Incident at Newark Northgate? (22 January)

[trentside]

The poor gentleman has been named as John Wright, of Doncaster.

From the Lincolnshire Echo:

A Network Rail worker hit by a train at Newark Northgate in January has now died.

John Wright was struck by East Coast Trains' 10.08am service from London King's Cross to Newark at 11.39am on Wednesday January 22.

The 49-year-old, from Doncaster, suffered severe head injuries and was airlifted to hospital.

It has now been confirmed by both Network Rail and the British Transport Police that he passed away in hospital on Friday.

Phil Verster, route managing director for Network Rail, said: "We are all deeply saddened by this news and our thoughts and prayers are with our colleague's friends and family."

British Transport Police say they are still investigating the incident, which they are continuing to treat as non-suspicious.

A spokesman said: "I can confirm that a member of Network Rail staff, who was struck by a train at Newark Northgate railway station on Wednesday, 22 January 2014, has sadly died of his injuries in hospital.

“BTP officers attended Newark Northgate railway station alongside colleagues from Nottinghamshire Police and East Midlands Ambulance Service after receiving a report at 11.39am of a man being struck by a train.

"The man, 49-year-old John Wright from Doncaster, was a member of Network Rail’s on-track team.

"He sustained serious head injuries and was taken by air ambulance to the Queens Medical Centre in Nottingham.

“BTP was informed by hospital staff that the man had died at 5.35pm on Friday, 31 January.

“Our thoughts remain with Mr Wright's family at this difficult time and we have specially trained officers providing them support.

"Detectives are currently working to establish the circumstances surrounding this incident, which is not being treated as suspicious.

Thoughts with his family, friends and colleagues.

 

[PG]

Sad sad news :cry: , thoughts with his family, friends, co-workers and the driver involved.

 

[91103eastcoast]

This is a terrible tragedy, and my thoughts are with his family and colleagues at this difficult time.

 

[westcoaster]

Poor soul, rest in peace brother.

 

[Zoidberg]

The RAIB has announced that it's investigating. There's a bit more detail of the incident than I've read so far. From http://www.raib.gov.uk/publications/current_investigations_register/140122_newark_northgate.cfm

RAIB is investigating an accident involving a track worker who was carrying out lookout duties near Newark Northgate station. The accident occurred at about 11:40 hrs on 22 January 2014. The track worker was struck by a passenger train and suffered fatal injuries.

The track worker was part of a gang of three engaged in the inspection of two sets of points to the south of the station. The train, a passenger service from King's Cross, was approaching from the south at around 26 mph (42 km/h) and was heading into platform 3 as scheduled.

 

[ainsworth74]

The report into this has now been published:

Summary

At around 11:34 hrs on 22 January 2014, a track worker was struck by a passenger train as it approached Newark North Gate station. He was part of a team of three carrying out ultrasonic inspection of two sets of points at Newark South Junction and was acting in the role of lookout. The accident happened around 70 metres south of the platforms at the station.

A few minutes before the accident, the lookout and two colleagues arrived at the yard adjacent to the tracks in a van. One colleague was in charge of carrying out the inspections and the other, the ‘controller of site safety’ (COSS), was in overall charge of the safety of the team. They had planned to carry out the inspections on lines that were still open to traffic in accordance with a pre-planned safe system of work. All three had many years of relevant experience in their respective roles and were familiar with the work site.

Upon arrival at the yard, the lookout and tester proceeded to the track to start the inspection work; the COSS remained in the van. Shortly after they had started the inspection, the 10:08 hrs London to Newark North Gate passenger service approached. It was due to stop in platform 3, which required it to negotiate two sets of crossovers. The train blew a warning horn and the two staff on site acknowledged the warning and moved to the nominated place of safety. However, just before the train moved onto the first crossover, the lookout turned to face away from the train, walked towards the station and then out of the position of safety. He moved to a position close to where he had been before the train approached, most probably to check for trains approaching in the opposite direction, having decided that the approaching train was proceeding straight into platform 1. Although the train braked and blew a second warning horn, the lookout did not turn to face the train until it was too late for him to take evasive action.

Recommendations

As a consequence of this accident, RAIB has made two recommendations and identified a learning point. The recommendations are addressed to Network Rail and relate to:

• improving work site safety discipline and vigilance, especially for teams doing routine work with which they are familiar; and
• improving the implementation of Network Rail’s procedures for planning safe systems of work so that the method of working that is chosen minimises the risk to track workers so far as is reasonably practicable, as intended by the procedure.

The learning point relates to improving the implementation of Network Rail’s competence assurance process by providing training and sufficient working time to enable front line managers to implement the associated procedures as intended by Network Rail.

See full report here.

 

[stuartl]

The COSS is to be prosecuted

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-nottinghamshire-31517336

 

[dysonsphere]

A former rail worker is being prosecuted after one of his colleagues was struck and killed by a train.

John Wright, from Doncaster, died in hospital nine days after the accident near Newark North Gate station in Nottinghamshire on 22 January 2014.

The Office of Rail Regulation (ORR) is prosecuting the "controller of site safety" (COSS) for allegedly breaching health and safety law.

A preliminary hearing is due to be held at Nottingham Crown Court in March.

The ORR said in a statement: "This was a devastating incident and our thoughts are with the family and friends of John Wright."
The train that hit John Wright John Wright was hit by train which had come from London King's Cross

Mr Wright, 49, had worked on the railway for about 30 years, and was in a team of three people inspecting points on the day of the accident.

He was working as the "lookout" while a colleague was the "tester".

The third member of the team, the controller of site safety, was in overall charge of safety.

Mr Wright was struck at about 11:34 GMT by a passenger train from London King's Cross.

He was airlifted to a hospital in Nottingham but died on 31 January.

Just posted text its a bit odd from the published still from train camera he appears to be in a safe position.

 

[Crossover]

Just posted text its a bit odd from the published still from train camera he appears to be in a safe position.

From the report:

However, just before the train moved onto the first crossover, the lookout turned to face away from the train, walked towards the station and then out of the position of safety. He moved to a position close to where he had been before the train approached, most probably to check for trains approaching in the opposite direction, having decided that the approaching train was proceeding straight into platform 1

I'm guessing that the use of platform 3 was unusual for this service and the lookout thought that platform 3 would remain a position of safety

 

[Searle]

Just posted text its a bit odd from the published still from train camera he appears to be in a safe position.

From the RAIB report:

However, just before the train moved onto the first crossover, the lookout turned to face away from the train, walked towards the station and then out of the position of safety. He moved to a position close to where he had been before the train approached, most probably to check for trains approaching in the opposite direction, having decided that the approaching train was proceeding straight into platform 1. Although the train braked and blew a second warning horn, the lookout did not turn to face the train until it was too late for him to take evasive action.

So I assume just after the picture was taken, he moved onto the tracks.

 

[Crossover]

From the RAIB report:



So I assume just after the picture was taken, he moved onto the tracks.

If anyone actually reads the report, this is basically what you will find

 

[CallySleeper]

I'm guessing that the use of platform 3 was unusual for this service and the lookout thought that platform 3 would remain a position of safety

This should absolutely not be the case. Platform three is used by terminating EC services every two hours off peak, starting with the 11.35 ex KGX arrival. This has been the case IIRC since May 2011.

Since platform two is inaccessible from the south, and since the lookout and tester were reportedly very familiar with the area, and thus train pattern, I'm very surprised that he, being a lookout, walked onto the loop. Especially since the tester knew it was terminating in platform three and told the lookout (paragraph 32)

 

[dysonsphere]

Sorry read the report yesterday meant it seemed odd he moved from safty to danger, still dont see how it can be the fault of the COSS

 

[AndyPJG]

Sorry read the report yesterday meant it seemed odd he moved from safty to danger, still dont see how it can be the fault of the COSS

My understanding of the report is that the CoSS was still in the van and not overseeing a safe system of work in accordance with NR standards (paras 48 & 65-67).

 

[dysonsphere]

My understanding of the report is that the CoSS was still in the van and not overseeing a safe system of work in accordance with NR standards (paras 48 & 65-67).

Yes I saw that doubt if the COSS could have done much in the short time there was. After all the deceased was the lookout as far as I can see.

 

[ainsworth74]

But I think the point is that he should have been supervising the situation ensuring there was a safe system of work. Even though if he had been there he couldn't have done anything he should still have been properly on site not in a van. That would be my understanding at least.

 

[garethslee]

The COSS is to be prosecuted

From the BBC article.
"A former rail worker is being prosecuted after one of his colleagues was struck and killed by a train."

Former? Has he been fired?

 

[CallySleeper]

But I think the point is that he should have been supervising the situation ensuring there was a safe system of work. Even though if he had been there he couldn't have done anything he should still have been properly on site not in a van. That would be my understanding at least.

I agree with all of this. The COSS acted against the rules, and there may well have been little he could do, though I still believe that the lookout, being a lookout at least should have been observant and attentive to his own safety and the path of the train.

 

[edwin_m]

I agree with all of this. The COSS acted against the rules, and there may well have been little he could do, though I still believe that the lookout, being a lookout at least should have been observant and attentive to his own safety and the path of the train.

It says in the report that part of the COSS's responsibility is to stop anyone leaving the place of safety before it is safe to do so, and that had the COSS been present he might have been able to alert the lookout by shouting.

 

[AndyPJG]

From the BBC article.
"A former rail worker is being prosecuted after one of his colleagues was struck and killed by a train."

Former? Has he been fired?

Could be resigned, retired, retired on medical grounds etc. He had 36 years of experience as a track worker, so presumably 52+ years old.

 

[91104]

This should absolutely not be the case. Platform three is used by terminating EC services every two hours off peak, starting with the 11.35 ex KGX arrival. This has been the case IIRC since May 2011.

Since platform two is inaccessible from the south, and since the lookout and tester were reportedly very familiar with the area, and thus train pattern, I'm very surprised that he, being a lookout, walked onto the loop. Especially since the tester knew it was terminating in platform three and told the lookout (paragraph 32)

It is possible to enter platform 2 from the south and the line through platform 2 is bi directional if rarely used in the down direction and I started 1A00 05.35 to Kings Cross from there the other week which surprised me.