Active distortion of positions can be easily combatted using DGPS (differential Global Positioning System) technology - basically using GPS to plot the position of a fixed ground station, and then transmitting the position error to surrounding receivers so they can apply the same adjustment to their position. As this effectively renders selective availability pointless, the US has 'promised' that they will never again use it on GPS.
I don't think any nation would be likely to start to shut down systems that are absolutely safety critical to commercial aviation, and are virtually safety critical to merchant shipping as well, though ships do have more alternatives, especially in coastal waters, without giving at least enough notice to get aircraft out of the sky. It is difficult to envisage a Domesday scenario which requires all 3 systems to be shut down instantly - perhaps an indiscrimate firing of nuclear missiles by China, but I can't imagine they rely totally on foreign satellite navigation systems anyway.
Terrestrial DGPS is old school now. The UK and Ireland marine DGPS is being shut down by the General Lighthouse Authorities on 31 March 2022 - the equipment is life-expired and the accuracy available from GPS alone (without the benefit of the GLONASS, BeiDou and Galileo satellites used by the more modern multi-constellation GNSS receivers) typically meets the DGPS performance specification most of the time now that Selective Availability has been permanently discontinued. Integrity monitoring can be done with modern RAIM (receiver autonomous integrity monitoring) capable receivers - it doesn't need DGPS.
The newer approaches to augmentation are space-based augmentation services (SBAS), such as EGNOS in Europe, or assisted GPS, where the augmentation is retrieved via the Internet.
Selective Availability will not come back on GPS. There is no Selective Availability hardware fitted from Block IIF satellites onwards, so of the 31 satellites in the current GPS constellation, only 14 have SA hardware. This number will decrease over time as the older Block IIR and IIR-M satellites are retired. Moreover, it would be pointless for the United States to start intentionally degrading civilian L1 GPS signals again when there is no such thing as Selective Availability on GLONASS, BeiDou, Galileo or the L2C and L5 signals of GPS.
Unsurprsingly, other people have noticed that over-reliance on GPS is a risk. LORAN may be on its way back as eLorain:
https://www.xyht.com/gnsslocation-tech/the-return-of-loran/
Northwestern Europe had eLORAN - but France and Norway decided to turn off their transmitters on 31 December 2015. Without the French and Norwegian stations, the LORAN chains covering UK and Ireland would not work, so the General Lighthouse Authorities terminated the UK and Ireland stations.
Ongoing thought is being given to GNSS vulnerabilities as the satellite signals are weak and easy to jam, whilst the system owners seem determined to limit the use of the encrypted and hardened signals to military and government users only. Certainly, in the marine world, approaches such as trilateration of fixed AIS installations and/or RACONs (radar beacons) are being considered, but these techniques will not translate directly to land-based systems. Maybe we will see trilateration of cell towers used for GNSS backup, but that would leave huge areas with poor or no backup service.
There is
a recent article about work towards a possible GNSS based Train Localisation On Board Unit (TLOBU), allowing ERTMS with many fewer balises, on the Inside GNSS website.