ever considered for singling or other rationalisation? It's a bit of an outlier in terms of 100mph railways, being used by 1/2 tph each way at most, which is a lot more than in the recent past. I guess there would have been some freight in the past as well though

I'd hope such things would never have been considered. Singling has caused all manner of constraints on the Waterloo-Exeter route, it would have caused similar constraints on the Berks and Hants / Westbury route.

The line has been at least 1tph each way since at least the 1983/4 timetable, perhaps earlier, and with HSTs generally. I can't see singling would have made its operation particularly easy, and would be an example of cost-cutting leading to service degradation.

== Doublepost prevention - post automatically merged: 25 Nov 2022 ==

Around 1983, which was not a good period for BR, there was a proposal to close Castle Cary-Cogload Junction and send all the West of England trains via Bristol. It got as far as asking how much equipment being installed for the Westbury area resignalling would be written off or could be recovered. How much of this was a serious consideration and how much was BR going through the motions with a proposal that it knew was politically unacceptable I know not, but the question was asked.

It would surely have caused significantly slower journeys, as well as filling up Devon and Cornwall services with Bath and Bristol passengers and consequent overcrowding. I suppose they could have changed the timetable to something like a 30-min headway service to Bristol (it was hourly at the time) with the WoE running via the South Wales line to Bristol Parkway, and probably fast from Reading to Bristol Parkway, to avoid losing too much time.

Prime services like the Cornish Riviera would of course have lost a lot of time through running via Bristol however you did it.

 

[eldomtom2]

I have yet to see any evidence that Dr Beeching ever had a 'vision' of the size of the network that he somehow 'wanted'. That would have been totally uncharacteristic backwards reasoning for someone with the analytical mind of an industrial engineer and senior ICI Divisional Manager.

This is a such a backwards reading of what I said I wonder if it's deliberate. Beeching did not have a vision of the size of the network. He had a vision for the railway as a whole, and that vision did not see a future for a large number of lines we have today.

It would have made no sense to propose or recommend any further withdrawals of passenger services (beyond those in the Reshaping Report) in a document published under the new government.

Again, this is a massive misreading. Obviously Beeching was not proposing closures to take place within the present government term in the Trunk Routes report. But that is not the same thing as thinking large portions of the network were unnecessary.

 

[Railwaysceptic]

That on its own is worthless without talking about how Beeching defined a viable route and what his vision for the railway was. As I believe I have made very clear with evidence, his vision was not one that saw a future for Salisbury-Exeter, or indeed many other lines that are open today.

Yes, because for a variety of reasons Beeching did not get to implement his vision...

We know how Dr. Beeching defined a viable route and we know what his vision was for the future of British Railways. It was not what you are suggesting. You have not provided evidence that he planned from the start to close all the routes "not selected for development."

It is true that in the period after the publication of his report, a negative decision was made about the route between Salisbury and Exeter, but its reprieve was not because he was "prevented" from closing it. It was because the Western management demonstrated it was worth keeping open.

Dr. Beeching was not impeded by public opinion. There was vociferous opposition to most of the closures which did take place but that did not prevent them from going ahead. The vast majority of the public agreed with his approach and until the October 1964 election, he also had the full support of the Transport Minister, the Prime Minister and senior civil servants in both the Treasury and Transport.

p144 of my edition: ' Back in the office, I sat forlornly in front of my authorised version. No railway west of Plymouth. No Exeter-Salisbury. No Taunton-Westbury-Reading. In a while I rallied............. I had at least saved a little. West of Plymouth; Exeter-Salisbury; Taunton-Westbury-Reading were in as grey 'routes not for development'. ' This is fairly conclusive evidence of Dr Beeching's thinking at some point. Never said this was part of Beeching's report 'The Reshaping of British Railways'.

Thank you. I had forgotten that. Yes, it shows that at one stage Dr. Beeching's thinking had changed from what it had been at the time of his report. It does not prove however that the report's describing some routes as "not selected for development" was merely a euphemism for closure by stealth.

 

[stuu]

I'd hope such things would never have been considered. Singling has caused all manner of constraints on the Waterloo-Exeter route, it would have caused similar constraints on the Berks and Hants / Westbury route.

The line has been at least 1tph each way since at least the 1983/4 timetable, perhaps earlier, and with HSTs generally. I can't see singling would have made its operation particularly easy, and would be an example of cost-cutting leading to service degradation.

I didn't say it would have been a good idea, but with trains taking ~15 minutes for the section I could imagine someone might think it was doable

 

[Gloster]

I didn't say it would have been a good idea, but with trains taking ~15 minutes for the section I could imagine someone might think it was doable

Even with TCB or Tokenless Block you would really only have time for two trains an hour, unless you started running at uneven times in order to squeeze one more in every two hours, which is asking for trouble. It was thirteen minutes Cary to Athelney, and another four to Cogload, for a passenger: goods or engineers’ trains would take so long that they could only run in the dark hours. With signals at Somerton dividing the line in to two sections, you might squeeze the odd extra train in, but it would be a bit tight.

I still think that it was BR showing willing to make economies to keep the Department of Transport and the government happy, but knowing the politicians wouldn’t bite the bullet. The outcry from their MPs would have been horrendous: all but two seats in Devon and Cornwall were Conservative.

 

[paul1609]

Not entirely successfully given that Yeovil Junction - Sherborne was hurriedly reinstated shortly after singling in 1967 before the track had been removed due to the 'optimism' as to how much could be removed.


There has always been a much larger population between Salisbury - Exeter than Westbury - Exeter (particularly given Frome is bypassed). There was significant scope to improve the intermediate service - prior to 1964 Honiton and Gillingham had minimal London services as they weren't junctions, whereas now these are 2 of the 3 busiest intermediate stations.

I think the original rationalisation plan was stops only at Honiton, Axminster, Crewkerne, Sherborne (railhead for Yeovil) and Gillingham. Obviously that got pared back.

I had an old VHS cab ride from Salisbury to Exeter in 1987 in which the driver, cameraman and inspector discuss the influence of Sherborne School. Apparently enough establishment figures in the 1960s had been schooled there to prevent any talk of closing the route to their old alma mater. Obviously speculative, but quite feasible given similar threats to the 'Deerstalker Express' in the 1990s.

Yeovil Junction to Sherborne (Templecombe) has never strictly speaking been fully reinstated. The former up line is a reversible single line and the former down line is classed as a down only loop.
Sherborne school until relatively recently was a significant traffic for the line. I regularly used the Brighton to Exeter Sunday Evening train in class 159 days. This had a really odd calling pattern. One evening if failed to call at Sherborne and I remember hundreds of schoolboys panicking. At Yeovil Junction a pragmatic solution was formulated whereby the train reversed and went back to Sherborne dropped the school kids off and then continued to Exeter arriving on time.
I also remember a class 158 from Brighton running out of Diesel just outside of Romsey such that it missed the last connection West to Exeter at Salisbury and the Guard realising that his nearly full trains passengers were all either travelling back to Plymouth for the Navy like myself or school kids returning to Sherborne.

 

[Taunton]

Prime services like the Cornish Riviera would of course have lost a lot of time through running via Bristol however you did it.

Not as much as you might think, because most of the way round via Bristol is fine for 125mph, which none of the B&H I don't believe is. Back in Beeching's time the B&H had expresses at about 2-hourly intervals, same as the Southern, to Exeter, apart of course from summer Saturdays.

Don't forget City of Truro's grand run from Plymouth to London (some times not beaten until the HST came along) was going round by Bristol!

On the Southern line, the structure of the timetable is now quite different. The two-hourly expresses were just that, fast from Salisbury to Exeter Central, with just a couple of stops at the junction stations, different pattern for each. And then there were the local trains, stopping at every single station (and there were a lot), and running for only part of the route in varying combinations. Nothing like the current arrangement, a frequent service serving the remaining significant points, and through from Waterloo, but having closed the many basket cases. The Atlantic Coast Express used to detach two coaches at Salisbury to do all the stops behind the main train, which local service arrived at Exeter Central one-and-a-half HOURS behind the main train. Hamilton Ellis, prominent railway writer, used this when a child from London to a family farm near Semley, and wrote about the interminable progress.

 

[Gloster]

It was being said that sending the West of England trains via Bristol would only add about twenty minutes to the journey. I have a vague feeling of somewhere or other having heard or read that one idea was that one or two trains (possibly the Hind and Riviera) would miss Temple Meads by going via St Philip’s Marsh, but I am not sure if this was contemporaneous.

 

[eldomtom2]

We know how Dr. Beeching defined a viable route and we know what his vision was for the future of British Railways. It was not what you are suggesting. You have not provided evidence that he planned from the start to close all the routes "not selected for development."

What, then, was his vision for the railways, if not the one I have presented using quotes from his report?

And again, you fail to see the difference between "I recommend this route for closure in the next few years" and "I do not believe this route is worthy of investment, and believe it should be closed in the next couple of decades".

 

[Dr Hoo]

What, then, was his vision for the railways, if not the one I have presented using quotes from his report?

And again, you fail to see the difference between "I recommend this route for closure in the next few years" and "I do not believe this route is worthy of investment, and believe it should be closed in the next couple of decades".

The Trunk Routes document was largely focussed on freight rather than passenger (as indeed was the Reshaping Report in fact but the long Appendix of individual station closure proposals tended to overshadow this). Nevertheless the Trunk Routes document had maps of current passenger volumes (in 1964, Map 10) and envisaged future volumes (in 1984, Map 20). These flows were shown between 'Traffic Centres'/'Main Areas' (e.g.London and South West England rather than, say, Exeter specifically. Volumes between London and the South West direct and also from the Solent area to the South West direct (i.e. not via Bristol) were expected to remain broadly constant even in the face of expected growth in car ownership and road improvements.

Both in the Reshaping Report and the Trunk Routes document Dr Beeching was strongly critical of tiny wayside stations for both passenger and freight purposes on the obvious basis that they tended to generate minimal traffic but greatly impeded more lucrative longer distance and high speed flows (quite apart from their own direct costs). The Summary of the Reshaping Report noted that: "Fast and semi-fast, inter-city passenger trains are potentially profitable and need to be developed selectively, along with other forms of traffic [i.e. profitable freight]..."

In the case of Salisbury-Exeter there were no major freight flows (e.g. future liner trains, merry-go-round coal, steel or oil) anticipated and hence none were shown on the Maps in the Trunk Routes document. A worthwhile semi-fast passenger service was there for the making, obviously not encumbered by calls at the likes of Dinton, Semley, Milbourne Port, Chard Junction or Seaton Junction. Gerrard Feinnes, an open-minded and dynamic railwayman, got this and as Western Region GM set about adapting the route to a future role as a semi-fast inter-city route of the type envisaged and outlined by the Good Doctor.

It's all perfectly obvious if you read the original documents with an open mind.

 

[Irascible]

Around 1983, which was not a good period for BR, there was a proposal to close Castle Cary-Cogload Junction and send all the West of England trains via Bristol. It got as far as asking how much equipment being installed for the Westbury area resignalling would be written off or could be recovered. How much of this was a serious consideration and how much was BR going through the motions with a proposal that it knew was politically unacceptable I know not, but the question was asked.

Good grief - so they'd shut the bit all the south-west expresses use & keep Westbury-Castle Cary just for Weymouth trains? that surely has to be a keeping-someone-happy study.

It may have been, but the circa 1983 question was about straightforward closure. By then just about the only revenue earning freight was the Westbury-Exeter Central cement, which was supposed to go down via Yeovil to avoid the climb up from St David’s: all general traffic went via Severn Tunnel and the Fawley-Tiverton Junction had ceased, while the Italian china clay hadn’t yet started. There were a few ballast workings to and from Exeter or Meldon, one of which went down via Yeovil, and trips from Taunton Fairwater to Yeovil tip. Passengers was roughly one an hour reach way with a couple of extras plus the Newspapers and return vans.

Where did the coail up to Exmouth Jct come from & when did that start?

Not as much as you might think, because most of the way round via Bristol is fine for 125mph, which none of the B&H I don't believe is. Back in Beeching's time the B&H had expresses at about 2-hourly intervals, same as the Southern, to Exeter, apart of course from summer Saturdays.

Yes - it really isn't much slower via Bristol, was even less before the B&H was 110mph in places although murky memory suggests that came farily promptly after HSTs. Posisbly something to do with getting an agreement not to need a secondman to do it?

 

[Route115?]

In his famous memoirs, Mr Fiennes mentions that he wanted fewer stations than pressure groups and local politicians were willing to accept and that consequently the service was inferior to what he had planned. He did not say he wanted to close more track. These details have nothing to do with Dr. Beeching's report.

I sometimes wonder if people worried too much about closing some lightly used branch lines and not enough about closing some stations on trunk routes. There are some quite long distances between stations in some reasonably populated areas on trunk lines - you may actually be better off living on a secondary route if you are a user of local stations. The trouble is that additional local stations might require four tracking - expensive if the track bed exists and absolutely prohibitive if not.

 

[nw1]

Not as much as you might think, because most of the way round via Bristol is fine for 125mph, which none of the B&H I don't believe is. Back in Beeching's time the B&H had expresses at about 2-hourly intervals, same as the Southern, to Exeter, apart of course from summer Saturdays.

Don't forget City of Truro's grand run from Plymouth to London (some times not beaten until the HST came along) was going round by Bristol!

On the Southern line, the structure of the timetable is now quite different. The two-hourly expresses were just that, fast from Salisbury to Exeter Central, with just a couple of stops at the junction stations, different pattern for each. And then there were the local trains, stopping at every single station (and there were a lot), and running for only part of the route in varying combinations. Nothing like the current arrangement, a frequent service serving the remaining significant points, and through from Waterloo, but having closed the many basket cases. The Atlantic Coast Express used to detach two coaches at Salisbury to do all the stops behind the main train, which local service arrived at Exeter Central one-and-a-half HOURS behind the main train. Hamilton Ellis, prominent railway writer, used this when a child from London to a family farm near Semley, and wrote about the interminable progress.

Interesting. Actually it does seem that stops did cause a very large loss of time in steam days, presumably due to slower acceleration of steam trains. Even still, the time penalty was staggering in some cases. I was looking at the 1963 Southern timetable on Timetable World and while non stop services from Waterloo to Southampton Central (e.g. the 1030 or 1230) took just 1hr21min, the 1130 service which also called at Basingstoke (2 min stop), Micheldever and Winchester took 30 minutes longer (1hr51min) ! Strange that just three stops would cause half an hour of extra time.

Similarly Southampton to Bournemouth non-stop was 35 mins, while stops at Brockenhurst, New Milton, Christchurch and Pokesdown (also on the 1130) increased that to 54 mins - not quite as extreme as the above case, admittedly.

Maybe the 1130 had a different class of loco with a lower max speed? (Apologies for going a bit OT, maybe this is better discussed on the "Transition era" thread...)

 

[Gloster]

Where did the coail up to Exmouth Jct come from & when did that start?

I think the coal came, like all the other general traffic to the south west, via Bristol (probably starting from Severn Tunnel Junction) to Exeter Riverside and was then tripped up the bank to Exmouth Junction. It certainly didn’t come via Castle Cary.

 

[30907]

Interesting. Actually it does seem that stops did cause a very large loss of time in steam days, presumably due to slower acceleration of steam trains. Even still, the time penalty was staggering in some cases. I was looking at the 1963 Southern timetable on Timetable World and while non stop services from Waterloo to Southampton Central (e.g. the 1030 or 1230) took just 1hr21min, the 1130 service which also called at Basingstoke (2 min stop), Micheldever and Winchester took 30 minutes longer (1hr51min) ! Strange that just three stops would cause half an hour of extra time.

Similarly Southampton to Bournemouth non-stop was 35 mins, while stops at Brockenhurst, New Milton, Christchurch and Pokesdown (also on the 1130) increased that to 54 mins - not quite as extreme as the above case, admittedly.

Maybe the 1130 had a different class of loco with a lower max speed? (Apologies for going a bit OT, maybe this is better discussed on the "Transition era" thread...)

It didn't, but the 2-hour fasts were limited to 400t maximum; the unlimited timing was 88 plus 37 minutes. The xx30 semifasts also had pathing issues behind the Winchester-Southampton T diesels in the 1957 timetable (which is why the 11.30 had a Micheldever stop at all!) - this had been resolved in 1963 but the 11.30 didn't change.
(Pedant mode: it lost Hinton A and Boscombe stops in order to allow the down Belle to have a 2-hour timing.)

 

[Taunton]

I think the coal came, like all the other general traffic to the south west, via Bristol (probably starting from Severn Tunnel Junction) to Exeter Riverside and was then tripped up the bank to Exmouth Junction. It certainly didn’t come via Castle Cary.

By 1983 the residual coal traffic was household grade, which came from the East Midlands collieries (Welsh steam coal being somewhat difficult in domestic fires), and came via Birmingham and Bristol. Class 46-hauled, it used to stop off and drop wagons at Taunton's Coal Concentration Depot.

In former times, when coal went to Exmouth Junction for the steam loco depot, the Southern made sure it kept off the Western - unless it was Welsh it came from the North through Bath Green Park yard and the S&D via Templecombe.

 

[eldomtom2]

It's all perfectly obvious if you read the original documents with an open mind.

And by that you presumably mean "if you ignore what the original documents actually say and make something up". What do you think Beeching meant when he said "therefore, unless future traffic levels over the through routes are likely to be many times higher than at present, the expenditure of the very large sums of money necessary for the maintenance, renewal, and improvement of all existing through routes cannot be justified, and the concentration of traffic and of development expenditure upon selected routes is clearly desirable"? What do you think he meant when the only non-trunk routes he said would stay open were commuter routes in the "main urban areas" and "freight feeder lines"? What do you think he meant when he said the role of passenger trains in his vision was to "concentrate upon the provision of bulk transport over routes of heavy demand, and over medium to long distances"? What do you think he meant when he said the railways should focus on "intermediate and long distances, while leaving shorter distances and cross country journeys to coaches and the private car"?

 

[Taunton]

And by that you presumably mean "if you ignore what the original documents actually say and make something up". What do you think Beeching meant when he said "therefore, unless future traffic levels over the through routes are likely to be many times higher than at present, the expenditure of the very large sums of money necessary for the maintenance, renewal, and improvement of all existing through routes cannot be justified, and the concentration of traffic and of development expenditure upon selected routes is clearly desirable"?

Beeching was right, as always **. As we have described above, the Salisbury-Exeter traffic in 1960 was passengers in the non-stop expresses from Waterloo to Exeter etc, which WAS a duplication of what Paddington provided, and all stations local stoppers, which had lost most of their traffic in the 1930s when buses and cars became practical in country areas. The traffic that has developed along the line in more recent times, such as Templecombe to Waterloo, let alone Andover to London commuters, just didn't really seem to exist then, or be adequately catered for. The world changes. And even then, most such journeys are nowadays made on the A303.

** - there, that's been said. Stand by for incoming ...

 

[Dr Hoo]

And by that you presumably mean "if you ignore what the original documents actually say and make something up". What do you think Beeching meant when he said "therefore, unless future traffic levels over the through routes are likely to be many times higher than at present, the expenditure of the very large sums of money necessary for the maintenance, renewal, and improvement of all existing through routes cannot be justified, and the concentration of traffic and of development expenditure upon selected routes is clearly desirable"? What do you think he meant when the only non-trunk routes he said would stay open were commuter routes in the "main urban areas" and "freight feeder lines"? What do you think he meant when he said the role of passenger trains in his vision was to "concentrate upon the provision of bulk transport over routes of heavy demand, and over medium to long distances"? What do you think he meant when he said the railways should focus on intermediate and long distances, while leaving shorter distances and cross country journeys to coaches and the private car"?

I think that you are the one 'making something up'. Nowhere in either report did Dr Beeching say that "only" certain lines would remain open. As I noted earlier, he did however write that: "It should be recognised that the purpose of this study is to select routes for future intensive use, not to select lines for closure"

I think that by "focus on intermediate and long distances" he meant just what he wrote. The Trunk Route report describes this as being more than "about 100 miles or so". You may be aware that Gillingham and points west are over 100 miles from London and also that no motorway was likely on this axis within the study period up to 1984.

In 1964 long stretches of indisputably Trunk Route, such as the WCML and ECML, were still less than 100 mph, didn't have continuous four aspect signalling, higher speed junctions and so forth. There was no way that the nation could afford to upgrade everything any time soon, especially multiple routes on similar axes. So it was blindingly obvious that only a proportion could be "Developed" in a useful timescale. It was also obvious that other routes only needed to retain the capacity needed for more local traffic.

Dr Beeching had, of course, decided on electrification of the SWML to Southampton and Bournemouth (going beyond the 1955 Modernisation Plan vision) and identified the Solent-West Midlands axis as a Major Trunk Route. Clearly sound conclusions. However, Basingstoke-Salisbury-Exeter didn't have quite the same prospects. But he didn't propose it for closure.

What would you have done?

 

[eldomtom2]

I think that you are the one 'making something up'. Nowhere in either report did Dr Beeching say that "only" certain lines would remain open. As I noted earlier, he did however write that: "It should be recognised that the purpose of this study is to select routes for future intensive use, not to select lines for closure"

Yes, he said that. But you are ignoring all the evidence that shows what his vision for the railway was. There is a reason for all the repeated statements in the report that the railways should focus on "cheap bulk movement". Note that Beeching says:

It must be remembered that the survey looked ahead twenty years and that the process of reaching the situation described above is bound to progress by a number of stages. The present report, as a basis for future investment, will have to be reassessed from time to time. The effect on the future extent of the trunk route system will be gradual. As has already been said, this report is not a prelude to closures on a grand scale: it is, rather, a basis for more definitive, stepwise planning of route rationalisation.

- which rather gives the impression that the report doesn't recommend specific closures because of its broad level-look, and not due to any opposition to the closures implied. His final statement on route closures:

For the sake of clarity, it is emphasised that non-selection of lines for intensive development does not necessarily mean that they will be abandoned in the foreseeable future, nor even that money will not be spent upon some of them to improve their suitability for their continuing purpose. It is emphasised that the developed trunk lines will be supported by several thousand miles of freight feeder lines, and that clarification of the position with regard to trunk route development will facilitate decisions about the feeder network. It is also emphasised that the provision of capacity for commuter traffics into the main urban areas is the subject of separate consideration.

- which is notable for the absence of even the slightest platitude suggesting that routes that are neither a trunk route, a freight feeder line, or a commuter route have a future.

I think that by "focus on intermediate and long distances" he meant just what he wrote. The Trunk Route report describes this as being more than "about 100 miles or so". You may be aware that Gillingham and points west are over 100 miles from London and also that no motorway was likely on this axis within the study period up to 1984.

I do not see what the relevance of Gillingham being 100 miles from London is. I strongly suspect that in Beeching's eyes, the relevant figures were that it was 57 miles from Basingstoke and 67 miles from Exeter. Looking at it from this angle, it seems hard to argue that Basingstoke-Salisbury-Exeter would not fall into the category of "shorter distances and cross country journeys" that Beeching felt should be left to road transport.

In 1964 long stretches of indisputably Trunk Route, such as the WCML and ECML,

You should tell Beeching that - he saw the ECML as only a "trunk route" up to Newcastle - in his eyes all England-Scotland traffic should have been concentrated over Carlisle-Carstairs.

In 1964 long stretches of indisputably Trunk Route, such as the WCML and ECML, were still less than 100 mph, didn't have continuous four aspect signalling, higher speed junctions and so forth. There was no way that the nation could afford to upgrade everything any time soon, especially multiple routes on similar axes. So it was blindingly obvious that only a proportion could be "Developed" in a useful timescale. It was also obvious that other routes only needed to retain the capacity needed for more local traffic.

Except, of course, Beeching was not talking about what to prioritise.

What would you have done?

An utterly irrelevant question, since we are discussing what Beeching wanted and not what actually happened.

I also note that you have not explained your interpretations of most of the Beeching quotes I asked you to explain.

 

[Railwaysceptic]

Yes, he said that. But you are ignoring all the evidence that shows what his vision for the railway was. There is a reason for all the repeated statements in the report that the railways should focus on "cheap bulk movement". Note that Beeching says:

- which rather gives the impression that the report doesn't recommend specific closures because of its broad level-look, and not due to any opposition to the closures implied. His final statement on route closures:

- which is notable for the absence of even the slightest platitude suggesting that routes that are neither a trunk route, a freight feeder line, or a commuter route have a future.

I do not see what the relevance of Gillingham being 100 miles from London is. I strongly suspect that in Beeching's eyes, the relevant figures were that it was 57 miles from Basingstoke and 67 miles from Exeter. Looking at it from this angle, it seems hard to argue that Basingstoke-Salisbury-Exeter would not fall into the category of "shorter distances and cross country journeys" that Beeching felt should be left to road transport.

You should tell Beeching that - he saw the ECML as only a "trunk route" up to Newcastle - in his eyes all England-Scotland traffic should have been concentrated over Carlisle-Carstairs.

Except, of course, Beeching was not talking about what to prioritise.

An utterly irrelevant question, since we are discussing what Beeching wanted and not what actually happened.

I also note that you have not explained your interpretations of most of the Beeching quotes I asked you to explain.

In Post 4 you asserted that Dr. Beeching wanted far more closures than proposed in his Re-Shaping report. When challenged, you asserted in Post 8 that his second report - The Development of Trunk Routes - provided evidence. On being reminded that this second report was not about branch lines etc, your Post 10 response was that Dr. Beeching was dodging criticism (!) and that "not selected for development" was a euphemism for closing lines down. When reminded of specific points in the Trunk Report, you repeated in Post 12 your previous contention and inserted quotations which contradicted your opinion.

On being informed that Dr. Beeching had originally divided the railway lines into three groups, you declared incorrectly in Post 17 that this was meaningless without a definition of a viable route or an understanding of Dr. Beechings vision; incorrectly that you had provided evidence and incorrectly that the Trunk Route report showed there was no future for the Basingstoke/Exeter route.

And so it goes on. You repeatedly insist without evidence that Dr. Beeching planned from the outset to close all the routes his Reshaping Report had set aside for a future decision and you repeatedly quote sections from his reports which very strangely you feel prove your point but which in fact refute your assertions.

It seems debating with you is sterile. I'm not going to continue and I advise others not to either.

 

[Taunton]

It's a bit thin to blame Beeching personally for the decisions. He was the Chairman, but relied on his judgement of whichever of the longer serving railway managers had shown their understanding of the overall policy situation. Gerry Fiennes' books show that sometimes this was him, and sometimes not.

Given that Salisbury-Exeter was then either non-stop expresses (which DID duplicate from London what Paddington was doing), or basketcase all-stations stoppers, the conclusion is not surprising. The two routes are closer geographically than sometimes supposed. I've pondered here before on whether there's a hilltop somewhere around Wincanton where one might see with binoculars the trains on both routes, and further east they both pass either side of Salisbury Plain, with nothing in between. It would be good to know the loads that were obtained, year-round, on the expresses on the two routes, because I get the impression that outside the holiday season the Southern didn't carry many beyond Exeter. Certainly in the 1960s, just like today, it was quite often difficult boarding any Up service to Paddington at Taunton to get a seat, despite substantial 12-coach etc formations, in particular for a family travelling together. There was often an extra strengthening Hawksworth SK tacked on the back of the Mk1 formation which, being furthest from the buffers at Paddington, was the best bet.

Lyme Regis and Padstow are holiday destinations, not good all year round ones like Exeter and Plymouth. And when it comes to the overall London to Penzance route, having the Bristol/North line join at Taunton, which always used to provide more traffic, passenger and particularly freight, than London did makes it really a front runner.

 

[yorksrob]

Yes, he said that. But you are ignoring all the evidence that shows what his vision for the railway was. There is a reason for all the repeated statements in the report that the railways should focus on "cheap bulk movement". Note that Beeching says:

- which rather gives the impression that the report doesn't recommend specific closures because of its broad level-look, and not due to any opposition to the closures implied. His final statement on route closures:

- which is notable for the absence of even the slightest platitude suggesting that routes that are neither a trunk route, a freight feeder line, or a commuter route have a future.

I do not see what the relevance of Gillingham being 100 miles from London is. I strongly suspect that in Beeching's eyes, the relevant figures were that it was 57 miles from Basingstoke and 67 miles from Exeter. Looking at it from this angle, it seems hard to argue that Basingstoke-Salisbury-Exeter would not fall into the category of "shorter distances and cross country journeys" that Beeching felt should be left to road transport.

You should tell Beeching that - he saw the ECML as only a "trunk route" up to Newcastle - in his eyes all England-Scotland traffic should have been concentrated over Carlisle-Carstairs.

Except, of course, Beeching was not talking about what to prioritise.

An utterly irrelevant question, since we are discussing what Beeching wanted and not what actually happened.

I also note that you have not explained your interpretations of most of the Beeching quotes I asked you to explain.

You're of course quite right. Beeching was seeing how the third group of lines panned out, and from the quotations you've made, it is patently clear that he thought that a proportion wouldn't work out - the inevitable conclusion being that he expected them to close at some point.

Anybody not recognising this reality is being willfully obtuse.

 

[eldomtom2]

your Post 10 response was that Dr. Beeching was dodging criticism (!)

I have no idea why you consider this claim objectionable. Beeching would not have put the lines about "not selected for development" not necessarily meaning "selected for closure" if he didn't think there was need to preemptively rebutt criticism.

and that "not selected for development" was a euphemism for closing lines down.

In practice, yes. The focus of The Reshaping of British Railways and The Development Of The Major Railway Trunk Routes was different. The focus of the first was to propose (among other things) that steps be taken in the immediate future to close a large number of lines; the focus of the second was to develop a vision of what the railway should look like in twenty years and what network would be necessary to achieve that vision.

Because of this broad-level look, Beeching's expectation was presumably that it would be followed by more detailed studies, with the possibility that these studies could lead to results that meant that which routes would be developed would change - for example, he brings up North London commuter services, heavily reliant on the main lines unlike those in the southeast, as an example of something that would have to be taken to account in more planning.

Thus the value of Trunk Routes is that it is Beeching presenting his vision of what the railway of the then-future should look like. It is through this vision that we can see why most of the routes "not selected for development" would have closed under his vision, at least to passenger traffic.

Beeching is very clear in his report that he believed the railways had too many trunk routes, and that the number of them that the railway directed trains and funds into could be greatly reduced. This, then, leaves the question of what would happen to those routes not deemed one of the trunk routes of the future.

For starters, Beeching directly states that one of the goals of publishing the report is "so that any future proposals for trunk line closure, or diminutions of line utilisation, can be seen in a broader context". This is an explicit statement of a desire for further closures than those recommended in the Reshaping report (which itself was not fully implemented).

But beyond that, we can see how most of the lines "not selected for development" do not fit into his vision of the railway. First, an important thing to understand about Beeching's selection of trunk routes is that he expected the transfer of through trains onto the selected trunk routes to be total - for instance, he proposed routing traffic from Newcastle, York, etc. to Scotland not over the ECML through Berwick but instead over the Tyne Valley line and then onto the WCML.

Thus, the only remaining traffic on the routes "not selected for development" would be local services. And it is very clear what Beeching thought of local services outside of the major cities' commuter services. He repeats over and over again that the railways need to focus on "bulk movement", and provides maps showing how the proposed trunk route network links all major centres of population. With passenger traffic he is explicit as to the meaning of this:

The role of the railways will be to concentrate upon the provision of bulk transport over routes of heavy demand, and over medium to long distances... ...while leaving shorter distances and cross country journeys to coaches and the private car.

In other words, railways cannot compete economically with road transport over the non-trunk routes and should not bother.

In addition, Beeching is explicit that one of the key purposes of selecting trunk routes is to reduce infrastructure costs. Singling lines etc. will do very little to balance the books when a line's only left with local services...

And so it goes on. You repeatedly insist without evidence that Dr. Beeching planned from the outset to close all the routes his Reshaping Report had set aside for a future decision and you repeatedly quote sections from his reports which very strangely you feel prove your point but which in fact refute your assertions.

I note that you don't bother arguing why the quotations contradict my opinion.