Only if every signal is fitted and the overlaps increased, as discussed above for the Sunderland line. The same applies in principle to Indusi as used in Germany, but they may use longer overlaps.
What I like about Indusi is the enforced slowdown at the distant or yellow, as opposed to than the 'acknowledge and carry on regardless' feature of our UK AWS. This ensures that once a warning is received and acknowledged, the train MUST slow down according to a predefined standard braking curve to a speed where the next transponder, at the overspeed position on final approach to the signal, is guaranteed to catch an out of control train and arrest it within the overlap, which is typically 200m, just as in Britain. Hence in Germany Indusi doesn't need the equivalent of our additional TPWS+ equipment at higher speed junctions, where regular OS and TS doesn't provide sufficient protection.
TPWS as generally fitted is reckoned to be about 60% as effective as ATP in terms of accident casualties prevented. Train stop on metros should be 100% effective (barring overspeeds or stop-and-proceed issues) because the overlaps are as long as the braking distance of the trains.
That figure seems reasonable for TPWS for the risks remaining for following train collisions, the uncontrolled risk of re-acceleration after passing unchecked through an overspeed trip*, and the non fail-safe nature of the system.
* re-acceration is prevented with Indusi where the train remembers it has passed an active overspeed magnet and continues to enforce a speed and braking constraint until a subsequent clear trainstop is passed or a timeout or reset has occurred.
Also whilst Indusi is not entirely fail-safe it is certainly more so than TPWS, more like our AWS in that respect, so a total trackside signalling power failure continues to give 'most restrictive' warnings and alarms that can stop trains. TPWS by contrast always requires trackside power to stop trains.
