Derailment at Kirkby (Merseyside) - 13/03/2021

[61653 HTAFC]

But where do you draw the line here in terms of the severity of the offence for the excuse of "He shouldn't go to prison because he's a family man?

For me the question should be "what would an actual custodial sentence achieve?". Would it prevent further harm from the offender? In this case almost certainly not- this man will not be in a position to repeat his actions in the future. Would it provide comfort to any victims? Again not in this case, as thankfully there were no serious injuries or lives lost. Would it be a deterrent to others? Perhaps, but probably not any more so than the loss of a career.

The judge will have had access to information which is not in the public domain, in order to determine an appropriate sentence. I see no reason to suggest undue leniency in this case, and would discourage unqualified people from requesting a review under the "unduly lenient" conditions mentioned upthread. In my opinion such action will do more harm than good, and would be a waste of public money.

 

[ComUtoR]

CVRs are of very low value for trains,

CVR ?

Visual rather than audio CCTV pointed at the driver would be of greater use (because that would see phone use, packing their bag etc), but I doubt the Unions would ever accept that.

I agree that getting cab cameras past the current ASLEF and RMT would perhaps be a total brick wall.

Visual and audio has already been accepted by the Union.

 

[Bletchleyite]

CVR ?

Cockpit Voice Recorder (I think someone else said it in full before my post).

Visual and audio has already been accepted by the Union.

At your TOC I guess, but everywhere?

 

[ComUtoR]

Cockpit Voice Recorder (I think someone else said it in full before my post).

Cheers

At your TOC I guess, but everywhere?

ASLEF have been involved from the start. Not just at my TOC. I believe a trial has already taken place and at my TOC it may be introduced in full. Just not sure when.

Also the Union works on a national level too. Not just TOCs. For it to be agreed locally, something as big as this would have already gone to the Executive level. There was even something in the journal a few years ago. For it to be agreed locally at one TOC would also open the doors for agreement at other TOCs too. Its coming, just a question of when.

 

[Master29]

For me the question should be "what would an actual custodial sentence achieve?". Would it prevent further harm from the offender? In this case almost certainly not- this man will not be in a position to repeat his actions in the future. Would it provide comfort to any victims? Again not in this case, as thankfully there were no serious injuries or lives lost. Would it be a deterrent to others? Perhaps, but probably not any more so than the loss of a career.

The judge will have had access to information which is not in the public domain, in order to determine an appropriate sentence. I see no reason to suggest undue leniency in this case, and would discourage unqualified people from requesting a review under the "unduly lenient" conditions mentioned upthread. In my opinion such action will do more harm than good, and would be a waste of public money.

Very sound reasoning. One of those subjects which requires in depth analysis for any serious offence when one thinks about it. That is what I meant in terms of serious offences in general. Again it comes down to the nature of the particular incident, of which I think you have made very good points.

 

[FrodshamJnct]

For me the question should be "what would an actual custodial sentence achieve?"

Precisely. Well said.

 

[bramling]

Precisely. Well said.

The answer is it serves as a deterrent for others. Contrary to the notion that prison is like a holiday camp, for most people the prospect of prison is a pretty scary thought.

 

[61653 HTAFC]

The answer is it serves as a deterrent for others. Contrary to the notion that prison is like a holiday camp, for most people the prospect of prison is a pretty scary thought.

I'm not convinced prison would be a necessary deterrent in this particular case though. We have a lot of train drivers on this forum, and I can't imagine that any of them are now thinking "sod the rules about not using mobiles, I won't even go to prison if it causes me to smash through the buffers!"

What this incident may do, is prevent a small minority of drivers from "pushing the boundaries" of the rules if they otherwise would have, but I don't think a custodial sentence would have any significant effect on the impact of that "teachable moment". Indeed those lessons will have been taken on board long before this court case even began.

 

[seagull]

In many highly responsible and safety critical jobs such as train driving, and for the vast majority of conscientious employees, no punishment handed out by a judge can equal the self-torture and punishment one goes through following an incident where a mistake or error has been made. The feeling is indescribably awful.

 

[O L Leigh]

In many highly responsible and safety critical jobs such as train driving, and for the vast majority of conscientious employees, no punishment handed out by a judge can equal the self-torture and punishment one goes through following an incident where a mistake or error has been made. The feeling is indescribably awful.

Yes, I completely agree.

I also think that a bigger deterrence than porridge is the risk of throwing away a rewarding, well-paid living.

 

[nedchester]

In many highly responsible and safety critical jobs such as train driving, and for the vast majority of conscientious employees, no punishment handed out by a judge can equal the self-torture and punishment one goes through following an incident where a mistake or error has been made. The feeling is indescribably awful.

I do think there is a difference between making a mistake through a momentary lapse of concentration or misjudgement and a deliberate act like using a mobile phone. Granted a mistake can have awful consequences.

When I have been in the cab (for work purposes) the rules regarding mobile phones are made very clear and I have little sympathy with this person.

On the other hand I always felt the conviction and subsequent sentencing of the guard at James Street a few years back to be a travesty of justice.

 

[Falcon1200]

Network Rail would have to take the blame as the infrastructure manager, wether they designed that particular section or not.

We will have to agree to disagree on that; The blame as established by the legal proceedings is with the Driver. The fixed distant with AWS, which requires a warning to be acknowledged, is the Driver's reminder, in addition to their training and route knowledge, that they are approaching a buffer stop.

 

[FrodshamJnct]

We will have to agree to disagree on that; The blame as established by the trial is with the Driver. The fixed distant with AWS, which requires a warning to be acknowledged, is the Driver's reminder, in addition to their training and route knowledge, that they are approaching a buffer stop.

There was no trial. The driver pleaded guilty at Magistrates Court and the case was then sent to Crown Court for sentencing.

 

[Falcon1200]

There was no trial. The driver pleaded guilty at Magistrates Court and the case was then sent to Crown Court for sentencing.

Fair enough, post amended.

 

[Efini92]

We will have to agree to disagree on that; The blame as established by the legal proceedings is with the Driver. The fixed distant with AWS, which requires a warning to be acknowledged, is the Driver's reminder, in addition to their training and route knowledge, that they are approaching a buffer stop.

I think you’ve missed the point I was making. You’re correct in what you’re saying however there’s nothing to mitigate against human error.

 

[bramling]

I do think there is a difference between making a mistake through a momentary lapse of concentration or misjudgement and a deliberate act like using a mobile phone. Granted a mistake can have awful consequences.

When I have been in the cab (for work purposes) the rules regarding mobile phones are made very clear and I have little sympathy with this person.

On the other hand I always felt the conviction and subsequent sentencing of the guard at James Street a few years back to be a travesty of justice.

Have to say, I tend towards this.

I am glad the Kirkby driver avoided prison, however there’s a considerable disparity in sentence between Kirkby and James Street, a lot of this resting on the outcomes of the respective incidents. However Kirkby had the potential to have a worse outcome, and based on the facts we know I’d say was probably more negligent than the James St guard’s misjudgement of a few seconds.

Of course, in the case of Kirkby there wasn’t a young girl involved along with a family - and seemingly investigating police officer - seeking blood.

Notwithstanding the fact they were charged with very different offences, I’d say the James Street guard got a very harsh sentence, and being brutally honest this one is certainly on the light side.

 

[Trothy]

60 down to 15 on approach with company policy of 10mph at the start of the platform.
A fixes distance board on approach with a set of oss soon after and another set once in the platform.

On a resignalling this would definitely have a TPWS OSS for the reduction in the PSR. I believe the policy of any reduction of a third without appropriate signalling (approach control red, or flashing yellows for a junction for example) requires this these days.

 

[jamesst]

On a resignalling this would definitely have a TPWS OSS for the reduction in the PSR. I believe the policy of any reduction of a third without appropriate signalling (approach control red, or flashing yellows for a junction for example) requires this these days.

It does have then a second set once you enter the platform.

 

[Cowley]

To keep this thread solely to look at the incident at Kirkby I’ve split some posts off into a new thread about personal responsibility and the law, it can be found here.

 

[WatcherZero]

Should be noted a suspended custodial sentence means they serve the time they would be in prison in community service and if they commit any other offense/break their terms they are sent to prison to carry out the remainder of their sentence. The sentence was suspended for pleading guilty. If they hadnt pled guilty they would have received the same 12 month sentence but would have had to serve the first 6 months in prison and then (for sentences 12 months or less) you are automatically released into community service for the remainder.

If there was aggravating factors (e.g. maliciousness, violence, severe casualties) the sentence would be increased beyond the guideline length and/or they would be ineligible for a suspended sentence.

 

[ainsworth74]

The RAIB report into this has now been released:

Summary​

At around 18:53 hrs on Saturday 13 March 2021, a Merseyrail train hit the buffer stop at Kirkby station, Merseyside. The train was travelling at 41 mph (66 km/h) as it entered the platform. Soon afterwards, the driver applied the emergency brake, but there was insufficient distance remaining to prevent the collision, and the train struck the buffer stop at around 29 mph (47 km/h). The train came to rest under a bridge, around 28 metres beyond the original buffer stop position. The driver was taken to hospital as a precaution and was discharged the following day. There were no other reported injuries to the guard or to the 12 passengers on board. The collision caused significant damage to the station infrastructure and the front of the train, with the station remaining closed for eight days.

The accident occurred because the driver of the train did not apply the brakes in time, as he was distracted from the driving task by his mobile phone and by his bag falling onto the cab floor.

No engineered systems automatically applied the train’s brakes, as the conditions for their intervention were not met. The driver continued to operate the controls for two of these systems (the automatic warning system and the driver’s safety device), preventing their activation, despite not being entirely engaged in the driving task. A third system (the train protection and warning system) did not activate until after the driver had already applied the emergency brake. This system was installed in compliance with the relevant standards but it did not protect against the particular scenario of this accident.

The risk assessment processes used by Merseyrail and Network Rail did not identify the risk of the buffer stop being hit at relatively high speed. RAIB also observed that Merseyrail’s fatigue risk management procedure did not follow current industry good practice.

This accident would almost certainly have had a worse outcome if there had been more passengers on the train or in the platform area behind the buffer stop. At the time, the COVID-19 pandemic had led to restrictions on social contact which resulted in a reduction in passenger numbers.

Recommendations​

RAIB has made three recommendations. The first is addressed to RSSB and relates to research into devices to monitor the alertness and awareness of drivers. The second, addressed to Merseyrail and Network Rail, seeks to improve the risk assessment process for collisions with buffer stops at terminal platforms. The final recommendation asks Merseyrail to improve its fatigue management process to follow industry good practice.

RAIB also identified two learning points. The first reminds train drivers of the risks posed by using a mobile phone while driving a train. The second reminds train operating companies of the importance of understanding the limits of protection offered by the train protection and warning system when risks assessing terminal platforms.

Report 07/2022: Buffer stop collision at Kirkby, Merseyside

RAIB has today released its report into a buffer stop collision at Kirkby, Merseyside, 13 March 2021.

www.gov.uk

 

[theageofthetra]

The RAIB report into this has now been released:

Report 07/2022: Buffer stop collision at Kirkby, Merseyside

RAIB has today released its report into a buffer stop collision at Kirkby, Merseyside, 13 March 2021.

www.gov.uk

Our old friend fatigue again.

 

[Fawkes Cat]

Our old friend fatigue again.

Not really:

The accident occurred because the driver of the train did not apply the brakes in time, as he was distracted from the driving task by his mobile phone and by his bag falling onto the cab floor.
(...)
RAIB also observed that Merseyrail’s fatigue risk management procedure did not follow current industry good practice.

The cause was the driver's actions (or more precisely their inaction in not applying the brake in time). But while looking at the matter, RAIB have noticed that Merseyrail could be better at dealing with fatigue.

 

[Dai Corner]

Not really:



The cause was the driver's actions (or more precisely their inaction in not applying the brake in time). But while looking at the matter, RAIB have noticed that Merseyrail could be better at dealing with fatigue.

The only way fatigue could possibly be regarded as a contributory factor would be if it was shown that the driver could drive safely while using his phone when not fatigued but not when he was. He shouldn't have been do so at all.

 

[Taunton]

The accident occurred because the driver of the train did not apply the brakes in time, as he was distracted from the driving task by his mobile phone and by his bag falling onto the cab floor.

Isn't that pretty much what happened at Southall, likewise approaching the end of a run.

 

[Fawkes Cat]

Isn't that pretty much what happened at Southall, likewise approaching the end of a run.

On the basis of what Wikipedia has to say at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Southall_rail_crash ('The HST driver did not apply the brakes until it was too late because he was packing his bag and did not see the cautionary signals.') I see the similarity - but I don't see packing one's bag (Southall) or using your mobile phone (Kirkby) as a consequence of fatigue.

 

[Wyrleybart]

On the basis of what Wikipedia has to say at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Southall_rail_crash ('The HST driver did not apply the brakes until it was too late because he was packing his bag and did not see the cautionary signals.') I see the similarity - but I don't see packing one's bag (Southall) or using your mobile phone (Kirkby) as a consequence of fatigue.

IIRC the Southall incident also had the AWS isolated on the leading power car. The Kirkby incident saw the driver acknowledge the AWS / TPWS whilst preoccupied with his mobile

 

[ainsworth74]

Having read most of the report I can see why the driver plead guilty. It's pretty damning (not directly of course as the RAIB don't do that, so this is my own conclusion from their report to be clear) of his behaviour whilst in charge of the train.

 

[GC class B1]

As a signalling layman, I wonder why the TPWS OSS loops didn’t prevent the incident as it is my understanding that TPWS is intended to prevent SPADs (and by extension buffer stop collisions) and overspeeding. The report does not appear to consider whether TPWS could (or should) have prevented the buffer stop collision occurring as a result of the driver being distracted.

 

[ainsworth74]

As a signalling layman, I wonder why the TPWS OSS loops didn’t prevent the incident as it is my understanding that TPWS is intended to prevent SPADs (and by extension buffer stop collisions) and overspeeding. The report does not appear to consider whether TPWS could (or should) have prevented the buffer stop collision occurring as a result of the driver being distracted.

I believe these two paragraphs will explain why:

85 The PSR OSS as installed at Kirkby is designed to mitigate against a train not slowing from close to the full permitted speed of 60 mph (97 km/h), for the 15 mph (24 km/h) PSR as it enters the platform. As such, it is set to intervene should a train pass the loops at a speed equal to or greater than 53 mph (85 km/h). When the incident train passed these loops, it was travelling at 42 mph (68 km/h), so no TPWS brake demand was triggered (paragraph 21).

86 The buffer stop OSS is installed to mitigate against a slow speed misjudgement by a driver and assumes that a defensive driving approach is used. As such, it is designed to minimise the consequences of a buffer stop collision for trains approaching at speeds of up to 20 mph (32 km/h). The train involved in this accident, however, passed the OSS at 39 mph (63 km/h). While this triggered a TPWS brake demand, this had no effect as the driver had already made an emergency brake application (paragraph 44). If the driver had not applied the emergency brake, an emergency brake application triggered by the TPWS system at this point would still have resulted in a collision with the buffer stop due to the speed at which the train passed the OSS and the available braking distance.