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Following the Bedford incident, should TPWS - or something providing an equivalent level of protection - be fitted to all remaining unfitted signals?

Doubleyellow

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As an interested lay person can I ask a question ? I have seen several reports today which say the Intercity train was stopped because the AWS had triggered its brakes. Isn't AWS an early warning system? Would it be TPWS which would trigger the train's brakes

from RAIB latest (https://www.gov.uk/government/news/collision-between-two-passenger-trains-near-elstow) : "The train had come to a stop unexpectedly because a fault had developed with the Automatic Warning System (AWS) equipment fitted to it, which caused the brakes to apply."

Either AWS detected a fault with itself and demanded brakes (i think most likely), or erroneous brake application. This being in the front train (that was struck from behind while stopped). The signal that was at red behind this train, was passed at danger (and was not fitted with TPWS equipment, which would have demanded brakes for a signal passed at danger (SPAD))
 
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littlerock

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I appreciate there was a SPAD incident with the second train. I do know something about computer software. For AWS "to apply brakes within itself," this it would need to be programmed within the software as a response to a specific identified situation . What is an erroneous brake application?
 

Doubleyellow

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I appreciate there was a SPAD incident with the second train. I do know something about computer software. For AWS "to apply brakes within itself," this it would need to be programmed within the software as a response to a specific identified situation . What is an erroneous brake application?
A hardware or software fault resulting in an unintended/ spurious (i.e. not designed) brake application
 

Annetts key

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As an interested lay person can I ask a question ? I have seen several reports today which say the Intercity train was stopped because the AWS had triggered its brakes. Isn't AWS an early warning system? Would it be TPWS which would trigger the train's brakes ?

I appreciate there was a SPAD incident with the second train. I do know something about computer software. For AWS "to apply brakes within itself," this it would need to be programmed within the software as a response to a specific identified situation . What is an erroneous brake application?
Although classed as a warning system, Automatic Warning System (AWS) is a bit more than that. It's not a computer based system on older traction (it predates computerised train systems). I don't know about more modern traction.

There are two parts to AWS, the signalling system and track equipment and the on train equipment.

The track mounted equipment uses magnets to transmit binary states to the train. For a standard AWS installation, there are two magnets, a permanent magnet and an electro -magnet (that has the opposite magnetic field to the permanent magnet). they are mounted in the centre of the four foot on the track, in line with one another, with the permanent magnet first (as in the normal direction of travel by trajns) followed immediately by the electro-magnet.

The permanent magnet being a permanent magnet always produces a magnetic field. The electro-magnet is controlled by the interlocking. It is only energised when the signal is proved lit and the signal is commanded to show a green aspect.

A receiver mounted on the underside of the train detects the magnetic fields. The equipment can determine which magnetic polarity has been detected. This information goes to the cab equipment. The polarity and the sequence is it then is used to determine if a permanent magnet was detected and If an energised electro-magnet was detected.

If the received information is just that a permanent magnet was detected, in the cab, a horn sounds, the driver then has a short amount of time to press an acknowledgement button. If no button press is detected, after the time delay the system automatically applies the brakes.

If the driver pressed the acknowledgement button, the AWS indicator changes to black and yellow (as a reminder to the driver) and the timer for the automatic braking is cancelled so that the train can run as normal.

If a permanent magnet immediately followed by an electro-magnet is detected, a bell sounds in the drivers cab and the AWS indicator changes to all black.

It's important to note that the original purpose of AWS was to try to deal with the risk of drivers not seeing or not reacting to distant signals at caution (or colour light signals showing a yellow aspect) and hence by the time they saw the signal ahead at danger (red) beyond the distant signal they were unable to stop their train before passing the red/danger signal.

An AWS warning or brake application when not over the track mounted magnets is normally a fault with the on train AWS equipment.

If the lineside control equipment or the track mounted electro-magnet or the cabling for it is defective, the on-train equipment will act as if the signal is not green. The driver will not expect to get a horn at a green signal, so may not acknowledge the horn as quickly as normal, hence if the driver does not press the button in time, the automatic brake application will occur. This cannot be cancelled until the train has stopped (as I understand it).
 
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AlterEgo

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Something such as a separate tone for a red signal may have prevented this incident.
This does not seem likely. For whatever reason the driver had accelerated his train substantially, akin to travelling under greens and aiming for linespeed. How would a separate tone for a red signal have helped? The driver appeared to be under no impression that WH154 had been restrictive, either red or yellow (we do not know why at this stage, and may never know).
 
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Harpo

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As an interested lay person can I ask a question ? I have seen several reports today which say the Intercity train was stopped because the AWS had triggered its brakes. Isn't AWS an early warning system?
In normal operation AWS dumps the brake to stop the train if the warning horn isn’t acknowledged quickly enough.
 

41A

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If you see a fast train pass and then progress on single yellow towards red which clears to yellow then progress towards red, your brain will not need much to satisfy itself that it has cleared, as it would have done for him many times previously. Oddly this would be an area where passive AI type systems that can view red via cameras and link to current speed to provide a different warning sound might break the systematic behaviours. Of course this is just comment RAIB will do there good work.
 

littlerock

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So if driver of second train did not react to spad warning then AWS would.apply brakes automatically.? or can only TWAS do that? Which second train did not.have.
 

Sorcerer

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If you see a fast train pass and then progress on single yellow towards red which clears to yellow then progress towards red, your brain will not need much to satisfy itself that it has cleared, as it would have done for him many times previously. Oddly this would be an area where passive AI type systems that can view red via cameras and link to current speed to provide a different warning sound might break the systematic behaviours. Of course this is just comment RAIB will do there good work.
If I've understood you correctly, I believe driver training addresses the situation of coming up on red signals that keep clearing to yellow. They call it "chasing aspects", and this is a major SPAD risk. I don't think we really need AI systems though because cab-signalling and radio communication via ERTMS can already reduce much of the potential risk of human error, especially if it's ETCS Level 2. I agree with your final point about the RAIB.

So if driver of second train did not react to spad warning then AWS would.apply brakes automatically.? or can only TWAS do that? Which second train did not.have.
As I understand it, AWS only applies the brakes if you don't acknowledge the alarm after passing over the ramp but doesn't actually stop the train in the event of a SPAD which is what TPWS is for. AWS doesn't differentiate between a cautionary and danger aspect which is why drivers are generally advised to treat any uncertain yellow as a potential red. I'll be happy to let some of the more knowledgeable users correct me on that one.
 

E27007

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So if driver of second train did not react to spad warning then AWS would.apply brakes automatically.? or can only TWAS do that? Which second train did not.have.
The AWS magnet is located in the four-foot before the signal head, by 80 or 200 meters dependent on design requirements.
From the Sectional Appendix, the signal passed at danger is not equipped with TPWS "toast racks".
All trains are equipped with TPWS equipment.
There isn't a SPAD warning, if the signal / track circuit is equipped( the TPWS "toast racks" in the four foot), TPWS will stop a train by initiating an uncontrolled emergency brake application on passing a signal at danger. Uncontrolled meaning the driver cannot intervene or over-ride the brake application.

Questions requiring clarification.
1) the first train, did the train self-brake to an uncontrolled stop because of an AWS intervention by the train AWS equipment, ie an AWS system fault on the unit, or by controlled braking by the driver?
Or:
2) if the first train, was it brought to a immediate stop by controlled braking by the driver, was the driver reporting to the signaller an AWS indication failing wrong - side, Form RT3185 " bell received vs expected horn".

Note: for a right-side failure of AWS, the driver reports to the signaller at the first convenient stop, for a wrong-side failure of AWS the driver must stop and report immediately
 
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45Fox

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Interesting and informative discussion.
I think that there may be a case for fitting the first signal, if not already so fitted (ie if an auto such as WH154), after a junction, loop, etc, where traffic changes lines and there's a likelihood that one train will closely follow another, with TPWS. I honestly can't see the fitting of all autos with TPWS being sanctioned, on cost grounds if nothing else.

(Driver with nearly 42 years in, 37 driving. I don't currently work over the section of line at Bedford South [Kempston Road] but did for many years and am thoroughly acquainted with the moves there).
 

sharpener

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The information available at the location cupboard next to or near to the signal very much depends on the actual installation.

Thank you, much as I guessed. I just wanted to point out you would need more data so it was a bit more complicated than just piggybacking on the green-only feed to an AWS electromagnet! Literally one bit<g>.

Oddly this would be an area where passive AI type systems that can view red via cameras and link to current speed to provide a different warning sound might break the systematic behaviours. Of course this is just comment RAIB will do there good work.

This falls squarely under the "new system developments" commented on above. So not likely to happen.

But if by "systematic behaviours" you are referring to the problem of drivers cancelling the horn on autopilot when following another train on a long series of double yellows this has been a worry for a long time.

I grew up in New Malden and often used to watch this happening from a footbridge over the Portsmouth main line out of Waterloo.

Also tape recorders had a mechanical interlock to prevent you from putting it into Record mode by accident but I can't count how many times I have overridden it on autopilot and erased something by mistake.
 

Bletchleyite

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Also tape recorders had a mechanical interlock to prevent you from putting it into Record mode by accident but I can't count how many times I have overridden it on autopilot and erased something by mistake.

The "unformat" command was introduced to MS DOS because so many people just typed "format c:" (instead of a: ) then "y" and only then realised what they had done.

It's certainly an issue.

But is there any point modifying AWS when you can just install TPWS?
 

Kipperthecat

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The permanent magnet being a permanent magnet always produces a magnetic field. The electro-magnet is controlled by the interlocking. It is only energised when the signal is proved lit and the signal is commanded to show a green aspect

Often thought that a code 3 (nothing instead of a bell) should be treated like a code 7, or at least, like a code 4. As stated above, the permanent magnet ‘should’ be able to give the driver a minimum of a horn, yet it has not.
 

sharpener

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The "unformat" command was introduced to MS DOS because so many people just typed "format c:" (instead of a: ) then "y" and only then realised what they had done.

I considered adding that I am a bit more careful these days about deleting large files permanently using Shift-Delete in order to keep them from cluttering up the Waste Bin. I ask myself two questions "do I really care" and if so "can I download this file again".

Mostly they are enormous attachments or 10Mbyte pictures which for some reason ppl feel they have to send me, so I do not care. If I really want to store them then IrfanView does an excellent job of compressing to <500kB without noticeable loss of detail.

/offtopic

== Doublepost prevention - post automatically merged: ==

Often thought that a code 3 (nothing instead of a bell) should be treated like a code 7, or at least, like a code 4. As stated above, the permanent magnet ‘should’ be able to give the driver a minimum of a horn, yet it has not.

Do we know that is what happened? (I assume you mean when 1H46 got to the magnets at WH154)
 
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bramling

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Interesting and informative discussion.
I think that there may be a case for fitting the first signal, if not already so fitted (ie if an auto such as WH154), after a junction, loop, etc, where traffic changes lines and there's a likelihood that one train will closely follow another, with TPWS. I honestly can't see the fitting of all autos with TPWS being sanctioned, on cost grounds if nothing else.

(Driver with nearly 42 years in, 37 driving. I don't currently work over the section of line at Bedford South [Kempston Road] but did for many years and am thoroughly acquainted with the moves there).

I could certainly see a case for a piece of work to identify similar such signals and alter their risk profile such that they get a TPWS fitment. The industry is quite good at this sort of thing, there was a programme of changes to signal boxes after the Moreton-on-Lugg accident - I remember visiting a remote gate box on the Scarborough line fairly soon after that, and whilst I was visiting there there was a contractor present surveying the changes that would be required to install back locking.

This may well be the best consequence of Friday’s incident, especially if they aren’t able to prove exactly what the root cause was, which could well turn out to be the case - so instead develop an engineered solution will cover any potential scenario.

== Doublepost prevention - post automatically merged: ==

Often thought that a code 3 (nothing instead of a bell) should be treated like a code 7, or at least, like a code 4. As stated above, the permanent magnet ‘should’ be able to give the driver a minimum of a horn, yet it has not.

Could it ever be possible to have a situation where the magnet is wired up wrongly and you end up with the AWS indications transposed? Though if that remote scenario happened presumably by now something would have leaked out along the lines of “driver passed over this section the previous day and the warning was wrong”.

History unfortunately shows subconscious acknowledgement of AWS warnings does happen, and an incorrect AWS warning still wouldn’t fully explain what happened as the driver would still have been looking at the signal.
 
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sharpener

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Could it ever be possible to have a situation where the magnet is wired up wrongly and you end up with the AWS indications transposed?
AIUI not possible, the electromagnet and permanent magnet are of opposite polarity, if electromagnet wired wrongly the OB equipment will detect same polarity and give rise to an error. Also many earlier trains that day would have encountered the same issue.

As a complication IIRC there are situations where to avoid confusion both magnets are the opposite way round from usual, I thought it was in this article but can't now find it.
 

Annetts key

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Could it ever be possible to have a situation where the magnet is wired up wrongly and you end up with the AWS indications transposed? Though if that remote scenario happened presumably by now something would have leaked out along the lines of “driver passed over this section the previous day and the warning was wrong”.

History unfortunately shows subconscious acknowledgement of AWS warnings does happen, and an incorrect AWS warning still wouldn’t fully explain what happened as the driver would still have been looking at the signal.

AIUI not possible, the electromagnet and permanent magnet are of opposite polarity, if electromagnet wired wrongly the OB equipment will detect same polarity and give rise to an error. Also many earlier trains that day would have encountered the same issue.

As a complication IIRC there are situations where to avoid confusion both magnets are the opposite way round from usual, I thought it was in this article but can't now find it.
For AWS fitted to a unidirectional line, it's not really possible to cause a wrong side failure with the track and trackside equipment. The permanent magnet produces one polarity of magnetic field and it's obvious by the fixings which way up it's mounted (the mounting lugs are on the bottom).

The electro-magnet can be wired up incorrectly (yes, it's been done), but that just results in it producing the same polarity as the permanent magnet. The result is the driver getting a horn no matter what the signal is showing.

In addition, the test meter used by S&T staff when working on an AWS, clearly shows the magnetic strength and polarity, either P for permanent magnet or E for electro-magnet.

Similarly, if the permanent magnet and the electro -magnet are fitted in the wrong order, that also results in the driver getting a horn regardless of what the signal is showing (and yes, someone has done this in the past and got ribbed for it for several days...).

Unsafe "wrong side failures" on unidirectional AWS are therefore rare.

The situation is different for AWS fitted to bi-directionally signalled lines.

Failures with the on-train equipment are another matter, but I'm not an expert on tnat, so will leave that to others to answer.
 

rmHawk765

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I think it's been made clear lately that TPWS is at end-of-life. Trying to replicate even all of the ETCS Limited Supervision functions with it, such as partial speed monitoring at yellows, reds and junctions, is incredibly inconvenient with TPWS because all it is is a cheap stopgap. There's little other reason why it exists in my view, as one the justifications for it was that ATP wouldn't make sense with ETCS on the horizon.

The recent few junction overspeeds (and now this) we've seen clearly show that as lines get busier and stock becomes more performant, the safety systems have to adapt. Both France and Germany sorted this decades ago for instance - though I appreciate the counter-argument that our railways are still safer, which does show the safety system isn't quite everything.

Personally I think ETCS L2 on smaller, lesser-used lines is completely unnecessary. ETCS L1 offers almost all of its protection features when fitted at every signal, and is significantly cheaper as it does not modify the existing signalling and trains do not need to be retrofitted with the appropriate radio equipment (and I'm assuming the trackside radio equipment would also need to be upgraded for L2). It purely requires replacing TPWS grids with balises and linking them to the signals (and also powering them though I don't really know much about how they're powered), and installing balise receives and the appropriate hardware on the trains. If cost is really a huge concern, nationwide L1 is the only way to go, with L2 on mainlines including the MML (freight situation south of Bedford for example) as it increases capacity considerably even in its basic fixed block form and can easily be upgraded to moving block which basically makes terminating capacity the only bottleneck.
 

E27007

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The main thread has a post mentioning that RAIB will consider the sun angles. This means my current theory if the driver has no history of medical or competency issues, is that the AWS magnets possibly failed 'dangerously' for the two signals prior to the 810 and the driver took it for granted that the signals were green, not being able to see them clearly. Of course, this is extremely unlikely, but the only other factor without prior history that could've caused it is simply the heat (though 360s do have air con of course).
This is my take, a basic human factor in the incident, the driver was waiting at Bedford on the slow line, he saw the express pass through Bedford at speed, his instinctive thinking " he's running at a lick,I'm next, and when I'm crossed over to the fasts I'll have a nice clear run, he'll be several sections ahead of me". the first train did not run fast, it stopped and the driver reported to the signaller, so is set the trap, the trap the signal at red protecting the stopped train, and the second train approaching the red at more than 70 mph with a driver thinking the line is clear for several sections ahead.
 
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Kipperthecat

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oluoDo we know that is what happened? (I assume you mean when 1H46 got to the magnets at WH154)

Absolutely not ! I make no reference to the incident.

Another question: when should a driver report a code 4 ? S7 7.8 d) doesn’t address the issue. TS11 17.2 requires the ‘first’ train to be advised to report what AWS indications were received, indicating possibly, that the driver should stop and report immediately.

And another question: TS11 17.1 requires each train to be advised about a code 5 or 7, without exception, including therefore, trains proceeding on green. Is this the best course of action ?
 

Economist

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As an interested lay person can I ask a question ? I have seen several reports today which say the Intercity train was stopped because the AWS had triggered its brakes. Isn't AWS an early warning system? Would it be TPWS which would trigger the train's brakes ?

If there is a fault with the AWS system, it can fail to cancel if even if the cancellation button is pressed and released within the allotted timeframe. When this happens an emergency brake application will be the result. In nearly a decade of driving trains I only recall it happening to me once.
 

HSTEd

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Trying to affordably expand TPWS protection presumably runs into the problem that AWS, which provides control and power at most colour-light signals on the mainline railway, only has to signal green and not-green to the trains.

So, conceptually, it seems like we could provide an Over Speed System (OSS) arm-trigger loop on any signal fitted with an AWS electromagnet, but it could only be be set to trigger if the train is too fast for the least-restrictive restrictive aspect.

ie. if the train is going too fast to be appropriate for a yellow (in three aspect areas) or double-yellow (in four aspect areas) signal.

I'm not sure there are many cases where that would achieve something, and if you want to do anything better you'd need to break into the signalling system to get more control feeds rather than just using the signal that controls the AWS electromagnet.

Or at least, I think so, I may be wrong.
 
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Annetts key

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Trying to affordably expand TPWS protection presumably runs into the problem that AWS, which provides control and power at most colour-light signals on the mainline railway, only has to signal green and not-green to the trains.

So, conceptually, it seems like we could provide an Over Speed System (OSS) arm-trigger loop on any signal fitted with an AWS electromagnet, but it could only be be set to trigger if the train is too fast for the least-restrictive restrictive aspect.

ie. if the train is going too fast to be appropriate for a yellow (in three aspect areas) or double-yellow (in four aspect areas) signal.

I'm not sure there are many cases where that would achieve something, and if you want to do anything better you'd need to break into the signalling system to get more control feeds rather than just using the signal that controls the AWS electromagnet.

Or at least, I think so, I may be wrong.

Discussed in some detail by @Annetts key in post #58 above.
Expanding on what I said earlier, the control system for the AWS also varies depending on the actual installation.

First though, let me describe the signalling nomenclature.

In the signalling nomenclature, the first part is the individual equipment name or number.
E.g. a signal number, a point number, a track circuit number or name are the most common. These may have the signal box prefix, but mostly the signal box prefix is left out unless it may cause confusion.

The second part is further divided as follows: the first letter or the middle letter(s) is/are the function, the last letter is the type of equipment (e.g. R meaning relay) and If there is a P before the last letter, it means this is a repeat relay (P meaning repeat).

As I have and will talk more about signal control relays, for the record:

H at the beginning means yellow, hence HR means the control relay for the yellow aspect (* see note).
HH at the beginning means double yellow, hence HHR means the control relay for the top yellow aspect (* see note).
D at the beginning means green, hence DR means the control relay for the green aspect (* see note).
G at the beginning means signal.
E at the beginning or in the middle means light or lamp.
C at the beginning or in the middle means proving or checking.
T at the beginning or in the middle means track as in track circuit.

Hence 57 HR is a control relay for the yellow aspect of signal 57 (* see note).
AB TPR is the repeat relay for AB TR which in turn is the track circuit relay for AB track circuit.

* note that as there are different ways of wiring up a signal, you have to consider ALL the relevant relays that control the aspect on a signal, not just one. Just because a four aspect signal has the DR energised does not always mean that the signal will show a green aspect. If the HR is de-energised the signal should show a red regardless of the state of the other control relays.

Let me be clear what I mean by a repeat relay, as did not explain that in my earlier post. A repeat relay is provided when either the control relay it is repeating does not have enough contacts available for all the circuits that are needed or circuits are needed in a different location to where the control relay is located.

In most cases a repeat relay is wired up such that it's energised when the control relay it is repeating is energised.

Please note that there are various different repeat relay circuits and I am only describing the type that is relevant here. I'm also not including all details, otherwise the explanation will be rather long and more complicated.

There is also more than one method of using the nomenclature to show a repeat relay.

So the following are all examples of repeat relays:
HPR - repeats the HR
TPR - repeats the TR
TPPR - repeats the TPR

Sometimes a number is used rather than adding more Ps:
T2PR or - T(2)PR means TPPR, it repeats the TPR.

---

Right, back to AWS controls

I will first describe the typical arrangements for a relay interlocking.

The AWS gets it's "information" from the signal control relays for that signal. What I will describe is for a signal on plain line, there is more complex circuitry if there are points between the AWS track mounted magnets and the signal.

For the electro-magnet to be energised, and hence cause a bell to sound in the cab of the train, the interlocking needs to be calling for the signal to be showing green and for it to be lit.

That means for a four aspect signal, depending on the design of how the control relays are wired up, using either the contacts of all these relays (or repeats of these relays or equivalent) wired in series: HR, HHR, DR (when all these are combined, proves the signal is suppose to be showing green) and the ECR or GECR (name varies across the regions). Or if the signal design is wired as a climbing aspect circuit, just the DR contacts and the ECR or GECR.

Here the ECR or GECR (name varies across the regions) is the signal lamp proving relay, which is energised when the signal head is drawing enough current (for tungsten filament heads/lamps, this indicates that the lamp is lit).

Note that with a climbing aspect circuit design, the DR can only be energised if the HR and HHR are also energised.

If the signal control relays (HR, HHR and DR), or repeat relays (HPR, HHPR and DPR) (or equivalent) and the lamp proving relay, the GECR, or ECR or a repeat relay are in the local location cupboard, contacts of these relays are wired up to form the control circuit for the AWS electro-magnet either in the 110V AC supply to a 24V DC power supply unit (also known as a transformer rectifier) with the electro-magnet fed from the output of this unit.

Or the 110V AC to 24V DC power supply unit is continuously powered and the relay contacts are wired between the output of this and the electro-magnet.

If the signal control relays or repeat relays (or equivalent) are not in the local location cupboard, then the relay contacts may either be wired in a 110V AC circuit, which then feeds out to the local location cupboard, which is where the 110V AC to 24V DC power supply unit will be. That then feeds the AWS electro-magnet.

There is a further variation, again, if the signal control relays or repeat relays (or equivalent) are not in the local location cupboard, a 50V DC control circuit may feed out from where the signal relays are, this then feeds a relay only for the AWS. Contacts of this then control the 110V AC supply to the 24V DC power supply unit for the AWS electro-magnet.

Now you can see that due to all the variations in design, how difficult it is to retro-fit any new train control system to existing signalling installations.

For computer based signalling, the 110V AC to 24V DC power supply unit for the AWS electro-magnet is fed from an output from a signal module, which may be the same module that controls the signal itself.

Edited to correct an "of" to an "or".
 
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MadMac

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Now you can see that due to all the variations in design, how difficult it is to retro-fit any new train control system to existing signalling installations.
(Lengthy, excellent explanation snipped)

And that pretty much sums up the challenges. There’s no “one size fits all” panacea in terms of how you implement it. Each case has to be looked at on its own merits. Design, installation and testing resources are at a premium, if you can even find anyone willing to take on relay-based design: that is becoming a problem.
 

Exphia919

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The AWS magnet is located in the four-foot before the signal head, by 80 or 200 meters dependent on design requirements.
From the Sectional Appendix, the signal passed at danger is not equipped with TPWS "toast racks".
All trains are equipped with TPWS equipment.
There isn't a SPAD warning, if the signal / track circuit is equipped( the TPWS "toast racks" in the four foot), TPWS will stop a train by initiating an uncontrolled emergency brake application on passing a signal at danger. Uncontrolled meaning the driver cannot intervene or over-ride the brake application.

Questions requiring clarification.
1) the first train, did the train self-brake to an uncontrolled stop because of an AWS intervention by the train AWS equipment, ie an AWS system fault on the unit, or by controlled braking by the driver?
Or:
2) if the first train, was it brought to a immediate stop by controlled braking by the driver, was the driver reporting to the signaller an AWS indication failing wrong - side, Form RT3185 " bell received vs expected horn".

Note: for a right-side failure of AWS, the driver reports to the signaller at the first convenient stop, for a wrong-side failure of AWS the driver must stop and report immediately
Curiosity: Where does it mention in the Sectional Appendix whether TPWS is fitted at a signal or not? (assuming you are referring to the Network Rail National Appendix)
 

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That’s the risk which you crossover. You focus attention on the crossover speed, forget the previous signal was a single yellow and just power up once you know you’ve cleared the crossovers. That’s why TPWS should be installed at signals following a crossover.

Add to that, he’d probably done that move so many times, but never on a single yellow. Normally the fast trains would be well clear of the sections ahead.
We do not yet know at what point the driver accelerated. There's an awful lot of supposition being made when not all the facts are available. At the time the RAIB released their statement, they did not have the data from the lead cab OTMR.
 

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