The two points I have highlighted in bold are not necessarily true, depending on how any putative claim is framed.
In particular, there is nothing in this “can’t recover on behalf of other TOCs point” as a matter of law.
It is not readily apparent that GWR have failed to comply with the pre-action practice direction.
In terms of likely heads of claim for any putative court case, this pre-action protocol is likely to be irrelevant.
This is vanishingly unlikely.
Thanks for the rigorous challenge; it is important we don't give the OP false hope on the "strictly legal" side. However, I think we need to distinguish between what is
theoretically possible in the High Court and what happens practically in the Small Claims Track with a poorly managed automated claim.
You are absolutely right that, as a matter of law, nothing prevents Agency or Assignment of debt between operators. My point was evidentiary. In the pre-action phase (under the Practice Direction), a defendant is entitled to understand the basis of the claim. If GWR claims standing to sue for Avanti/WMT, they must evidence that authority.
The OP has explicitly asked for this proof multiple times. GWR has refused/failed to provide it. If they issue a claim without disclosing that evidence, they are procedurally vulnerable. A District Judge isn't going to just "take their word for it" that a contract exists between GWR and Avanti allowing GWR to keep Avanti's revenue. If they can't evidence standing, that head of claim falls.
You suggest the Debt Protocol is irrelevant. Even if we class this as a claim for
damages (breach of contract) rather than a debt, the Practice Direction – Pre-Action Conduct still applies. Paragraph 6 mandates that parties "exchange sufficient information" and "try to settle the issues without proceedings."
GWR has: a) Ignored specific requests for information (proof of standing). b) Ignored a reasonable settlement offer for months. c) Escalated to threatening criminal interviews for a civil dispute.
While a strike-out is unlikely (agreed), this conduct is highly relevant to costs.
I concede that "vanishingly unlikely" is a fair assessment regarding the OP getting
their costs paid. A full costs order against a claimant in Small Claims is very rare (requiring "unreasonable behaviour" under CPR 27.14(2)(g)).
However, the risk to GWR is failing to recover its own costs. If the OP makes a documented offer to pay the "actual loss" (e.g., £100), GWR refuses it, and the court later awards only £100, the Judge can refuse to award GWR their issue fees and hearing fees because the litigation was unnecessary.
That is the strategic goal here: to make the claim uneconomical for GWR to pursue by locking in a reasonable offer now.
Agree with this, I think it is similar to the likes of various civil recovery schemes that retailers use to try and claim money on their behalf (often with shady practices to extort as much money as possible) and as long as there is confirmation that they can act on behalf of other companies I can't see this argument holding up.
With regards to the losses, would anyone know whether previous court cases in relation to private parking and unfair charges have any relevance (Such as Parking Eye v Beavis). From what I can understand if the penalty was not disproportionate and for legitimate interests they may be able to argue for the amount. If that is the case GWR could say that if people only had to pay the difference when caught there would be no point enforcing it and so the conditions of travel allowing to charge the higher fare acts as a deterrence.
Parking Eye v Beavis is often the go-to case for companies justifying penalties, but there is a crucial distinction here. In
Parking Eye, the Supreme Court allowed the penalty because there was no other statutory framework to regulate parking conduct on private land.
In the rail industry, Parliament has provided specific statutory tools for deterrence and punishment: Penalty Fares and Criminal Prosecution (Byelaws/RoRA). These come with specific protections, time limits, and appeals processes. The argument here is that GWR cannot simply invent a new contractual penalty (retrospective Anytime Fares) to bypass the statutory limits they failed to use. They shouldn't get a 'second bite at the cherry' via contract law just because they missed the 6-month deadline for prosecution.
Here is the email I was sent:
The person my case has been forwarded to is a 'fraud manager' instead of revenue protection, which sounds ominous.
I have no intentions of attending an interview as I can't see a purpose except to get me to say something they can use. I will restate my points and see what they respond with.
Regarding the 'Fraud Manager' title: as
@z444z and
@MotCO hinted, this is administrative theatre.
@Watershed &
@z444z You are both right that getting a Small Claim struck out entirely for pre-action failures is rare. Courts prefer to deal with the substance of the dispute. However, cost sanctions are the real weapon here.
