Beeching's success story

[exile]

• If the modernisation plan didn't achieve its aims - i.e. making the railway profitable, then neither did the closure programme.

• The modernisation plan money wasn't tipped down a hole. The efficient railway of the 80's and beyond, relied on a lot of the kit built during the investment plan. Yes, some of it could have been better spent, but the idea that the railway could have continued on any basis at all, let alone commercial without the majority of investments in electrification, traction, rolling stock and signalling etc is ludicrous.

• Your statistics do illustrate how intertwined with the economy the fortunes of the railway were. Gives a good idea of why simply cutting route miles didn't make the railway profitable.

Not at all. Both motor and air transport were becoming more fashionable at the time, in comparison to rail and bus transport. Personal transport within the country and foreign holidays abroad both ate into rails traditional passenger market. To deny this is simply untrue.

If rail passenger usage fell from 1953 to 1980 then stabilised, that represents a notable change in fortune for the railway. Clearly a more stable passenger base makes planning and investment easier, as the investments during that time prove. That stabilisation of passenger usage relied on a stable network.



Surely Beeching would have inherited even more of a "museum" if BR hadn't been electrifying lines and building rolling stock beforehand ("tipping money down a whole" as you succinctly put it). Whizzy marketing and business re-organisations can get you so far, but ultimately you need kit as well.

I also don't buy this assertion that BR had time to write lists and reports and go through closure processes, but somehow didn't have time investigate costs and savings for one single line that could be reproduced elsewhere. Imagine how much more useful "Reshaping of British Railways" would have been if, as part of the Market Weighton worked example, a concerted effort to reduce the identified costs of the route had been made and used to develop a blueprint that could be used for similar marginal passenger services ?

The Beeching report was sadly lacking in detailed statistics - the same report today would have been accompanied by hundreds of spreadsheets showing the finances of individual lines and stations. Although of course since the TOCs are privately owned, maybe not!

 

[yorksrob]

The Beeching report was sadly lacking in detailed statistics - the same report today would have been accompanied by hundreds of spreadsheets showing the finances of individual lines and stations. Although of course since the TOCs are privately owned, maybe not!

Indeed, although I wouldn't want to see another one to find out !

 

[coppercapped]

The Beeching report was sadly lacking in detailed statistics - the same report today would have been accompanied by hundreds of spreadsheets showing the finances of individual lines and stations. Although of course since the TOCs are privately owned, maybe not!

That is the whole point! Until Beeching carried out his traffic studies, there were no detailed statistics. There had been attempts at traffic costing starting in the mid-1950s and the workshops knew to a penny how much heavy overhauls cost but the Beeching traffic studies were the most comprehensive commercial data that existed at the time.

 

[ChiefPlanner]

There is so much emotion regarding Beeching that any solid analysis is difficult to get. He was obviously asked to take a "strategic" view on the network and operations / markets etc- which was done and accepted. He was not entirely without sympathy for both railway staff and users in the sense that his suggestions were often tempered with comments on the need to plan change as well as possible. Course this means nothing if you were say a driver at Brecon or a Station Master at Streathpeffer (to choose 2 random towns)

What did emerge was a better sense of costs and revenues - it seems that the Big 4 had only a loose sense of both - top down figures at best - though the GWR had set up a Branch Line Committee as far back as around 1930 to sort out economies and better ways of doing things more economically. (a few closures came out of this) - but much more could have been done to investigate whether some things were really worth operating (for example the cats cradle of LMS / LNER operations in the Scottish Central belt which even the odd ball Lance Ibbotson had picked up on as wasteful and inefficient in the 1940's) - as a production led railway , it seemed more important that things were kept going and "modern" substitution was the way forward. (note for example the much admired Somerset and Dorset which got new "standard" locomotives - including 9F's to operate basically the same timetable with the same rolling stock - much being prewar - or the one coach Uppingham line which went from a Victorian 3F tank engine to a new 2-6-4T for a one coach train which often ran empty as there were no passengers.

Fast forward to the likes of the previously mentioned Gerry Fiennes who had gasped this as far back as the early 1950's - and to quote him - made the Shenfield electrics into a profitable and efficient operation - ditto his recasting of the Norwich main line and his excellent work on rural and freight operations.

Post Beeching - several of the General Managers got to grips with the bigger "business" picture of the railway - Gerry F again got a grip on the Western Region and converted the loss to a profit - whilst rationalising - yet seeking out new flows and markets. The 1968 Transport Act "saved" the vulnerable railways with a PSO obligation and a "contract" price BY ROUTE - to enable services to continue. You could argue - much as many of the American Railroads did in the mid - 1950's , that the only way forward was to become more resource aware and to develop new markets.

 

[341o2]

The 1955 modernisation plan certainly was not a failure, although some of the new diesels were.

I recall a train delay due to both air and vacuum brake in use on coaching stock. some of the 31's had dual brake, some either or, and a locomotive was dispatched to ECS with the wrong braking system

The problem was one of finance. BR were under pressure to modernise, another issue was that in the old order, everyone started at the bottom of their department. for loco crews this meant initially cleaning and firelighting, dirty and often cold and wet as well. BR was having difficulty recruiting.

It was the dawning of realising how much it was going to cost to requip the entire network, main lines ok, but what about all those sleepy branch lines.....No, said the treasury, thecountry can't afford it, hence the railways responding to become profitably, they must act commercially like any othe business, eg the road haulier could choose goods which could be carried at a profit.

so we had Beeching. Geery Fiennes did not totally see eye to eye with him, p118 of I Tried to run a Railway denounced parts as being "crass folly".

This followed the staement that "branch lines do not run at a profit" True
"Branch lines can never run at a profit" False

Feinnes selected a line under threat, whereby costs to run the line were £0.25m. By rationalisation - DMU's single track, unstaffed halts, conductor guards, automated crossings, the cost could be brought down to £84,000

 

[Lankyline]

On the point of using statistics to evaluate line profitability, Beechings team started in 1961 to evaluate all lines and looked at the contribution of each station, depot and section of the line to the whole system, from that they drew up their list.

A lot of myths and half truths relate to these evaluations, eg assessments made at the wrong time of day when passenger numbers were at their lowest, train timings changed so connections were missed and / or service becomes inconvenient etc etc, whatever the outcome the closure of branch lines impacted on the freight business dramatically.

local rail carried freight could not compete with road transport through the reasons we know already, but Beeching's vision of long haul freight meant that the railways could not just compete they were streets ahead of road transport. We have to remember Britains economy at the time was still based on heavy industry, ie steel, ship building coal, manufacturing etc, through developing rail freight and let's not forget Sealink, freight haulage for both raw material and finished goods took off, (even though Aslef tried their best to scupper it)

 

[exile]

That is the whole point! Until Beeching carried out his traffic studies, there were no detailed statistics. There had been attempts at traffic costing starting in the mid-1950s and the workshops knew to a penny how much heavy overhauls cost but the Beeching traffic studies were the most comprehensive commercial data that existed at the time.

The report may have been BASED on detailed statistics, but they didn't appear in the report. For example - receipts per station only appeared in the rather badly drawn maps rather than as a table.
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The 1955 modernisation plan certainly was not a failure, although some of the new diesels were.

I recall a train delay due to both air and vacuum brake in use on coaching stock. some of the 31's had dual brake, some either or, and a locomotive was dispatched to ECS with the wrong braking system

The problem was one of finance. BR were under pressure to modernise, another issue was that in the old order, everyone started at the bottom of their department. for loco crews this meant initially cleaning and firelighting, dirty and often cold and wet as well. BR was having difficulty recruiting.

It was the dawning of realising how much it was going to cost to requip the entire network, main lines ok, but what about all those sleepy branch lines.....No, said the treasury, thecountry can't afford it, hence the railways responding to become profitably, they must act commercially like any othe business, eg the road haulier could choose goods which could be carried at a profit.

so we had Beeching. Geery Fiennes did not totally see eye to eye with him, p118 of I Tried to run a Railway denounced parts as being "crass folly".

This followed the staement that "branch lines do not run at a profit" True
"Branch lines can never run at a profit" False

Feinnes selected a line under threat, whereby costs to run the line were £0.25m. By rationalisation - DMU's single track, unstaffed halts, conductor guards, automated crossings, the cost could be brought down to £84,000

Had Beeching not produced his report, the branch lines would still have closed by stealth as urgent maintenance and repairs (eg to bridges) fell due, as had happened in the years up to 1962.

Many of the lines would still have lost money even with costs reduced by 2/3 - a few of them carried no more than a busload of passengers per day.

 

[edwin_m]

Many of the lines would still have lost money even with costs reduced by 2/3 - a few of them carried no more than a busload of passengers per day.

That's probably true. Fifty a day would make them "no hopers" that would have closed sooner or later under just about any imaginable railway policy. But for others with rather more patronage, cost reduction might have made enough difference to keep them open through the 1960s to join the "social railway", in which case they would likely still be open today.

 

[RT4038]

That's probably true. Fifty a day would make them "no hopers" that would have closed sooner or later under just about any imaginable railway policy. But for others with rather more patronage, cost reduction might have made enough difference to keep them open through the 1960s to join the "social railway", in which case they would likely still be open today.

But would they? Following the 1968 Transport Act, which established the grants for the 'social railway', there was a rash of line closures (Wareham-Swanage, Alton-Winchester, East Lincolnshire etc), the reason for which was to get the cost of the grants down. If more branch/secondary lines were open, more would have to be closed at that time. The country went through various financial crises during the 70s and could not afford the cost of these unremunerative railways.

 

[yorksrob]

But would they? Following the 1968 Transport Act, which established the grants for the 'social railway', there was a rash of line closures (Wareham-Swanage, Alton-Winchester, East Lincolnshire etc), the reason for which was to get the cost of the grants down. If more branch/secondary lines were open, more would have to be closed at that time. The country went through various financial crises during the 70s and could not afford the cost of these unremunerative railways.

I do suspect that this had a lot to do with the change from grants for individual social railways to a block grant to BR. This may have been a disastrous change.

 

[edwin_m]

But would they? Following the 1968 Transport Act, which established the grants for the 'social railway', there was a rash of line closures (Wareham-Swanage, Alton-Winchester, East Lincolnshire etc), the reason for which was to get the cost of the grants down. If more branch/secondary lines were open, more would have to be closed at that time. The country went through various financial crises during the 70s and could not afford the cost of these unremunerative railways.

Interesting question. Were the lines closed post-Beeching "rationalised" first, or did they (like most of the earlier closures) still have buildings, track and signalling at the time of closure that could have been eliminated earlier to save cost?

If they could have held on until the 1974 oil crisis they would most likely still be there today. There were very few closures after that, as more people realised the value of the surviving network.

 

[RT4038]

Interesting question. Were the lines closed post-Beeching "rationalised" first, or did they (like most of the earlier closures) still have buildings, track and signalling at the time of closure that could have been eliminated earlier to save cost?

If they could have held on until the 1974 oil crisis they would most likely still be there today. There were very few closures after that, as more people realised the value of the surviving network.

A bit of both I think. Wareham-Swanage and Alton-Winchester had pretty much been rationalised, whereas the East Lincs. lines had lots of manual level crossings (and the priority for capital expenditure was on improving the lines carrying the most traffic, not avoiding closure of secondary routes).

I think it is this aspect of the cost of 'rationalising/modernising' that it is frequently forgotten by the critics of Beeching - no doubt capital was limited, so do you spend it ensuring the profitable routes remain that way (electrification, line upgrades, signalling, level crossing elimination/mechanisation, ticketing, developing HSTs etc) or on 'rationalising' (automatic level crossings, colour signalling etc) little used secondary routes thereby reducing their losses. I know which way I would have gone if faced with this quandary in the 60s.

 

[yorksrob]

A bit of both I think. Wareham-Swanage and Alton-Winchester had pretty much been rationalised, whereas the East Lincs. lines had lots of manual level crossings (and the priority for capital expenditure was on improving the lines carrying the most traffic, not avoiding closure of secondary routes).

I think it is this aspect of the cost of 'rationalising/modernising' that it is frequently forgotten by the critics of Beeching - no doubt capital was limited, so do you spend it ensuring the profitable routes remain that way (electrification, line upgrades, signalling, level crossing elimination/mechanisation, ticketing, developing HSTs etc) or on 'rationalising' (automatic level crossings, colour signalling etc) little used secondary routes thereby reducing their losses. I know which way I would have gone if faced with this quandary in the 60s.

It makes it even more of a waste to then close routes such as Winchester - Alton and Yarmouth - Lowestoft on which money had already been spent rationalising them.

 

[simonw]

It makes it even more of a waste to then close routes such as Winchester - Alton and Yarmouth - Lowestoft on which money had already been spent rationalising them.

Money spent on rationalisation is a 'sunk cost' and is irrelevant in the decision whether to keep a line open or close it.

 

[yorksrob]

Money spent on rationalisation is a 'sunk cost' and is irrelevant in the decision whether to keep a line open or close it.

It's still a waste I'm afraid.

 

[simonw]

It's still a waste I'm afraid.

So having spent money rationalising the railway and found that it continued to lose money then it should have continued to remain open?

I think the expression you are looking for is throwing good money after bad.

 

[RT4038]

It's still a waste I'm afraid.

British Railways had started 'rationalising' lines before the Beeching cuts, but I think the real impetus came following some closure refusals generally on political grounds. The Government had to seen to be reviewing the closure cases ( and refusing some to maintain faith in the system), and the Railway had to be seen minimising their costs.

Both the examples (Yarmouth-Lowestoft and Wareham-Swanage) required little or no capital expenditure in order to convert them into a long siding. If this had turned them into profitable services, then they would not have been re-proposed some years later after the initial Beeching cuts dust had settled.

A real waste would have been Capital spent on rationalisation/modernisation (such as Automatic level crossings and Central signalling) and then a closure proposal later when the line was still found to be a basket case. I do not think there were really many cases of this happening. I suspect that BR management had a greater idea of the immediate prospects for their business than hindsight gives them credit for.
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Money spent on rationalisation is a 'sunk cost' and is irrelevant in the decision whether to keep a line open or close it.

You are right, but it is certainly a factor in deciding whether to rationalise/modernise or close without doing any of this work.

 

[yorksrob]

So having spent money rationalising the railway and found that it continued to lose money then it should have continued to remain open?

I think the expression you are looking for is throwing good money after bad.

In the case of Swanage and Yarmouth - Lowestoft clearly yes. Government should have done its bit and refused closure.

One should consider Yarmouth - Lowestoft in the context of Lowestoft - Ipswich further South. I suspect that that line didn't make a profit either, but Government refused closure for whatever reason and look where we are now. Certainly not "good money after bad" but important local transport link. Infact Lowestoft - Yarmouth would probably be even busier than the Ipswich route now.

 

[simonw]

You are right, but it is certainly a factor in deciding whether to rationalise/modernise or close without doing any of this work.

Agreed, if the cost of rationalisation was not expected to be outweighed by the reduction in operating costs then there would have been little point in carrying it out.
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In the case of Swanage and Yarmouth - Lowestoft clearly yes. Government should have done its bit and refused closure.

One should consider Yarmouth - Lowestoft in the context of Lowestoft - Ipswich further South. I suspect that that line didn't make a profit either, but Government refused closure for whatever reason and look where we are now. Certainly not "good money after bad" but important local transport link. Infact Lowestoft - Yarmouth would probably be even busier than the Ipswich route now.

I think the Swanage line as a preserved line is rather more a contributor to the local economy than it would be had BR not closed it.

Similarly for the West Sommerset.

 

[yorksrob]

Agreed, if the cost of rationalisation was not expected to be outweighed by the reduction in operating costs then there would have been little point in carrying it out.
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I think the Swanage line as a preserved line is rather more a contributor to the local economy than it would be had BR not closed it.

Similarly for the West Sommerset.

That's the tail wagging the dog. The preserved line grew out of the original opposition to closure, although I notice that Beeching's fan club often cite the presence of preserved railways as some sort of a justification for the policy failures and bad decisions of the time (even though there were already plenty of closed railways around the country which really were basket cases that could have as easily been preserved, without replacing important transport links).

I think the point is that Beeching is held up as some sort of genius because of freightliner, however, because freight flows tend to come and go, you need a robust passenger network which is extensive enough to accommodate those flows when they do come and go, so Beeching's policy of closing secondary routes would have ultimately kyboshed the railways ability to carry the sort of bulk freight flows it is suited to.

 

[simonw]

That's the tail wagging the dog. The preserved line grew out of the original opposition to closure, although I notice that Beeching's fan club often cite the presence of preserved railways as some sort of a justification for the policy failures and bad decisions of the time (even though there were already plenty of closed railways around the country which really were basket cases that could have as easily been preserved, without replacing important transport links).

I think the point is that Beeching is held up as fsome sort of genius because of freightliner, however, because freight flows tend to come and go, you need a robust passenger network which is extensive enough to accommodate those flows when they do come and go, so Beeching's policy of closing secondary routes would have ultimately kyboshed the railways ability to carry the sort of bulk freight flows it is suited to.

The Swanage line and most other preserved lines were hardly important transport links.

Had the railways not been state owned they would have closed a lot earlier.

Language like fan club or making out people see Beeching as a genius does nothing to strengthen your argument.

 

[yorksrob]

The Swanage line and most other preserved lines were hardly important transport links.

Had the railways not been state owned they would have closed a lot earlier.

Language like fan club or making out people see Beeching as a genius does nothing to strengthen your argument.

The residents of Swanage in 1970 would have begged to differ.

I note that you haven't contradicted the content of my argument, regardless of the language used.

 

[simonw]

The residents of Swanage in 1970 would have begged to differ.

I note that you haven't contradicted the content of my argument, regardless of the language used.

And how many of them actually used the line? Answer: not enough to make it viable or anywhere near. Of course people complain about a closure, most I would wager were not regular users of the line.

As to keeping secondary routes open just in case at some point in the future as a freight route, that is not a rational decision.

 

[yorksrob]

And how many of them actually used the line? Answer: not enough to make it viable or anywhere near. Of course people complain about a closure, most I would wager were not regular users of the line.

As to keeping secondary routes open just in case at some point in the future as a freight route, that is not a rational decision.

In that case, say goodbye to bulk railfreight. Freight flows aren't permanent so if you want a freight railway, you have to develop the regional passenger network as well I'm afraid.

 

[RT4038]

In that case, say goodbye to bulk railfreight. Freight flows aren't permanent so if you want a freight railway, you have to develop the regional passenger network as well I'm afraid.

I'm not sure this statement is correct - the USA has a freight railway, without a regional passenger network

 

[ChiefPlanner]

Freight (and I speak from some experience) paid avoidable costs on main lines and paid full costs on freight only lines - which were managed appropriately)

I suspect the early 1970's closures - (like Swanage / Alton - Winchester and Alston) - were due to a tightening of the overall finances on BR in a difficult era of high inflation and so on - the cash pot of the 1968 Transport Act was under severe pressure (as was the whole UK economy in those dark days) - and I suspect the spotlight on BR was to keep most of the system going with a few cuts to keep Government happy.

 

[yorksrob]

I'm not sure this statement is correct - the USA has a freight railway, without a regional passenger network

Fair point, although I think the statement is true for the UK railway. We are a small island and we need the bulk flows off the road. However, I doubt very much freight alone would be able to support the freight network as it is, and I also doubt that the public would be prepared to subsidise it for freight alone. The regional passenger railway is symbiotic with the freight network.

I've mentioned in a previous post the changing freight flows on the Settle Carlisle - which have all depended on the passenger service (they wouldn't have existed at all if the line had closed).

I would also remind people of the lines between Manchester and Sheffield. The Hope Valley was originally listed for closure as the freight flows were based around the Woodhead line. Yet nowadays the freight flows from Peak forest are based on the Hope Valley. Given that the line through Bakewell was also closed, would these have been able to be accommodated without it if the Hope Valley passenger service hadn't been retained and the line saved ?
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Freight (and I speak from some experience) paid avoidable costs on main lines and paid full costs on freight only lines - which were managed appropriately)

I suppose my point is, would freight have survived if it had had to pay for the full costs of the secondary routes that weren't designated 'for development' if they had closed to passengers, or would it have been the case (as I suspect) that we would have a lot fewer bulk freight flows fitting in with the much reduced passenger network.

 

[ChiefPlanner]

I suppose my point is, would freight have survived if it had had to pay for the full costs of the secondary routes that weren't designated 'for development' if they had closed to passengers, or would it have been the case (as I suspect) that we would have a lot fewer bulk freight flows fitting in with the much reduced passenger network.


Freight caused a good few lines to be retained at "low cost" - think of the Aberdare line , the Vale of Glamorgan and Ebbw Vale (to quote 3 Welsh examples) - which were succesfully reborne as thriving passenger operations. Other examples such as Hemyock or perhaps Carmarthen - Lampeter - (Aberaeron) died and were lifted when he base traffic of milk was handed over to road and local processing plants and there were no other freight options or passenger opportunities.From about 1980 - freight was expected to run at "no subsidy" - and this influenced BR policy.

 

[Senex]

Freight (and I speak from some experience) paid avoidable costs on main lines and paid full costs on freight only lines - which were managed appropriately).

Surely that did not happen until the Sole User charging system for the use of infrastructure came in. Wasn't that about the middle of the 80s, and wasn't it connected with the introduction of the Business Sectors?

 

[edwin_m]

Fair point, although I think the statement is true for the UK railway. We are a small island and we need the bulk flows off the road. However, I doubt very much freight alone would be able to support the freight network as it is, and I also doubt that the public would be prepared to subsidise it for freight alone. The regional passenger railway is symbiotic with the freight network.

I largely agree, although the places that generate and receive bulk freight tend to do so for a period of decades so there is a reasonable predictability about what the flows might be.

I would also remind people of the lines between Manchester and Sheffield. The Hope Valley was originally listed for closure as the freight flows were based around the Woodhead line. Yet nowadays the freight flows from Peak forest are based on the Hope Valley. Given that the line through Bakewell was also closed, would these have been able to be accommodated without it if the Hope Valley passenger service hadn't been retained and the line saved ?

Wasn't the choice between these two routes influenced by freight as well as passenger issues? All the freight on Woodhead was end-to-end and could therefore be diverted to Hope Valley, but the Hope Valley freight originated at places along the route so would have been lost if it closed. Combined with the Hope Valley serving some intermediate population and Woodhead passing through empty countryside, I believe the correct decision was made in that case.