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Carmont (near Stonehaven) derailment - 12 August 2020

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trebor79

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Ladbroke Grove and Great Heck were probably rather higher collision energy, being head-on collisions with moving trains, with one of them moving faster than at Carmont.
Mmmm, but there's a difference between a head on collision with an object that will be defected and deformed to some extent, and an object that will absorb very little energy through deformation and is rather less moveable.
Bit like when I had a 60mph head on crash in my car and was completely uninjured (as were the people in the other car). If I'd hit a tree I think I'd have fared far worse.
 
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gimmea50anyday

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Howver Polmont didn't involve an HST. It was DBSO leading a push/pull set of Coaches.
maybe so, but Polmont and Southall involved mk3 coaches and both also had a loco continuing to push from the rear
AAIB have a large hangar and other warehousing to store items at the very secure and private site, so a good place to take parts and vehicles for further investigation after removing from the scene.
indeed part of Pan Am 103 showing the explosive damage to the forward fuselage is still here and is used for training AAIB investigators
 

edwin_m

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Mmmm, but there's a difference between a head on collision with an object that will be defected and deformed to some extent, and an object that will absorb very little energy through deformation and is rather less moveable.
Bit like when I had a 60mph head on crash in my car and was completely uninjured (as were the people in the other car). If I'd hit a tree I think I'd have fared far worse.
That's entirely compatible with the collision energy being lower in this case, and illustrates how the collision energy probably has less influence on the outcome than sequence of events between the initiation and everything coming to rest does. Greyrigg for example was a greater collision energy but a less severe outcome than Carmont, which may have had as much to do with the fact no solid object was struck as with the supposed greater structural strength of Pendolinos over Mk3s.
 

najaB

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That's entirely compatible with the collision energy being lower in this case, and illustrates how the collision energy probably has less influence on the outcome than sequence of events between the initiation and everything coming to rest does.
That was the point I was raising - I suspect that this accident resulted in the cab detaching because there was a large torque applied to it, unlike a lot of other accidents which involved more head-on collisions.
 

trebor79

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indeed part of Pan Am 103 showing the explosive damage to the forward fuselage is still here and is used for training AAIB investigators
The rest of it is in a scrapyard in Lincolnshire. The owners son was stung by a newspaper flogging bits of it - eg cockpit instruments - a few years ago. Apparently it has to remain in storage as "evidence" due to ongoing civil legal cases in the States. No idea who foots the bill for that.
The AAIB report is very detailed on the sequence of the structural failure, similar to the forensic detail on the sequence of events in the Stonehaven derailment. It all helps to inform future design and practice to mitigate the effects of such events where possible.
 

Ken H

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So stones were washed onto the track by the huge amounts of water around. Any loose material will move when there is enough water about. Its what happened when the Ambleside - Keswick roads was closed by the storms winter 2019-2020. And I see it on roads near me whenever it rains hard. Usual way to stop that is to put in barriers across the possible watercourse to try and stop material moving downwards. Helps a bit...
 

swt_passenger

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So stones were washed onto the track by the huge amounts of water around. Any loose material will move when there is enough water about. Its what happened when the Ambleside - Keswick roads was closed by the storms winter 2019-2020. And I see it on roads near me whenever it rains hard. Usual way to stop that is to put in barriers across the possible watercourse to try and stop material moving downwards. Helps a bit...
In my own thinking, I suspect in the final analysis there’s also been a particularly susceptible section of “French drain” that was tending more towards the vertical, and with hindsight a poor design decision.
 
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YorkshireBear

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So stones were washed onto the track by the huge amounts of water around. Any loose material will move when there is enough water about. Its what happened when the Ambleside - Keswick roads was closed by the storms winter 2019-2020. And I see it on roads near me whenever it rains hard. Usual way to stop that is to put in barriers across the possible watercourse to try and stop material moving downwards. Helps a bit...
It was a piped system not a watercourse so unlikely to have been picked up.

Steep pipes like that always have risks due to the force created but there are so many considerations when deciding the type of drainage at a location so it's hard to comment based on what is known so far.

I think a focus on understanding sudden and torrential (dangerously torrential) rain and exactly where it impacts will be an important part of the recommendations.
 

Dave W

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The AAIB report is very detailed on the sequence of the structural failure, similar to the forensic detail on the sequence of events in the Stonehaven derailment. It all helps to inform future design and practice to mitigate the effects of such events where possible.

I suspect the investigation branches have always been co-operative but the relocation to Farnborough (the office is pretty nice, although if you're invited take your own lunch!) and various other machinations in the last few years (establishment of a Tri-branch Management Board with AAIB and M[arine]AIB) has probably strengthened that. They also went through a period of sharing resources and probably still do - there is (or was) an external comms specialist role encompassing all three branches which coincided with RAIB and certainly MAIB becoming rather better at communicating what they were up to. The AAIB had done "safety digests" for years but they only became a thing at RAIB in 2015-6ish. I visited on official business in 2015; I didn't go round the hangar but I was shown the broken bar coupling from the Northern Line runaway incident - after the investigation had concluded it had been stored.

I'm not at all surprised that AAIB are involved, particularly in light of the apparent violent nature of the derailment. Having read the report it seems, as always, that there are many factors involved. Several things had to unluckily align to cause such a catastrophe; a flick through the hundreds of accident reports on the Railways Archive would reveal Stonehaven, in that regard, is sadly not unique.
 

Taunton

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45 As the signaller was not aware of any obstruction on the line, railway rules did not require him to instruct the driver to travel at a speed slower than the maximum normally permitted. ... After passing over the crossover, the train’s speed increased and, as permitted by railway rules, the driver continued to accelerate the train towards 75 mph (121 km/h), the maximum permitted speed at the accident site.
One questions this approach. They had two landslips and two floodings nearby, with three trains pulled up in the nearby vicinity. All these events had by definition blocked the line since the previous train passed. Is it really appropriate for "railway rules" to allow another train, in the middle of all this, to be accelerated to maximum linespeed?

Meanwhile "old school" railway operating prevailed. The reversing train was to be crossed over at the signalbox, but because this did not have facing point locks it has to hang about for 2 hours (0718 to 0917) while the right person, with clamps, comes out from Aberdeen through the storm to fit them. How is it that pointwork on a main line, which handles non-passenger trains perfectly well, is felt unsafe if passengers are on board, even though it was then instructed to be traversed at a creeping pace anyway. Something wrong with priorities here, every concern that the points will fail, which is so extremely unlikely, but none for subsequent safety at speed in conditions where there had already been multiple washouts all around.

I recall also that old onetime accident reports used to have coverage of how long it took for services to be restored, often in hours. This one was a difficult situation to recover, but for it to have taken three months to restore rail services (12 August to 3 November), especially when the last vehicle was removed on 15 September, should surely invite comment as well. Yet there is none on this aspect.
 
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edwin_m

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One questions this approach. They had two landslips and two floodings nearby, with three trains pulled up in the nearby vicinity. All these events had by definition blocked the line since the previous train passed. Is it really appropriate for another train, in the middle of all this, to be accelerated to maximum linespeed?

Meanwhile "old school" railway operating prevailed. The reversing train was to be crossed over at the signalbox, but because this did not have facing point locks it has to hang about for 2 hours (0718 to 0917) while the right person, with clamps, comes out from Aberdeen through the storm to fit them. How is it that pointwork on a main line, which handles non-passenger trains perfectly well, is felt unsafe if passengers are on board, even though it was then instructed to be traversed at a creeping pace anyway. Something wrong with priorities here, every concern that the points will fail, which is so extremely unlikely, but none for subsequent safety at speed in conditions where there had already been multiple washouts all around.
Clip and scotch is a very longstanding rule, but in the "old school" the signaller would have been allowed to apply the clamps themselves.
 

Highlandspring

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Also AAIB have a large hangar and other warehousing to store items at the very secure and private site, so a good place to take parts and vehicles for further investigation after removing from the scene.

The vehicles involved are still at Springburn (the former Glasgow Works site) though I hear there is a plan to move them elsewhere - though still in Scotland - at some point. The RAIB had jurisdiction of them for examination for about 12 weeks but they’re now being retained as evidence for the police investigation and for the Fatal Accident Inquiry, whenever that will be.

They still are, if they have been shown how.

Yes, indeed.
 

scotraildriver

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Clip and scotch is a very longstanding rule, but in the "old school" the signaller would have been allowed to apply the clamps themselves.
Given that drivers who work in RETB areas are deemed competent in clamping and scotching I find it very odd that signallers aren't. It's a few hours course and doesn't require refreshers.
 

USRailFan

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Mmmm, but there's a difference between a head on collision with an object that will be defected and deformed to some extent, and an object that will absorb very little energy through deformation and is rather less moveable.
Bit like when I had a 60mph head on crash in my car and was completely uninjured (as were the people in the other car). If I'd hit a tree I think I'd have fared far worse.

Re Great Heck - wasn't the DVT completely shredded by the Class 66 - which was itself so damaged it had to be cut up on site (AFAIK it was the first Class 66 to be retired/scrapped)?
 

LAX54

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Given that drivers who work in RETB areas are deemed competent in clamping and scotching I find it very odd that signallers aren't. It's a few hours course and doesn't require refreshers.
Signalmen used to be able to do everything once upon a time, nip out kick wire runs, clip up points, nowadays it is rare for this to happen, back in the day, a Signalman could be asked to work any non block post level crossing, or be a piltoman for SLW, work AHB's / CCTV's all gone, done by MOM's and Contractors these days.
 

43096

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Re Great Heck - wasn't the DVT completely shredded by the Class 66 - which was itself so damaged it had to be cut up on site (AFAIK it was the first Class 66 to be retired/scrapped)?
The DVT was demolished at Great Heck, but 66521 wasn't cut on site, it was moved to Doncaster Works, then Leeds Midland Road and stripped for spares, before eventual disposal at Booth's in 2006.
 

najaB

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If that was the reason then it's even more concerning that a set weren't available in the signal box.
I've no idea if there was or was not. I was just pointing out that it wasn't necessarily an "new railway" thing about competencies and who can do what and rather could be something as simple as they couldn't find them.
 

30907

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One questions this approach. They had two landslips and two floodings nearby, with three trains pulled up in the nearby vicinity. All these events had by definition blocked the line since the previous train passed. Is it really appropriate for "railway rules" to allow another train, in the middle of all this, to be accelerated to maximum linespeed?
That looks to be one of the areas under further consideration.

The floodings you mention are not specially relevant - floods (on plain track, bridges are different) are not normally going to cause an accident.

It will be interesting to see if RAIB can come up with a workable recommendation. As NR hadn't assessed the cutting as a major risk, anything short of a blanket "50mph within N miles of a landslip after heavy rain" might not have mitigated the derailment, and a blanket restriction like that would be extreme. However, we must wait and see.
 
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edwin_m

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The floodings you mention are not specially relevant - floods (on plain track, bridges are different) are not normally going to cause an accident.
Floods can wash away the ballast and formation, making it unsafe for trains to proceed, and the damage may not be visible if the track is underwater. They are also inseparable from landslips, in that if there's a flood on the track there could well be excess water nearby bringing earth and stones down onto the track.
 

trebor79

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Floods can wash away the ballast and formation, making it unsafe for trains to proceed, and the damage may not be visible if the track is underwater. They are also inseparable from landslips, in that if there's a flood on the track there could well be excess water nearby bringing earth and stones down onto the track.
Indeed I remember many years ago travelling on XC HST to Bristol through torrential rain and flooding (would have been that year around the millennium that there was widespread flooding). We stopped at several points before proceeding at walking pace through sections that were flooded above rail level.
 

najaB

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Floods can wash away the ballast and formation, making it unsafe for trains to proceed, and the damage may not be visible if the track is underwater.
That's already taken care of by the rules - normal line speed doesn't apply if the rails aren't visible.
 

O L Leigh

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Meanwhile "old school" railway operating prevailed. The reversing train was to be crossed over at the signalbox, but because this did not have facing point locks it has to hang about for 2 hours (0718 to 0917) while the right person, with clamps, comes out from Aberdeen through the storm to fit them. How is it that pointwork on a main line, which handles non-passenger trains perfectly well, is felt unsafe if passengers are on board, even though it was then instructed to be traversed at a creeping pace anyway. Something wrong with priorities here, every concern that the points will fail, which is so extremely unlikely, but none for subsequent safety at speed in conditions where there had already been multiple washouts all around.

It's my understanding (and I'll happily be proved wrong) that it is not unusual for emergency crossovers at locations like Carmont not to have facing point locks (FPL), as it is often the case that when they are required to be used there will be a wait for someone to come out and secure them before any movement through them can be authorised. This would be required irrespective of the type of train, passenger or otherwise.

There is no great concern about the failure of the points, only a concern that they are secure as the lack of FPLs means that it is possible for a set of points to be "picked" and split which would cause a derailment. The lack of FPLs on emergency crossovers is not a safety issue for trains operating in the normal direction anyway, as these points will be trailing to traffic and the action of the train wheels would keep the blades in the correct position anyway.

As for the instructions relayed to the driver regarding permitted speed, it's easy to be critical in hindsight. The signaller had not been informed of any other line blockages between Carmont and Stonehaven, so there was no requirement to give a caution. I'm quite sure that the individual in question has been thinking "if only..." ever since this happened, but with no information how would he/she have known to have given such an instruction.

Besides, this is still an interim report and, therefore, does not yet give us the full story nor identify the lessons to be learned. Lets wait and see what the RAIB's final report has to say.
 

edwin_m

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That's already taken care of by the rules - normal line speed doesn't apply if the rails aren't visible.
Yes indeed, but I was thinking of the situation when a train at line speed encounters a flood that nobody knows about. That's probably nearly as dangerous as encountering a landslide nobody knows about, although potential flood locations are easier to predict.
It's my understanding (and I'll happily be proved wrong) that it is not unusual for emergency crossovers at locations like Carmont not to have facing point locks (FPL), as it is often the case that when they are required to be used there will be a wait for someone to come out and secure them before any movement through them can be authorised. This would be required irrespective of the type of train, passenger or otherwise.
It just seems to me that if there is such a crossover, the signallers should be trained to apply/remove the necessary equipment, which should be available in the box - especially somewhere like Carmont where even in normal weather it would take some time for assistance to arrive.

On occasion a train using an emergency crossover would have to regain the right line via another one. In that case would the MOM have to chase the train to that location if there was nobody else available to assist there, or would the pilotman in conjunction with single line working (not applicable to this incident) have the necessary competence and equipment?
 

Taunton

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I see also the various reports have a common thread that it's "all due to climate change", and it was "unprecedented rainfall". While it's undoubtedly true that the climate does change over time, positive and negative (we don't currently have the extreme cold winters of the 1940s, which certainly brought their own issues), there is a tendency to use this as a "not my fault then" excuse, or as a glib reason to increase budgets, rather than just one of the many things to be managed.

Regarding derailments in the immediate area due to washouts, the report itself describes another one which occurred there - in 1915. The 1878 Tay Bridge collapse was the "worst storm ever experienced".

I do believe that, far more than unmanageable climate change, the various issues of destaffing locally based PW gangs, outsourcing to remotely-based subcontractors, designing down to a much closer minimum tolerance, design work outsourced to the bottom bidder, etc, have the more significant part to play in such civil engineering failures happening. Anyone who thinks such earthworks collapses are some modern phenomenon has obviously never read The Railway Children.
 

bramling

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It's my understanding (and I'll happily be proved wrong) that it is not unusual for emergency crossovers at locations like Carmont not to have facing point locks (FPL), as it is often the case that when they are required to be used there will be a wait for someone to come out and secure them before any movement through them can be authorised. This would be required irrespective of the type of train, passenger or otherwise.

There is no great concern about the failure of the points, only a concern that they are secure as the lack of FPLs means that it is possible for a set of points to be "picked" and split which would cause a derailment. The lack of FPLs on emergency crossovers is not a safety issue for trains operating in the normal direction anyway, as these points will be trailing to traffic and the action of the train wheels would keep the blades in the correct position anyway.

As for the instructions relayed to the driver regarding permitted speed, it's easy to be critical in hindsight. The signaller had not been informed of any other line blockages between Carmont and Stonehaven, so there was no requirement to give a caution. I'm quite sure that the individual in question has been thinking "if only..." ever since this happened, but with no information how would he/she have known to have given such an instruction.

Besides, this is still an interim report and, therefore, does not yet give us the full story nor identify the lessons to be learned. Lets wait and see what the RAIB's final report has to say.

I 100% agree that it’s a procedural issue rather than anything which could even begin to be found wanting against the signaller. As you say, it’s a very difficult one to address - whilst on that very specific occasion and with the great benefit of hindsight there would clearly have been value in cautioning the train, in reality this is opening up the most almighty can of worms.

For me there has to be the assumption that the infrastructure is safe, come rain or shine.
 

Taunton

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For me there has to be the assumption that the infrastructure is safe, come rain or shine.
Even when there have already been four weather-caused line blockages and three trains stranded in the immediate vicinity?

We read the MOM took two hours to get from Aberdeen to Carmont due to the inclement weather. Do we believe they should actually have driven at full 70mph down the A92 dual carriageway through it all, until encountering any road washout?
 
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