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"What if" scenario- what does BR without Beeching look like?

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ChiefPlanner

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Hallelujah! Thank you Journeyman, tbtc, Chief Planner and others for your posts.

I entirely agree.

But unfortunately logic and cold hard data won't deter the romantic idealists and the conspiracy theorists from continuing to peddle their nonsense.

An alternative view on Beeching was written by the relatively recently deceased "master" railwayman - Dick Hardy , a fine traction engineer and ace manager as far as handling staff of all grades was concerned. He was switched onto the General Management role at Kings Cross and Liverpool - ending up at the BRB on a senior management trainee role. He was the ultimate do-er and frankly stated that at his busiest times he never had a budget to worry about - it was all "performance and operations".

He wrote a book on Beeching about 1983 or 4 - entitled "Beeching - Champion of the railway" - very well worth a read as it sort of clears his name , and delves in the man's not unreasonable stance as a manager. No one could ever be expected to be liked for doing his job , but he had a go at it. Warts and all.

For my own views , people can never let go of the Woodhead and Great Central closures.

Both had outlived their purposes in my view - Woodhead would have been a godsend in WW2 when huge coal flows went over the Pennines - and the GC , frankly, should never have been built.

Woodhead went once the coal traffic vanished , (and the equipment was up for renewal) and the GC was on the way out for much of the same reasons - declining coal flows to the South East and the ability to transfer the residual traffic (which was not much frankly) to parallel routes , a process started by Fiennes and the inventor of MGC (R T Munns) from the early 1950's. They - being very solid "traffic" railway managers could see the writing on the wall.....
 
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yorksrob

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I think it's more cock-up than conspiracy, and I suspect it's probably just that it was the easiest way to measure things. Remember that a whole heap of analytical tools available to us now just weren't there - the resources Beeching had to work with were tiny, and he acknowledges that lack of time and staff in his report. He did the best he could at the time.

All things considered, I think they were reasonable assumptions. Personally, I've moved from a town that has a station to one five miles away that doesn't, and although I have access to a car, I still use the bus to get to the station for onward travel by train on a regular basis, and a lot of other people do too. Human beings are complicated things, and I'd say, once again, this is an area where our understanding has greatly increased in recent years. At the end of the day, he was there to try and stem the absolutely massive losses BR was making, and it needed to be done quickly. If it hadn't been, the situation would have got worse, and we'd have seen something like Serpell's more drastic options adopted instead.

If you were already measuring something a different way, why go to the trouble of changing it ? I think one could make an excuse for the urgency of cutting without investigating whether those assumptions actually held true for 1962 or 1964, but by 1966 and 1968 it was getting tired. It doesn't matter whether you, I, Dr Beeching or Mystic Meg think that those are reasonable assumptions. At some point, someone should have investigated whether they were true or not.

And it is frustrating that these threads are always titled "Beeching this" or "Beeching that", when it would be far more satisfying to have a thread about "the closure programme 1962-71" as this was a policy that was supported by several Governments and at least a generation of senior railway management. Beeching wasn't responsible for all of it, although he wasn't just someone brought in to "fulfil a remit" as you say, he was a key former of the policy, and a hawkish one at that.

Quite what your fixation with slam-door stock has to do with this, I've no idea. Many of the communities deprived of rail services were full of people who never used the trains, and in those circumstances, if the line is losing money hand over fist, what other decision can reasonably be made? I think the Basic Railway concept was a good one and it saved a few marginal routes. It could possibly have saved more if it had come earlier, but many of those would have been stays of execution at best. Many, many of the lines closed during the Beeching era had never even repaid the costs of their construction.

With regard to the slam door thing, I just find it fascinating that someone can complain bitterly about the moquette on one hand, yet on the other, be silent when the track is torn up. I find destroying vital public infrastructure on the basis of unproven assumptions, far less justifiable than building rolling stock to a tried and tested design.

I work in a community that has thousands of people who never use trains. It's called Leeds, and I wouldn't call that an excuse for running down the railway. You say a little further up that Beeching was trying to stem massive losses - he should have been championing the basic railway.

Retaining expensive infrastructure for the few occasions when that happens is just not a viable option. The railway is not a theme-park for enthusiasts. I know profit isn't everything, but the subsidy for the network is already bigger than a lot of people can stomach, and having back-up routes for everything that under normal circumstances would just cart fresh air about is a luxury we can't afford.

According to The Steyning Line by James Buckman, there were enough people using the route for even the BRB to have doubts about closure. Infact some thought at the time that the decision to list the line for closure led to a small decline in numbers during the mid 1960's.
 

yorksrob

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Ironically, one of the worst legacies of Beeching is that people are now far too scared to close basket-case railways and stations. I'd say there's a fair bit we should probably be looking at - the decision to throw two million quid at rebuilding Breich, when closing it was the obvious things to do, is one of the most egregious wastes of taxpayers' money I've ever seen.

Actually, I think that's one of the best legacies of Beeching. I wouldn't particularly trust a Government or you to stand up for my interests as a railway user when deciding whether a line should close. Do you have any lines in mind ?


Beeching is a convenient bogeyman for people to get angry with, because he's so closely associated with closures. Never mind that all he actually did was get a bit more methodical about things that had been going on haphazardly for years. He probably saved a few lines in the process.

If he did save any, it was accidentally, not by choice. He fundamentally believed in a smaller network, by hook or by crook.
 

yorksrob

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The odd thing is, I've known about the second part of Beeching's report since I was about eight. I had a very odd upbringing, it would seem.

Ironically, when someone does admit to having heard of the 1965 report, they generally only speak of the map of 'routes selected for development', and claim that everything else was to be closed. The report says nothing of the sort! Ironically, even some of the routes that Beeching recommended for development (Woodhead and Glenfarg to name two) have since been closed.

I did read it once. What stood out was the example of the lines across the Pennines, however not the part about Woodhead (that's already been done to death) but the selection of the Hebden Bridge route over the Diggle line.

It strikes me as all rather pointless as it implies all these saved maintenance costs by selecting the Hebden line, yet as this was presumably "not a prelude to the closure" of the Diggle line, you would still have had to maintain it anyway. Given the population along both routes, its hard to imagine that anyone in their right mind would have sanctioned the closure of either (and that's before we remember that Diggle ended up as the main route anyway).

The whole thing also seemed too obsessed with freight, and not enough consideration of local rail needs.
 

Journeyman

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If he did save any, it was accidentally, not by choice. He fundamentally believed in a smaller network, by hook or by crook.

All the evidence suggests he took a long, dispassionate and much-needed look at the railway, found it was a mess, and proposed a solution. Yes, he came to believe in a smaller network. I happen to think he was right.

His research spawned Freightliner and InterCity, two of BR's great modern successes.
 

Journeyman

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The whole thing also seemed too obsessed with freight, and not enough consideration of local rail needs.

That's because BR's traditional goods-yard-at-every-station setup was making absolutely colossal losses, and it needed to be dealt with.
 

yorksrob

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All the evidence suggests he took a long, dispassionate and much-needed look at the railway, found it was a mess, and proposed a solution. Yes, he came to believe in a smaller network. I happen to think he was right.

His research spawned Freightliner and InterCity, two of BR's great modern successes.

I'm still intrigued to know what lines you think we should be "looking at", particularly as you think there's a "fair bit".
 

Journeyman

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If you were already measuring something a different way, why go to the trouble of changing it ? I think one could make an excuse for the urgency of cutting without investigating whether those assumptions actually held true for 1962 or 1964, but by 1966 and 1968 it was getting tired. It doesn't matter whether you, I, Dr Beeching or Mystic Meg think that those are reasonable assumptions. At some point, someone should have investigated whether they were true or not.

Things get changed all the time. They may have been changed because the new method helped measure something that wasn't measured before. Bear in mind that in the sixties, if you wanted specific detail on how many people used something, you actually had to go out and count them, which in most cases was nigh-on impossible.

I think you're making many of your assumptions and criticisms with the benefit of hindsight. Yes, a long-term view wasn't taken, but that's partly because most long-term predictions would have turned out to be wrong anyway, and the railway didn't have that luxury - it was close to bankruptcy.

And it is frustrating that these threads are always titled "Beeching this" or "Beeching that", when it would be far more satisfying to have a thread about "the closure programme 1962-71" as this was a policy that was supported by several Governments and at least a generation of senior railway management. Beeching wasn't responsible for all of it, although he wasn't just someone brought in to "fulfil a remit" as you say, he was a key former of the policy, and a hawkish one at that.

I agree, his name tends to be used as a convenient shorthand, and it was much bigger than just him. However, I disagree with your view that he went in with a pre-formed agenda. His brief was to work out which parts of the railway were losing money, and to come up with a plan for turning that around. Given what he had to work with, and his lack of a crystal ball, I'd say he made a good stab of it, and any subsequent failure wasn't through malice or incompetence or a whole range of other things - life is just unpredictable. Many of the closures were justified, and without them, the situation would have got much worse very quickly.

With regard to the slam door thing, I just find it fascinating that someone can complain bitterly about the moquette on one hand, yet on the other, be silent when the track is torn up. I find destroying vital public infrastructure on the basis of unproven assumptions, far less justifiable than building rolling stock to a tried and tested design.

Oh, for goodness sake. My opinion on your beloved EPBs is completely irrelevant here. You can argue until you're blue in the face, it makes no difference - by the 1960s the rail network was not fit for purpose, having largely retained its Victorian configuration, and it was far, far too big and far too expensive to run. There's evidence for that in spades.

I work in a community that has thousands of people who never use trains. It's called Leeds, and I wouldn't call that an excuse for running down the railway. You say a little further up that Beeching was trying to stem massive losses - he should have been championing the basic railway.

He championed the railway, full stop. He worked out what it was good at, and what it shouldn't be doing in a rapidly-changing world. He showed that InterCity and commuter trains were effective and generated plenty of money, and channelled investment in improving them. He showed that changing the methods of freight handling could rapidly improve economics. He finally streamlined the network and removed a load of struggling secondary and duplicate routes that were never really needed in the first place, and only built in the highly competitive Victorian era.
 

Journeyman

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I'm still intrigued to know what lines you think we should be "looking at", particularly as you think there's a "fair bit".

I'd close all the one-train-a-week Parliamentary stations for a start. Most of them would never attract decent levels of custom even with a proper service, and even a really basic station with no staff costs about £50k a year to run.
 

coppercapped

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An alternative view on Beeching was written by the relatively recently deceased "master" railwayman - Dick Hardy , a fine traction engineer and ace manager as far as handling staff of all grades was concerned. He was switched onto the General Management role at Kings Cross and Liverpool - ending up at the BRB on a senior management trainee role. He was the ultimate do-er and frankly stated that at his busiest times he never had a budget to worry about - it was all "performance and operations".

He wrote a book on Beeching about 1983 or 4 - entitled "Beeching - Champion of the railway" - very well worth a read as it sort of clears his name , and delves in the man's not unreasonable stance as a manager. No one could ever be expected to be liked for doing his job , but he had a go at it. Warts and all.

For my own views , people can never let go of the Woodhead and Great Central closures.

Both had outlived their purposes in my view - Woodhead would have been a godsend in WW2 when huge coal flows went over the Pennines - and the GC , frankly, should never have been built.

Woodhead went once the coal traffic vanished , (and the equipment was up for renewal) and the GC was on the way out for much of the same reasons - declining coal flows to the South East and the ability to transfer the residual traffic (which was not much frankly) to parallel routes , a process started by Fiennes and the inventor of MGC (R T Munns) from the early 1950's. They - being very solid "traffic" railway managers could see the writing on the wall.....
I have that book - and very good it is too.
 

coppercapped

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If you were already measuring something a different way, why go to the trouble of changing it ? I think one could make an excuse for the urgency of cutting without investigating whether those assumptions actually held true for 1962 or 1964, but by 1966 and 1968 it was getting tired. It doesn't matter whether you, I, Dr Beeching or Mystic Meg think that those are reasonable assumptions. At some point, someone should have investigated whether they were true or not.

And it is frustrating that these threads are always titled "Beeching this" or "Beeching that", when it would be far more satisfying to have a thread about "the closure programme 1962-71" as this was a policy that was supported by several Governments and at least a generation of senior railway management. Beeching wasn't responsible for all of it, although he wasn't just someone brought in to "fulfil a remit" as you say, he was a key former of the policy, and a hawkish one at that.
Oh for <insert deity of choice>'s sake...
  • Between 1923 and 1939 (16 years) the 'Big 4' closed 1,300 miles of passenger railway
  • Between 1948 and 1962 (14 years) BR closed 3,318 miles of railway
  • Between 1962 and 1972 (10 years) BR closed just over 4,000 miles of railway.
  • Since 1972 (46 years) closures have, except for one or two minor lines and stations, effectively stopped. There has never been such a long period of stability.
More miles of railway were closed prior to the Beeching Report 1 than after its publication.

Get it into your head that by 1962 the railways were broke.
 

tbtc

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any sort of passenger accounting which doesn't take account of incoming traffic, must surely set alarm bells ringing for anyone who wishes to use statistics to understand the what is going on

It makes a lot of sense.

If people in 1960s Normanton go from Normanton to Whitby on holiday once a year then, if they close the Whitby branch the Normanton people might still travel to a holiday destination by train (to Blackpool, Cleethorpes, Morecambe, Skegness etc).

If they close the line through Normanton then Normanton people are unlikely to use the train to go on holiday by train.

So, it makes sense to allocate the Normanton to Whitby revenue to Normanton (as outgoing traffic) rather than Whitby (as incoming traffic).

Then there are those untried assumptions - people would railhead to a nearer station, people will go another route, people will catch a bus instead

It's a bit confusing.

When someone is suggesting reopening a line, it seems common to overhype the catchment areas by counting lots of other towns/villages - e.g. an Okehampton - Tavistock line doesn't just serve those two relatively small places because apparently we should be including the huge catchment area of Devon villages (spread over a large age).

But when it comes to closing routes, you believe that people won't "railhead" at a station outside of the town/village they live in (but if you open a new station then people from other towns will flock to it)?

Ironically, one of the worst legacies of Beeching is that people are now far too scared to close basket-case railways and stations. I'd say there's a fair bit we should probably be looking at - the decision to throw two million quid at rebuilding Breich, when closing it was the obvious things to do, is one of the most egregious wastes of taxpayers' money I've ever seen

It's ridiculous that we are spending millions of pounds on Breich station - crazy.

But the same people who take a "money is no limit" approach to every sacred passenger are generally the ones who complain that privatisation is to blame for the ever increasing subsidies required!

BR would have let lots of stations and some routes wither away if it were allowed to continue. But privatisation means we have benchmark service levels, committed to for years at a time and then nobody dares reduce them at subsequent franchise - bar a couple of stations on the WCML around Stoke/Stafford there's been very few stations threatened with closure or downgraded to parliamentary status. If BR were still around (and free to tinker with fares/ service levels without the same accountability/ scrutiny) then they'd have wielded the knife much more ruthlessly (if the S&C was on their radar in the 1980s then I doubt some branches would still be operated by a nationalised operator in 2018!

Privatisation means it's a lot harder to reshape the network because the option of sneakily downgrading services/stations is no longer an option - maybe ironically it's saved the kind of poorly used stations/lines that it's biggest critics most admire.

most people in the sixties lived fairly close to where they worked, and long-distance commuting was much less common than it is now. That's why I can forgive him for closures like the Waverley Route. The Borders Railway has been very successful since it reopened, but only because the economy of the area it serves has transformed completely over the last fifty years. In 1968, you could probably count the number of daily commuters from Galashiels to Edinburgh on the fingers of one hand.

True - something that is hard for some people to appreciate from a modern perspective - in the '60s there were still manufacturing jobs in the Borders (before Pringle moved overseas) - if you lived there then you didn't need to leave the Borders on a regular basis - the idea of commuting all the way to Edinburgh would have been for the very rich.

There's very, very few Beeching-era closures that I think were serious errors of judgement. Of the two you mention that weren't on his hit list, I think Woodhead was sensible, and Glenfarg rather foolish, as it's lumbered Scotland with much longer and slower journeys north of Edinburgh ever since.

Woodhead had it's function whilst the long/slow/heavy freight from Wath/Tinsley to Lancashire was essential. Once that market left, the passenger market was never going to be enough to keep a second line from South Yorkshire to Manchester open - it didn't serve anywhere particularly large.

Glenfarg is a tricky one. It's a faster route from Edinburgh to Perth/ Inverness but Perth and Inverness aren't particularly large places (both smaller than Kirkcaldy IIRC). CityLink have generally abandoned central Perth (preferring the P&R on the outskirts) because the place isn't actually that big.

Running Edinburgh - Perth - Dundee would therefore serve smaller places than running the current route through Fife.

If you were to open a section of line alongside the M90 (today) then I think the bigger priority would be the section from Inverkeithing to Halbeath - speeding up journeys from Edinburgh to Glenrothes/ Leuchars/ Dundee/ Aberdeen by running through Cowdenbeath instead of Kirkcaldy - that'd need significantly less infrastructure than the route through Glenfarg (which only really serves Kinross/Milnathort).

A bigger "cheap" priority for Edinburgh - Perth would probably just be to double track sections of line from Ladybank to Bridge Of Earn (and maybe a crossover at the north of Ladybank so that Perth - Edinburgh trains can use the *southbound* platform!).

unfortunately logic and cold hard data won't deter the romantic idealists and the conspiracy theorists from continuing to peddle their nonsense

I fear you are right - there's this idea of Beeching as this hapless bloke travelling the country only on the wettest Winter days, managing to avoid "Market Day" in every town he visited, having the worst luck, or being part of a conspiracy involving Marples and some shadowy agenda.

But you won't change their minds - it's like the Attack Of The Unsinkable Rubber Ducks - their faith in the 1960s routes is unshakable.

For my own views , people can never let go of the Woodhead and Great Central closures.

Both had outlived their purposes in my view - Woodhead would have been a godsend in WW2 when huge coal flows went over the Pennines - and the GC , frankly, should never have been built.

Woodhead went once the coal traffic vanished , (and the equipment was up for renewal) and the GC was on the way out for much of the same reasons - declining coal flows to the South East and the ability to transfer the residual traffic (which was not much frankly) to parallel routes , a process started by Fiennes and the inventor of MGC (R T Munns) from the early 1950's. They - being very solid "traffic" railway managers could see the writing on the wall.....

Good points.

Most lines had a purpose when they opened, but that doesn't mean they still had a purpose fifty years ago and certainly not that they would have much of a purpose in 2018.

But, if this Forum had "likes", you know that you'd get a lot more likes saying something nostalgic like "they should abandon HS2 and re-open the GC instead" rather than trying to take a rational approach to the network.

He championed the railway, full stop. He worked out what it was good at, and what it shouldn't be doing in a rapidly-changing world. He showed that InterCity and commuter trains were effective and generated plenty of money, and channelled investment in improving them. He showed that changing the methods of freight handling could rapidly improve economics. He finally streamlined the network and removed a load of struggling secondary and duplicate routes that were never really needed in the first place, and only built in the highly competitive Victorian era.

This, this, a thousand times this!
 

yorksrob

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Things get changed all the time. They may have been changed because the new method helped measure something that wasn't measured before. Bear in mind that in the sixties, if you wanted specific detail on how many people used something, you actually had to go out and count them, which in most cases was nigh-on impossible.

I think you're making many of your assumptions and criticisms with the benefit of hindsight. Yes, a long-term view wasn't taken, but that's partly because most long-term predictions would have turned out to be wrong anyway, and the railway didn't have that luxury - it was close to bankruptcy.

I agree, his name tends to be used as a convenient shorthand, and it was much bigger than just him. However, I disagree with your view that he went in with a pre-formed agenda. His brief was to work out which parts of the railway were losing money, and to come up with a plan for turning that around. Given what he had to work with, and his lack of a crystal ball, I'd say he made a good stab of it, and any subsequent failure wasn't through malice or incompetence or a whole range of other things - life is just unpredictable. Many of the closures were justified, and without them, the situation would have got much worse very quickly.

Well, he seemed to have formed very strong views when he was on the Stedeford Committee. This was before he'd taken on any role at BR, so I'm sceptical that he would have had much access to data in order to undertake an in depth study on which to base these views.

If he'd have taken an open view on how to reduce losses, the closure programme might not have been so damaging.

He championed the railway, full stop. He worked out what it was good at, and what it shouldn't be doing in a rapidly-changing world. He showed that InterCity and commuter trains were effective and generated plenty of money, and channelled investment in improving them. He showed that changing the methods of freight handling could rapidly improve economics. He finally streamlined the network and removed a load of struggling secondary and duplicate routes that were never really needed in the first place, and only built in the highly competitive Victorian era.

It's great saying InterCity routes and some freight flows make money (incidentally, he didn't show that commuter routes made money, because they didn't tend to), but what's the point for the country and passengers if you haven't any plan for the vast bulk of the regional railway ?

It's like his theoretical musings as to whether one should develop the Diggle or the Hebden Bridge route through the Pennines - its detatched from reality because in the real world you need both.
 

yorksrob

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It makes a lot of sense.

If people in 1960s Normanton go from Normanton to Whitby on holiday once a year then, if they close the Whitby branch the Normanton people might still travel to a holiday destination by train (to Blackpool, Cleethorpes, Morecambe, Skegness etc).

If they close the line through Normanton then Normanton people are unlikely to use the train to go on holiday by train.

So, it makes sense to allocate the Normanton to Whitby revenue to Normanton (as outgoing traffic) rather than Whitby (as incoming traffic).

A very dangerous assumption.

You can allocate Normanton to Whitby tickets to Normanton, and if the traveller is going on holiday, they may well go somewhere else by train instead. Net result, no reduction in revenue. If, however they are going to visit Aunty Flo in Whitby, they are not going to go somewhere else by train, so that is lost revenue. Similarly, if they like Goth weekends, they're unlikely to go to Blackpool, net result more lost revenue.

It's a bit confusing.

When someone is suggesting reopening a line, it seems common to overhype the catchment areas by counting lots of other towns/villages - e.g. an Okehampton - Tavistock line doesn't just serve those two relatively small places because apparently we should be including the huge catchment area of Devon villages (spread over a large age).

But when it comes to closing routes, you believe that people won't "railhead" at a station outside of the town/village they live in (but if you open a new station then people from other towns will flock to it)?

A little consideration of social history and human nature may prove enlightening.

If you're a public transport dependant passenger who's used to an established train service within walking distance, you're not likely to react well to having your lifeline suddenly taken away from you. You're more likely to make a major lifestyle change and switch to driving/retire/move house etc.

If, on the other hand, you're already a remotely living motorist, you're probably more likely to railhead to a parkway station on the off-chance. You will be used to travelling longer distances to access services.

It's a well known fact that humans dislike loss more than they seek gain. Added to that, the fact that roads were clearer and the motor car was a more fashionable lifestyle choice in the 60's, it's not hard to see how railheading might not have taken off then in the circumstances of closure than it does now.

It's ridiculous that we are spending millions of pounds on Breich station - crazy.

But the same people who take a "money is no limit" approach to every sacred passenger are generally the ones who complain that privatisation is to blame for the ever increasing subsidies required!

BR would have let lots of stations and some routes wither away if it were allowed to continue. But privatisation means we have benchmark service levels, committed to for years at a time and then nobody dares reduce them at subsequent franchise - bar a couple of stations on the WCML around Stoke/Stafford there's been very few stations threatened with closure or downgraded to parliamentary status. If BR were still around (and free to tinker with fares/ service levels without the same accountability/ scrutiny) then they'd have wielded the knife much more ruthlessly (if the S&C was on their radar in the 1980s then I doubt some branches would still be operated by a nationalised operator in 2018!

Privatisation means it's a lot harder to reshape the network because the option of sneakily downgrading services/stations is no longer an option - maybe ironically it's saved the kind of poorly used stations/lines that it's biggest critics most admire.

I'm not so sure we'd suddenly have had a lot of closures. I have a suspicion that the closures might have continued to dry up after the unsuccessful attempts to close Settle- Carlisle. At the very least, I'd hope that Whitby might have a service that was fit for purpose !
 

yorksrob

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Oh for <insert deity of choice>'s sake...
  • Between 1923 and 1939 (16 years) the 'Big 4' closed 1,300 miles of passenger railway
  • Between 1948 and 1962 (14 years) BR closed 3,318 miles of railway
  • Between 1962 and 1972 (10 years) BR closed just over 4,000 miles of railway.
  • Since 1972 (46 years) closures have, except for one or two minor lines and stations, effectively stopped. There has never been such a long period of stability.
More miles of railway were closed prior to the Beeching Report 1 than after its publication.

Get it into your head that by 1962 the railways were broke.

If more miles of route were closed before 1962, does it not surprise you that those closures made absolutely no difference to the railway being broke ? Do you not think it might have been time to try something different ?
 

yorksrob

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Perhaps you lot ought to start a supergroup.

You could be called The Acolytes, and your first hit could be "where have all the railways gone", followed by a cover version of "road to nowhere".
 

Journeyman

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If more miles of route were closed before 1962, does it not surprise you that those closures made absolutely no difference to the railway being broke ? Do you not think it might have been time to try something different ?

They must have made some difference. The railways made a profit until 1952.
 

yorksrob

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They must have made some difference. The railways made a profit until 1952.

Whatever it was, it must have been subject to diminishing returns because as closures accelerated, the defecit increased.

It also illustrates that the railway was already pruning and rationalising itself to a large extent. I can't help but think that maybe local and regional managers at that time were taking a more nuanced and holistic approach to whether a line should stay, and were rather better at making those judgements than Beeching, and the ideological imperative to slash as many route miles as possible that he engendered. If the railway was already contracting according to local needs, was there any need for a 'Reshaping' report at all ?

In my view, probably the greatest tragedy of the disastrous closure programme from 1962 onwards is that BR was extremely good at rationalising routes and controlling costs, but it's managers only seemed to be motivated to do so after a line had been offered for closure and rejected. Think of the Marshlink and East Suffolk. Why weren't these measures undertaken for other routes with a view to making them viable before closure sought, rather than begrudgingly in the few cases where it had been rejected.

It seems to me that with a fairly small change in emphasis on policy, we could have had a railway genuinely preparing itself for the twentieth century, rather than spiralling into decline.
 

edwin_m

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Beeching may have had some justification in assuming that people would use buses instead of trains, considering that bus services and ridership were at around their all-time peak in the 1960s. But despite both being run by the state there seemed to be no attempt to create the sort of inter-modal co-ordination seen in the countries where public transport really works at proving an alternative to the car. This might have resulted in some rail links remaining open with buses feeding in passengers. Conversely some lines that didn't close, in areas of very low population and zero congestion, might have been replaced by express buses throughout.

Instead, more people driving created traffic congestion, made the bus services less attractive and contributed to a vicious circle of decline. There were some half-hearted rail replacement bus services but they didn't last very long.
 

Journeyman

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It also illustrates that the railway was already pruning and rationalising itself to a large extent. I can't help but think that maybe local and regional managers at that time were taking a more nuanced and holistic approach to whether a line should stay, and were rather better at making those judgements than Beeching, and the ideological imperative to slash as many route miles as possible that he engendered. If the railway was already contracting according to local needs, was there any need for a 'Reshaping' report at all ?

While some of that is true, I think BR made multiple failures to get to grips with its problems and resolve them in its first fifteen years, simply kicking the can down the road until the situation got so bad it could no longer be ignored. One of those problems was utterly failing to adopt any form of network thinking. The retention of regions with a large degree of autonomy created excessive waste and continued the rather ridiculous practice of competitive behaviour, and trains terminating on regional boundaries, rather than running through to more useful destinations. A classic case in point was the Eastern Region's Great Central and the London Midland Region's Midland Main Lines both chasing an ever-dwindling pool of traffic to pretty much all the same destinations. It was only when the GC was (rather more sensibly) transferred to the London Midland Region that it could be seen for what it was - a rather pointless and expensive duplicate route that was not carrying anywhere near enough traffic to justify its existence.

No-one took a strategic overview of this stuff, and that's why the Southern's Withered Arm continued to pointlessly cart fresh air about in the West Country for years, in competition with ex-GWR routes, again to almost all the same destinations. It's only after Beeching came along that a sensible rationalisation of a lot of these routes and stations took place. Continued local management was consistently wasting resources running services that didn't need to be operated. Why the hell was the Western Region providing freight depots in Birkenhead until the late sixties, when the LMR was providing duplicate facilities in the same town?!?

In my view, probably the greatest tragedy of the disastrous closure programme from 1962 onwards is that BR was extremely good at rationalising routes and controlling costs, but it's managers only seemed to be motivated to do so after a line had been offered for closure and rejected. Think of the Marshlink and East Suffolk. Why weren't these measures undertaken for other routes with a view to making them viable before closure sought, rather than begrudgingly in the few cases where it had been rejected.

It seems to me that with a fairly small change in emphasis on policy, we could have had a railway genuinely preparing itself for the twentieth century, rather than spiralling into decline.

Attempts were made to cut staffing levels and rationalise infrastructure very early on, but met with extremely fierce union resistance that BR failed to sufficiently stand up against. As a result, they were very limited in what they could do, and union opposition to even the smallest changes in working practices throughout the fifties and sixties probably doomed quite a few lines by making it seriously difficult to cut costs.
 

Journeyman

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Instead, more people driving created traffic congestion, made the bus services less attractive and contributed to a vicious circle of decline. There were some half-hearted rail replacement bus services but they didn't last very long.

Some of them have been surprisingly long-lasting. The X95 from Edinburgh to Carlisle was introduced to replace Waverley Line services in 1969. It actually still runs, having gone through several different operators in its time.
 

ac6000cw

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Some of them have been surprisingly long-lasting. The X95 from Edinburgh to Carlisle was introduced to replace Waverley Line services in 1969. It actually still runs, having gone through several different operators in its time.

The current Oxford-Bedford-Cambridge X5 is also a direct descendant of the original rail replacement service (as far as I'm aware). Plus some new ones have been added more recently - the Peterborough-Wisbech-Kings Lynn(-Swaffham-Dereham-Norwich) X1 service is shown on the railway journey planner/departure boards and is effectively the equivalent of the old M&GN route to Norwich.
 

yorksrob

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While some of that is true, I think BR made multiple failures to get to grips with its problems and resolve them in its first fifteen years, simply kicking the can down the road until the situation got so bad it could no longer be ignored. One of those problems was utterly failing to adopt any form of network thinking. The retention of regions with a large degree of autonomy created excessive waste and continued the rather ridiculous practice of competitive behaviour, and trains terminating on regional boundaries, rather than running through to more useful destinations. A classic case in point was the Eastern Region's Great Central and the London Midland Region's Midland Main Lines both chasing an ever-dwindling pool of traffic to pretty much all the same destinations. It was only when the GC was (rather more sensibly) transferred to the London Midland Region that it could be seen for what it was - a rather pointless and expensive duplicate route that was not carrying anywhere near enough traffic to justify its existence.

No-one took a strategic overview of this stuff, and that's why the Southern's Withered Arm continued to pointlessly cart fresh air about in the West Country for years, in competition with ex-GWR routes, again to almost all the same destinations. It's only after Beeching came along that a sensible rationalisation of a lot of these routes and stations took place. Continued local management was consistently wasting resources running services that didn't need to be operated. Why the hell was the Western Region providing freight depots in Birkenhead until the late sixties, when the LMR was providing duplicate facilities in the same town?!?



Attempts were made to cut staffing levels and rationalise infrastructure very early on, but met with extremely fierce union resistance that BR failed to sufficiently stand up against. As a result, they were very limited in what they could do, and union opposition to even the smallest changes in working practices throughout the fifties and sixties probably doomed quite a few lines by making it seriously difficult to cut costs.

In terms of duplication, rationalisation was perhaps justified in some cases and not in others. The loss of the "withered arm" for example seems to have left Okehampton and Tavistoock stranded without a passenger service, something people have tried to reverse ever since. The continued interruptions of the mainline merely serve to make this closure the disaster that keeps on giving.

Similarly the loss of services from the mid-Sussex towns to Brighton ended up destroying transport links between many areas.

In terms of Union involvement, this may have been true, however its also true that figures such as Sidney Weighell and Ray Buckton were aware of the clear and present danger the closure programme posed during the 70's, so they may have been more chance of compromise once the cuts started to bite.
 
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Journeyman

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In terms of duplication, rationalisation was perhaps justified in some cases and not in others. The loss of the "withered arm" for example seems to have left Okehampton and Tavistoock stranded without a passenger service,

...because too few people used the trains to make them viable.

something people have tried to reverse ever since.

...and haven't succeeded because it's still not viable.

The continued interruptions of the mainline merely serve to make this closure the disaster that keeps on giving.

There might be a justification for a more weatherproof inland route, given how much traffic the coastal route now carries, but for much of the last fifty years, that justification hasn't been there.

Similarly the loss of services from the mid-Sussex towns to Brighton ended up destroying transport links between many areas

...that no-one used.
 

edwin_m

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Some of them have been surprisingly long-lasting. The X95 from Edinburgh to Carlisle was introduced to replace Waverley Line services in 1969. It actually still runs, having gone through several different operators in its time.
The current Oxford-Bedford-Cambridge X5 is also a direct descendant of the original rail replacement service (as far as I'm aware). Plus some new ones have been added more recently - the Peterborough-Wisbech-Kings Lynn(-Swaffham-Dereham-Norwich) X1 service is shown on the railway journey planner/departure boards and is effectively the equivalent of the old M&GN route to Norwich.
I'd argue that these show that a "rail replacement" bus can be viable if it's not just rail replacement but also aims to serve the wider travel market while keeping some integration with the remaining rail network. An express bus is viable at much lower passenger flows than train service. It would be good to have these fully integrated in terms of through ticketing, Delay Repay etc.
 

Indigo Soup

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With hindsight, closing Woodhead was rather silly and has screwed things up for Transpennine services.
Woodhead was always a freight, specifically bulk coal, route, with a few passenger services slotted in. On the Yorkshire side, passenger trains from Manchester didn't really have anywhere to go after Sheffield, and there isn't really anything in between, so it made sense to remove the passenger services to fit in more coal in the 1960s.

When the coal traffic went away, the line closed as it was no longer needed. The Hope Valley route suits passenger traffic better.
 

LOL The Irony

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Woodhead was always a freight, specifically bulk coal, route, with a few passenger services slotted in. On the Yorkshire side, passenger trains from Manchester didn't really have anywhere to go after Sheffield, and there isn't really anything in between, so it made sense to remove the passenger services to fit in more coal in the 1960s.

When the coal traffic went away, the line closed as it was no longer needed. The Hope Valley route suits passenger traffic better.
I agree which is why I said "with hindsight".
 

Journeyman

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I have to disagree. With hindsight, closing Woodhead was rather silly and has screwed things up for Transpennine services.

The case for closing Woodhead was sound, and the case for reopening it is dreadful. It's only nostalgia for the old days that keeps bringing it up. The line has cult status among enthusiasts that it doesn't really deserve.

The closed section passes through an uninhabited wilderness with no traffic-generating potential. The line ran into Sheffield Victoria, which was isolated from all other routes by the time the line closed, making onward journeys inconvenient. There was, and remains, plenty of spare capacity between Manchester and Sheffield. The line is now much more congested at the Manchester end than it was before. You'd have to get trains into Sheffield Midland, which would involve attempting to squeeze a railway into a built-up area. You'd have to build yet another new tunnel at Woodhead, which would be prohibitively expensive.

The line closed as its equipment and locomotives were life-expired, and the freight traffic it carried pretty much disappeared completely. There's no demand for that traffic again.

The only reason everyone loves Woodhead so much was the 76s. They've gone. They're not coming back. If Woodhead reopened, it would have the same types of trains you get everywhere else.
 
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