1) London is about 25% of the UK economy. Like it or not. The London Commuter area holds roughly the same % of Britain's population. HS1 and HS2 point towards London. And the issue is connecting HS1 and HS2. How daft to complain about the focus of discussion being on London.
2) The reason the 395s are not well supported is simple. They DON'T go where the traffic wants to go, yet. Partly because residential choices were made on the basis of place of employment and available transport, and these take longer to respond to new opportunities. And partly because St Pancras Kent Domestic is not an ideal terminal location for the service. If the service had a wider range of destinations available THROUGH a Euston-KingsX central station, you'd see demand rise appreciably. Even adding OOC would strengthen the market considerably. But this is all 10 years or so in the future. Looking at today's situation leads to myopia - which contributors here have in droves.
2a) There may arise a need to implement a Barking "International" station to provide connections to/from the Kent Javelins; likewise, a travelator link is likely to be needed to connect Stratford International to Stratford (City) to strengthen the effectiveness of this connection. You may well argue that this is NOT what HS1 is for. I argue that HS1 is another railway - a fast one - but just another railway, and its infrastructure should be optimised for Britain.
3) My HS London Central proposal, given the advances in tunnelling technology, probably no more expensive overall than the current HS2 plan to destroy a whole city block.
4) Overloading the OOC - HC London Central section? Unlikely before 2045-ish. But even so, if this approach was adopted, provision would be made to add a third running tunnel and possibly a fourth. OOC - Euston is a very short leg of a tunnelling-intensive new railway. Indeed, the cost of fitting out a station greatly exceeds the cost of providing the space for the tracks and platforms. Because a through station won't need as many platforms as a dead-end terminus, the fit out costs will be less - neutralising most cost differences.
5) The Davies Commission report will be significant in determining just how traffic demand pans out. In many ways, the ideal would have been to have this finalised before detailed HS2 planning was undertaken. I personally still don't think anything is set in concrete, especially not the London end of HS2. Just because Heathrow loses it Hub function, doesn't mean that there won't be charters, freight and non-interlining traffic. Perhaps I was being too restrictive when I mentioned only domestic traffic, sorry.
5a) Apples vs Apples please on airport issues. A 3rd runway at Heathrow is a patch-and-mend approach which will cost less than a new Hub, but only meet needs for a few years before further steps will become necessary. The estuarine Hub proposals combine a vast array of elements, and the total price tag would not be presented to the Treasury for payment. An awful lot of commercial investment would be needed, and it's the sort of utility infrastructure that pension funds prefer. Any on-land runways now have major complexities in terms of regional amenity as well as cost of acquisition. Any new Hub site (not enhancing an existing airport) would be at least as far from London as the estuarine proposals. London access would trigger similar issues to HS2, with similar compensation funding requirements. And the estuarine proposals have the advantage of being in some proximity to HS1.
The estuarine proposals have NO road access for the general public or passengers. An inland Hub would not be able to quarantine access, so would require substantial adaptation of the road network to suit.
That's all in the Davies boat at the moment. None of us (at least not on a railway discussion board) should presume to solve it or pre-empt its outcomes - though I'm sure aviation discussion boards are very lively with the issues even as I type.
6) This thread is about the link between HS1 and HS2, not about HS2 itself. The link is a section of railway in London, and my approach is to make that work for London as much as to see it work for HS2. Most of those posting have a clear Northern perspective on the matter.
6a) I stand corrected on the issue of 3 tracks vs 4 on the section of NLL affected. As a long-term proposition, this section will be a bottleneck for local passenger trains, through freight trains and HS trains. What is lacking is a coherent Freight rail strategy for London; and without that it's incumbent on those responsible to ensure that no steps are taken now that become an impediment to London's productivity in 10-15-20 years' time - a source of regret to the next generation.
6b) With a long-term Freight Rail Strategy for London, it will be known where traffic increases from Thamesmead will be routed, how and when the necessary infrastructure will be funded, the maximum freight traffic which will be allocated to the NLL, WLL, SLL and GOBLIN, provisions on the main lines outward from these orbitals to carry the freight and what strategic alternative routes will be built to absorb the overflow.
6c) Any freight strategy for London must also take into account the N-S electric spine and the E-W link projects.