Trains all at a stand in the Manchester area... (Thursday afternoon 06AUG2026)

jfollows · 7 Aug 2026

Freightmaster said:
It's been piecemeal to put it mildly.

For example, Macclesfield box was closed a couple of years ago, but the Stockport area
is still controlled by no less than four lever frame signalboxes!

Piccadilly still controls from Piccadilly to Levenshulme plus the Styal loop including
Manchester airport and Salford Crescent through to Blackrod/Hindley.

Five, I think

Heaton Norris Junction
Stockport No. 2
Stockport No. 1
Edgeley Junction No. 2
Edgeley Junction No. 1 (built 1884)

when I was younger there was also

Adswood Road Junction
Cheadle Hulme

but these have now gone.

And I used to enjoy sitting on the platform at Macclesfield watching the signal box, which has now gone.

RailUK Forums

Starmill · 7 Aug 2026

norbitonflyer said:
139 (but there would be barely time to use it on the Stourbridge Shuttle!), 345 (Elizabeth Line), 376 and 707 (South Eastern), 378 and 710 (London Overground), 398 (cardiff valleys), 399 (Sheffiekld Tram Trains), 555 (tyne & Wear Metro), 777 (Merseyrail)

I don't think there's anyone arguing that the Town car or T&W Metro should have had toilets included. I think this all rather supports my point that the regulations have coincided with a big expansion in toilet accessibility.

There are some exceptions which are sensibly criticised, mainly just 376s and 398s. This doesn't have anything to do with access regulations though.

LNW-GW Joint · 7 Aug 2026

Freightmaster said:
It's been piecemeal to put it mildly.

For example, Macclesfield box was closed a couple of years ago, but the Stockport area
is still controlled by no less than four lever frame signalboxes!

Piccadilly still controls from Piccadilly to Levenshulme plus the Styal loop including
Manchester airport and Salford Crescent through to Blackrod/Hindley.

But Manchester ROC controls multiple sections of the north west. As new sections are resignalled, control is transferred to Manchester ROC.
That now includes routes out of Liverpool Lime St, Blackpool North, North Manchester, some lines at Crewe, Macclesfield etc.
The plan is eventually all of the north-west will be controlled from Manchester ROC.

Paul AC · 7 Aug 2026

Justin Smith said:
Thanks for that !
I thought huge areas were controlled from a few signalling centres, has that not happened yet in Manchester ?

It has up to a point, but just because a railway passes a signalbox/signalling centre doesn't mean to say that the latter controls the former! It's a good quiz question, probably asked on this forum at some point in its history: list the signalboxes that don't control the trains that pass outside....

QueensCurve · 7 Aug 2026

bahnause said:
That hasn't been the case for years, except perhaps for local service disruptions. It simply doesn't have enough staff to handle anything more than that. SBB is centralized and operates four major control centers (West in Lausanne, Central in Olten, South in Pollegio, and East at Zurich Airport). These are structured—both technically and organizationally—in such a way that they can mirror and support one another. The server architecture is designed to be redundant. If, for example, the Central Operations Center in Zürich goes down, parts of the control system can be switched over to the screens at one of the other three centers (e.g. Olten, but who wants to go to Olten...). Staff would then be reassigned to workstations at the other operations center.

I have fond memories of standing on the platform at eg Visp and looing in where I could just about see the nx panel and watch the operator settiing the route. But I am thinking of the old Visp bahnhoff and my recollections are dated.

Stampy · 7 Aug 2026

It'll be fun for us in Peterborough soon as we will be surrounded by ROC's controlling trains just outside the area...

York ROC = East Coast Main Line
EMCC = Stamford - Birmingham Line
Colchester or Romford ROC = Line through March and Ely

And there's the Spalding Line which is at Lincoln SCC, or has that gone into York ROC now?

signed · 7 Aug 2026

Snow1964 said:
If the outage was 90 seconds (as suggested) the system should have been able to cope on battery. No one relies on a generator kicking in that fast, they would normally take at least 5 minutes before they are running and can have heavy load. Remember it was started on a warm day, these things are designed to start at something like -10c in middle of winter too. Cold diesels are pretty gutless for first few minutes so expecting full power within a minute and a half is bonkers spec.

I one visited a data center, they sure believe and test that their yacht-engined generators be up and full load in 30s-1min with the immediate load running on batteries. And some of the newer models can deliver (tho dirty) power in 10s tops

And note that that kind of MW+ power producing generators are kept warm with block heaters, and everything is load tested on a schedule.

Now failure can happen obviously

Amaranthe · 7 Aug 2026

So having now read all 13 pages now with a lot of it having gone completely over my head, may I offer my simplistic thoughts?

I've seen reports that said that the backup system did work but it was issues with the equipment that meant it took so long to resolve so...

Could it not be as simple as whatever caused the power outage also caused part(s) in the computer to fry, meaning new parts had to be ordered which didn't arrive until many hours later?

Freightmaster · 7 Aug 2026

Stampy said:
EMCC = Stamford - Birmingham Line
Colchester or Romford ROC = Line through March and Ely

I can't see either of those happening for many years - there just isn't the budget available
to resignal 'secondary' routes these days. On the ECML itself, the closure of Doncaster PSB
has been put back on at least two occasions and still has no definite date.

Stampy said:
And there's the Spalding Line which is at Lincoln SCC, or has that gone into York ROC now?

Still Lincoln.

Harpo · 7 Aug 2026

Paul AC said:
It's a good quiz question, probably asked on this forum at some point in its history: list the signalboxes that don't control the trains that pass outside....

Sadly, Swindon ‘B’ is no more!

Iskra · 7 Aug 2026

Justin Smith said:
Thanks for that !
I thought huge areas were controlled from a few signalling centres, has that not happened yet in Manchester ?

Stockport is considered too expensive/disruptive to sort out. It's quite interesting watching Pendolino's whizz past a box still controlled by bells and old-fashioned levers.

The Planner · 7 Aug 2026

Iskra said:
Stockport is considered too expensive/disruptive to sort out. It's quite interesting watching Pendolino's whizz past a box still controlled by bells and old-fashioned levers.

Its being looked at.

Stampy said:
It'll be fun for us in Peterborough soon as we will be surrounded by ROC's controlling trains just outside the area...

EMCC = Stamford - Birmingham Line

Nuneaton to Birmingham is controlled from Saltley, that won't alter.

Nicholas Lewis · 7 Aug 2026

Amaranthe said:
So having now read all 13 pages now with a lot of it having gone completely over my head, may I offer my simplistic thoughts?

I've seen reports that said that the backup system did work but it was issues with the equipment that meant it took so long to resolve so...

Could it not be as simple as whatever caused the power outage also caused part(s) in the computer to fry, meaning new parts had to be ordered which didn't arrive until many hours later?

From what I can gather this was a run of the mill power outage from the local DNO. This is the most credible failure scenario and it should have been seamless to the operators within the ROC but it wasn't. The site should have three sources of supply one we know was from the local DNO, one was from a back up generator was a third from the 25kV system?

Anyhow its been know from the dawn of computers they dont take kindly to power glitches so the raw electronics is fed through power converters that keep the supply clean. Then we also know that even a momentary power dip let alone a full loss will upset the equipment so its all designed to withstand that even your home laptop can cover for a few 10's milliseconds. But this is mission critical equipment so it will all be fed off duplicated UPS (uninterruptible power supplies) that will be sized in capacity and duration that should more than sufficient for the incoming supplies to be reconfigured to one of the alternatives.

NR have finally broken cover and apologised for the fiasco but revealed anything else other than telling us how hard everyone is working to sort the issue. Thing is it shouldn't have happened in the first place and Secretary of State should be requesting NR to report the facts and why it took so long to restore the systems. There are maybe a dozen of these ROCs around the country now and there still being expanded so their resilience is paramount.

AndrewE · 7 Aug 2026

Nicholas Lewis said:
NR have finally broken cover and apologised for the fiasco but [NOT] revealed anything else other than telling us how hard everyone is working to sort the issue. Thing is it shouldn't have happened in the first place and Secretary of State should be requesting NR to report the facts and why it took so long to restore the systems. There are maybe a dozen of these ROCs around the country now and they're still being expanded so their resilience is paramount.

good point. What will be done at other ROCs when the analysis of this collapse is complete...?

muz379 · 7 Aug 2026

AndrewE said:
good point. What will be done at other ROCs when the analysis of this collapse is complete...?

That will depend on what the investigation into this incident finds. And what similarities there are between the systems at different RPCs.

If it finds that the systems in place to ensure continuity of supply weren't designed to deal with the specific scenario that occurred then modifications to those systems might be considered.

If it finds that the systems in place didn't work as intended perhaps because a part of the system failed then a more appropriate response is to look at changing maintenance regimes.

AndrewE · 7 Aug 2026

Again we have in https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/c3ekd5784k5o

Systems had to be rebooted. But there was some damage to those that control signalling, which took time to fix because of the need to replace certain parts.

but nobody has explained or even hinted at how a power outage and restoration has fried things to the extent that "certain parts" needed replacing... It will be interesting to read what actually happened!

== Doublepost prevention - post automatically merged: 7 Aug 2026 ==

Is our cause here? https://www.networkrail.co.uk/wp-co...and-and-Wales-CP7-Strategic-Business-Plan.pdf
has on p9

We expect a decrease in asset reliability in CP7, given the way we have had to prioritise and allocate
available funding to deliver our objectives. Whilst we have sought to focus on train performance, we
have had to balance our expenditure and asset interventions in order to protect safety, as well as
focusing investment on those areas which will bring the highest economic and social benefits. The
indication is that average asset age will increase and (other things being equal) have a small impact
train performance, particularly in the later years of CP7.

68000 · 7 Aug 2026

AndrewE said:
Again we have in https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/c3ekd5784k5o

but nobody has explained or even hinted at how a power outage and restoration has fried things to the extent that "certain parts" needed replacing... It will be interesting to read what actually happened!

Well in a similar outage in November 2023 in Edinburgh, the interlockings lost communication with the trackside modules and the messages overwhelmed the control system. I do not know if they replaced certain parts but I would not take any PR statements as gospel at this time.

didcot_watcher · 7 Aug 2026

In this case there could have been a flood of signals as the supply returned as a large number of track side supplies may have been lost.

sharpener · 7 Aug 2026

Nicholas Lewis said:
From what I can gather this was a run of the mill power outage from the local DNO. This is the most credible failure scenario and it should have been seamless to the operators within the ROC but it wasn't. The site should have three sources of supply one we know was from the local DNO, one was from a back up generator was a third from the 25kV system?

As a point of detail (see under) two of them came from the same substation(!) But if it was a fault at a higher voltage two miles away then bringing a truly independent supply from a different s/stn might have been disproportionally expensive. And wouldn't have helped anyway as it was back on supply in 90 secs, which ought to have been covered by the UPS. Some press reports have it that the backup generator failed to start but it seems to me the original problem lay in the UPS not taking over to begin with.

Elecman said:
Manchester ROC has 2 independent 6.6kV DNO intake feeders fed from a primary substation either of which can feed the entire building by closing the relevant bus bar couplers on the HV panels ( there are some reports of a large part of Ardwick also bring without power) do sounds like it’s a SPENWL issue.

I don't think it can be something like overvoltage leading to equipment failure as no-one else seems to have reported damage. It's a bit odd though that I can't find any trace of a press release on the SPENW web site since it has been quoted by the BBC.

Who is going to be responsible for investigating and reporting on this? It would be nice to have an organisation with the attention to detail and perseverance of RAIB but I imagine it is outside their remit.

NESO produced a report on the Heathrow failure and the summary here is worth a read especially the following paragraph:

The review also found that energy network operators are not generally aware whether customers connected to their networks are Critical National Infrastructure (CNI), and there is currently no explicit cross-sector requirement on CNI operators to ensure appropriate continuity of operations in response to power disruption. CNI facilities also have no priority within the electricity legal or regulatory framework. Work is underway, led by government, to identify and analyse cross-sector CNI interdependencies.

Russel · 7 Aug 2026

Nicholas Lewis said:
NR have finally broken cover and apologised for the fiasco but revealed anything else other than telling us how hard everyone is working to sort the issue. Thing is it shouldn't have happened in the first place and Secretary of State should be requesting NR to report the facts and why it took so long to restore the systems. There are maybe a dozen of these ROCs around the country now and there still being expanded so their resilience is paramount.

I'm sure the old reliable "lessons will be learnt" script is being dusted off as we speak...

plugwash · 8 Aug 2026

Iskra said:
Stockport is considered too expensive/disruptive to sort out. It's quite interesting watching Pendolino's whizz past a box still controlled by bells and old-fashioned levers.

What I heard was that when the "manchester south" scheme was put in, it was hoped that it would be extended to cover stockport,. When what is now platform 0 was first built it was numbered 1, presumablly in anticipation of resignalling works but the ansaldo kit proved problematic so the stockport area never got added to the system.

Trothy · 8 Aug 2026

plugwash said:
What I heard was that when the "manchester south" scheme was put in, it was hoped that it would be extended to cover stockport,. When what is now platform 0 was first built it was numbered 1, presumablly in anticipation of resignalling works but the ansaldo kit proved problematic so the stockport area never got added to the system.

It wasn't really meant to be extended, the original plan for the scheme was for it to replace all 5 stockport boxes, but at the last minute it was discovered the Ansaldo equipment wasn't up to the job.

It was quite the embarrassment at the time and I feel it's the reason replacing those boxes continues to be something NR continues to avoid, despite what would be an obvious cost saving in manpower alone. (Those boxes would be a single panel/workstation)

plugwash · 8 Aug 2026

Do we know why specifically it was "up to the job" for the cheadle hulme area but not for the stockport area?

Harpo · 8 Aug 2026

Trothy said:
I feel it's the reason replacing those boxes continues to be something NR continues to avoid, despite what would be an obvious cost saving in manpower alone.

Resignalling is never driven by manpower savings, just asset condition or enhancements. The manpower savings are a very minor clawback.

5 boxes into 1 workstation probably loses about 16 posts (minus 4 boxes net) might save a total of £0.8m a year. Resignalling is approaching £0.5m per signal.

YorkshireBear · 8 Aug 2026

sjm77 said:
Indeed, I was suprised to see the peak extras on the CLC Warrington Central route this morning. Being a Friday there are many working from home so these would have been a low priority to roster (probably) but Northern managed it. Meanwhile TPEx did not provide anything on the same route until the 11:00 arrival into Lime Street and 11:19 departure to Cleethorpes. A stark difference.

I think some of that is scale of operations. Northern Manchester crews generally got home. Whereas I am aware of a substantial amount of TPE crews who were lodged unexpectedly as no taxis could be found as they were after the more lucrative stranded passengers.

Having been rescued from Manchester by car and seen the volume of taxis on the M62 that doesn't surprise me.

I think it took TPE a longer time to unlock Friday nights chaos. By lunch they were running a full service.

Gerald Fiennes · 8 Aug 2026

Harpo said:
Resignalling is never driven by manpower savings, just asset condition or enhancements. The manpower savings are a very minor clawback.

5 boxes into 1 workstation probably loses about 16 posts (minus 4 boxes net) might save a total of £0.8m a year. Resignalling is approaching £0.5m per signal.

You are right about the maths, but NR has generally to date largely been driven by other objectives that their Boards are put up to by the S&T function ... such as 'eliminating legacy signals by 20xx' or 'getting y ROCs in place by 20zz'. In particular, their processes are not very good at balancing capital and operating expenditure.... For the most part the BR-installed relay-based signals of the 70s and 80s are life-expired (or worse) so their priorities are (correctly) often around methodically getting rid of them.

Is a major factor with this incident the famous Ansaldo Track Counters? Controversial at the time they were put in on the Manchester South scheme and took some considerable effort (I seem to recall) to get reliable....

Snow1964 · 8 Aug 2026

68000 said:
Well in a similar outage in November 2023 in Edinburgh, the interlockings lost communication with the trackside modules and the messages overwhelmed the control system. I do not know if they replaced certain parts but I would not take any PR statements as gospel at this time.

Normally an overwhelmed computer is upgraded with faster processor or more memory, but it is not normally a spot decision to upgrade and replace parts, it tends to follow period of struggling.

There is also the question of if the control system cannot handle messages from all the attached equipment, how did they start it when they first turned it on, it would have been in same getting info from lots of sources at the start from scratch position.

This is starting to sound more like a UPS failure, or some undersized UPS that couldn't cope, or wasn't properly configured to switch back to the mains electricity when it came back (especially if as suggested a generator wasn't operating). I wonder if there was bad configuration and it kept trying the generator rather than switching back automatically to the restored mains

nineteenninety · 8 Aug 2026

Slightly unrelated but I find it quite ironic a job has just appeared on Northerns website for a disruption controller, based at Manchester ROC

Disruption Controller

Disruption Controller, When the railway runs exactly to plan, most people never think about what happens behind the scenes. But when disruption strikes, it's people in Control who keep the network moving. As part of our Control team, you'd play a key role in keeping customers and colleagues...

northern.engageats.co.uk

Edited to add link

didcot_watcher · 8 Aug 2026

Trothy said:
It wasn't really meant to be extended, the original plan for the scheme was for it to replace all 5 stockport boxes, but at the last minute it was discovered the Ansaldo equipment wasn't up to the job.

It was quite the embarrassment at the time and I feel it's the reason replacing those boxes continues to be something NR continues to avoid, despite what would be an obvious cost saving in manpower alone. (Those boxes would be a single panel/workstation)

At the time (of the start of Railtrack) it was reported by the local press that that staff had to be got from Indian railways to get the rod and frames back into working order. It could be this political reason being considered by NR

sharpener · 8 Aug 2026

Snow1964 said:
This is starting to sound more like a UPS failure, or some undersized UPS that couldn't cope, or wasn't properly configured to switch back to the mains electricity when it came back (especially if as suggested a generator wasn't operating). I wonder if there was bad configuration and it kept trying the generator rather than switching back automatically to the restored mains

Something like that. It's been said upthread that it is usual to require manual intervention to switch back to the mains, in case it is out of spec or not stable. To my mind this is not entirely sensible once the battery is about to give out, if the generator is not available there is not much to lose.

My experience in a rural area (not that it is at 6.6kV) is that once the supply is restored it remains OK. Even a 5kVA domestic system will automatically re-synchronise and switch back without a glitch so it can be done.

Trains all at a stand in the Manchester area... (Thursday afternoon 06AUG2026)

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