Pacer flattens gates at Dereham

[hexagon789]

DMUs of that vintage don't have have parking brakes held off by electrical systems. If they did, and knowing the nature of 14x units, they would be a lot more unreliable and the failure of electrical supply to a parking brake when in service would lead to fires.

This incident happened with a class 144 MS vehicle. Similar to DMS vehicles they have two spring-actuated parking brakes on the non-driven axle that apply a total of four brake blocks to that axle.

Air pressure normally releases the parking brake - the air supply is from the main reservoir pipe that runs the length of the train. It releases the parking brake by acting on a diaphragm that opposes the force of the spring. Once the main res sir pressure rises to about 1.5 bar the parking brake begins to release. It's probably totally released just over 3 bar, I can't remember the pressure off the top of my head. Traction units are designed so that they can't be driven without sufficient main res air supply so this sort of parking brake is both as simple and reliable in operation as it can be and is also fail-safe.

The parking brakes can be manually released when required when no main res air supply is available by way of a 'ring pull' being operated to 'wind off' the spring on each parking brake. This is the only way such a vehicle could be moved on its own on or off a low loader for example.

Every vehicle of every 14x unit has the same system. I've never heard of one failing before.

Thanks for the technical details, wasn't sure if the brakes effectively locked on if the brake circuit was de-energised as per Westcode.

 

[Llama]

144s and other Westcode units' service brake 'locks on' (fully applies) when the brake circuit is de-energised. It is self-lapping and will even self-adjust for dynamic loads such as from empty to passengers loading full and standing (or vice versa) even if the unit is completely shut down and no drivers desk is energised. However that air as applied by the service brake will eventually bleed off fairly quickly once the unit's air supply is not being replenished by the engine-driven compressors. This usually happens in a matter of hours and is due to leaks etc. The design of the system ensures that the parking brake will be applied by the spring as air bleeds off - before the brake cylinder pressure runs out.

 

[Clarence Yard]

When I was at the Oak, I personally saw several vehicles off low-loaders onto the North Outgoing road. Seen a fair few being loaded there too! Although it was the contractors job to winch off, we always had a loco (usually an 08) positioned to shunt the vehicle away.

As these vehicles were always “swingers”, the 08 also acted as a set of blocks, just in case it ran away. You can scotch the vehicle after it is unloaded and screw on any brake, if it has one, if you are not moving it away immediately. If it was to be moved later, the 08 would usually retreat out the way after the vehicle was secured.

The RAIB (if they do investigate) will be looking at the railways risk assessment - I hope they weren’t just relying on “it was all the hauliers risk” - their mitigation measures (or lack of) for the runaway risk and how they were managing the nearby crossing during the unloading.

 

[Llama]

There's no way of screwing down a pacer vehicle if its parking brakes have been wound off. There is a parking brake application cock in the left hand intermediate cupboard on a 144 MS, but all that would do is vent the main res pipe pressure to the parking brakes and thus allow the parking brake springs to apply the brake - as long as the parking brake isn't wound off. And obviously if there's no main res pressure to vent then the parking brake is going to stay in whatever state it is in irrespective of the PBAC.

 

[hexagon789]

144s and other Westcode units' service brake 'locks on' (fully applies) when the brake circuit is de-energised. It is self-lapping and will even self-adjust for dynamic loads such as from empty to passengers loading full and standing (or vice versa) even if the unit is completely shut down and no drivers desk is energised. However that air as applied by the service brake will eventually bleed off fairly quickly once the unit's air supply is not being replenished by the engine-driven compressors. This usually happens in a matter of hours and is due to leaks etc. The design of the system ensures that the parking brake will be applied by the spring as air bleeds off - before the brake cylinder pressure runs out.

Thanks, you've confirmed that my understanding was correct then

 

[DustyBin]

DMUs of that vintage don't have have parking brakes held off by electrical systems. If they did, and knowing the nature of 14x units, they would be a lot more unreliable and the failure of electrical supply to a parking brake when in service would lead to fires.

This incident happened with a class 144 MS vehicle. Similar to DMS vehicles they have two spring-actuated parking brakes on the non-driven axle that apply a total of four brake blocks to that axle.

Air pressure normally releases the parking brake - the air supply is from the main reservoir pipe that runs the length of the train. It releases the parking brake by acting on a diaphragm that opposes the force of the spring. Once the main res sir pressure rises to about 1.5 bar the parking brake begins to release. It's probably totally released just over 3 bar, I can't remember the pressure off the top of my head. Traction units are designed so that they can't be driven without sufficient main res air supply so this sort of parking brake is both as simple and reliable in operation as it can be and is also fail-safe.

The parking brakes can be manually released when required when no main res air supply is available by way of a 'ring pull' being operated to 'wind off' the spring on each parking brake. This is the only way such a vehicle could be moved on its own on or off a low loader for example.

Every vehicle of every 14x unit has the same system. I've never heard of one failing before.

Interesting, thanks. It sounds more-or-less the same as the system you’ll find on modern HGVs and buses.

 

[2HAP]

Sorry, but that's for RAIB to say, not the railway, and while further information may have been requested, no decision on investigation has yet been made.

RAIB have said. Safety digest to be published.

[Withdrawn] Runaway at Dereham Station

Runaway at Dereham Station, Mid Norfolk Railway, 10 December 2020.

www.gov.uk

At around 15:52 hrs on 10 December 2020, a rail vehicle detached from a winch rope during unloading from a heavy haulage road trailer directly onto the railway. It ran away and collided with the gates of a nearby level crossing. The vehicle broke through the gates and came to rest over an open, public road.

 

[2HAP]

The RAIB have published their Safety Digest.

Runaway and near miss at Dereham station, Mid-Norfolk Railway, 10 December 2020

www.gov.uk

Around 15:52 hrs, a runaway rail vehicle narrowly avoided striking pedestrians and road traffic on Norfolk Road level crossing at Dereham station. The vehicle was the intermediate vehicle of a three-car Pacer diesel multiple unit that was being delivered to the station by road haulage. It ran away while a winch was being used to roll it off an inclined trailer onto a siding that led to the gated level crossing. The level crossing was open to road users at the time. No arrangements were in place to prevent the runaway vehicle reaching the level crossing.


This accident demonstrates the importance of:

• railway undertakings ensuring that when they contract out work:
  
  • any information and supervision needed to plan and safely carry out the work is made available
  • the specific risks arising are identified, and adequate mitigation measures put in place
• road haulage contractors, and others undertaking safety critical work on or near railway infrastructure, stopping work when the method statement does not cover the required tasks.

 

[Spartacus]

Can't say there's anything too surprising there, though the mechanics of the attachment (and subsequent detachment) of the winch cable makes interesting reading. Unloading facing a level crossing, with nothing to protect it, seemed remarkable as soon as I saw the location.

 

[BrianW]

Can't say there's anything too surprising there, though the mechanics of the attachment (and subsequent detachment) of the winch cable makes interesting reading. Unloading facing a level crossing, with nothing to protect it, seemed remarkable as soon as I saw the location.

Maybe not surprising, but shocking!

People could have been killed- it's only luck that they weren't.

 

[Taunton]

Even if it had gone to plan, it looks so tight a fit that when the vehicle was finally winched down from the truck it would almost be up against the crossing gates anyway. Should the gates not have been across while an unbraked rail vehicle was being moved so close? I wonder what they were going to do with it once unloaded and sat there unbraked.

Here's the unloading siding curving to the left; you can see where it is ballasted over where road vehicles manoeuvre. With space for the ramp as well, once off the rail vehicle must have been virtually on the points.

Norwich Rd - Google Maps

 

[BayPaul]

The heritage rail sector really does need to up its game. Incidents like this, the toilet on the South Devon Railway, and the signalling incident on the Romney, Hythe and Dymchurch will surely make the authorities start to look very closely at their operations and how competent they are to conduct their own risk assessments. As Taunton and Spartacus mentioned, a casual glance at this plan would have shown that stock unloaded at this site could easily have gone through the gate, and yet it was still used in this way with the crossing open. This would suggest an underlying lack of safety culture, as does effectively outsourcing all planning and supervision of the job to the haulage contractor, without even checking the plan. No doubt most heritage railways operate in a much more professional way, but they risk being tarred with the same brush if avoidable incidents with potentially extremely severe consequences keep happening.

 

[2HAP]

The heritage rail sector really does need to up its game. Incidents like this, the toilet on the South Devon Railway, and the signalling incident on the Romney, Hythe and Dymchurch will surely make the authorities start to look very closely at their operations and how competent they are to conduct their own risk assessments. As Taunton and Spartacus mentioned, a casual glance at this plan would have shown that stock unloaded at this site could easily have gone through the gate, and yet it was still used in this way with the crossing open. This would suggest an underlying lack of safety culture, as does effectively outsourcing all planning and supervision of the job to the haulage contractor, without even checking the plan. No doubt most heritage railways operate in a much more professional way, but they risk being tarred with the same brush if avoidable incidents with potentially extremely severe consequences keep happening.

The Great Central Railway has a particularly poor record. A collision in 2006 with no drug/aclohol screening post accident. A SPAD and derailment in 2013 and a runaway and collision in 2014.

 

[BrianW]

Even if it had gone to plan, it looks so tight a fit that when the vehicle was finally winched down from the truck it would almost be up against the crossing gates anyway. Should the gates not have been across while an unbraked rail vehicle was being moved so close? I wonder what they were going to do with it once unloaded and sat there unbraked.

Here's the unloading siding curving to the left; you can see where it is ballasted over where road vehicles manoeuvre. With space for the ramp as well, once off the rail vehicle must have been virtually on the points.

Norwich Rd - Google Maps

The heritage rail sector really does need to up its game. Incidents like this, the toilet on the South Devon Railway, and the signalling incident on the Romney, Hythe and Dymchurch will surely make the authorities start to look very closely at their operations and how competent they are to conduct their own risk assessments. As Taunton and Spartacus mentioned, a casual glance at this plan would have shown that stock unloaded at this site could easily have gone through the gate, and yet it was still used in this way with the crossing open. This would suggest an underlying lack of safety culture, as does effectively outsourcing all planning and supervision of the job to the haulage contractor, without even checking the plan. No doubt most heritage railways operate in a much more professional way, but they risk being tarred with the same brush if avoidable incidents with potentially extremely severe consequences keep happening.

The Great Central Railway has a particularly poor record. A collision in 2006 with no drug/aclohol screening post accident. A SPAD and derailment in 2013 and a runaway and collision in 2014.

Sadly these incidents feed the 'old gits playing trains' thoughts of some. Health & Safety and Risk Assessments have not 'gone mad'- they are to protect lives. We are all responsible, paid/ unpaid, part-time/ full/ volunteer ... 'I didn't think' doesn't cut it. And esp at 'this difficult time' when coal and diesel and rail are under serious 'review' and threat. I'm shocked that matters of life-and-death get so few postings while reopening Beeching closures get so many.

 

[BigB]

Sadly these incidents feed the 'old gits playing trains' thoughts of some. Health & Safety and Risk Assessments have not 'gone mad'- they are to protect lives. We are all responsible, paid/ unpaid, part-time/ full/ volunteer ... 'I didn't think' doesn't cut it. And esp at 'this difficult time' when coal and diesel and rail are under serious 'review' and threat. I'm shocked that matters of life-and-death get so few postings while reopening Beeching closures get so many.

I'm not sure it feeds into that at all - my reading is that the haulage contractor was responsible for the unloading, which is the usual way railways do this. If the linkage had not failed then the carriage could have been scotched in a controlled manner.
Normally scotches (and handbrake where applicable) are applied well before the winch is detached - you would never for example rely on gravity to hold a vehicle, and often we just run the shunter up to it and couple to that before the winch is removed.
It reads that the linkage failed as it was not a secure attachment, and that the contractor improvised as he did not see a plan for how this was to be done.

Having watched Allelys loading and unloading several times, control is passed to them until the item is on the truck or on the rails, and I wouldn't jump to blame the railway too quickly, as they may not have had access to the unloading plan on site either. If the agreement was to just park and scotch the carriage where it was unloaded, then move it the next day then this should have been acceptable.

 

[BayPaul]

I'm not sure it feeds into that at all - my reading is that the haulage contractor was responsible for the unloading, which is the usual way railways do this. If the linkage had not failed then the carriage could have been scotched in a controlled manner.
Normally scotches (and handbrake where applicable) are applied well before the winch is detached - you would never for example rely on gravity to hold a vehicle, and often we just run the shunter up to it and couple to that before the winch is removed.
It reads that the linkage failed as it was not a secure attachment, and that the contractor improvised as he did not see a plan for how this was to be done.

Having watched Allelys loading and unloading several times, control is passed to them until the item is on the truck or on the rails, and I wouldn't jump to blame the railway too quickly, as they may not have had access to the unloading plan on site either. If the agreement was to just park and scotch the carriage where it was unloaded, then move it the next day then this should have been acceptable.

I really don't think that a railway can just pass the buck like that though. Fine to get the contractor to make the detailed plans, but surely someone on the railway would want to check them, and equally, the railway presumably would have chosen that site for the transfer, which to my lay eyes looks ridiculously close to an open level crossing for a job of this nature.

 

[Taunton]

my reading is that the haulage contractor was responsible for the unloading ...

The "Nuffin' to do with me, mate" approach just doesn't work here. It's all happening on the railway, with the railway's selected contractors, and the railway is the one responsible for everything on their property - particularly their own rail vehicles running through their own gates!

If you buy a house from a housebuilder, it's all their responsibility too. They can't say "leak, mate - that was the subcontractor plumber, you'll have to sort it out with them".

 

[BrianW]

I'm not sure it feeds into that at all - my reading is that the haulage contractor was responsible for the unloading, which is the usual way railways do this. If the linkage had not failed then the carriage could have been scotched in a controlled manner.
Normally scotches (and handbrake where applicable) are applied well before the winch is detached - you would never for example rely on gravity to hold a vehicle, and often we just run the shunter up to it and couple to that before the winch is removed.
It reads that the linkage failed as it was not a secure attachment, and that the contractor improvised as he did not see a plan for how this was to be done.

Having watched Allelys loading and unloading several times, control is passed to them until the item is on the truck or on the rails, and I wouldn't jump to blame the railway too quickly, as they may not have had access to the unloading plan on site either. If the agreement was to just park and scotch the carriage where it was unloaded, then move it the next day then this should have been acceptable.

It really doesn't matter what WE think, unfortunately (or maybe fortunately?); it's what is done and not done, and what the public and its representatives think- MPs, Councillors, newspapers, 'gossip', RAIB, ORR, ...

I found this from 2016: https://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/heritage_railways

and this: the ORR Annual Health and safety Report 2019-20:

Home page | Office of Rail and Road

www.orr.gov.uk

Posts 38 and 43 from 2HAP refer to the RAIB report- which makes for disturbing reading.

Pages 45-53 of the ORR report relate specifically to heritage railways:
p46 refers to a 'wide range of risk management maturity';
p47, para 131- 'operators still need to increase their levels of vigilance, and particularly competence assurance'
p52, para 144- 'significant challenges must be addressed ... relating largely to reliance on an enthusiastic but largely voluntary workforce performing safety critical tasks profesionally.'

George Freeman, MP for Mid Norfolk, which includes Dereham, was a Minister of State for Transport in 2020.

And of course health and safety is everyone's responsibility.

 

[awsnews]

I'm not sure it feeds into that at all - my reading is that the haulage contractor was responsible for the unloading, which is the usual way railways do this. If the linkage had not failed then the carriage could have been scotched in a controlled manner.
Normally scotches (and handbrake where applicable) are applied well before the winch is detached - you would never for example rely on gravity to hold a vehicle, and often we just run the shunter up to it and couple to that before the winch is removed.
It reads that the linkage failed as it was not a secure attachment, and that the contractor improvised as he did not see a plan for how this was to be done.

Having watched Allelys loading and unloading several times, control is passed to them until the item is on the truck or on the rails, and I wouldn't jump to blame the railway too quickly, as they may not have had access to the unloading plan on site either. If the agreement was to just park and scotch the carriage where it was unloaded, then move it the next day then this should have been acceptable.

The HSE would not agree with that position. Any organisation employing sub contractors to do anything has a level of responsibility for the health and safety of those activities. If CDM regulations apply there are more onerous obligations to comply with.

 

[BigB]

At no point have I said the railway have no responsibility for activities on their property, clearly they do, the point was that this is not necessarily "the fault of old gits playing trains". The impact of the event was potentially greater because of a lack of awareness of the risks, but the cause of the incident is the failure of the method of fastening the carriage to the winch.
The area of competance for offloading a carriage is not necessarily the railway, though they should know what is happening and approve the work before it starts. Clearly at that location there was a potential for overrun if anything failed, and this should also include the winch failing - this is why for example you almost never lift loads over people. The fact that it was not mitigated for would 100% fall with the railway as the transport company may not necessarily know if there was gradient present or how far an item would before it could strike anything (though should be aware in their planning).

I don't know if in 20 years they have never requested the level crossing to be closed to traffic during unloading, and if the majority of unloading at this point was e.g. steam engines or braked items their processes - though not documented - may have been sufficient.

Do runaways happen on "the big railway" - yes they do, and the point I was trying to make is that in this instance it's not because people are playing at it, it seems there was an over-reliance on a specialist contractor doing their job.

 

[paul1609]

Out of interest does anybody know of any other heritage railway where the vehicle unloading area leads directly on to a running line and/ or to a level crossing?
Ours at the K &ESR leads on to a 600 yds long siding/ headshunt.

 

[alexl92]

Ordinarily in this situation would the railway have had a shunter on hand to move the coach once unloaded? Obviously the 144 centre car doesn't use a type of coupler that would be compatible with the railway's existing rolling stock so could that be a factor?

 

[Titfield]

HMRI (Her Majestys Rail Inspectorate) have already stated that they are going to play closer attention to Heritage Railways. At the HRA Annual Conference there has been a presentation by HMRI for at least the last 2 or 3 years emphasising the need for Safety Management Systems and Safe Systems of Working.
Having said that though, one of the issues on Heritage Railways seems to be the mind set "Not my job" "Not my responsibility" "Above my pay grade". The fact remains that safety is everybody's responsibility. Another issue imho is that many HRs use the former BR Rule Book from 19?? and one wonders if that is still the most appropriate rule book to be using. A serious incident could cause severe harm to the HR movement and effectively set it into terminal decline.

 

[Dunfanaghy Rd]

Just out of idle curiosity:
a) Who owns the unit in question, and
b) Who was the haulage contractor actually working for?
Pat