Train Crash near Santiago de Compostela, Spain.

[Giugiaro]

Can the Spanish ASFA system warn of an approaching speed reduction, i.e., something like a permanent AWS magnet in the UK?

No. As I said before the ASFA only tells the driver the state of the next signal and only forces a complete stop if the train passes a signal at danger. There is no speed control nor speed indication.

The ASFA is a system made back in the 70's. The EBICAB 700, called CONVEL in Portugal, was implemented in the 80's/90's and has signal and speed indication, dead-man alarm, an overspeed alarm and a automatic speed controller. If EBICAB 700 was adopted in Spain back in the 90's not only it would made possible for Portuguese trains fitted with ConVel to travel safely in Spain but would also make things like this accident nearly impossible.

Lets hope that this accident forces the infrastructure administrator to implement the ERTMS system widely in Spain and make travelling safer. Again my feelings goes for the families of the perished passengers.

 

[rebmcr]

So doing some research (this was helpful), it seems that a 130 has the following consist, in BR terms:
DPM+TS+TS+TS+TS+TS+TS+TS+TS+TS+TS+TS+DPM
(using Trailer Standard for all the carriages is adequate here).

A 730 replaces the two Trailer cars adjacent to the Driving Pantograph Motor cars with what I'm going to call a Generating Motor:
DPM+GM+TS+TS+TS+TS+TS+TS+TS+TS+TS+GM+DPM
As you can see in this picture of two units working in multiple.

From the webcam footage of the tragedy, it seems to me that the leading GM car derails first (perhaps due to the weight of the diesel engine), uncouples from the DPM, and then drags the trailers along with it. Then the leading DPM derails by itself, having resisted the sideways forces for a small time longer.

The link in my first paragraph also states the the maximum speed when running in diesel mode is indeed 180km/h.
--- old post above --- --- new post below ---

Lets hope that this accident forces the infrastructure administrator to implement the ERTMS system widely in Spain and make travelling safer. Again my feelings goes for the families of the perished passengers.

Apparently ERTMS was already planned for when this line is converted to Standard Gauge.

 

[GB]

thats 2 serious transport related accidents in Europe recently, the last one being the Costa Concordia.

Costa Concordia was well over a year ago so not exactly recent and the French train accident was a lot more recent.

 

[YorkshireBear]

Is this near a crossover from the HS line under ETRMS (or similar) to a classic section? Could that contribute in a lack of concentration?

 

[Bungle73]

Costa Concordia was well over a year ago so not exactly recent and the French train accident was a lot more recent.

I'm not sure what point was trying to make with that comment anyway?

 

[YorkshireRider]

The tunnel mouth is just 100m beyond the large road bridge (Autostrada del Atlantico - Angrois Viaduct) at the back of the shot.

This is a tight and sudden curve following a long straight through multiple tunnels.

Even so, there is surely speed limit warnings on approach to bends like this (or is there in Spain?), also there were 2 drivers in the cab, both of them failed to realise the bend was approaching?? im guessing as in the UK there is hours and hours of route learning that goes into the job. I think there will be more to this.

 

[CC 72100]

Webcam like we have in this country for enthusiasts i believe.
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One driver is under investigation. BBC got quite a lot saying when he was rescued saying i hope no one died or it is all on me. So it is still hypothesis but..... also looking at the video the speed it came round that corner...

Well, the first paragraph of the El Pais article is this (I've bolded what the driver has said)

Uno de los maquinistas del tren Alvia que descarriló ayer en Santiago de Compostela quedó atrapado tras el accidente en la cabina del convoy. A través de la radio con la que se comunica con la estación, cuando aún no sabía siquiera si había fallecidos, hizo un relato de lo que acababa de suceder. Expresó que le dolía la espalda y las costillas y que no podía salir. “¡Somos humanos! ¡Somos humanos!”, repetía. “Espero que no haya muertos porque caerán sobre mi conciencia”. El conductor había dicho previamente, antes del siniestro, que iba muy rápido, a 190 kilómetros por hora; después habló de 200. Finalmente, al entrar en la curva, volvió a decir: "¡Voy a 190!", según explicaron ayer a EL PAÍS fuentes de la investigación.

Translating as "I hope there are no deaths as it will come under my conscience".... "I am (was) at 190".

Doesn't sound good at all. :cry:

 

[Giugiaro]

Here are two videos to compare the ASFA and the CONVEL EBICAB 700

Requires Spanish knowledge.


ASFA

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1UBCoLdQwg4


CONVEL

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oJviHQbhMuw

 

[neonison]

Is this near a crossover from the HS line under ETRMS (or similar) to a classic section? Could that contribute in a lack of concentration?

It is where the high speed line trails into the classic lines a about 2 km before Santiago station. This is the first of a series of tight curves leading into the station.

There is a clock in the footer of the video and a scale on Google Maps. These together suggest about 180 kph.

.

 

[bnm]

I have just read elsewhere that the line in question, prior to the curve where the train derailed, was fitted with the European Train Control System (ETCS), then the line switched to the older ASFA system.

Was the ETCS prior to the curve set up to control overspeed? Can the driver override the system? Was there a wrong-side failure?

http://zelo-street.blogspot.co.uk/2013/07/spanish-rail-crash-what-we-know.html

 

[Oliver]

The train in question is a RENFE Class 730 which is a dual-gauge, dual-voltage and hybrid powered train. It's a RENFE Class 130 that has the particularity of having two diesel-electric generator sets on the consist.

What's the maximum speed of a train of this type? I have seen lots of reference to it being a "high speed train", but are we talking about greater than 125mph/200kph?

 

[Zoidberg]

What's the maximum speed of a train of this type? I have seen lots of reference to it being a "high speed train", but are we talking about greater than 125mph/200kph?

From http://www.spanishrailwaysnews.com/noticias.asp?not=139

The new Alvia S-730 trains can reach 250 km/h on high-speed tracks and 220 km/h on electrified conventional tracks, while their top speed on non-electrified conventional tracks is 180 km/h.

 

[ReverendFozz]

Absolutely tragic, thoughts are with those affected and there families...

The Twitter Trolls using this as an argument against HS2 are just ****tish, it is not even 24 hours and people are using it for there ends, they should be ashamed of themselves

Sent from my HTC Wildfire S A510e using Tapatalk 2

 

[Xenophon PCDGS]

Radio 4 now say the death toll has risen to 80, with 141 injured with 36 of these classified as critical.

 

[rf_ioliver]

I have just read elsewhere that the line in question, prior to the curve where the train derailed, was fitted with the European Train Control System (ETCS), then the line switched to the older ASFA system.

Was the ETCS prior to the curve set up to control overspeed? Can the driver override the system? Was there a wrong-side failure?

http://zelo-street.blogspot.co.uk/2013/07/spanish-rail-crash-what-we-know.html

This is something I was wondering...this is the start of the Santiago-Ouerense high speed line...even taking signalling into consideration, surely the driver would have already been slowing down, or been much slower then he was.

The comment about the driver *knowing* he was speeding at such a degree are however very disturbing..

Looking at the video of the crash, it appears that something failed after the front locomotive. Does anyone here know more clearly how the Talgo bogies work, IIRC they are rather "strange" in being just a single axle balanced between two coaches? Please correct me if I'm wrong...

t.

Ian

 

[the sniper]

Obviously there's scope for a lot of things to have gone wrong here. At this stage we don't know whether it was something technical or down to the driver or whatever, but personally the thing that gets my attention is the 'one of the drivers' comment which keeps getting mentioned. So, two people were in the cab?

We all know here in the UK how cab access is highly controlled and driver distraction worried about. I'm certainly not saying that there shouldn't have been another driver in the cab, as that could be totally legitimate, but you have to imagine what went on in that cab will form a major part of the investigation.

The Europeans seem to have a more relaxed attitude towards cab access in general at the moment. It'll be interesting to see whether this crash requires/leads to any changes in that attitude.

Saying that, I know some passengers in this country think every train has two drivers, because they confuse the Guard for a second driver, so these reports may mean nothing at all...

EDIT: And just to say, what shocking footage, I've never seen anything like that. It'd be interesting to know whose footage it is and who released it. Looks like the camera is inside the railway boundary. I'd rather it wasn't 'out there' tbh, but this is just the modern way I suppose.

 

[Giugiaro]

[youtube]SqX_13cPk0M[/youtube]
[youtube]OF7krSxJ71A[/youtube]

There are two different variable gauge systems in Spain. CAF and Talgo. While watching this video, make sure you know which system is being examined:

[youtube]y8N7Ikw87tM[/youtube]

 

[Antman]

Obviously there's scope for a lot of things to have gone wrong here. At this stage we don't know whether it was something technical or down to the driver or whatever, but personally the thing that gets my attention is the 'one of the drivers' comment which keeps getting mentioned. So, two people were in the cab?

We all know here in the UK how cab access is highly controlled and driver distraction worried about. I'm certainly not saying that there shouldn't have been another driver in the cab, as that could be totally legitimate, but you have to imagine what went on in that cab will form a major part of the investigation.

The Europeans seem to have a more relaxed attitude towards cab access in general at the moment. It'll be interesting to see whether this crash requires/leads to any changes in that attitude.

Saying that, I know some passengers in this country think every train has two drivers, because they confuse the Guard for a second driver, so these reports may mean nothing at all...

I might be wrong but it seems to me that there is a fairly relaxed attitude to cab access here in the UK, indeed there was a thread on the subject recently.

 

[notadriver]

It isn't relaxed. What on earth gave you that idea ?

 

[Darandio]

I might be wrong but it seems to me that there is a fairly relaxed attitude to cab access here in the UK, indeed there was a thread on the subject recently.

That stated many times the complete opposite to a relaxed attitude!

 

[Zoidberg]

...

There are two different variable gauge systems in Spain. CAF and Talgo. While watching this video, make sure you know if you know which system is being examined:

...

Thanks very much for this post - very informative

 

[bnm]

Looking at the video of the crash, it appears that something failed after the front locomotive.

To my eyes it looks as if the generator car behind the lead vehicle is the first vehicle to leave the rails. This could possibly be due to a higher centre of gravity because of the heavy diesel engine in this vehicle.

 

[rebmcr]

The comment about the driver *knowing* he was speeding at such a degree are however very disturbing...

Reports say he knew he was doing 190kph, and that any deaths "would weigh on his conscience".

I can see 3 possibilities here:

• Wilful, criminally-insane/suicidal negligence. "I don't care, I'm going 190!". This would not fit well with the conscience remark.

• Faulty brakes. It seems like he might have mentioned that though, so probably not — unless there is an industrial cover-up.

• Incredibly late braking (either due to negligence, distraction, or unknown factors). "Oh ****, I'm going 190, we can't stop in time, no no no!" This unfortunately seems to fit best out of what we know.

If a secondman was indeed present, it further reduces the likelihood of the first bullet point.
If a secondman with limited knowledge of this road was present, then it fits with the third bullet point.
If the secondman was present AND had knowledge of the road, then either he/she was also distracted, or it was a brake failure — but then it's even more unlikely that we would not have heard about the brake failure.

Therefore it seems likely that either:
a) The driver was alone in the cab and was distracted, or
b) The driver and the secondman were in the cab, the driver was distracted (possibly by the secondman), and the secondman was unaware, or
c) The driver and the secondman were in the cab, and they were both distracted (possibly by each other).

 

[Antman]

It isn't relaxed. What on earth gave you that idea ?

The thread on here recently!

Somebody seems to think Spanish rules are relaxed because there was another driver in the cab.

Credit to Spanish firefighters who abandoned their strike action to attend the scene.

 

[D1009]

I am surprised the driver spoke or even was given the opportunity to speak to the media following the accident, was there a reporter on the train?

Also to those criticising RENFE for not having safety systems in place to prevent an accident such as this, we should remember that (as far as I know, and I'm willing to be corrected) the only systems in this country that would prevent a similar accident are ETCS and TASS. Not sure about ATP. Normal TPWS only prevents collisions resulting from signals passed at danger.

 

[158747]

TPWS also operates if a train approaches a permanent speed restriction too fast.

 

[68000]

AWS indications of speed restrictions were recommended and implemented after the 1969 Morpeth crash. TPWS is installed for speed restrictions across the network where the speed reduction is more than 30mph and have been since 2004

 

[Giugiaro]

I was thinking that same thing. AWS and TPWS don't have real time speed surveillance and control, which means that right now most trains in the UK are in the same situation as the Spanish trains under ASFA?

I need some explanation about the British ATP. What I came to know is that ATP monitories speed before a signal or speed restriction and if the driver fails to answer the warning or the train is going to fast to go past the signal at the target speed makes the train come to a full stop (?).

 

[68000]

I was thinking that same thing. AWS and TPWS don't have real time speed surveillance and control, which means that right now most trains in the UK are in the same situation as the Spanish trains under ASFA?

I need some explanation about the British ATP. What I came to know is that ATP monitories speed before a signal or speed restriction and if the driver fails to answer the warning or the train is going to fast to go past the signal at the target speed makes the train come to a full stop (?).

TPWS will apply the brakes automatically if a driver is heading too fast towards a 30mph difference speed restriction. This has activated hundreds of times across Britain since installed nearly 10 years ago

 

[D1009]

Thanks for correcting me, that development must have passed me by.