Terrified passenger pulled along platform after train doors close on his ankle

[Bittern]

I've had the doors of a 318 close on me before. Luckily there was someone getting off behind me who pushed the door open button. Hurt like hell!

To this day I still have no idea why the doors closed.

 

[Greenback]

Only if the railway turns out to be majorly at fault. There is a tendency for people to go running to the media with a one sided story, but when the full facts emerge and the passenger is found to be at fault we rarely hear about it.

The words 'wheelchair', 'Pacer' and 'Guide Bridge' are subtle reminders of how some passengers behave.

Indeed! I meant if there had been a fault with the doors!

 

[Peter Mugridge]

Doors can snap shut quickly; I ended up outside a 319/1 at the bottom of the platform ramp in the tunnel at Barbican on an ex-Moorgate 319 once when the 319/1s were brand new. And I'd point out that the 321s and 319s are basically the same design; presumably they have the same door mechanisms?





For those who are wondering, the sequence of events at Barbican was: Press door button as soon as it lights up to exit at Barbican, step forwards; realise that doorway in question is in the tunnel ( not obvious from within the train owing to a combination of bright lights inside the carriage and particularly dirty windows ), doors close suddenly before I can move back in the carriage and pitch me out onto the bottom of the ramp. While landing, trouser leg snags on cable bracket on wall, ripping my brand new cords in the process.

The doors were open for probably two or three seconds in total, no more than that.

And for the record, BR did pay for the ripped trousers to be replaced.

 

[O L Leigh]

There is no way the driver could have gained interlock and taken power if the person had their ankle stuck between the doors. It's more likely that the guy's trouser leg got stuck which he should have been able to pull out from between the door rubbers with a bit of application.

Despatch at Rayleigh is done, I'm sure, by CCTV monitors. These aren't ideal because as soon as you move the train you lose sight of the screens so can't see what's going on down the side of the train.

In some respects there are echos of the incident at Huntingdon where a member of the public lost an arm. In that incident the DOO monitors gave an imperfect view along the side of the train so the driver could not see that the person had his jacket caught in the doors. One of the findings of the RAIB report was that it should have been possible for him to have pulled his jacket free but the pressure between the door rubbers on the Cl365 was higher than specified and the profile of the rubbers themselves created a clamp-like structure that gripped on to the garment, especially when compared to the door rubbers on a Cl317. Interestingly no-one pulled the passcom immediately in that incident either.

My own suspicion is that there is a degree of over-reporting of this incident and that it has become blown out of proportion somewhat. As well as the issue of interlock, in 30 seconds a Cl321 would be going way faster than anyone could run, let alone hop.

O L Leigh

 

[jon0844]

The alarm is quite hard to find on a 365, and of course doesn't automatically stop the train.

Huntingdon did result in clear stickers being put up with arrows to a, frankly stupid, location for an alarm and emergency door release.

I am sure the victim didn't have an entire ankle trapped and hop along. Much more likely clothing only, and possibly pulled free sooner.

Plus, I can't recall ever failing to hear the hustle alarm, bar newer stock where it only goes off if a door is actually opened.

Sent from my MB525 using Tapatalk

 

[O L Leigh]

No, but there are times when a driver is instructed not to use the passcom override, and that includes when pulling out of a platform precisely for this reason.

But that assumes that the passcom is operated in the first place.

O L Leigh

 

[185]

DOO = Deaths Often Operation

 

[B1GDAD]

321 stock on the line usally, sometimes 315 for very early trains and certain slots.
Yes CCTV dispatch by the driver on DOO.
AND NO WAY would an ankle be trapped and interlock obtained.
Trouser leg, maybe (long shot it would not just pull out as train moved, but possible)
Person could of got out at last second (hustle would of been sounding, does happen)
Once doors are shut and driver takes power he would have no way of seeing the full train length departing on a curve like Rayleigh
Over reporting by someone who as not got a clue! well!! i will leave it to you

 

[Gmac]

Im surprised door interlock was achieved

 

[MCR247]

It wouldn't have been with an ankle in the door

 

[Striker]

They don't even need an enquiry now. It's been solved on here within a day!

 

[MCR247]

Well, we do try

 

[hairyhandedfool]

I really don't think the story is the whole truth. There is too much information missing based on that account.

 

[jon0844]

No, but there are times when a driver is instructed not to use the passcom override, and that includes when pulling out of a platform precisely for this reason.

That's a good bit of info, as I did wonder if a driver would take an alarm more seriously at that time and for the very reason that the alarm might be about something like this, as against something happening WITHIN the train.

Not that I mean they wouldn't take things seriously after, but if an alarm went off during travel it would usually make more sense to slow gradually, or go to the next station (if someone is taken ill, for instance).

And, obviously once the train goes beyond the screens, a driver has no way to know what is happening.. but what could happen if a dispatcher saw it when the train was moving? How quick could they stop the train?

Although that situation is unlikely (as is the driver not noticing), there are times when a platform may have a lot of people waiting for a later train that could make it possible for a dispatcher, or driver, to assume people are standing clear and not see that someone has something caught up (e.g. a bit of a coat, or a bag strap). I should add that the doors of a Northern Line train were able to hold a heavy rucksack, which was dragged all the way along the platform and into the tunnel not so long ago (I saw it with my own eyes), so some doors aren't as sensitive as - say - the new Victoria line trains where a strand of hair seems to be sufficient.

But, in all the instances where I've seen things like this, it's ALWAYS due to someone jumping on or off at the last second, when the hustle alarm has gone off. Mind you, some rolling stock seems to do the hustle alarm AS the doors close, while others give 1-2 seconds before there's any movement. Some people could, perhaps, assume the alarm gives them a little bit of time still. For a safety thing like this, perhaps all trains should have to give the same warning/closing process. Not that I know how easy it would be to change this (if it requires new components, the cost would rule that idea out quite quickly!).

I am sure the official report will clear things up, and I agree that this story sounds like there's some misinformation.

 

[blacknight]

[/URL]

Unfortunately that isn't much of a defence. DOO or not, the full length of the train should be checked by Driver/Guard immediately before departure. The driver should leave the cab if necessary in DOO. I am surprised interlock was obtained with an ankle stuck in the door though. Though I am not familiar with the said units.

Just how is the driver expected to physically check rear of train then go forward to cab to close doors. Difficult to tell by CCTV alone whether person standing by doors is seeing off or is trapped in the doors, especially if interlock is obtained.
Going by rule book no DOO train in passenger service should ever move forward as driver can not for 100% be sure no person is trapped in doors, only make a judgement call based on instrumentation as stated previously once train moves forward driver can nolonger see platform mounted CCTV monitors.http://www.raib.gov.uk/publications/investigations_reports/reports_2007/report112007.cfm

 

[Aictos]

Think best to wait for the investigation and any CCTV evidence that might be available before passing comment on this one just so all the facts are out there.

I quite agree, otherwise it's just a one sided story that members here will be commenting on.

 

[PTF62]

In some respects there are echos of the incident at Huntingdon where a member of the public lost an arm. In that incident the DOO monitors gave an imperfect view along the side of the train so the driver could not see that the person had his jacket caught in the doors. One of the findings of the RAIB report was that it should have been possible for him to have pulled his jacket free but the pressure between the door rubbers on the Cl365 was higher than specified and the profile of the rubbers themselves created a clamp-like structure that gripped on to the garment, especially when compared to the door rubbers on a Cl317. Interestingly no-one pulled the passcom immediately in that incident either.

That report is very interesting to read, especially the causes of the accident and the recomendations - http://www.raib.gov.uk/cms_resources.cfm?file=/070430_R112007_Huntingdon2.pdf

The alarm is quite hard to find on a 365, and of course doesn't automatically stop the train.

Huntingdon did result in clear stickers being put up with arrows to a, frankly stupid, location for an alarm and emergency door release.

However FCC have now altered the alarms on the 365s by putting a plastic cover over them that must be ripped off before the alarm can be activated, with bold warnings on the cover about the penalty for misuse (there is a picture in page 36 of the RIAB report of what the alarms used to be like).

This can only result in a delay in someone activating the alarm in an emergency situation, and I am very surprised in the light of the RAIB report on the Huntingdon accident (see section 93 to 99) that FCC has been allowed to do this.

 

[jon0844]

The covers are a bit silly (and presumably fitted for another purpose - to stop people just pressing/pulling them) and FCC has fitted them to the 313s too. They're probably now on all of their trains actually.

When there was an incident that required someone to use it on a train I was on, the person who did so pulled the metal tab and it just came off (pulled through) - leaving the panel covered! Imagine having to take time to tear it off when the tab broke in an emergency!

 

[O L Leigh]

Just how is the driver expected to physically check rear of train then go forward to cab to close doors. Difficult to tell by CCTV alone whether person standing by doors is seeing off or is trapped in the doors, especially if interlock is obtained.

Well I always have one last look back just before taking power and like to see some daylight between the punters and the side of the train. Some locations give you a better view than others, but it should be possible by some combination of checking the monitors/mirrors and looking back to see that everything is A-OK before going.

Going by rule book no DOO train in passenger service should ever move forward as driver can not for 100% be sure no person is trapped in doors, only make a judgement call based on instrumentation as stated previously once train moves forward driver can nolonger see platform mounted CCTV monitors.http://www.raib.gov.uk/publications/investigations_reports/reports_2007/report112007.cfm

No, that's not true. You can be certain that no-one is trapped in the doors by looking and seeing. It isn't a judgement call at all. Some drivers might be guilty of waiting for the interlock light and then just going, but they ALL check back first before pressing Door Close to make sure that they are clear.

O L Leigh

 

[CarterUSM]

[/URL]

Just how is the driver expected to physically check rear of train then go forward to cab to close doors. Difficult to tell by CCTV alone whether person standing by doors is seeing off or is trapped in the doors, especially if interlock is obtained.
Going by rule book no DOO train in passenger service should ever move forward as driver can not for 100% be sure no person is trapped in doors, only make a judgement call based on instrumentation as stated previously once train moves forward driver can nolonger see platform mounted CCTV monitors.http://www.raib.gov.uk/publications/investigations_reports/reports_2007/report112007.cfm

No, it is quite easy to see that no one is trapped and the doors are all free from obstruction before departure by using one's eyes and perhaps DOO equipment situated at the location. "one final look"

 

[jon0844]

but they ALL check back first before pressing Door Close to make sure that they are clear.

What do you do when you stop on a platform where the doors open on the other side?

I've come off 313s where the driver has never come out to look at all - and just looked in the mirror on the right hand side of the train from the driver seat. Perhaps the mirror is fine, if you can see all through to the light at the end of the train - but at night, I'd question how effective looking in a mirror could be.

Does the WA route have many stations like that, with old-school mirrors?

 

[Broken Viking]

However FCC have now altered the alarms on the 365s by putting a plastic cover over them that must be ripped off before the alarm can be activated, with bold warnings on the cover about the penalty for misuse (there is a picture in page 36 of the RIAB report of what the alarms used to be like).

When there was an incident that required someone to use it on a train I was on, the person who did so pulled the metal tab and it just came off (pulled through) - leaving the panel covered! Imagine having to take time to tear it off when the tab broke in an emergency!

That isn't just silly, it's a blatant safety hazard...If a cover release tab can (And has been proven, by thy testimony) to be capable of failing like that, then how is a passenger supposed to stop the train in a genuine emergency when every second counts? hock::roll:

I presume that these are the type of alarms that resemble a large "emergency stop" button and the covers in question are perspex and directly over them, aren't they? (Don't think I've scratched any 365s yet, so can't speak from personal experience) If removal tab failures are a possibility as ye say (And every millisecond counts in an emergency) I think my default technique for operating them will now be to punch the cover as hard as possible - The intention being to completely smash through the cover and have my fist continue straight onto the alarm button.

In critical situations like that, I'm not going to bother wasting valuable seconds messing about with some time consuming "pull tab" procedure that belongs only on drinks cans...And if anyone from the RAIB happens to see this, I'd personally like to see such things outlawed with immediate effect.

Well I always have one last look back just before taking power and like to see some daylight between the punters and the side of the train.

Granted I've never been a driver and thus can't speak from experience...But is there anything stopping ye guys from throwing the droplight down and poking thy head out of the window to double-check the interlock aspect hasn't missed a bit of trapped clothing before releasing the parking brake?

I know that a window peek might seem a bit of an arduous process to do every time, but on a DOO service I would think that such a thing should be standard procedure no matter how rare clothing traps are. I've managed to get part of my shirt caught in the doors of a 450 before (Thankfully I was inside the train) despite the great care I exercise whenever using the railway, so it's quite possible that it happens more often than people realise...

 

[jon0844]

It's not perspex, but a rubbery like cover that has a hole at the top left with a metal 'ring pull' that should tear it off. Once torn off, you'd need to unscrew the cover and replace it with a new one. Once open, on a 365, there's a lever you pull down - but it pops back up straight away and there's no light or signal.

I've used one (when a fight broke out, which ultimately had the driver coming back and throwing them off himself!) and you don't really have any way to know it worked and if the driver has been alerted. It's a poor design for many reasons, and the cover has made it worse - even if there are big stickers pointing to where they are!

I think the door release has a clear perspex cover, but I am not 100% sure.

 

[hairyhandedfool]

....This can only result in a delay in someone activating the alarm in an emergency situation, and I am very surprised in the light of the RAIB report on the Huntingdon accident (see section 93 to 99) that FCC has been allowed to do this.

I don't know of the incident in question or the fitting on WAGN units, but the FCC 319s had them fitted by Thameslink/Southern, I was told a reason, but I can't think what it was, perhaps something to do with the way the perspex/glass, previously used, broke (or not) when needed.

 

[jon0844]

Before FCC put on the covers, the alarms were not protected at all - so I guess they were being set off by kids all the time (well, maybe not the 365 ones as you'd struggle to reach!).

I can't remember what the 319s were like.

 

[PTF62]

It's not perspex, but a rubbery like cover that has a hole at the top left with a metal 'ring pull' that should tear it off.

That is the problem -
- If you have found the alarm in its odd location,
- Not been put off by the dire warnings of penalties
- You then have to work out what to do to remove the cover.

Not ideal in an emergency. To quote from the Huntingdon incident report "Immediately following the point where P2 became trapped, there was considerable confusion within the train as to how to stop it in the emergency."

Once open, on a 365, there's a lever you pull down - but it pops back up straight away and there's no light or signal.

After a few seconds you get a recorded message telling you that the driver has been notified.

I think the door release has a clear perspex cover, but I am not 100% sure.

On the 365s they are a break 'glass' design, which are highly unlikely to be used in an emergency like this (what would you break the 'glass' over your head with?). Also according to the Huntingdon incident report, "The only sign in the vicinity of the incident door relating to the Emergency Door Release is found on the left-hand door leaf (D1). If this release had been activated the train would have stopped immediately; however, passengers are instructed not to use this release if the train is moving."

 

[Broken Viking]

On the 365s they are a break 'glass' design, which are highly unlikely to be used in an emergency like this (what would you break the 'glass' over your head with?). Also according to the Huntingdon incident report, "The only sign in the vicinity of the incident door relating to the Emergency Door Release is found on the left-hand door leaf (D1). If this release had been activated the train would have stopped immediately; however, passengers are instructed not to use this release if the train is moving."

Personally; If ever I was faced with a situation like that, the EDR is the first thing I'd be going for. Not only because it's guaranteed to stop the train (No interlock system is going to allow a train to carry on with an EDR deployed) but - More importantly - Because it'll release the doors in question right away, and with them the object trapped within.

And I agree, the fitting of glass covers to the EDR handles is foolish at best. In a situation like that in the OP I wouldn't hesitate to punch straight through it to gain access (A broken hand and a little bit of Blood is a price worth paying in that situation, no?) but most people wouldn't be able to get through it if they didn't happen to have a golf umbrella to hand, or didn't instinctively know the location of the nearest window hammer!

Personally, I detest a lot of the changes they've made to safety equipment that have been implemented only to save on abuse related delays. It's most interesting to note that - Because such things hit the TOCs shareholders right in the wallet - Every means possible is taken to reduce abuse related delays, including measures like those above which actually endanger the safety of the honest, fare-paying public! :mad:

I think this whole thread and the safety issues raised within clearly go to show my point: The safety of the travelling public comes first only if it doesn't decrease profits for shareholders. This of course doesn't apply to the majority of railway staff who work "on the ground" (And who do a Bloody good job at it!) but it's clear where the top priorities lie at the boardroom level...And it clearly isn't in passenger safety!

 

[PTF62]

Personally; If ever I was faced with a situation like that, the EDR is the first thing I'd be going for. Not only because it's guaranteed to stop the train (No interlock system is going to allow a train to carry on with an EDR deployed) but - More importantly - Because it'll release the doors in question right away, and with them the object trapped within.

I would now, but only because I now know from the RAIB report that the EDR will stop the train straight away (although as you point out it is common sense).

The problem that the RAIB report into the Huntingdon incident mentions is that although the EDR will stop the train straight away, passengers are instructed never to use it whilst the train is moving.

 

[ralphchadkirk]

The RAIB report also acknowledges that had the train stopped immediatly it probably would have stopped on top of the person.

 

[jon0844]

I didn't hear anything when I used the alarm, but I would say that most people would not bother to read the warning notice in a genuine emergency. They'd simply need to find the alarm and be able to pull it/push it (as appropriate).